In God We Trust
Ray Vallowe joined the United States Army on July 20, 1948, for a three-year enlistment. On November 9, 1948, he began occupation duty in Japan with the 1st Cavalry Division. When the 7th Division came back to Japan in late 1948 from duty in Korea, some troops from each of the Army divisions in the area were transferred into the 7th, including Vallowe, who was placed in the 31st Field Artillery Battalion, a 155 Howitzer unit. After two months in the 31st, he was transferred in August of 1949 to the 57th FAB. This unit was sent to Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, for cold weather training. They trained wearing snow shoes and cold weather gear, going on winter marches.
When the Korean War broke out, the 7th Division was depleted when hundreds of the men originally assigned to it went to Korea as fillers for the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions. The 57th FAB returned to the mainland of Japan and billeted near Yokohama in late July or early August of 1950. In the meantime, MacArthur had devised a "buddy system" plan to conscript South Korean civilians fresh out of the rice paddies of Korea, send them to Japan, and train them alongside the remaining troops in the 7th Division. Soon thereafter, the 57th was alerted that it would be needed for the Inchon Landing as a supporting unit for the 31st Infantry Regiment (then 31st RCT).
The Marines were in the first waves of the invasion, followed by elements of the 7th Division. After landing in Korea, the 31st moved south to Suwon and linked up with the 1st Cavalry Division. After the 38th parallel was retaken, the 7th Division was sent back to Pusan. After a short wait, the Army troops were loaded onto ships to make an amphibious landing in northern Korea. The Marines went ashore at Wonsan. The 7th Division landed 100 miles north at the port of Iwon, which put them almost parallel to the Chosin Reservoir. The 31st then went into reserve, while the 17th Infantry Regiment spearheaded the drive to the Yalu River, arriving there on the 21st of November. It was 40-45 miles north of the Chosin Reservoir. On November 24, 17th Infantry Regiment was ordered to the Chosin Reservoir, where the 31st was to meet the 5th Marines. Soldiers under Don Faith's command at the Fusen Reservoir were rerouted to Chosin.
The 57th FAB arrived at the Chosin Reservoir on the afternoon of November 27 and dug in for the night. That night, the Chinese hit them. There were 21 American tanks some four miles behind them, but the tanks pulled back to Hagaru on the 29th, leaving the 57th unprotected. Corporal Ray Vallowe was a member of Headquarters Battery of the 57th and had an MOS of .50 caliber machine gunner. His commanding officer was Ray Embree. On the 28th, Vallowe was wounded when a bullet made a clear shot through his arm. The cold weather helped to stop the bleeding and heal the wound. It would take four days before his unit could get out of Chinese entrapment.
On December 1 they were ordered to move out. Everybody had to make it on their own. The Chinese were strafing the convoy and there were no supplies. Most of the officers had been killed. Vallowe and others from the 57th crossed the frozen waters of the Chosin Reservoir, escaping to Hagaru-ri. There, medics discovered that he had severe frostbite to his fingers. He was shipped out of Korea via airplane from Hagaru-ri to Kyoto, Japan, and from there to an Air Force hospital on the main island of Japan. He spent the next several months recovering from severe frostbite.
Courtesy of President Truman, Vallowe's enlistment in the Army was extended one year. After returning to duty, he was reassigned to an engineering company in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. From September to December of 1951, he helped build and test pre-fab houses for the Army on Mt. Washington near Berlin, New Hampshire. He received an early out on May 1, 1952.
My reason for this research.... At the core of every drama is a conflict which makes it a drama. This research would never have been written without the special interest, dedication, and concern of my sons providing me with vital information they had obtained from the National Archives. That information, combined with many recent books on the Korean War written after 1980, peaked my interest and changed my frame of mind to write this accounting.
Before, I was content to let a repressed memory forever remain so, mostly because those early reports were so disgusting to me. The degradation of all the Army forces within those first six months of the Korean War in 1950 was totally unacceptable to me. Those first reports clashed with my own personal belief that something was desperately wrong and misleading in those reports, especially the first six months of this 'war'. However, there was really no way I could find the truth to refute the false statements known to be out there. Two of my sons living near the National Archives in Maryland had a heightened interest in the battle east of Chosin, and that inspired them to seek information in the Archives in 1991. They discovered a document listed as "Combat Reports of the 31st Regimental Combat Team." They thought the door had been opened to the battle at Chosin Reservoir, but were disappointed to read, "Due to the nature of the action, and the retrograde movements, all records have been lost." It seemed a lost cause and effort. They were indeed back to square one.
However, through thorough searching, they found in its place reports from some officers and men who took an active part in the action east of Chosin. With those reports were found some newly released, "declassified documents" concerning that retrograde movement. More importantly, there were also documents discussing Colonel MacLean's movement into the Chosin Reservoir area. While my sons were not sure of their importance, these documents established a time line for me as well as a dark mystery. This discovery changed my frame of mind to search out facts. As new books were written and hit the stores, newly-stated facts were beginning to unfold the mystery concerning those who had fought and died east of Chosin. Those 'declassified' documents about the Chosin campaign had been marked "Secret," and therein lies the mystery. I now had supportive material to challenge those earlier misleading reports and the continued degradation of the task force I served with at Chosin.
In my own research of various books written about the Korean War, I found new facts were being brought to the forefront about the "Forgotten War" that is so aptly named. But within those earlier reports were the reasons that it was forgotten. Many stories of the actions on the Army side were either fabricated or totally inaccurate. Those daily reports, lost during the battle for the Chosin Reservoir in late November and early December of 1950, explicitly told about the three battalions of Army units and how they were urgently re-deployed into that region. The lost reports have only recently come to light. Naturally, as more is written, more will become known.
The explosive political situation in South Korea proceeding this war and surrounding our nation's entry into this so called "Police Action" can explain why "some" of the National Archives records concerning our actions and movements into North Korea near the Manchurian border were classified and marked "Secret." However, they are now declassified and used here in my research. The mystery is, why did only this one document concerning one Army unit task force and its importance need to be marked "Secret?" Why only one of many concerning and designating a legitimate force into a "Phantom Force" is the real mystery. Why was it necessary to classify just this one? That question has bothered me and will consume much of this research.
One of the biggest dangers in any research is that one may uncover something one really did not expect to find while looking for a clue to a mystery. It can be a revelation which mentally brings one right back to a battle long over, and long repressed in one's memory. Such is the case here. My research has uncovered a mystery--a puzzle to be solved. As the pieces go into place, I find an overwhelming picture forming of embellished importance of historic and heroic actions of the 1st Marine Division.
It is each division's own business to create their own pieces from whatever source and build their own history as they review it. Such is the labor of their own historical division. Human nature, however, dictates a bias to that division history. I do not find fault with that in anyway, save one. That is of criticizing others within their midst who were trained differently then they. Or, because they were a smaller outfit, feel they can and did receive more in the way of individual leadership, material, and support. That criticism I do fault. And when it gets over zealous, and over exaggerated to the point of degrading the unit I served with and the friends I lost there, as well as exceeds that division's total loss in lives, it is hard to remain silent. This research is an attempt to correct those derogatory remarks and to replace them with some facts supported by the archive records and Marine history itself.
The most important distortion is that the Chosin Campaign was a sole Marine operation. That is a promulgated distortion of history that is far from factual. The truth will unfold in my research as we move forward towards that event in history. Too many Army men lost their lives in that battle east of Chosin to be ignored and hidden away in the National Archives for over 30 years. Why did that happen? What was the underlying reason to bury the information about troop movements into an area fully dominated by the 1st Marine Division? While the Marine contribution to the withdrawal from the Reservoir is well highlighted, the commitment of the smaller 7th Division Task Force MacLean is by design and intent withdrawn or withheld from historical accounts of the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Therein lies the mystery.
There exists a well-known reference between the two words "commitment and contribution." It can be compared to that well-known breakfast of "bacon and eggs." It has been stated that, "The pig supplying the bacon made a total commitment to that meal, while the chicken supplying the eggs made only a small contribution." Such is that relationship to the battles waged at Chosin on each side of the reservoir. The Marine force was on the west side. The smaller Army task force was on the east side.
The early evaluations of a combat action have historically been based on the contributions of the force that contributed the most men to it. In the case of the Chosin Reservoir campaign, that force was the 1st Marine Division. But X Corps military records for that time frame exist and list the death toll for those battles. They reveal that the true commitment and cost was given by the Army task force which was sent urgently into that area.
Similarly, the contributions of the lowly man in the trenches were rarely recognized. "While it is the hen that lays the eggs, the rooster is the one doing the most crowing" about their contributions at Chosin. No way is this better highlighted than in the awarding of so many Medal of Honor distinctions to higher ranking Marine officers at Chosin. That ratio is almost a 50% split between the man in the trenches. Early on, I dismissed these awards as none of my business. That changed in the 1990s when I heard a remark made by a Marine public information officer concerning an Army officer. His comments downgrading the importance of awarding LtCol. Don Faith the Medal of Honor posthumously (he stated that the medal was not deserved), caused me to research the award citations. What I discovered will be covered later.
Some neglect of the Army's contribution in the Chosin Reservoir can be justified. Its concealment from military history, however, cannot be justified. This neglect will forever remain a blot within our American military history. It is one military event that can never be restored to its proper place and time in military history. The outcome of the battles at Chosin Reservoir will remain the same, no matter what else my research reveals. What will change, however, are the true figures on the number of men involved in that action. That number will be increased by this accounting of the 7th Division personnel involved in the action east of Chosin, adding some 4,000 Army men who had tanks and artillery equipment in the area at the time. The change in Army numbers will change the events that produced the outcome and the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, as well as its entire battle dates between November 27-December 6.
I am not an expert on the battle that took place east of Chosin (due to lack of records, no one ever can be), nor am I mandated from the 7th Division to represent them. But I do have firsthand knowledge of what took place east of Chosin, because I was there when events took place. I am one of the few remaining survivors of the battle east of Chosin. At the time the battle was taking place, one event stretched rapidly and continuously into another event. These events tended to overlap, mesh together, and blur as they unfolded. As is the case with most combat veterans, some unpleasant memories were blocked out of my mind through time. Remembering combat is somewhat like experiencing and remembering pain. We can remember having it, but can never experience that same degree again. Consider the burning pain from a bullet. It feels much like a hot poker or a branding iron as it hits and burns, cutting its way through a muscular area of the body. Later, if one brushes against something that produces heat of a similar nature, such as leaning against or touching a hot water pipe, that instant pain stimulates memories of the bullet that hit long ago. But the memory is only a fleeting one. Thus nature protects us against painful memories. Some can handle them better than others.
So also, new facts can stimulate memory in small increments. The availability of the hidden Chosin records, now made public, may stimulate the memories of many of those men who fought in this "conflict" in North Korea, and may prove unpleasant and uncomfortable to them. I apologize in advance if this turns out to be the case for any of my readers. I understand, since I have also suffered some long, sleepless nights since the records were uncovered. My sleeplessness is not so much over the action involved or friends lost in combat. They are the things one suffers in combat. We all lose something, including our own youth and our own outlook on life itself. Each combatant has his own burden to carry. He, and he alone, knows the extent of that burden. While others may sympathize with you, no one can truly understand completely the change in you, for you truly cannot understand it fully yourself. You keep it to yourself, hidden within your own shell, but you are changed forever. Your mind pictures that friend lost in combat many times, and you wonder what life would have been like without your involvement in a war. Still you can do that and your buddy of days long gone cannot, for he has left the scene many, many years past. My own life revolved around events of that war. I met my wife to be from my hospital stay as I recovered from wounds received in Korea, and we have been married since 1952. That was an outcome of few regrets. But undoubtedly events would have taken a different path if I had not been wounded and hospitalized, for the plans I had formed before combat altered after that combat. Still there are irritants of losing a good close friend and best buddy within that combat. More so when you feel it could have been avoided by later events which strongly point in that direction.
What has mystified me these last forty plus years begins with the fact that so many of the books written concerning the action around Chosin Reservoir neglect the few facts which were available immediately following that action concerning the 7th Infantry Division personnel who fought at the Chosin. While the story and glory of the 1st Marine Division at Chosin is well known, that of the 7th Infantry Division is not. The 1st Marine Division history was written for distribution in 1957.
"The only history worth reading," John Ruskin points out in his Stones of Venice, "is that written at the time of which it treats, the history of what was done and seen, heard out of the mouths of the men who did and saw." Few men of Task Force MacLean-Faith recorded their memories of its history for the reason I just stated earlier in this segment of my research. That is sad, but totally understandable to me. Each man shared the same moments of misery as his comrades in arms, within the same hours of battle, and within the same region. Each saw and were involved in the same events. Each vividly remembers more of the outstanding events, particularly those that dealt with friendly fire from our own forces. While that happened, although thank God, sparingly, these were the outstanding events. When a hammer continually strikes an anvil over and over again, it is difficult to separate the individual blows and sounds emitting from that anvil or to also note which of those blows were the most severe to the ringing in your ears. Likewise, a constant barrage of shells, either incoming or outgoing, is of no special note. The friendly fire incidents were remembered because they were not supposed to happen, while in combat those from the enemy were the norm. Enemy rounds and friendly fire were easy to distinguish from one another, as the enemy did not have 105mm and dropped napalm lobbing in that fire.
This may seem like a weak excuse, but it is the only one I can offer. I cannot speak for all those within Task Force MacLean-Faith, but each man I have talked with about his experience at Chosin remembers that first hour of our withdrawal on the afternoon of December 1, 1950. It was one single event that is burned forever in their memory. The "friendly fire" that haunts our memories was an honest error. It was an air drop intended for the enemy, but that was not to be. It is a flaw in human nature to severely blame, and consider unforgivable, mistakes of our side which affect the lives of our forces. Yet, we all made huge mistakes on the battlefield. That includes those commanders who made monumental mistakes that originated in pride and arrogance of command--a deadly trait. Their tragic results were overlooked--in fact, they were often elevated to heroic and legendary stature. Some are revealed within the pages that follow.
One of the outstanding facts of the Korean War must be understood within the time frame of its first six months, between the battles of July 5 and December 31, 1950. There can be no comparison whatsoever to the next two and one half years of the fighting. As I state several times within this manuscript, a Declaration of a National Emergency regarding Korea was never issued or sought until December 16, 1950. That one fact alone proves the interest in this war, that it was not viewed as a war. A new precedent was established within our nation that there will be no intent in the coming decades to view a "police action," "conflict," "invasion," or any other involvement that might cost American lives, to be rated under a "National State of Emergency".
The Archive records are most revealing about Chosin Reservoir evasion of action dealing with the 7th Division forces. They shed new light on events at Chosin Reservoir. Combining them with sources and reports from other writers, they form a picture--a piece of the puzzle. But the biggest missing piece of this puzzle is still clouded in fog. I intend to blow some of that fog away so that the whole picture can be seen clearly. War itself is extremely ugly, and so are many fringe elements of it. Unfortunately, many of those elements were present at Chosin. I intend to explore them.
This accounting will also reveal the cost in human lives that has completely and totally been ignored by historians. In the Army sector of the Chosin Reservoir, the casualties of the action that took place there were officially listed not as "Killed in Action," but as "Missing in Action." Plain and simply, we were cut off, and our records were lost. As a result, the connection to this task force was severed completely . That is what makes this drama special. The records were pulled, and the men listed were merely marked "missing." They became "phantoms" who fought within the Chosin Reservoir area.
Between November 22, and December 10, all reports pertaining to Colonel MacLean's forces were marked "Secret." Only personnel with "Top Secret" clearance could view them. As a result, the public could not access them to review them to justify or verify our movement into the Chosin area. We became a combat force without any past. Instead, we became a "Phantom Force" without placement, free to roam the Chosin area. As ghost-like figures, we appeared in various places--in misty valleys and ridges. In the foggy areas we suddenly appeared. We were seen by authors on the west side of the reservoir, as well as the east side. We were seen in the middle of the reservoir also. Our spirits were active, but without form. From time to time, a few of us became visible, and mixed among others at Chosin. We were an individual task force without credentials or credibility on record to justify our existence or location. When all else failed, we were placed merely "somewhere east of the reservoir." But historians were never "too specific", and never placed this phantom force "too close" to the banks of the Chosin Reservoir. Instead, they claimed we "may have been" nearer to another reservoir called Fusen, some 20 air miles east of the Chosin Reservoir.
Only negative reports from Chosin placed us in force around that reservoir at all. We were "lost," and apparently authors and historians decided to adhere to the adage, "If you can't say anything nice; say nothing at all." We simply and plainly vanished from the pages of history as a result. Yet, the loss of our force was well known within Army circles. But where did we go? Did we just vanish with the swirling and blowing snow, carried adrift by air currents into the National Archives? For whatever reason, we were deliberately removed from that page in history.
So, what will be the significance of this revelation, and will it really change anything at all? Since we could not defend our position, nor prove by record that we were there east of Chosin (around either reservoir), the Marine command had carte blanche authority to grab all the coverage. Who would know the difference? Chosin became known as a "sole" Marine operation, and this claim could not be challenged by record from any of the survivors of Task Force MacLean-Faith.
The Marines fought valiantly at Chosin. But as this mystery is unraveled, it is possible that those who have heretofore received the full credit, might find themselves on the receiving end of the same kind of negative remarks that the Army veterans of the Chosin Reservoir have received through the years. That is not my intention with this research, but nevertheless, "Let the chips fall where they may."
The Army veterans of Chosin were degraded in various ways. We were those "Army Jokers who failed to bring their equipment out with them and did not erect tents at Hagaru." Our provisional brigade, formed to fight our way south out of the Reservoir merely "moved through the Marine lines when started, and thus to safety." And so it went, year after year, after year, until a full 30 years passed. Finally, classified reports once again saw the light of day when they were declassified and made open for public review in the 1990s. Unfortunately, by then time itself had eroded interest in the event. Those increased news reports expanded through these now 50 plus years verified over and over again the claim that only the Marines, "isolated and alone," fought their way out of Chosin, "even bringing some Army wounded with them." Within X Corps, only General Smith's Marines seemed able through individual integrity to "Keep their Honor Clean." Yet, one can not truly have honor without integrity. To take credit from others assisting you is one thing, but to degrade that action is entirely a dishonorable one.
In Korea, far too often the Navy and the Air Force were locked in the battle over air superiority. (Who really controlled that Korean air space on the American side?). The prime action to defeat the enemy, however, was neither at sea nor in the air, but on the ground. The Army had no air support of its own. The Navy role was primarily at sea. Its contribution on land was contrary to its 'perceived mission' of its own commitment to an ocean conflict. The Chinese Army had no naval vessels to create that battle. Thus the Navy was un-engaged as such. The Chinese Army likewise had no air power introduced in the Korean War of any great significance. That force was totally a ground force. Yet whatever destruction wrought by air or sea, from either or both Navy and Air Force, it did not shorten this war by one additional day. Neither of these forces significantly had any military influence on the Chinese Army. The Chinese naval presence was nil--almost non-existent--so their threat to our Navy was also nil. The major ports were never in great danger, the Chinese being smart enough to locate inland out of range of those big guns of the Big MO. There was no naval combat 'commitment' of that independent department other than of floating mine fields. Once cleared, they were of no future threat to them. The Navy's only land 'contribution' was directly through the Marine Corps--one division fully assigned inland, far beyond the reach of the big naval guns as well. Yet, that force, the Marines, were no better by any means in exceeding the affect by Army forces employed there. But by tradition the Navy could not accept that as their preconceived commitment as being anywhere within their own conceived military mission (the Marines along the shore line).
Still the Navy 'should' control the mission of the Marines. They do not consider themselves soldiers--only Marines; perceived to be "elite" in everything and every task assigned (except through numerous excuses and disclaimers in Korea of being so far inland, out of their element, etc). This was highly evident at Chosin. The Marine casualties were highlighted, and the Army casualties was merely numbers therein. It was an accepted fact that casualties were an expense of war. The less press records of their KIA numbers, the better off the Army would be in meeting future commitments.
In his book, The Masks of War, Carl Builder said, that though the "Air Force and the Navy can offer up versions of how they would prefer to fight, their versions are only preferences, not commitments." The Navy prefers naval battles. The Air Force prefers air combat. Their training efforts are continual. Not so the Army forces. As Builder outlines, "The Army has been handed something much more concrete around which it can define both means and ends. In the national commitment to use of force, the Army has been given specific assignments as to where it must fight--in West Germany, South Korea, and Berlin--three overseas assignments so clear and important that the nation has already made the extraordinary decision to fight even if its forces are not attacked. The Army, uniquely among the services, is tied to these national commitments by alliances and the physical presence of troops to use military force to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those nations."
As Carl Builder points out, "It is the soldier, that is tied to the national defense." He makes a powerful point. The Army of citizen soldiers has the commitment (more than a mere contribution) to fight the battles assigned to them. As such, the Army is never given credit, nor does it seek it, for those commitments set by our government. The importance of Korea is that it was a national commitment, not a sole Army one. President Truman called upon MacArthur to commit his forces into a ground "conflict." (Those of us who were there called it a "war," not a "conflict.").
There were two major American obstacles in the first days of that commitment. No planes or ships were ready or available to move the troops into Korea, simply because MacArthur had no direct control over those transporting units. Had the Army Air Corps still been in existence, that would not have been a major problem. But post-World War II "unification" of the military branches had changed that. As Carl Builder continued, "For the Army, war will always be on terms chosen by others--partly by the nation's enemies, partly by the nation's leadership--terms that are never satisfactory or welcome, but always to be met with a sense of duty, honor, and courage. The Army is the nation's most loyal and obedient servant."
As it must be, the Army is never "elite" in its own mind, for it knows not its next mission assignment. The occupation forces in Japan were severely criticized for not being fully prepared for Korea, but that was not its assigned mission. Each new mission may be given without proper time to prepare. Pearl Harbor is a great example. Had the Japanese waited until Monday morning instead of attacking the fleet on Sunday (our traditional day of rest), the battle might have been different in plane losses to them. Who knows for sure? Likewise, had we been relieved of occupation duty earlier in Japan, our overall effectiveness would or could have been better. Hindsight 20/20 once again.
As the Second World War ended in the Pacific, new problems for occupation duty and the acceptance of prisoners of war and their surrender were being reviewed in Washington. America sought to establish a surrender line as far north in Korea as the Soviets would accept. However, due to the fact that the Soviet army could move quickly into Korea, there was little that America could do. The nearest American forces were on Okinawa some 600 miles distant from Korea (Policy and Direction, 9). The 38th Parallel seemed the best choice, although Admiral M. B. Gardner suggested moving this line further north to the 39th Parallel. That line included Dairen within the Liaotung Peninsula. All agreed that Korea was more important than Dairen. Either way, America would be hard pressed to beat the Russians to any position in Korea.
Between August 11-14, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that he had three priorities for his occupation forces. Japan was the first; Korea was the second; and China was the third. Shortly before August 15, 1945, General Order #1 was sent to General MacArthur. It directed that he furnish a time table for the occupation of a port in Korea. This General Order stated that all Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel would surrender to the Russian commander. Those south of the parallel would surrender to the United States Military Expeditionary forces. While Washington waited for a reaction to this General Order from Moscow, it was planned that if the Russians failed to accept the proposal of this General Order, the plan would then be modified and changed for our forces to occupy the port of Pusan. However, Russian forces had already entered Korea three days before.
Premier Josef V. Stalin replied to President Truman on August 16, 1945. He had very little to say concerning the 38th Parallel. His main concern was to correct and authorize Russian forces to accept the surrender of Japanese in the northern half of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, thus dividing that island and placing Russian forces in Japan. Truman would not agree to that, so Stalin informed the President that the Liaotung Peninsula included Dairen and Port Arthur and were located within the USSR military zone. That zone was directly across the Yellow Sea at the mouth of the Korean bay which lies directly across the North Korean capitol. "President Truman parried Stalin's proposal to place Russian forces on Hokkaido, Stalin's message settled the surrender zones in Korea, and canceled American plans to land troops at Darien." (Policy and Direction, 11)
Thus the creation of this zone--the 38th Parallel--became the dividing line in Korea, cutting more than 75 streams and 12 rivers, 104 country roads, and six north to south railroad lines. American zone south covered some 37,000 square miles. There were 12 principal cities of 20 principal cities on the Korean peninsula within the American zone. The barrier zone created serious adverse conditions in both zones. The North and South were mutually dependent on each other. The hydroelectric plants in the north had to supply the southern regions as well. This created a natural irritant to the South, as power was continually cut off from the southern regions at will. It was a prelude to an upcoming conflict.
General MacArthur designated the XXIV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, to occupy and administer South Korea on behalf of the United States. General Hodge appointed Major General Archibald V. Arnold, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, as head of the United Occupation Force, Military Government of South Korea, on 12 September 1945.
The Soviets sent forces into Korea with definite objectives. They sealed their zone, and stopped inter-zone communications and transportation. They set up road blocks with machinegun emplacements, yet some 5,000 to 6,000 refugees from North Korea poured into the American zone within the first few months. Communist-inspired riots throughout the southern area marked the close of the first year of the American occupation. In the fall of 1946, General Hodge was forced to declare martial law. Within this year, the three regiments of the 7th Division were on line. The 17th and the 32nd were sent to their areas of responsibility, the 32nd being sent to the 38th Parallel as the border guard regiment. Shortly thereafter, the "Iron Curtain" dropped in Korea. The border became an armed zone. The 17th Regiment was sent into the area south of Seoul, their area being quite large. The 184th Regiment was stationed in and around Seoul, the Capitol City of South Korea. In January of 1946, the 31st Regiment was reactivated and joined the 7th Division, replacing the 184th Regiment, which returned to the California National Guard. (Division Book 98).
The 7th Division's mission was variable. It assisted the Military Government in its occupation duties wherever possible. It guarded the 38th Parallel to prevent unauthorized North Koreans and Russian personnel from crossing the parallel. It protected refugees from North Korea. It trained the division for combat duty. And, unconsciously, its troops performed individually in the role of American ambassadors to the Orient. The engineers rebuilt and expanded roads and bridges, establishing fresh water basins. Health and sanitation was updated to minimize common disease. A small military defense force for South Korean was created. Later, it proved to be even too small to ward off any impending invasion from the north. The biggest contribution of the American occupation to the Korean people would be that, for the first time in forty years, freedom of thought, action, and speech was theirs.
On June 30, 1949, the last tactical occupation forces left Korea. The countdown to an invasion and a new war had begun. D-Day was now only 360 days away, and the clock was ticking.
"War is not a question of valor, but a question of money. It is not regulated by the laws of honor, but by the laws of trade....against representative governments who can throw the most projectiles. Who can afford the most iron or lead." - Congressman Roscoe Conkling, NY 1862
One of the sad facts about the Korean War, concerning the reports over the "quality" of the American occupation forces committed to action the first six months in particular, was what was expected from these troops. These early forces had to meet and do battle with a North Korean Army that had some four or more years of planned offensive for the invasion of South Korea on their own time table and at the place of their selection. First, one must obtain some kind of a perspective of what training our American forces had and the equipment they had to work with at the time. Next, the urgent need to throw these men into combat without being a full and complete combat team must also be placed in perspective. On the eve of the North Korean invasion, the Eighth Army in Japan under the command of General Walton "Bulldog" Walker had about 93 percent of its authorized strength. Each division had an authorized strength of 12,500 men, and none of these divisions were even up to their peace time strength. (Policy & Direction, 54)
Each division was short of its war strength by nearly 7,000 men, 1,500 rifles, and 100 ninety millimeter anti-tank guns. Three rifle battalions, six heavy tank companies, three 105mm field artillery batteries, and three anti-aircraft batteries were missing from each division. In terms of battle potential, each infantry division could lay down only 62 percent of their infantry firepower, 69 percent of their anti-aircraft artillery firepower and only 14 percent of their tank firepower. Add to this the continuous turnover of personnel which amounted to 43 percent annually in the Far East Command (FEC). Between 1945 and 1949, the main duty of this personnel was that of occupation duty focusing on discipline, courtesy, and conduct. In April of 1949, MacArthur directed and ordered all divisions to complete Regimental Combat Team (RCT) field exercises. The time tables he set in order for minimum proficiency level to be maintained were: (1) company (battery) level - by December 15, 1949, (2) battalion (squadron or task force) level by 15 May 1950, and (3) regimental (group or task force) level by 31 July 1950, - Unfortunately, the 15 May date was all the time frame we had before the war broke out. At the regimental level --sorry, it was too late. The battle was already underway. (4) Division (air force or task force) level proficiency was to be reached by 31 December 1950, and (5) combined and joint operations training was to include amphibious exercises concurrently with RCT and division level training. The latter would be folded into the 7th Division's urgent amphibious training for Inchon as well.
Still, there were other problems, including space to train. An area in the vicinity of Mount Fugi was acquired to accommodate limited division exercises over rugged terrain. Each and very other area was exploited to its maximum use. The 1st Cavalry Division was around Tokyo, in maximum use of its training sites. The 7th Cavalry Regiment (I was with "B" Troop at the time) was 1ocated at Camp Drake. We completed our battalion training before completing basic individual training in order to use that division's lone training area. However, the 1st Cavalry Division was rated the most effective on the eve of the Korean invasion. Its proficiency score was 84%. On an average, these troops were several years younger then their counterparts of World War II, and had only "very basic" basic training of only eight week before being sent to overseas assignments. These deficiencies were not the fault of the men in the lower ranks, nor necessarily those of the training officers or the non-commissioned officers. They did what was required of them with the orders passed down to them. America was too eager to roll back the budget to support its occupation forces. The tug of war between occupying and rebuilding a top notch fighting force did not seem that important. After all, we were a "super power," and no one in their right mind would dare challenge us.
But the Russians would--with the A-bomb. In late 1949, their tests were known. They had the 'bomb" as well, and our government thought that we had better respond by changing from a peacetime Army back into a war trained force--overnight. Hence the urgency in the Far East to build. But there was nothing to build with.
MacArthur's Eighth Army "combat" forces on June 25, 1950, consisted of four under strength infantry divisions and seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions in Japan, one infantry regiment, and two anti-aircraft battalions on Okinawa. He restated that his mission required at least five full-strength infantry divisions, 23 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, and one separate RCT with previous full wartime strength. The low enlistment rate and budget limitations forced reorganization of all units, and in reality shifted numbers. The new table of reference was now 100% efficiency among 12,500 men. For example, if we refer to a division as 93% effective, the 12,500 x 93% is equa1 to a 11,625 man force, short 925 men--each in a full division. Thus the burden fell on the cadre to concentrate on smaller forces (task forces) to get the same job done that had been accomplished by larger forces of World War 2.
These cadre did one hell’va job with what they had to work with. Most of those cadre trainers would pay the price of their own lives, lost in the first six months of the Korean War. At Chosin, some 160 cadre men ranked as sergeants gave their lives in the span of five days. For anyone to degrade their effort is unconscionable, uninformed, and entirely insensitive to the problems that existed within that time frame. Training was needed, but in a country as densely populated as Japan, training areas were hard to come by. Large training areas were at a premium, encroaching into the farming areas adjacent to the area of training. As a result, troops were restricted in their training to very small posts of regimental size. Divisions could not be concentrated and trained together. Road network restricted heavy tank movements. As such, those heavy tanks sat in storage. The ratio of non-combat personnel in the Far East was excessive. This stemmed from the past war years, as it does today, to make the Army an attractive career by leaving the choice of arms or service largely to the individual. The combat arm, and especially the infantry, failed to attract sufficient men to keep the infantry forces on a par with other arms and branches. Many enlistees went directly to service schools, which reduced the infantry force further. (Policy & Direction, 54)
This was a mission to refurbish and rebuild Eighth Army infantry division equipment at minimum cost. It was planned that the project would be completed by June 30, 1950. On the date of the North Korean invasion, thousands of pieces of these refurbished and rebuilt military vehicles were available that would not have been otherwise. In reality, the Far East Command had received no new vehicles, tanks, or other equipment since World War II. When one criticizes the force east of Chosin for not bringing out their equipment with them, this is the equipment in reference. I repeat again: "America, you got off cheap within the first six months of this war, with very low cost in equipment and manpower replacement."
On the June 25, 1950 date of the North Korean invasion, an estimated 80 percent of the Army's 60-day reserve of armament equipment was unserviceable. Almost 90 percent of the armament equipment and 75 percent of the automotive equipment was issued to the combat divisions on that date, rebuilt by the Roll-Up program. Units deactivated after World War II within the command had turned over large quantities of this abandoned equipment, but most of it was not serviceable. Eighth Army was authorized 226 recoilless rifles, but it only had 21. Of 18,000 1/4 ton trucks, only 10,000 were serviceable, and of 13,780 two and1/2 ton trucks, only 4,441 were in running condition. Total ammunition supply was 45 days, and much of that was over 5 years old. Plus, there was the same number of days for perishable food and canned supplies. I personally had a can of food in Korea that had been canned in 1943. There were 180 days worth of packaged petroleum supplies, and 75 days as bulk supply (in refinery or underground storage tanks or other holding tanks not prepackaged for individual units as 55 gallon barrels or Gerry cans, etc., with only a 15-day supply being distributed to individual divisional units.
Such was the American commitment to its armed services on the eve of commitment into combat. Those who seek to degrade these occupation troops have been severely mislead if they think that these troops were leading the "good life." They have been incorrectly compared to the ease of life that the reporters had enjoyed back in the states during the five years after the last war. As I will state again and again in this and following chapters, I believe that the American people got more than their money’s worth out of the "occupation forces" who were subsequently engaged in the first six months of the war. They had reached the Yalu River (7th Division) at two points, looking into Manchuria, They had destroyed the North Korean Army. They had been driven back below the 38th Parallel, and fought and returned there. All this was done on a budget, and all with World War II rebuilt equipment. What more could one ask of them?
In May of 1950 one. month before the North Korean invasion our forces were at or near the task set by MacArthur (level 2) battalion strength level, (squadron or task force) which explains the numerous uses of the many task forces created in Korea. 0n July 14, 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division was preparing for an amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea ( All units in Japan had served as amphibious units during World War II) in order to show some semblance of effective fighting strength, MacArthur stripped the 7th Division of trained officers and men, leaving the 7th Division, a skeleton or crust that was temporarily useless for combat. (Policy & Direction, 85)As to his other forces; General Walton Walker of Eighth Army would report concerning his 24th Division-first in combat-"With only two battalions in each regiment, American forces in Korea could not employ normal tactical maneuvers based on the full firepower and the flexibility of triangular organization, nor can we guarantee flank protection. (Policy & Direction, 89).
The latter concerning flank protection was important in this respect, the number of the missing in action forces came mainly from the inability to defend ones flank position, allowing the enemy to breach your sides and rear guard. As of this date -50 years later-there are still ever 8,000 men missing in action. The official decree, "Died of Wounds while missing in action."
0n July 23rd, Army officials in Washington asked MacArthur to recheck his figures on casualties. Perhaps, just perhaps, the actual casualty rate was lower then the number forecast. It was reported back to Washington that the actual number of men and officers lost in Korea closely approximated the earlier educated guess. (That did not seem to make any big difference in replacements.) The only discrepancy was the excessive missing-in-action rate, which reflected the ability of the enemy to envelop the under-strength American units almost at will. General William Dean, commander of the 24th Division, commented that his troops could not stop the enemy tanks. The World War II-era 2.36 inch rocket launcher (bazooka) was wholly inadequate, and proved dangerously disappointing against the heavily-armored Russian tanks.
MacArthur continued to request replacement and filler units, He requested over 200 company-sized units from Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Transportation, and other technical services. This requisition would require 43,472 men and officers, but there were only 150 such units in the United States. While he was seeking more forces, the 24th Division faced nine North Korean divisions with more than 80,000 men, as well as a total of 120 to 150 modern tanks. Still, as above, this North Korean force would be destroyed by American forces prior to the entry of the Chinese armies in November of 1950.
MacArthur’s piecemeal commitment of inadequate American forces that were weak in manpower, mobility, and reserves against a determined and numerically superior enemy constituted a basic violation of military doctrine. The under-trained Koreans in the south could not hold the line, so the need for American forces could not be avoided. The consequences had to be taken until reinforcements arrived. As he stated, little did he realize that they would never be provided in an adequate number. The occupation forces on line were extended for one full year, and recycled as needed on the firing line. MacArthur also had to rely on returning men to duty and combat who had been casualties. After they recovered from their wounds in the FEC hospitals, they were returned to front line duty. On August 4, they numbered 30% of the casualties received on the same day. Thus these early line forces were expendable, destined to hit the casualty charts as repeated numbers on the "wounded in action" column. Replacements of any sort only came over time as they become available through the draft, and from National Guard and Federal Reserve units.
After the opening shots were fired by the American Task Force Smith on July 5, 1950, the United States commenced its involvement--but not its entire will--in the Korean War. By July 22, after a 17-day battle against two superior North Korean divisions on their own time table of invasion, the American 24th Infantry Division had pulled back almost 100 miles. It had also lost more than 2,400 men missing-in-action, and enough material to equip an entire division. Their death rate was consistent at 31.5%, a rate that would hold steady throughout the war for this division. Their own commanding officer of the division, Major General William Dean, would be separated from his forces and captured during this withdrawal. Much was asked and requested of this division of occupation-trained forces. Indeed, much was given by these forces in cost of their own lives on this early field of battle. A sad note in history, however, is that more count was kept on the tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, and other equipment lost than on the men that fought around and used that equipment.
General MacArthur chose the 24th Division because its location was the closest to Korea. Therefore, it could be deployed faster--a concept that I detail in depth later in this writing, "using forces already in place." This division on the last day of May 1950 was reported as being the lowest in combat effectiveness of all major units in Japan. The list:
Keep firmly in mind that no one at any time had ever made any claim or boast that any of these units were at any time 100% effective. Within the first six months, these divisions were going to be eroded by whatever combat effectiveness they had on the eve of the Korean invasion. They were a prime target, not only for the North Korean Army. Additionally, they were highly susceptible to press criticism (sniping from the rear) because they were not performing at that 100% rate. Expecting a 62% force to operate at 100% efficiency? Come on. Get real. Only if 100% was operating at 62% would one have justification to bitch.
Replacements were slow to arrive. By August 5, most surface shipping space was filled by units and equipment. Airlift brought in about 340 replacements each day, but this was far from adequate to build beyond the daily casualty rate just to break even. Losses by August 5th totaled 7,858, with replacements only at 7,711. Furthermore, not all of these were immediately sent to Korea. As General Walker was steadily being pushed back towards the port of Pusan, he stopped and established his "Stand or Die" line, otherwise known as the Pusan Perimeter. He now had on line the 25th Division and the incoming 1st Cavalry Division.
At the Pusan Perimeter, General Walker tried to stabilize his battle lines in a defensive posture. Meanwhile, he was still responsible for the 7th Division in procuring training and new replacements of this division still in Japan. General Walker was ever busy rushing his Eighth Army forces back and forth to fill gaps breached by the enemy. His forces were battle weary with little immediate hope of any relief. MacArthur’s plans earlier for the 1st Cavalry and the 5th Marine Brigade for an amphibious landing above and behind the Pusan Perimeter were aborted due to logistical necessity. He had to commit both units to the perimeter to maintain the port of Pusan for receiving shipping cargo of much-needed war materials.
The interval between June 25 and September 15, 1950 left only one division in Japan--the 7th Infantry Division. Located at various camps spread between the northern regions of the main island of Honshu, and the upper island of Hokkaido, the division was severely disorganized from its May rating of 74%, most likely under 50%. It was gutted of its cadre of non-commissioned officers and specialists, and then described as, "a three-ring circus," "a revolving door," "one hell’va mess," "a crust without filling," and "a skeleton of a military organization." In short, it was considered to be a "lousy division." After depleting the division, it stood at one-half of its pre-Korean invasion strength, with only 574 officers and 8,200 enlisted men (of which I was one). Many of these enlisted men had little if any unit training. Warm bodies were the main concern. Many of the technical staff and experienced non-commissioned officers had not been replaced.
On July 29, General Walker appealed to MacArthur for the 7th Division's 32nd Infantry Regiment to be flown into his perimeter. MacArthur denied that request, stating that it would "completely emasculate pre-set plans for the entire division, which was being reconstructed and will move to Korea possibly in late September."
MacArthur assisted on rebuilding the division by moving 1,600 men from Okinawa, these men intended for a third battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment. He diverted to the division an automatic Anti-Aircraft Artillery unit (15th AAA-AW), this unit apparently a replacement for the division's own 29th AAA-AW Battery A. That battery had been deactivated while the division was serving in Korea on occupation duty (after its reactivation on April 20, 1948). This later unit attached proved of prime value at the Chosin Reservoir, saving many, many lives there. Its twin 40mm guns and quad 50s were responsible for many who are alive today. Without this unit, disaster would have been total.
MacArthur assigned two companies of Combat Engineers, and requested an urgent need for three infantry battalion cadre destined for the division to be sent without delay. He requested that General Walker now return to the division those specialists "loaned" him. Walker felt it would be impossible to withdraw anyone from his front line perimeter. MacArthur compiled a needs list of specialists he could not find within his command. He requested the Department of the Army quickly scout out experienced non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the many who served in World War II. He ordered 30% of ‘all’ replacements before September 10 to be diverted into the 7th Division. He had already completely exhausted all other sources of replacements. Still, that would in no way bring the 7th Division up to any reasonable wartime strength in numbers. What to do?
General MacArthur conceived a new plan for replacements. South Korea might be asked to provide soldiers for American units. He would attach more than 8,000 to the 7th Division. On August 11, MacArthur directed General Walker to procure, screen, and ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7th Division, able-bodied male South Koreans. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government cooperated, and on the 17th of August, about 7.000 Koreans were shipped out of Pusan. "They were right out of the rice paddies... and had nothing but shorts and straw hats. It was ‘understood’ that they had physical examinations, were inoculated and had some kind of papers." These men were briefly trained--somewhere--and then "attached" to the 7th Division. They were officially outfitted with American fatigues, M-1 rifles, and back packs. For every intent and purpose, they were with the 7th Division. By August 7, the 7th Division began amphibious training--without the ROKs. Admiral Turner Joy had already conferred before embarkation with General David Barr, the division commander, as to our amphibious objectives.
Preparations for all of the above problems was further compounded by the required relocation of the division into camps just vacated by the 1st Cavalry Division. Those of us from Hokkaido were moved closer to the port of Yokohama for embarkation. The problems were many, and then on top of them we had ROKs added to every unit. Still, as I restate throughout this book, the "Hourglass" Division worked the problems through as best they could. Later, much more would also be required of these men in the 7th Division.
Still unknown and yet to materialize at Chosin, there was an unexpected problem--an added obstacle--one which required still more of this mixed force of Americans and South Koreans attached to our division, each one accounted for on our morning reports and rosters and assigned to units, sections, and squads. My section was the work detail section of Headquarters Battery-wire section. It had the responsibility for all wire communications lines between forward infantry regiments and the rear Fire Direction Center (FDC). Our duty was to distribute and lay lines forward either by roadside or overhead lines or both. We were also to operate and maintain switchboards and phones between the forward observers position. Wherever the command post was, we were to be there as well, linked to that unit. We were to be road runners between forward units. But more importantly, our section was rounded out with ROK "buddies" from MacArthur’s Buddy System. They were South Koreans who spoke very little, if any, English.
Consider the individual ROK position. He had been grabbed off of the streets in South Korea and shipped to Japan to be integrated with American forces. These forces were, for the most part immediately resented and ignored. Any details assigned to them kept them in their own groups. Because of the language barrier, it was more difficult for them because we completely ignored them. As far as combat was concerned, most of them stayed put. We do not know what the interpreter told them to do when the battles started. I was sure that our side would not want them roaming around our perimeter in the heat of battle. There was an underlying reason for that. We had been told about the North Koreans infiltrating our lines wearing American uniforms obtained from captured or killed American soldiers. Just having these ROKs in our area wearing our uniforms made us jittery.
In the Task Force MacLean-Faith area at Chosin, it was a highly confused situation. In the consolidated perimeter we were forced to defend, all of the battalions were mixed together. Artillery men were also required to become infantry men. The howitzers were of no long-range use except for direct fire, their barrels being pointed downward instead of skyward, sight more down the barrel. This was a strange and weird war. The NKPA committed atrocities against our forces in South Korea, yet in the north--in their home territory--the North Korean people did not seem to really resent us. Indeed, many favored us over the Chinese, as evident by some 90,000 or more evacuated from Hungnam for South Korea.
The American soldiers could not get their minds straight concerning the South Koreans who served with us, as it was rumored and later a proven fact, that General Dean, a past 7th Division commander, had been betrayed by the South Koreans who turned him over to the NKPA, and that was in South Korea. We got better cooperation in North Korea from their people while we were in reality their enemy. I personally believed that the forces on line were more at ease with the ROKs staying in place keeping a low profile, not moving around the perimeter firing their weapons at God knows what.
A classic line from the movie "Cool hand Luke" would fit like a glove here between the ROKs and American forces. "What we have here is a failure to communicate." Years after the Korean War, the ROKs fought in Vietnam, but there they were a separate fighting unit with their own commander. Their battle record in Vietnam proves that, as a unit, the ROKs were not cowards. In Korea, the situation was entirely different. Unlike, for example, Colonel Drysdale's 41st British Commandos who were OPCON or attached to the 1st Marine Division as a unit during the Korean War, the ROKs were not joined to the division as separate units with their own commander. Instead, they were integrated into the 7th Division to fill vacancies for American wiremen, radiomen, or riflemen needed on the line. They wore the 7th Division uniform and were entitled to wear the division patch for identification. To reach them by mail if they were attached to my unit (57th FAB), their mailing address was the same as mine: 57th FAB, Unit Four, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, CA, APO 7. They were placed in a squad or section as if they were an American individual, without regard to any connection to their own government. They were on our daily roster.
Thus, when one speaks of 2,800 men in Task Force Faith, the ROKs are automatically included. They were listed as attached to the 7th Division, and like it or not, their casualties were also our casualties, they were a part of our division at Suwon and at Chosin. They were a part of Task Force MacLean-Faith-that Phantom Force, and thus were part of its fate and its place in history. Their bodies are mixed with the American bodies that lie somewhere together still around Hill 1221 (Faith Mountain). In the book, Ebb and Flow, the casualty figures for the 7th Division and its attached ROKs during the Changjin Campaign, 27 November-10 December, are separated on Chart Page 147 in the following manner:
Total = 2,760
It has been the general consensus that ROKs made up 33 percent of the 7th Division's Task Force Faith and Task Force Smith. However, if using the 33 percent figure when speaking of the total casualties in the 2,800-man Task Force Faith, the figures would be as follows. There were 4,065 missing in action. If ROKs made up 33 percent of the total, the number of ROK MIA's would have been 1,340. The ROK figure in the above table represents 38 percent of the task force, not 33 percent. That means that, within a group of 100 men, 38 of them were inadequately-trained South Korean ROKs. Similarly, if 38 percent of Task Force MacLean's 2,800 men were ROKs, that meant that there were 1,064 ROKs attached to this 7th Division task force. If only 33 percent, there were 924 ROKs mixed with only 1,876 American troops to carry the weight of the battle east of Chosin. Their bodies are mixed with the American bodies that still lie together somewhere around Hill 1221 (Faith Mountain) in North Korea.
Having mixed units is by no means a new precedent for a combat force, but it is important with regards to the Chosin Reservoir campaign. For without this perspective, it would be difficult to understand what this author is trying to convey to the reader. MacArthur had also authorized General Walker to add ROKs to his units, but that was a slow process, as they had to first be trained to prepare them to enter the front lines. By late August the 1st Cavalry had 739 ROK soldiers, the 2nd Division had 234, the 24th Division had 949, and the 25th Division had some 240 assigned to them.
One cannot state as pure fact that all of these South Koreans were entirely useless and not deserving of being listed as lost in combat. Some undoubtedly did more than their share. After all, they spoke the same language as the North Koreans. It would have been easy for them to desert into the countryside. Most of them were named Kim. How could one truly report them absent? But some were valuable without question, as was one with our small group after the break-up of the Task Force Faith at Hudong-ni, on the early morning hours of December 2,1950. Many men died that night. The South Koreans taking shelter in a hut with some of us survivors went out for assistance and brought back an elderly North Korean couple. They brought us some food and broth (dog soup). The women made a sling for my injured arm and provided information of the Chinese in the area. With some of that information, the South Korean could point the way around the enemy strongholds onto the ice of the Chosin Reservoir. But that drama is a distance off in this narrative.
As the downsizing of the 7th Division progressed, the workload on the remaining force increased--some to twelve and fourteen-hour days. Ammunition, new clothing, and M-1 rifles for the ROKs came in and went out. Scheduling this supply was outside of our routine duties. Most clothing was supplied by and issued to new inductees through the training units and camps for that purpose. Our supply was routine reissue.
In review of my letters home for that time frame, the complaint was lack of sleep and physical fatigue. Letter writing was reduced. What we were doing was of a self censorship disciplinary scale. We were not informed of our itinerary to begin with, or the dates to relocate. We moved material as we were told, and we moved to other camps as was required. But common sense alerted us that we were Korean bound, ready or not. It was common knowledge as well as we were revamping trucks and jeeps, moving spare tire mounts from the back to the side to attach wire telephone reels, and painting those white battle stars on all vehicle hoods for our air identification that these were not necessary for "peacetime" missions.
As our forces were gutted of men for other divisions, so, too, were our supplies. In the wire section, we were short of pliers, pocket knives, wire strippers, and friction and rubber tape for splicing wraps. (Vinyl tape was not yet available.) Souvenir season was over. With money vouchers in hand, we went on scavenger hunts in the countryside for the equivalent of the American hardware store, picking up extra batteries, wrenches of all kinds, and other needed items. We loaded freight rail cars, moving large crates of whatever--including 105mm shells, four to a crate--by raw rope handles on each end. I lost track of how many we loaded and unloaded during this never-ending task. Being a detail section, the wire section was called upon for all duties. I remember that word was out to weld the wire breakers on the jeep front bumpers. A favorite enemy tactic was stretching wire low across the roads. If an unsuspecting jeep driver rode into these wires with his windshield down, he could be decapitated. The wire breakers we welded onto the jeep bumpers before leaving for Korea prevented this from happening. Everyone in every category (MOS) had urgency built-in as we prepared for war, but at least for the time being, we were not being shot at--yet.
Amphibious training was scheduled. We had to scale down a three-story building on the debarkation nets, keeping in mind that our helmets had to be buckled under our chin. (It could be a missile if landing on the man under us on the net). This training, however, could not simulate the real thing. The building did not move back and forth, nor up and down. In the real thing, the net slammed against the side of the ship, pulling us upwards away from the landing craft that we were trying to get into. The maneuver was even more difficult for those having burdensome M-1 rifles. As is evident, there were many problems before we loaded ships for Korea. We discovered that they were all minor ones compared to those yet to come. The Frozen Chosin was totally unknown to us at that point. Its fate to us was yet to unfold.
The Korean "buddies" were slowly distributed throughout the division. There was absolutely no time to train them. Since they were not being shipped to Japan from Korea until August 17, and not fully attached until August 31, D-Day and embarkation day was 10-15 days away. Our amphibious exercises had been completed upon our arrival at those various camps vacated by the other divisions already in Korea. Each section had a "Kim" or two added, but what were we suppose to do with them? Due to the language barrier they were not fully understood. Those assigned to the wire section were integrated to man and run lines with the crews, but the wire section required communications between those crews and the switchboard section. The last thing we wanted was to try to explain what had to be done between English and Korean over these lines. We needed an interpreter between the Koreans and Americans--not the best scenario in a combat situation. Furthermore, these "buddies" were required to stay put within the perimeters, unless with another GI. One of the safeguards we observed in Korea--as in all wars--was the assigned daily use of passwords. They were picked at random and designed to make it difficult for the Koreans or Chinese to pronounce. Examples were "Helter" reply "Skelter"; "Abraham" reply "Lincoln"; "Cairo" reply "Egypt", etc.
Problems similar to those that other army divisions had were multiplied one-third for our division. Additionally, there was the added reality that we could be more easily infiltrated by North Koreans if they dressed in army uniforms acquired by our "buddies." Since we had so many ROKs already in our division, it was by no means a reassuring situation. But that was our problem again to work through, one we handled as best as we could. It was a problem exclusive to the 7th Division, its men, cadre, and officers, these men, cadre and officers, hopefully with some semblance of infantry and/or artillery training, knowledge of the Korean language a plus, however, we would exempt either and all requirements at this point in time, this was not the time to be highly selective.
With these "buddies," their strength in numbers brought us close to World War II wartime strength. But as equipment was added, the firing batteries had to rely on the Koreans to man the gun crews. Any misunderstanding here between the fire direction center and the gun crews as to elevation, charge, or other required settings endangered the accuracy of the fire mission. As the infantry moved forward under cover of an artillery barrage, the rounds could fall short of their target and land in friendly territory. This happened too often due to untrained personnel. The enemy was enough problem eroding our ranks; we did not have to contribute to their efforts. But the "buddies" had added to our warm body count, and the ROKs added would not be reported separate from our division. We were all Seventh Division "soldiers," like it or not. The artillerymen took their ration of 15 rounds of ammo for their M-2 Carbines, and prepared for the upcoming Inchon Landing.
The real cost of war is measured in lives, not in equipment. Indeed, "War is not a question of valor." For "valor" was not lacking in Korea with MacArthur, but in Washington, in cooled or heated and brilliantly lighted marble and granite halls. Young men in Korea were being sacrificed to a situation that Congress had helped to create. Yet that same Congress avoided legislation for funds to end the war as economically as possible. In this era of winning wars by the 'Who can throw the most iron or lead' method, truly we should have been the ones in the winning position. Yet, the battle reality was that we had to rely on "dead man supplies"--grabbing what we needed from our fallen comrades in arms just killed beside is. That diminished us somewhat in honor and valor, and placed a guilt trip on our own survival.
At Chosin, withdrawing our 31st RCT army tank force for use by others was a premature action, based on the assumption that our task force was already written off as "dead men," who had no further use for tank defense. The fact that such a decision had to be made at all was a crime in itself. Yet it was made and activated, and those who were sacrificed due to that action were denied even their place in history for some 30 years. They became the scapegoats of the Chosin battle in North Korea. Whose responsibility was that? Did that responsibility lay at the feet of MacArthur, or did it truly belong in those warm halls of Congress? For Congress failed to press forcibly for a "Declaration of a National Emergency" to lay the groundwork for action in North Korea. The results are history, without this task force included within its history. Whatever guilt is not the fault of the members of that task force at Chosin. What they did--or failed to do--was not a question of their personal valor. Rather, it was a question of abandonment, and I am not referring to any equipment loss.
Still, one glowing difference between "dead man supplies" and Task Force Faith was that, at that time, Faith’s force was still alive. The question left hanging is, "Who benefited by the withdrawal of those tanks?" My theory on this will be covered later in this narrative. From Day One of our troop involvement in North and South Korea until 16 December 1950, no Declaration of a National Emergency was issued. Why the delay? That is a burning question of commitment to this action in Korea between July 5, 1950 and that date in history.
"Any infantry officer must at times be ruthless. Part of the job is to send men into places from which you know they are not likely to come out again. This is never easy, but it is especially a soul searing business when the only thing you can buy with other men’s lives is a little more time." - General William F. Dean
The first general assigned to the "police action" in Korea was Major General William F. Dean of the 24th Infantry Division. He had been the 7th Infantry Division commander while they were still in Korea before relocation to Japan before war broke out in Korea. His orders were to place a small force of men as far north towards the 38th Parallel as time would allow. This small force, now known in history as Task Force Smith, was comprised of the first American troops to engage the enemy in Korea. Named after its commander, [Brad] Smith, it could well be considered to be engaged in a suicide mission to buy "a little more time." That time was needed to move larger forces into South Korea in the hope of stopping the North Korean Army from completely overrunning the south.
In reality, this first task force created by General Dean was not as disastrous in cost of lives and equipment as the one created by the Marine commander Major General O. P. Smith known as Task Force Drysdale. Still, all historians record this reality as a myth: that "Smith kept his MSR open and secure at all times." It can’t be both. It must be one or the other. The reality was that, on the first night of the official opening of the Chinese Campaign, ‘all roads’ into and surrounding Hagaru-ri were severed by CCF forces. The proof of this lies in the fact that Task Forces Drysdale and MacLean--5th & 7th Marines--were all cut off from Hagaru and each other. MG Smith’s new Command Post and MG Almond’s X Corps CP were established at Hagaru-ri. Drysdale's force totaled 922 men with 141 vehicles, including 250 41st British Commandos; Company G, 1st Marines Regiment; B Company, 7th Division, 31st Infantry Regiment; and other divisional elements. Pulling out from Koto-ri ‘ten miles south’ of Hagaru at 290930 November. This force was faced with serious resistance by the time it had traveled less than two miles. It was reinforced with seventeen additional tanks from D Company USMC. At 291615, the column was stopped four miles north of Koto-ri. Lt. Colonel Drysdale asked Marine Division HQ if he should resume the advance. MG Smith ordered him to continue at "all costs." Halfway to Hagaru, the CCF closed in and split the column. By then it was pitch dark due to the delay in waiting for the tanks to be refueled. Here the Marine tank commander junior in rank to Drysdale declined to comply with Drysdale's request to spread the tanks in pairs throughout this column. Being in the lead, he pushed on to Hagaru. The vehicle column of remaining trucks was then left defenseless on this single road.
There, the Chinese destroyed the middle truck of Drysdale’s column. Their concentration of fire power around that truck stopped the rear trucks and seventeen tanks. The tanks were forced to return to Koto-ri. As Drysdale surmised, the CCF force hitting his column were well-trained in roadblock tactics. Their continual fire against the truck in the center created a man-made road block reminiscent of the same tactic that was taking place against our tanks at Hudong-ni east of Chosin. Here Drysdale’s column was a perfect example of a hastily-formed task force that was not the best choice to head this force. Being British with a small force of his own, he was unknown to the two attached units--the Marines and Army--mixed together. It was truly a different force in leadership than those set in motion by Army forces. At least the Army units were from the same division and with one common bond.
This is not to imply that Colonel Drysdale was not a capable leader, but this mixture of men created different views of the mission assigned. It stacked the deck against Drysdale and reduced his authority in command. The distribution of the tanks controlled by the Marines were later criticized for being grouped instead of spread throughout the column. The front tanks stopping to zero in on the enemy thus stopped the column, making it a stationary target for the enemy mortar fire power. The enemy took full advantage of this situation, as our forces would have done in a like situation. The Marine forward tanks merely moved on to Hagaru, leaving the column of thin-skinned trucks behind them unprotected.
While a Marine officer was discussing surrender terms of his group with the Chinese Commander, twenty-five of the Commandos slipped out of the perimeter. There is a dispute over the Marine Corp's historical version of this incident. [Red Flag] "A mistaken report of page 298 of "US Marine Corps Operations in Korea" refers to the 2/7th Marines rescuing 22 Royal Marines during this phase of the withdrawal who had been stranded in CCF dominated territory since the convoy had fought its way through on 29/30 November. This statement cannot be substantiated."
These twenty-two men were among the twenty-five Royal Marines that slipped out of the area from the trapped forces from Task Force Drysdale column on the reference date. [As stated earlier in their Special Pub No. 8: Royal Marines, Historical Society] "25 of the Commando HQ personnel were led back to Koto-ri by the Assault Engineer Officer, Capt P J Ovens, after slipping out of the perimeter whilst surrender terms were being negotiated in the early hours of 30 November." Why this misstatement of fact is included within the Marine history is unclear. Surely the Royal Marine Commandos knew the location of their own smaller force of men. In fact, Army records state that the Royal Marines--41st Commandos--and the 31st RCT Army tanks were employed in the link-up between Hagaru-ri with the 5th, 7th, and 11th Marine Regiments withdrawing from Toktong Pass on 3 December.
Drysdale’s force suffered 321 casualties and lost 75 vehicles. But the 300 men that got to Hagaru were praised for that effort. While General Smith was not in ‘full command’ of all forces at this point in time, the one thing he detested about Almond was that his orders were issued directly to Marine regimental commanders rather than through Smith. Smith commanding other forces not under his command were not his own concern here. But Smith could have, and should have, delegated complete and absolute command to Lt. Colonel Drysdale over those tanks, giving him full authority to order them into whatever position he wanted them. The 7th Division however, was not Smith’s to command. Their orders were issued by that division. Their mission was to advance to MacLean as a battalion force, yet only one company was attached to Drysdale.
He started with a powerful force containing tanks. At least, he had them. But one must consider this force made in haste was due to the weak perimeter at Hagaru and its importance to that perimeter. The weak defense was set within Smith's area of responsibility, not by Almond. He reacted in panic to save it. Drysdale’s force was a creation by Smith’s urgent command, not Almond’s. The Marines created Task Force Drysdale. Although they named it after the "attached" British Commander under United Nations Command in Korea, it was still created and ordered by the Marines. That cannot be disputed. Included in Drysdale’s losses were 7th Division personnel, adding weight to the 7th Division effort between Koto-ri and Hagaru.
In an interview, General Ridgway said that Smith had "taken every feasible measure to develop and guard the Main Supply Road." (There was only one.) He also said, "Smith, as I have explained, despite the pressure from the X Corps, took the time to keep his line of retreat open and secure." His version of this incident is a Myth. If a road is open and 'secure' there is no real enemy opposition to it remaining so. Furthermore, does Ridgway's statement, "despite the pressure from the X Corps, took the time to keep his line of retreat open and secure," suggest that X Corps opposed keeping that MSR open and secure?
In North Korea, as well as later in the south, the Chinese used frontal assaults. The casualties reflected the savage impact and slaughter of those attacks on both sides. The use of Army task forces made this an entirely different type of warfare. Here, one must highlight the courage and obedience to the commanders selected for each of these task forces. Each one of the commanders went beyond "considerable risks" in committing their forces. Some went beyond the risks to orders of "at all cost," particularly since that cost was to the force that was out there, not to the commander issuing the order. At the time, generals no longer lead forces. They merely sent them into harm's way. Orders were orders, and duty was duty.
One Marine captain posed a question about his own commander's dilemma in moving his forces at Chosin. Should he move (on orders) against something he knew to be wrong? I believe that question was answered with the first Army Task Force Smith, and the Marine-created Task Force Drysdale between Koto-ri and Hagaru. He was ordered by that Marine commander to break through "at all costs," and Drysdale obeyed that order against his own better judgment. Here was the answer. I believe that his answer also lies within the other 23 Army task force commanders. Their loyalty was to a higher source.
For a commander to delay his own orders, yet require others to ‘give all,’ is contradictory to his own oath. In the congressional hearings (1951) over General MacArthur's dismissal, General Marshall stated, "You preach loyalty all the time.... If the example at the top is contrary to that, then you have got a very serious situation." The field commander had others over him as well. He was not a law totally unto himself, for he could be replaced as easy and as fast as any private in the ranks. A general was just as expendable and replaceable as any other rank. Those many task forces used before Christmas Day 1950, highlight also the need for small groups because there were no larger forces ‘available’ for the mission and objective. That their use tapered off as replacements finally came on line and that line stabilized confirms the pressure on corps commanders to create those forces in the early days and months of the war.
General Ridgway was later forced to use these under-strength units until his retrograde movement back into South Korea stabilized, followed by a reverse movement back toward the 38th Parallel. The Marine Division, fully ‘reinforced’ from the start, was not be plagued with the use of these forces (TF Drysdale the exception). It was strictly an Army problem. Replacements for the six Army divisions were slow to catch-up [G-1], while the Marine Corps had to be concerned with replacements for one division only.
In the early days of the Korean War, the task of fighting it was parceled out by necessity to the small Task Forces due to the lack of larger forces. Tight discipline could not be maintained because of the nature of the task force. That army commander did not have the luxury of time to correct every infraction of the rules. Some of these temporary forces were mixed together [e.g., MacLean-Faith with a heavy mixture of ROKs] and all thrown into combat with small amounts of training and, more importantly, small amounts of ammo. This fact made them more testy than usual. One needed ammo to protect himself within the large area that they were assigned in order to cover the density per yard. Still, being a ‘reinforced’ division favored the Marines at Chosin. Our Army tanks were attached to their "reinforced" unit of the 5th Marine Regiment at Chosin. More about that in the Frozen Chosin drama that lies ahead in this narrative. The history thus far discussed has merely set the stage for that later drama.
At this point, it seems appropriate to comment on the identification of some identical military equipment pieces between services and units. The Army tank force of the 31st Regiment consisted of marked tanks with standard and designated numbers for this regiment. Thus the letters and numbers "07th Div -.31st" were stenciled on the equipment, along with other numbers as well, such as HQ-2, etc. While these units were temporally loaned and assigned to General Smith, who was the commander in charge on 292039 November, the vehicles and tanks did not physically change hands. In other words, they did not pass to or become the sole property of the Department of the Navy or its lesser Corps--the Marines.
In Korea, the Marines were in (reinforced) divisional strength, as opposed to an amphibious strike unit. In divisional strength they were therefore stronger in manpower and weapons than any single division of the six Army divisions present in Korea at the same time. For the Marine commanding general to even imply that there could be a superior comparison between the Marines and any other division, especially the Seventh Division consisting of one-third ROKs, was a disservice to his division, It would, indeed, have been high praise had the numbers been reversed and he took the same position. But whatever his motive for any comparison, he picked the wrong division for that comparison--in reality, merely elevating our 7th Division higher than our numerical strength dictated. General Smith highlighted the difference between the Army and the Marine Corps. While this research is not about the Marines as such, it must be stated that the real difference between any of the six Army divisions and that of the one Marine division, the Seventh Division and General Smith’s criticism was against them, any comparison should be between the two divisions.
To compare, state, or imply that the "quality" of a larger force is superior to a smaller force implies that "quality" may be close, but not quite there. However, the comparison didn’t degrade the 7th Division. We were numerically deficient in American forces (a proven fact) to any other division at that time in Korea. General Smith’s remarks didn’t change our status. He would have better served his division by comparing it to any other Army division, preferably the 2nd Infantry Division coming from the states, at the same time. Once again, his concern for the Army forces (which were not really his concern) was highlighted. His comments did not solve the problem. Instead, they just degraded it.
From this larger, 'inferior' American/ROK force evolved two smaller groups designated as task forces --something the Marine Corps itself did not want. "Whenever I hear the words 'task force', I shudder," said a distinguished Marine veteran. "In Korea, all too often the phrase became an apology for a makeshift collection of vehicles and men committed to disaster." They were incomplete units, taking, holding, and in rear guard positions, without flank protection, and with small amounts of ammo due to lack of vehicles to bring more supplies up to the combat area.
Yet these forces served a vital function while receiving neither accolades nor praise of any kind for their efforts. Most of the Missing in Action total came from these forces in the first six months of the war. Some of the units were completely wiped out, and the men in other units were unable to state the name of the man on line with them, simply because they didn’t know that man or his name. These men were assigned a distasteful job--one in which the Marine commander wanted no part. If the reader finds any heroes in this book, they will be of the reader's creation, not mine. For the men of these task forces were only mortal men. They had no power beyond that given to any man at birth. So if reader creates one or two heroes, they should be from one of these many task forces. Unfortunately, they are for the most part unknown and MIA.
General Smith refused to split his forces into smaller groups. Nevertheless, he got caught in an enemy envelopment situation, and he was required not only to create a task force of his own, but also to order it to continue forward "at all costs" to save Hagaru. Yet in military history, the concept is as old as the services themselves: That first wave to hit the beach, a squad attack, a platoon of men, all equal a task force. But for any commander to order his own force forward "at all costs," then within three days time refer to the survivors of the forward units of Task Force MacLean-Faith as "Army Jokers," proves his lack of compassion for his men on the line. His further feeble attempt to be macho in regard to the dead and equipment priorities also proves his misguided sense of military priorities. War is not a pleasant business. To be in a situation where one has to rate casualties between the most severe and those one must require to remain, placing them secondary to those killed, is unrealistic for a commanding general just adding to that number "at all costs" to save his command, unless he related "at all costs" to dollars and cents. One may rate vehicles in that manner, but not human life.
The 17th Infantry Regiment was the oldest of the 7th Division. It was commanded by Herbert B. Powell. He was outstanding in that he was the only Army regimental commander lacking West Point credentials in Korea. He won his commission by competitive exams. He was ordered to spearhead the landing at Iwon when Almond picked that site some 105 miles above Wonsan. It was viewed on October 26, while the regiment was in port at Pusan, as still in "enemy territory." The 17th Regiment had been pre-administratively loaded to land behind the Marines at Wonsan. That fact required another change to combat loading for anticipated enemy assaults at Iwon. His regiment would reach Pungsan on the 31 October. Here they would link with the ROK Capital Division. This latter force moved east towards the coast line. Here both forces were in combat with the NKPA (North Korean Peoples Army) 71st Regiment, backed by mortars and artillery of the 23rd Coast Guard Regiment. The 1/17 led by Lt. Col. Francis P. Carberry engaged the enemy for four full days, at which time the enemy forces were reported as "almost completely annihilated."
After a delay at the Ungi River above Pungsan, Powell received the go for the Yalu River, "at maximum speed" The temperatures dived downwards to thirty-two degrees below zero on November 14-15. The division had no bridging or amphibious means to cross the Ungi River. The engineering battalion (13th) improvised a footbridge of empty oil drums and planks. On the east side of this crossing, Powell's force met further NKPA fire and the enemy force launched many "suicide attacks", delaying this force an additional two days. On November 21, Powell's 17th Regiment closed on Hyesanjin unopposed, led by Carrol Cooper and his armored element. It received credit--yet downplayed as to its importance--to reach the Yalu. It receive credit, yet was downplayed as to the importance of reaching the Yalu. The rather important mission assigned to it was achieved. Its real estate was not lost, but abandoned on orders. This achievement embarrassed the Marine commander's delay in following his own orders. That pattern of delay had its origin at the landing date for the Inchon Invasion.
[1] The 31st Regiment deactivated after Bataan defeat.
[2] "Superior Enemy," North Korean forces, fully equipped with tanks and artillery, that balance in numbers topped at Inchon. The CCF [Chinese forces] were ‘never’ superior to our forces in firepower and support units, tanks, or artillery, nor -in fact- to our total UN numbers in North Korea.
[3] These are the men of reference in an unsubstantiated dispute over the Marines History "rescuing" 22 of them, on page 298 in Marine history.
[4] Colonel Charles B. Smith
[5] Captain William B. Hopkins, "One Bugle No Drums". p.92
[6] One asinine statement that recycles in a book; Life of "Chesty" Puller of the 1st Marine Regiment, stated he got some of the army vehicles, because "the keys" were left in the ignition. [?] I wonder what army he was referring to.
"...I shouted, do not provoke me...I am the Polar Bear!" ...."But provoke me they did and I returned. At Inchon, I turned the North Korean flank, raced into burning Osan, and closed the invader's back door. As the cold winter winds began to blow".....
Excerpt from, "A tribute to Polar Bears past and present," by Karl Lowe, Colonel, US Army Retired
In 1950, there was a vast difference in the education levels than the common soldier of today. In today's military, every soldier is a high school graduate. Such was not the case in the military forces during the war years 1950-1953. Although the education difference separated the Army's regimental (West Point) commanders from the common line soldier, there was one bond and obligation to all. They had taken the same oath: "Freely and without reservation..." to defend their country. I say freely because up to the Chosin action, almost all of the forces were volunteer enlistees. Due to the need for trained military personnel as the Korean War progressed, most of these volunteer forces were retained beyond their original discharge date by a presidential order extending them for an additional year. A standard enlistment was three years, but the "Truman Year" was ordered to allow the United States government lee time to draft, train, equip, and ship replacement forces to the Korean War zone.
It was evident that the early forces in Korea between the time frame of June 25 through December 1950 were expendable in order to buy time, as were the forces on Bataan in late 1941. This was due in both cases to budget wars. Money was not involved as much as that most precious supply of human life. At the time of the Korean War, Europe was of prime concern first and foremost over our commitment to Korea, even after committing our forces to combat. This fact is well documented.
A short review of past history on the war involving the United States and The Empire of Japan, shows that, in his 'state of war' request to Congress, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not ask that war be declared against Germany as well.[1] I bring this point up because after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941, on that date, at that hour, at that place, at that time in our history, we were not at war with Germany. Yet, as the Japanese engaged us in war in the Pacific arena, America ironically completed a two and one-half year build-up of forces in England for D-Day-against Germany--delayed until June 6, 1944. The forces defending Bataan had to surrender in April of 1942. A postwar "domino theory" was utilized repeatedly against a communist threat that had to be stopped. Those dominoes fell monthly in the Pacific, and America counterattacks were underway to regain those islands lost.
Although American forces in the Pacific were left desperately in need of supplies, the main focus was on accumulating forces in Europe, not our war against Japan. There was a similarity to this in our involvement in the "Police Action" in Korea on June 25th, 1950. It seems ironic that, when the North Koreans invaded across the 38th Parallel and a commitment was made to send a small force of the 24th Infantry Regiment--Task Force Smith--to engage the North Korean army in battle, once again it was the only war we had. However, once again all consideration was given to the European area. But there was one huge difference here. Unlike World War II, we were to "involve ourselves in this one." The North Korean army had never attacked any of our forces under any present commitment or treaty. Surely we should have committed our entire nation to defend our own forces before being sent into combat. That could have happened, but it did not. American occupation forces were committed to defend Korea--by no means a one time precedent for sending American forces into combat with insufficient forces or armor.
Korea: "The Korean War meant entry into action 'as is' with two instead of three battalions with light tanks instead of heavy ones." - Willoughby, 360
Iraq: "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at Camp Buehring in Kuwait on Dec. 8, 2004 where he addressed concerns over being deployed to Iraq without sufficient armor.
The North Korean invasion activates the American involvement
On June 30, 1950, five days after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, President Harry S. Truman authorized American ground forces in Korea. The first order of business for General MacArthur was to review those combat units available to him, as combat readiness and conditions had changed dramatically since Victory over Japan (V-J) Day. Five Star General MacArthur was authorized to use whatever combat forces he had available for stopping the North Korean Army from overrunning South Korea. MacArthur's 'new' authority committed American occupation forces to direct combat action hundreds of miles distant across the Sea of Japan. After only one year, MacArthur was 'reassigned.' The Korean territory was taken from his command and transferred to the State Department. He was directly subject to orders from the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington DC. This latter group fully represented the three military departments: Army, Navy, and Air Force (which evolved from the Army Air Corps in 1947).
The JCS knew the battle readiness of the armed forces under their immediate authority. The JCS's duty was to relay all their information to the President of the United States. Nevertheless, the order for troop movement began, and material, ammunition, and all logistics of war were on the move within the Far East Command. All occupation forces were ordered on highest alert to move as ordered.
Let's review some major changes in the military since World War II. The Army Air Corps, originally under the Department of the Army, no longer existed. In September 1947, the Army Air Corps became a new and separate department when the Department of the Air Force was born. Army transport ships were turned over to the Merchant Marines. The jet fighter plane was mass produced and distributed throughout the new Air Force command. A new devise, called the "helicopter" also appeared. However, due to severe budget restraints, other war-related production and other important tools of war were canceled. For example, ammunition manufacturing was curtailed sharply, and the production of much of its heavy armor shells was halted completely. World War Two armaments were abandoned and left to rust in the open on past battlefields in the Pacific. They were retrieved during Operation Roll-Up, a plan to refurbish used government equipment. However, much of this equipment was not even cataloged for immediate retrieval by armed forces so they could be dispatched urgently to Korea. Instead, those forces were dispatched in a piece-meal fashion. Army transport ships were no longer available in large numbers near Japan to transport those forces. Plus, undersized Navy and Air Force units also had proportionally reduced transports and planes. The Navy adapted to its peace time mission. The Air Force was busy building their new department, including changing uniforms and redesigning stripes and blankets. Blue was in vogue for them.
The Navy and Marines kept their traditional uniforms from the past. The Army continued its asinine changes to the Army uniform following World War II. The "Ike" jacket was in fashion, as well as those stupid half stripes someone accepted for the Army. Ranking itself changed. I went into basic training as a private but came out as one of the first newly named "recruits." It took six months to return to my first rank as a Private, then to Private First Class. The Corporal rank replaced the old three stripe Buck Sergeant, and the Staff Sergeant--one rocker--was the one referred to as a just plain sergeant. Even as the Korean War was underway in 1952, our Army uniform was being changed again to green, disregarding the Ike jacket. Sometime within the war, the 1st Cavalry's familiar troop designation was changed to company status. Surely that money and energy could have gone into other more important war-related matters.
Acting on a JCS recommendation, President Harry S. Truman notified General MacArthur on July 10, 1950 of his appointment to be in command of all United Nations forces. Whenever practicable, he was to identify himself as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). On July 14, President Rhee of South Korea assigned his military forces to MacArthur. MacArthur was to submit a bi-weekly report to the JCS. In turn, they were to submit those reports through the Secretary of Defense to the Department of State for presentation to the Security Council of the United Nations. Given his military strength in the Far East region, it was to MacArthur's credit that he agreed to accept this commitment in Korea. For before any American task force fired the first shot in Korea, the Pentagon denied supporting forces to MacArthur. At that time, it was reported that the entire general reserve consisted of only the 3rd Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division, both under strength, and both located on the United States mainland.
Under the directives given to MacArthur by the JCS (there would be few of these), and through precedent in the considerable latitude granted American commanders in the past, General MacArthur had authority to depose and employ his forces as he saw fit. This new UN authority reflected the fact that the planning of any major operation and tactical or local strategies was to originate with MacArthur. From the start he expressed the opinion that "success would be in direct proportion to the speed with which he was sent reinforcements." Without full support and reinforcements, the results would vary. He stated, "In this matter, time is of the essence," adding, "Business as usual--to hell with that concept." (Policy & Direction, 106)
MacArthur had enormous problems to solve at the top level of his chain of command. His prime concern was securing an adequate force for his upcoming Inchon landing, for although his available forces would continually change, his set target date would not. Still, MacArthur believed he would get all the manpower he needed. He would not yield on his September 15 date for Inchon. October would be too late. Only between September 15 and September 18 would the tidal surges be high enough to cover the extensive mud flats that fronted Inchon. Only then could landing craft safely be brought into that harbor. The next available date would be mid-October due to the phases of the moon. But too many lives might be lost in Walker's area in that extra month.
MacArthur decided to follow his own keen sense of timing. His invasion date was September 15, and the place of entry into Korea was at Inchon. The operation code name was "Chromite." The planning staff studied the possibilities for an amphibious operation in September, and postulated three plans:
(1) Plan 100-B, landing at Inchon on the 'west' coast
(2) Plan 100-C, landing at Kunsan on the 'west' coast
(3) Plan 100-D, landing near Chumunjin-up on the "east" coast
Plan 100-B, which called for a landing at Inchon with a simultaneous attack by Eighth Army, was favored. On 23 July, General MacArthur informed the Department of the Army that he had scheduled an amphibious landing in mid-September for the 5th Marines and the 2nd Infantry Division to land behind the enemy lines in coordination with an attack by Eighth Army. However, North Korean successes upset MacArthur's plans as fast as he made them. MacArthur first had to divert the two American forces en route from the States into Walker's defense line in South Korea.
Here the continuing test of MacArthur's authority was challenged, as not all commanders involved in the landing were pleased with the site picked. Some suggested sites further south of Kunsan (Plan C) at Posung-myon, which was thirty miles south of Inchon. General Oliver P. Smith of the Marines favored Plan C.
Smith was also not pleased with the date. He wanted more time for the 7th Marines, en route from the States, to arrive. Here the chain of command was not directly linked through MacArthur to the Marines. In reality, General Almond did not assume his X Corps command authority over the Marine forces until the beachhead was declared to be secure.
There is an important point to note here. Before the landing, the 1st Marine Division was unattached to MacArthur, and completely under Navy command. It was sheltered under the Navy in any dispute with MacArthur. The 1st Marine Division did not come under MacArthur's direct command until 21 September. At that time, Smith informed the Navy commander that the amphibious part of the landing was secure. The land operation then reverted to the Army command and X Corps under Almond.
The Army had no official say about either the amphibious or the land operations. MacArthur was the five star general whose authority controlled the Army forces in Japan and Walker's Eighth Army command. The Army had to do what MacArthur required and commanded it to do. He did not have to ask anyone how he was allowed to use the forces under his command. His authority was his rank.
Through the years, press coverage of O. P. Smith elevated his overall importance in the Inchon landing. Smith had his own preference among Plans A, B, and C, but in reality, he had absolutely no authority or vote on picking the site for the landing. His several attempts to divert the site from Inchon could not move MacArthur, nor could MacArthur order the Navy brass to land at Inchon with the many dangers involved in that landing. The Navy had the concern of its own ships and the responsibility of the landing. Once the plan was accepted by the Navy and they turned their ships towards the final target (whatever that target would be), Marine and Army troops onboard the ships merely tagged along. The Inchon Landing was never at any time MG Smith's decision--nor the invasion forces' decision--to make. Smith merely had to take the final plan (B-100) of operation for Inchon and execute the landing to seize Inchon as ordered.
MacArthur had his commission on the line. It would be a costly failure for him if the Inchon landing failed. MacArthur stated it was a 5,000 to 1 gamble, but if it was successful, it would save 100,000 lives. That was truly an optimistic view, and one reserved to MacArthur alone. All things considered, the Navy planners were opposed to the landing. On and off, the Navy's officers objected to MacArthur's staff planners in general terms. When General Smith of the United States Marine Corps reported to Admiral Doyle in Tokyo on August 22, his objections to the Inchon landing began to surface. Smith and Doyle worked closely together to arrange the details of the assault on Inchon, nevertheless Smith's objections were noted by the Navy. But once Admiral Doyle was ordered to land forces at MacArthur's approved site at Inchon, the case was closed as far as the Navy was concerned. MG Smith's objections were just one of rattling his own cage for publicity and notoriety.
There was also a constant in General Smith's personality. He detested early deadlines. On August 23, he was informed that the landing date was September 15, but he was told before leaving the United States that the target date was September 23. He had the pressure of a time schedule added to the landing. As would become apparent throughout his command in Korea, he always sought to delay the dates for whatever the operation. While his whining fell on deaf ears aboard ship (which moved on Navy time schedules), he nevertheless could and did upset the ground objective timetables by individual actions within his own command.
Inchon was Smith's first attempt to delay a set plan of operations. His command in North Korea at the Chosin Reservoir also included several other delays, and again after he returned to South Korea there was another delay again with General Ridgway. Whatever his problems were with his one division, the Army had multiple ones with its divisions already on line. Those Army forces were exposed hourly to enemy fire and needed support as soon as possible.
After July 13, General Collins of the JCS informed Rear Admiral James Doyle of General MacArthur's intention to land at Inchon by General Collins of the JCS. Admiral Doyle was assistant to Admiral Turner Joy. Admiral Joy "agreed that a landing at Inchon could be extremely difficult, but that it could be done." Collins asked Almond how the assault forces would cross the Han River after the assault, and Almond replied that, "amphibious trucks, available in the theater, could be used to ferry forces across,... and that the assault would more than likely be unopposed because the plan would utilize an airborne RCT to seize and secure the north shore of the Han River." This is a point to remember because there was a major dispute between Almond and Smith later at that river.
General Collins would not commit himself or the JCS to the landing, and returned to Washington. In the meantime, Taejon fell to the enemy on July 20. Our forces were in further retreat, steadily being forced back towards the port of Pusan. Here MacArthur had to abort his plans to use the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Marine Brigade for the landing at Inchon. News of the fall of Taejon reached Washington at the same time the plans for the amphibious landing did. Worried over the developing situation and the increased pressure upon General Walker's defense line, MacArthur was asked if he still believed it advisable to launch an assault in mid-September. He replied that if the full Marine division was provided, the time would, indeed, be excellent. (The 7th Marines were not, however, there for the landing.)
In the meantime, Walker's line was receiving increased pressure in early August, and MacArthur negated his plan. He ordered the 5th Marine RCT and the 2nd Infantry Division, both at sea heading to Korea from the States, to join Walker's forces. This move jeopardized the landing, for if the attack was made in September, both of these units would have to be withdrawn from Walker's line, or the "Marines withdrawn and teamed with the 7th Division." The latter plan was preferred because removing the 1st Cavalry Division from the Pusan Perimeter would clog the port of Pusan of much needed incoming supplies.
The 7th Division was cannibalized at half strength. Its key cadre and key personnel were already on line with Walker's forces as fillers for the 24th, 25th, and the 1st Cavalry Divisions. It would not up to full strength until October 1, and it would not be ready for amphibious operations until October 15. Still, MacArthur had faith that he would get the forces he needed. October might be too late, so September was the only time and month with suitable conditions. He gave the JCS his revised plan for using the depleted 7th Infantry Division. If it was not acceptable, "it would have to be staged out of Pusan Perimeter rather than Japan." [
For MacArthur this meant that he had to return to the drawing board. What forces were left and available? Since only those of the depleted 7th Infantry Division remained, he was forced to negate the landing he firmly believed would save lives and end the savage loss of men and equipment. His first effort with the 1st Cavalry, now with the 2nd Division, had to be aborted as well to support Walker's lines. He had no choices left. The 7th Division, ready or not, had to be bumped to the front of the line.
This was not the first time he would be called upon to use a small force to engage the enemy. MacArthur always had faith in his forces, even when they were under strength. Our being in Korea in the first place proved that fact. So he relied on the 7th Division, a unit with an impressive history of amphibious landing of their own in the Pacific during World War II.
Here MacArthur was as bold as with his landing decision alone. He did not hesitate to use his Army forces. As the records state from the past, the Army landings could be successfully carried out under their own command, for the army had its own history behind it. Indeed, General Holland M. Smith, USMC, was responsible for the training of Army forces and the 7th Division in amphibious warfare procedures. He had trained and used the 7th Division as the first amphibious unit under his command to assault the island of Attu under difficult conditions. The 7th Division mastered the art of landing amphibious craft there. Holland 'Mad" Smith himself stated in his book Coral And Brass that, "I have always considered the landing of the Seventh in the dense fog at Attu, on May 11, 1943, an amphibious landing without parallel in our military history. Transport was not available to carry the entire equipment of a full division and even if it had been it was useless on the terrain of this bleak Aleutian island, where the sponge like tundra bogged down all heavy equipment." (C&B 103) He further stated, "This was my first experience in battle with any troops I had trained and I was keen to see how they made out." During that landing, the Japanese mounted a "Bansai" attack. "This mad charge through the fog made a profound impression and alerted me to ever present danger of just such a final desperate attack during my operations in the central Pacific," said Holland Smith. So even a Marine general learned something of value from the Seventh Division at Attu that he could pass on to others, including his Marines. Holland Smith went on to train many more forces and be in command of many island invasions of his own.
In the military, we learn from others. We collectively share knowledge, and we win with a team spirit. No one man does it all. It takes team work. With the knowledge gained from the Marine training, the Army exceeded the amphibious divisions and landings of the Marine Corps during World War II. Again, according to Marine General Holland M. Smith, Marines trained the 7th, 77th, 81st, and 96th Infantry Divisions in amphibious warfare during World War II. The Army ended up with some 28 amphibious divisions, "Whereas the Marines never had more than six." Of the Army group, the 1st Cavalry had many amphibious landings of its own. The 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division, along with the 17th Regiment and the 184th Regiment of the California National Guard, made amphibious assaults on the island of Kwajalian, as did Marines, The 7th Division got a late start, but made up for it in timely fashion with rapid landings in the Pacific. The landing at Attu was a full year, plus a few days, before the D-Day landing in Europe on June 6, 1944. The Pacific action was a budget war. The Army 7th Division used DUKW, the pneumatic-tired amphibious truck developed by the Army and used for the first time at Attu. They proved adequate to the task. The 17th Regiment on the adjacent island landed artillery support with these units. "In this way powerful artillery support was available for the main landing on the northern and southern objectives." (C&B 146)
Holland Smith's love for his Marines was primal at all times. But he gave credit to others when he felt that credit was justified. He was, however, in his own class when compared to the 1st Marine Division commander to follow at Inchon, General Oliver P. Smith. Only the last names were similar. In Korea, General Edward M. Almond, in charge of X Corps, was likened to Holland M. Smith in boldness and speed, while Oliver P. Smith was in the mold of the Civil War general, George McClellan. He was cautionary and slow. At Inchon, Oliver Smith was severely critical of the 7th Division before the contest would begin. One can only wonder what were his underlying fears. Would one American/ROK Division be a threat to outshine his division of Marines? He had the numerical strength of force, with no ROKs other than some used as interpreters. More about these three generals will follow. One can only truly judge the players by the way they play the game and carry the ball towards the goal line.
On August 23, a meeting was underway in the Tokyo Dai Ichi Building, 6th floor conference room. Present were Generals MacArthur, Collins, Almond, and Wright of the Army; Admirals Joy, Struble, Sherman and Doyle of the Navy; and various officers of lesser ranks. Before the meeting began, General O. P. Smith discussed with Almond the possibility of landing at Posung-Myon instead of Inchon. Almond rejected that view. Here again, the window of opportunity was extremely short. Less than one month remained, and MacArthur still had no authorization to land anywhere, let alone Inchon.
In his presentation, Admiral Doyle concluded that the operation was not impossible, but that "He did not recommend it." General Collins and Admiral Sherman suggested Kunsan, which was 100 miles south of Inchon.
Admiral Sherman stated, "If every possible geographical and naval handicap were listed, Inchon had them all." He cited the two main objectives, and discussed the elements of tides and terrain, and many studies of hydrographics. The studies listed Inchon tides as 20.7 feet, one of the highest tides in the world. On September 15, the rise and fall would be more than 30 feet because of the position of the moon. The first tide would occur at 0630 in the morning, and the afternoon high tide would be at 1919 hours, a full thirty-five minutes after sunset. Within two hours, most of the assault craft would be wallowing in the ooze of Inchon's mud banks as sitting ducks. Still, assuming this could be done, the approaching darkness would allow only two and a half hours for the ground forces to land during the afternoon high tide. This time limit would be hard pressing on the forces to land, secure a beachhead for the night, and bring in supplies to withhold a beachhead for the night. Added to all of this was the fact that the landing would be made right in the heart of the city itself.
General Collins' objections and those of the JCS were that Inchon was too far to the rear of the present battle area. With the limited resources available, the 1st Marine Brigade would have to be withdrawn from Walker's position. This would further endanger Walker's line. (Here was the plan to pull the Marine Brigade from General Walker.) General Collins was not sure if the capture of Inchon and Seoul could make contact with Walker anyway. And foremost, he might "well run into overwhelming enemy force within the area of the capital city and suffer a complete defeat." Admiral Sherman seconded his suggestion that Inchon be scraped in favor of Kunsan (Smith's choice). So two of the Joint Chiefs, Collins and Sherman, were opposed to the landing at Inchon. But the Army was not the biggest obstacle. The Army was committed to do whatever MacArthur's final decision would be. The Navy had to make its commitment to the landing, otherwise it would never materialize.
General MacArthur listened to each man's objection to Inchon. It, indeed, had all the named handicaps. Each man had a valid point. But, then MacArthur made his case.
The Navy's objections as to tides, hydrography, terrain, and physical hardships were substantial and pertinent. But MacArthur believed that they were not insurmountable. As to the proposal for a landing at Kunsan, MacArthur agreed that it would eliminate many of the hazards of Inchon. But he also believed that it would be an attempted envelopment which would not envelope. It would be a "short envelopment," and nothing in war is more futile. Such action would mean that more troops would have to be sent to help Walker hang on. And MacArthur believed that "hanging on" was not good enough.
"The only alternative to a strike such as I propose will be the continuation of the savage sacrifice we are making at Pusan, with no relief in sight. Are you content to let our troops stay in that bloody perimeter like beef cattle in the slaughterhouse? Who will take the responsibility for that tragedy? Certainly, I will not. If my estimate is inaccurate and should I run into a defense with which I can not cope, I will be there personally and will immediately withdraw our forces before they are committed to a bloody set back. the only loss will be my professional reputation. But, Inchon will not fail. Inchon will succeed, and it will save 100,000 lives."
Among the alternate proposals to Inchon, in addition to the Kunsan plan favored by the Navy, was one for a landing in the Posung-myon area thirty miles south of Inchon and opposite Osan. On the 23rd, Admiral Doyle proposed a landing there with the purpose of striking inland to Osan and there severing the communications south of Seoul. One day later on the 24th, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (USMC), called on General MacArthur and asked him to change the landing site to this area--all to no avail. MacArthur remained resolute on Inchon. Here a Marine officer with Corps status only to the Department of the Navy avoided his chain of command and lobbied for a different plan not in the original three. That was just rehashing the same argument. (This Marine pattern of objections increased under MG Almond's command well into the Chosin arena.)
The planners worked on Inchon's three landing beaches--Green Beach on Wolmi-do for the preliminary early morning battalion landing, Red Beach in the sea wall dock area of Inchon, and Blue Beach in the mud flat semi-open area at the south edge of the city for the two regimental-sized forces that would make the main landing in the evening. Later, 7th Infantry Division troops landed at Inchon over what was called Yellow Beach. As diversions, the battleship Missouri was to shell east coast areas on the opposite side of the Korean peninsula, including the rail center and port of Samch'ok, and a small force composed in part of the 41st British Commando unit (Drysdale) was to make a deceptive landing at Kunsan on the west coast, 100 air miles south of Inchon.
On his return to Washington, General Collins briefed the JCS on the plan. As the JCS studied it in detail, "They found no disagreement with what MacArthur intended to do, and on August 28th, his plan was approved." MacArthur had a full 18 days to activate it. He already had the 7th Division close to Yokohama. Had MacArthur delayed in his planning, the ships, men, and material would not have been ready for his set target date, and Inchon would never HAVE happened. While the planning took place in record short time, with all the problems that MacArthur had to overcome it was his greatest achievement.
But, the Joint Chiefs had lingering doubts. On September 7th, they informed MacArthur that almost all reserve forces were already committed. If the landing failed, the United Nations forces would be in grave danger. They called for a reconsideration of Inchon. MacArthur restated his faith in the success of the landing, besides the fact that every unit had been assigned its separate responsibility, "and those Marines and soldiers who were not already afloat along Korea's west coast were in the final stages of embarkation." It was the eleventh hour when he received the query: "In the light of the commitment of all the reserves available to the Eighth Army, we desire your estimate as to the feasibility and chance of success of projected operation if initiated on planned schedule." In reality, here was the paper work to lay the blame on MacArthur's pending failure. On September 8, the JCS again gave their approval after obtaining President Truman's approval. The landing was now a go, and rapid speed was required to load all men and equipment aboard ships and put out to sea.
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman aided MacArthur in his search for ships available for the Inchon landing. Anticipating a roadblock from Washington over ship tonnage available, Sherman had a complete list of all ships at sea, in harbors in the Pacific, on the US coast, in Japanese waters, and even in Philippine waters. When General Collins raised the question of "impossibility," MacArthur turned to Admiral Sherman and asked if sufficient tonnage could be made available by a shift in loading. With a ready list, the impossible gave way to the possible. This incident is cited merely to show how studied were the efforts of Washington's military advisors to deny the practicable means for supporting the Far Eastern Command to the fullest. Admiral Sherman's opposition to Inchon was mainly the result of technical difficulties. With assurances from MacArthur that "nothing rash" was intended and that the operation could be either terminated or diverted to less vulnerable strategic spots, Sherman was behind the Inchon landing concept. (Willoughby 367)
Commercial ships were pressed into service. All ships were tightly packed and cramped with troops. Even freighters acted as troop ships. Operation Chromite was under way, and there was no turning back. The storm between military men over the landing date subsided and then shifted to worrying about the forces of nature. The ships were required to be in transit on September 12 to reach Inchon on time. But a typhoon was brewing in the Sea of Japan, and it continued into the next day. Rough seas and pounding waves rocked the ships. I was stationed on the weather deck along with others, and had to seek shelter inside the ship somewhere. We moved into hatchways, officers' conference rooms, and wherever we could until the storm ran its course.
As the forces loaded for the Inchon Landing, another major controversy arose. MacArthur had not authorized the release of the 1st Marine Brigade. General Smith insisted that the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (5th Marines) on line with General Walker be pulled out and united with his landing force. This is an important point to remember, because it related to Chosin where a carbon copy surfaced. There, Walker suggested "using forces already in place." He had the enemy directly in front of him. Instead of pulling the 1st Marine Brigade out, a compromise was reached. The Marines were to remain in place and the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division was substituted for them instead. Smith would have none of that. That 32nd Regiment was partly ROKs and he wanted no part of them. With the pressure of naval officers behind him, Smith continued to insist on the 1st Marine Brigade [2] As I state within, at Inchon there was a compromise. However, at Chosin there was no time for one. This is so ironic, it is eerie. (Hell, if it worked at Inchon, why not replay it at Chosin?) Smith insisted that the Marines stay together, in spite of combat needs, drawing them from the front ranks. The 1st Marine Brigade was the 5th Marine Regiment. The 32nd Regiment included Don Faith's 1st Battalion. These two units exchanged places at Chosin, under the eyes of the Chinese surrounding both of them.
Either way, Smith's problem was entirely a Navy one. The upcoming one at Chosin was a totally Army one. But to activate this scenario of exchange at Pusan required placing the 32nd Regiment on line and removing the 5th Marines out of Walker's line. Even the Navy brass thought that to merely exchange two groups was an idiotic plan. Admiral Struble hit on the compromise: Pull the Marines out of Walker's line. That would pacify General Smith. Keep the 17th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division aboard ships in floating reserve outside of Pusan Harbor. That way, it could be rushed in if needed. If not needed, it would land later at Inchon and rejoin its parent division. The 32nd Regiment was substituted for the 3rd Regiment of the 7th Marines. Although suggested by the Navy, the problem could become a dangerous one and a total Army responsibility. Walker would just have to fill any gaps with his available forces. His exhausted 24th Division had been on line for over two and one-half months by the time the 17th Regiment unloaded at Pusan. It still had to travel to wherever the breach was in the front lines. Time was important, but Smith had his force. Walker had to deal with the problem this created. (At Chosin it would directly involve MG Almond.)
Smith has his other problems, too. He was unhappy with the landing site and the date, and he would not have his 7th Marine Regiment from the States in time for the landing. Tough. There was no compromise on that. He got them when they arrived. With Navy backing, he attempt once again to change the landing site. Again, tough. MacArthur had no ear to hear any more of that. He had already spent too much time getting his plans together and approved. He was not about to change his major offensive because one divisional commander was not completely attuned to MacArthur's own mission. And, as I state regarding the upcoming Chosin mission, I firmly believe MacArthur was still consistent in that thought and action with his November 24 offensive date at Chosin. He had not moved from his set timetables. Also, the time schedules eroded both Almond's and MacArthur's patience with Smith's whining ways.
General MacArthur's prior orders to General Walker to prepare the 7th Division "by intensified training and re-equipping for movement to Korea at the earliest practicable date," [SOURCE OF QUOTE?] highlighted the importance and responsibility placed on General Walker. On July 26, while he directed his own line divisions against the enemy, he still remained responsible for the training and rebuilding of the 7th Division nearly a thousand miles away. We were still under Eighth Army control. But, through his combined efforts with MacArthur, the 7th Division was only 1,800 men under strength by the Chromite date. (That was inclusive of the 8,000 plus untrained ROKs.) The high priority given the 7th Division created problems for Walker's forces in Korea. All incoming artillery replacements were side-railed to our division. Those actions proved effective to bring the division to a reasonable combat level. On September 7, we lacked only 1,349 officers and men short of our full war strength, including, of course, the ROKs who had just arrived some two weeks earlier.
Here one can, indeed, sympathize with General Walker. His forces had been driven back to the Pusan Perimeter line; they were totally battle weary; and now the loss of the 5th Marine (1st Brigade) was an unrealistic request. "According to Colonel Chiles, when General Almond telephoned Walker that he would have to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Walker became extremely excited and stated that he could not take the responsibility for the safety of the Pusan Perimeter if the brigade was taken from him. Admiral Doyle, on the other hand, said he could not accept the responsibility of the Inchon Landing unless he was given the brigade." According to Colonel Chiles, MacArthur personally made the decision to withdraw them with the compromise of the 17th Regiment of the 7th Division in floating reserve. That is where Walker coined his phrase about X Corps being, "MacArthur's Pets"
All the effort that Walker had put in place to build the 7th Division to war time strength just one month before was effectively short-circuited because he did not get his replacements. The 32nd Regiment was not permitted to be flown in to Walker's Pusan perimeter defense line. Here the reader should keep in mind that a similar scenario was repeated at the Chosin Reservoir and there were tragic results. Don Faith's battalion replaced the 5th Marine Regiment on the east side of Chosin on 24-25 November. Something similar happened at the Pujon (Fusen) reservoir as well.
There was one major difference at Chosin. There was no additional time to pacify General Smith due to his own delays. The replacement forces at Chosin were those of Task Force MacLean-Faith. The result of that exchange proved to be a fatal one. At Inchon, MacArthur had to yield to the Navy because he had to have them for the landing. But he did not have to yield to one of his field commanders (Army or Marine) once under Almond's X Corps command at Seoul or Chosin.
Because of MacArthur's decision to compromise--not with General Smith, but the Navy--General Barr had only two regiments instead of three at Inchon, as would Smith. The 7th Marine Regiment did not arrive in time for the landing (Sept. 21). Barr's forces were the 31st and the 32nd Regiments, each with a strength of about 5,000 men. including nearly 2,000 ROKs of doubtful value. Barr wrote that the ROKs could not, "By the wildest stretch of the imagination be considered combat worthy troops. They were civilians who had been picked from the streets and fields of South Korea without prior warning and rushed to Japan--stunned, confused, exhausted. There was no time to train them."
"So to put things into some proper perspective, I yield -to facts- on this point and will use it through out this research. Fact: The 7th Division was an 'inferior division' -in make up -to the "reinforced" 1st Marine Division. With this fact stated and accepted, through and too the end of the Chosin Campaign. What does that do to any comparative events for the other divisions in X Corps, if those other units 'could not or would not' do what this inferior 7th Infantry Division would do?"
As Operation Chromite approached, the ports of Kobe, Sasebo, and Yokohama in Japan, and Pusan in Korea were active. The 1st Marine Division, less the 5th Marines at Pusan, loaded ships at Kobe. The 7th Division loaded at Yokohama, and escorting naval vessels and gunfire supporting groups, as well as the command ships, were at Sasebo. Only the assault elements were combat loaded. All others were origination-loaded. Blackout conditions were in affect while at sea, which posed a difficult problem for those stationed (as I was) on the weather deck. All of our equipment was strapped to the weather rail, including our back packs and rifles. Rifles required constant cleaning and oiling against salt from misty sea spray to prevent rusting of rifle bores. In the wake of Typhoon Jane with her 110 mph winds and forty-foot waves, a second typhoon, Typhoon Kezia with winds of the 125 mph, was crossing the path of the Chromite armada of 260 ships crossing the Korean strait.
In the wake of the Marines at Inchon on the 18th, the 7th Division landed and split its force of two regiments. The 32nd moved towards Seoul as Marine support. On the 19th, the 31st moved some 20 miles southwest of Inchon to complete the capture of Suwon and its air strip. [A side note: Here the 7th Division did what the Marine commander would not do later at Chosin--split two regiments by miles, one heading north and the other heading south. The regiment was unable to secure its own flanks. Almond was, indeed, spreading us thin. The inferior force moved on an objective in "two different directions," something the Marine commander would not do at Chosin. At Camp Crawford in Japan, this motto was over one building: "The difficult we do immediately. The impossible takes a little longer." While the timeframe to load and land at Inchon was under way, Walker was still short his troops. He was given no replacements on the line itself, for he had lost the 1st Marine Brigade earlier to X Corps. This latter became a separate command. All of MacArthur's available forces were in Korea, which tipped the scales number-wise in favor of the UN forces in Korea.
Japan was stripped bare of all American ground forces. "Should Moscow or Peking's reaction to Inchon include an overt or covert threat to Japan, there would be no way America could defend Japan." MacArthur had gambled and won here as well. That neither nation took advantage of the weakened condition and situation in Japan (while no one else in Washington seemed to be overly concerned) was again evidence that no National State of Emergency would be declared at this time of uncertainty. The remarks between President Truman and Premier Stalin over the Port of Dairen should have been revisited for possible intervention by the Soviet Union in moving forces into Hokkaido on or after the Inchon Invasion. Here, it seemed a trade off had been agreed upon concerning Dairen and Hokkaido to accept Japanese surrender there and occupy this northern island.
After World War II, the Soviet Union was going to land forces on Hokkaido. The United States wanted to expand the parallel line upward to the 39th Parallel to include Dairen/Port Arthur. Surely any movement of military ships above Inchon into the Yellow Sea above the 38th Parallel and into Korean Bay east of China, which was weak in naval forces, could be considered (in my mind) more of an aggressive move toward the Russian shipping zones than the war in Korea itself, particularly given the fact of our stated support for the forces of Generalissimo Chaing-Kai-shek on Formosa.
Militarily, it was madness to have these forces spread all over in that fashion, but it was not the fault of the lowly private in the ranks, nor should it have been. Nevertheless, the mission was carried out with a reduced force. MacArthur's keen sense of timing proved true one last time. But from there on, something drastic happened to all military planning. Individual commands and lack of timetables were discarded, while the next operation for X Corps was set for October 20 (t would not be executed until October 26) at Wonsan in North Korea. The JCS had their doubts about Inchon. It was asinine for them to believe that Russia would move in Europe and not Japan when the latter was wide open to invasion.
We had neither equipment nor forces in the Far East, nor reserves in the states, to protect Japan. Yet, MacArthur elected to use all forces for Korea, as the JCS had no immediate concern to secure the void left in Japan. In reality, the JCS didn't have a clue as to how they could provide MacArthur with any given number of forces for the Korean Peninsula. There was never a reason in the Korean War explaining or justifying why our forces had to be committed to battle in a piece meal basis. Twenty-four hours (or twenty-four days) would have made little difference to the situation end date.
Russian capability of producing nuclear weapon had more so than ever made Russia a bigger threat to our forces world wide. But without fear, MacArthur left Japan devoid of all American ground forces with the removal of the 7th Division for Inchon. He was firm even at those Congressional Hearings in 1951. Before the Korean War even began, he believed that the Russian government would not intervene in such a war. While he did not assume or have responsibility directly for Korea in early 1950, his responsibility was to protect Japan at all times. He ended up with both responsibilities and at Inchon won both places. Later, when he was relieved of his Far East Command, he said in a Congressional hearing that, "There is no question about the war being in Korea. There is a great question whether the war would extend some place else. 'You have got a war on your hand's , and you can't say; Let the war go on indefinitely while I prepare for some other war,' unless you pay for it by the thousand and thousand and thousand of American boy's." The decision and disclaimer that the forces in power did not fully understand the diplomatic repercussion of our move into North Korea itself--and that MacArthur was to blame, was a shift of responsibility from the State Department to a military field commander. There was no precedent in our constitution to shift such responsibility, JCS or otherwise.
MacArthur had nevertheless taken a tremendous gamble when he left Japan wide open. His prime dispute originated over the safety of his forces and continued over reinforcements and replacements for those on the battlefield. Reinforcements and replacements were reciprocal brothers in inverse proportion to the safety of those forces already facing the enemy on that battlefront. Surely MacArthur had a lot on his mind that eve of the Inchon Invasion. The stakes were high. The gamble was his alone. The show was a total MacArthur production; thus, if it failed it would have been entirely his responsibility.
Prior to the landing MacArthur made this statement about the coming invasion:
"That night about half past two, I took a turn around the deck. The ship was blacked out from stem to stern. At their posts and battle stations the crew members were alert and silent, no longer exchanging the customary banter. At the bow I stood listing to the rush of the sea and watched the fiery sparkle's of phosphorescence as the dark ship plowed toward the target, the armada of other craft converging on the same area, all now past the point of no return. Within five hours, 40,000 men would act boldly, in the hope that 100 ,000 others manning the thin defense line in South Korea would not die, I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the dreadful results would rest on judgment day against my soul."
But, Inchon did not fail. MacArthur's "keen sense of timing" proved true one last time. His greatest achievement proved to be his last. It was the "old soldier's" last gift from MARS, that God of War. There were no more in store for him. Yet, MacArthur himself always hated employing his chosen career. In his address to Congress after being relieved of his command, he state, "It has been said that I was, in effect, a war monger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few men living today know it, and nothing to me is more revolting... but once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very objective is victory-not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory."
MacArthur's 'victory' over North Korea was achieved with Inchon. The only thing remaining was the capture of Seoul....
[1] And it was never declared. Germany would declare war on the United States, some days later. Recall my redundant fact here in Korea that no State of Emergency was ever issued until 16 December 1950.
[2] "I protested bitterly," Smith said; "'because the regiment was made up of forty percent South Koreans who couldn't speak English." His second dispute and he had not been in any action yet. A pattern has formed here before hitting the beach. a hostile breeding ground has developed for the disorder of the entire command, and hostility of general against general. Here is where "Ego's" would begin to soar.
[Author's Note: A large part of this chapter contains research by Roy Appleman, in the GPO Army history, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.]
While I have already stated that Admiral James Doyle and Major General Smith worked well together, prior to the Inchon landing, it appears that the catch word was 'together.' With Smith ashore, Admiral Doyle worked closely with X Corps Commander Almond on his urgency to land the 7th Division at Inchon. This was three days premature to Smith declaring the beach secure and Almond assuming full X Corps command over all ground forces ashore. While Smith had objected to using the Army's 32nd Infantry Regiment, Almond’s aggressive nature had its own schedule to activate.
During this time, other combat elements of X Corps had arrived to join in the battle for Seoul. On the 16th, the 7th Division arrived in Inchon harbor and Almond encouraged Admiral Doyle to hasten their unloading. General Almond was anxious to get them into supporting positions to block any possible enemy movement from the roads south of Seoul. Whether Smith knew it, approved it, or didn't, this plan created a buffer zone as a defensive rear guard to block any North Korean forces. It blocked those forces cut off south of Inchon.
The 2nd Battalion of the 32d Regiment landed during the morning of the 18th, and the rest of the regiment landed later in the day. On the morning of 19 September, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, moved up to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, in its position on the right flank south of the Seoul highway. It completed the relief without incident by noon. The total effective strength of the 32nd Infantry when it went on line was 5,114 men: 3,241 Americans (63%) and 1,873 (37%) ROKs. Responsibility for the zone south of the highway passed to the 7th Division at 191800 September. During the day, the 31st Regiment of the 7th Division came ashore at Inchon.
Admiral Sherman (JCS) had great concern about the availability of a full Marine division for the landing. However, after President Truman’s approval of the landing, he stated, "It must be assumed that the operation will not be delayed and if two battalions are late, the division will fight without them." [1] This highlights that Smith had no great input over the quantity of his force or their time of arrival, for in spite of Admiral Sherman's urging, the 7th Marines with accompanying troops did not embark from the United States until September 3, reaching Korea on the 21st too late for the landing. So Smith was short one full regiment of his Marines. If he harbored any objection over this, it must have been with Admiral Sherman and the Department of the Navy, not Almond.
On 21 September, two major developments occurred that were to affect future tactical operations. First, the third regiment of the 1st Marine Division--the 7th Marines--arrived in Inchon harbor and began unloading. Second, and more importantly, the command of the land operation passed from Admiral Struble to General Almond who, at 1800 hours, assumed full command of the Seoul operation ashore at the X Corps command post in Inchon. At this time, there were 49,568 persons, 5,356 vehicles, and 22,222 tons of cargo ashore. General Almond assumed full command of all land operations--or so it seemed.
After their failure during the night of 21-22 September to drive a Marine company from its advanced position at the eastern edge of Yongdungpo, the North Koreans apparently abandoned the city before daybreak. The 1st Marines occupied the city the next morning. On the left, they reached the destroyed railroad and highway bridges over the Han River two miles east of Yongdungpo. The 87th Regiment of the North Korean 9th Division and elements of the North Korean 18th Division had defended Yongdungpo. One battalion of the 87th Regiment reportedly suffered 80 percent casualties in the fighting there. Prisoners revealed that this regiment had left Kumch'on on 16 September to reinforce the Seoul area, traveling in trains that hid in tunnels during the day. It had arrived in the Yongdungpo area on 20 September, barely in time to enter the fight there.
On the 22nd, the 1st Marine Division issued an operations order setting forth its plan for the seizure of Seoul. The plan contemplated that the 1st Marine Division would capture the city. But that same day, General Almond introduced one change in the plan. He indicated that the ROK Marines and the ROK 17th Regiment were also to be committed to securing the city. Almond stated, "I think that General Smith thought it would be a great accomplishment for the Marine Division single-handed, to capture Seoul but he wasn't in the speed of mind I was." [2]
As the 1st Marine Division fought its way along the Inchon-Seoul highway and into Yongdungpo, the 7th Division protected its right flank and engaged and cut off enemy units moving toward the battle area from the south. An extensive minefield delayed the 32nd Regiment on the 20th as it attacked toward Anyang-ni where it was to cut the Seoul-Suwon highway. Exploding mines damaged three tanks of A Company, 73rd Tank Battalion, and completely blocked the narrow dirt road the column was following. Colonel Beauchamp, the regimental commander, had a narrow escape. A mine destroyed his jeep, killing the driver and wounding the radio operator a few minutes after he had left it. Engineer troops removed more than 150 mines from this field. During the day, the regiment captured T'ongdok Mountain and part of Copper Mine Hill. On the 21st, the 32nd Infantry seized the rest of Copper Mine Hill. It also captured the high ground two miles south of Yongdungpo and Hill 300, the high ground immediately northeast of Anyang-ni.
The 7th Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at Anyang-ni at 1430. When darkness fell, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry held blocking positions astride the Suwon highway two miles south of Anyang-ni. The 1st Battalion held the road east and the high ground northeast of the town, and elements of the regimental combat team established contact northward at Toksan-ni with the 2nd Battalion, where the latter had captured a considerable quantity of ordnance and medical supplies.
After arriving at Anyang-ni with the Reconnaissance Company, Maj. Irwin A. Edwards, Assistant G-2, 7th Division, received radio orders from the division to turn south to Suwon and secure the airfield below the town. Approximately at 1600, 2nd Lt. Jesse F. Van Sant, commanding a tank platoon, took the point with his tanks and, followed by the Reconnaissance Company and Major Edwards, started toward Suwon. Naval aircraft bombed Suwon just before they arrived there at 1800, destroying a large wooden structure on top of the ancient great stone wall at its East Gate. Debris from this structure blocked the gateway and forced the company to turn aside to find another entrance into the town. At this point, Lt. Col. Henry Hampton, 7th Division G-3, arrived from Anyang-ni with a platoon of B Company, 18th Engineer Combat Battalion, and joined the group.
Hampton and Edwards, with two enlisted men, led the column through the streets. Near the center of Suwon, the four men surprised two North Korean officers in the act of trying to escape in an American jeep. Edwards shot the driver. The other officer, a major in the North Korean 105th Armored Division, surrendered. The armored column engaged in some street fighting with scattered groups of enemy soldiers, capturing thirty-seven North Koreans. Three miles south of Suwon, the column went into a perimeter defense astride the highway. Being without maps, it had unwittingly passed the airfield a mile back up the road.
About 2100, a full moon rose and Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, having lost radio contact with the Reconnaissance Company, decided to send an armored force toward Suwon to find it. Colonel Hampton and the platoon of engineers had already loaded into a truck and gone ahead. Task Force Hannum, named after its commander, Lt. Col. Calvin S. Hannum, commanded the 73rd Tank Battalion. The 73rd started from Anyang-ni at 2125. It was a motorized force, comprised of: B Company, 73rd Tank Battalion; the battalion Advance Command Group; K Company, 32nd Infantry; C Battery, 48th Field Artillery Battalion; and a medical detachment. The force hurried south in the moonlight with all possible speed. Lt. Col. John W. Paddock, 7th Division G-2, accompanied it. On the way to Suwon, Colonel Paddock established radio contact with Major Edwards and asked for guides to direct him and his force into the perimeter.
Hannum's armored column reached Suwon near midnight. They found the East Gate blocked, and turned aside to enter the town from another point through the ancient stone wall that girded the town on that side. Inside the town, an enemy tank hidden behind a building opened fire on the leading American tank, knocking it out with one shot and killing Capt. Harold R. Beavers, the B Company tank commander who was inside it. In the fight that flared in the next few minutes, other American tanks destroyed the Russian T34, but a second enemy tank escaped. Hannum's force tried to follow it, but became lost at the edge of town. Hannum decided to wait for daylight rather than to risk another enemy tank ambush in the darkness.
Meanwhile, Edwards' party in its perimeter south of Suwon heard the sound of tanks northward. Lieutenant Van Sant thought their clatter sounded like T34's, but the others discounted his comments and hastened preparations to send a party to meet Hannum. Major Edwards put a Korean civilian and eight men from the Reconnaissance Company into two jeeps. Colonel Hampton said he would go along and possibly continue on to rejoin the 7th Division headquarters at Anyang-ni. The party started with Edwards driving the first of four jeeps. A mile northward, Edwards saw four tanks approaching in the moonlight. He flicked his lights in a recognition signal for what he thought was Hannum's lead tank. The tank stopped. Then suddenly its machine guns started firing, and it came on toward the halted vehicles. The men jumped from the jeeps and scrambled into the ditches. Colonel Hampton, however, started toward the tank waving his arms, evidently still thinking them friendly. Machinegun fire cut him down and the oncoming tank crunched into Edwards' jeep. Edwards escaped and rejoined the Reconnaissance Company the next morning.
The North Korean tanks rumbled on south, and a few minutes later the first one entered the Reconnaissance Company's perimeter. Just ahead of it, an escapee from the jeep party ran into the perimeter and gave the alarm. The second enemy tank reached the edge of the perimeter. Van Sant gave the order to fire. The American M26 tanks destroyed both T34's at point-blank range of forty yards or less. The other two T34's turned and clattered back toward Suwon.
At daylight, Hannum led his armored column south through the deserted town. Below it, he passed the crushed jeeps and the bodies of Hampton and two or three other men killed there. At midmorning, Hannum's armored force joined the Reconnaissance Company at Suwon Airfield where Major Edwards had moved it and Van Sant's tanks at daybreak. Before noon, Col. Richard P. Ovenshine's 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division (less the 3rd Battalion in division reserve) arrived at Suwon and relieved Task Force Hannum at the airfield. The Reconnaissance Company then reconnoitered south toward Osan. Task Force Hannum rejoined the 7th Division in the Anyang-ni area.
The big event of 22 September was securing Suwon Airfield and opening it to United Nations air traffic. This field, 21 miles south of Seoul, could accommodate the large C-54 transport planes with its 5,200-foot runway. Meanwhile, seven miles northeast of Anyang-ni, enemy forces succeeded in ambushing the lead platoon of B Company, 32nd Infantry, and badly disorganizing it. Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., the 1st Battalion commander, withdrew B Company two miles, to the vicinity of Kwanmun-dong, closely pursued by the enemy. There, the battalion checked the North Koreans. During the day, Lt. Col. Charles M. Mount's 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, seized the series of hills from one to two miles south of the rail and highway bridges that crossed the Han into Seoul. On 23 September, the 1st Battalion [Faith’s] captured its objective, Hill 290. This hill, three miles below the Han River and seven miles southeast of Yongdungpo, dominated the approaches to the Han River and Seoul from that direction.
In a pre-dawn attack on the morning of 24 September, Mount's battalion caught North Koreans asleep in their positions and overran them. In this surprise action, the battalion captured a regimental headquarters and much equipment. It also broke the remaining enemy strength close to the south bank of the river opposite Seoul. During the day, the battalion cleared the south bank of the Han in the fold of the river southeast of the city. This made possible an important action the next morning.
While the 7th Division was securing X Corps' southern flank, the heaviest fighting in the battle for Seoul began at the city's western edge on 22 September and lasted four days. The North Korean defense line at the western edge of Seoul was anchored at the north on Hill 296 just south of the Kaesong highway and west of Seoul's Sodaemun Prison. From the crest of Hill 296, the North Korean line curved in a gentle half-moon eastward and southward down spur ridges two and a half miles to the Han River, the concave side facing west toward the United Nations troops. The greater part of this uneven ridge line was dominated by three hills each 105 meters high, and accordingly known as Hills 105. Hills 105 North and 105 Center lay north of the rail and highway lines running into Seoul along the northern bank of the Han River. Hill 105 South lay between the rail and road lines and the river. Hills 105 Center and 105 South completely dominated the Pusan-to-Manchuria Kyonggi main rail line and the road that passed through the saddle between them to enter the city. These hills had been a training area for Japanese troops during the period of Japanese domination, and since then for both South and North Korean soldiers. The area was well-covered with various types of field fortifications and susceptible to quick organization for defense. The main railroad station and Government House lay in the center of Seoul two miles east of these positions.
At noon on 23 September, General Smith ordered the 7th Marines, which had begun unloading at Inchon on the 21st, to cross the Han and come up behind the 5th Marines. During the day, X Corps headquarters moved from Inchon to Ascom City, about halfway to Seoul on the main Inchon-Seoul highway. At 2200 on the night of 23 September, the division issued an operations order, confirming earlier verbal orders, directing the 1st Marines to cross the Han River early the next morning.
After daylight on the 24th, elements of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, started down the finger ridge from Hill 296, hoping to outflank the enemy in front of the 2nd Battalion in the center. Simultaneously, D Company moved out in assault against the ridge line. A heavy morning mist shrouded the company as it crossed the low ground and reached the base of Hill 66. Unexpectedly, the lead elements came upon enemy troops in their trenches. Neither side saw the other because of the fog and smoke until they were at close quarters. A grenade battle started immediately.
During the morning of 24 September, the 1st Marines began crossing the Han from Yongdungpo in the shadow of Hill 105 South, where the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, protected the crossing site. Before dark, the regiment had crossed to the north side and the 1st and 2nd Battalions had taken over from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, the southern flank of the Marine line at the western edge of Seoul. By now the 7th Marines had moved up on the left flank of the 5th Marines, with the mission of cutting across the northern edge of Seoul and blocking escape routes there. The 3rd Battalion of the 187th Airborne Regiment airlifted from Ashiya, Japan, to Kimpo Airfield on the 24th, and upon arrival there assumed responsibility for the airfield.
On the morning of 25 September, two platoons of tanks from B Company, 1st Tank Battalion, including two dozer tanks and a section of flame-throwing tanks, accompanied by a platoon of engineers and another of infantry, set out to join the 1st Marines in Seoul. Near the base of Hill 105 South, an enemy force with several antitank guns ambushed the column. The fighting was heavy and the outcome in doubt for several minutes.
Readers of this manuscript need to be aware that each of the following paragraphs are extremely important. Understanding them is an important prerequisite to understanding the Army experience at the Chosin Reservoir. The events mentioned in the following eight paragraphs connect to events that happened two months later at the Chosin Reservoir. Readers will also soon see an important declassified Operation Orders concerning the Chosin Reservoir Campaign. [3]
By this time, an important change had taken place in the plan to capture Seoul. The original operations plan required the 1st Marine Division to clear the city, but the expected capture of Seoul by the Marines was moving behind schedule. The stubborn enemy defense had denied the 1st Marine Division any important advance for three days. General Almond grew increasingly impatient. Seoul was a symbol in the Korean War, just as Paris, Rome, and Berlin had been in World War II. It was a political, psychological, and military target. General MacArthur desired to capture the city as soon as possible and restore the Korean capital to its people. [4]
Here began the important change and relationship to the Chosin Reservoir action that occurred on Day One--24 November--a mere two months away. The foundation for the envelopment, destruction, and complete withdrawal of any and all reference to the 31st RCT--their credentials--for involvement in the Chosin Reservoir campaign and history's intentional neglect, begins in the following paragraphs. The coming events at Chosin were a direct replay of the events at Seoul. In fact, it is my firm opinion that the events at Inchon were a prime reason for removal of orders as written by Colonel Allan D. MacLean. [5] His written operational orders concerned the relocation of the 32nd Infantry and MacLean’s own 31st RCT. They originated in South Korea and reappeared again within the North Korean phase of the Chosin campaign. The events at Chosin two months later on the same date of the month were fatal to the 31st RCT.
The cause and effect of the destruction of the 31st RCT has never been completely revealed or published, except within these research pages posted on the Korean War Educator. Reminiscent of accusations and disputes still to come at Chosin, note specifically that Almond did not change or interfere with Smith’s division operational orders. However, Almond did issue an ‘ultimatum’ to Smith at Inchon.
Dissatisfied with the Marines' progress, on 23 September General Almond told General Smith that he could continue his frontal assaults, but that he strongly urged him to use the space south of the Han River for an envelopment maneuver by the 1st Marines. Smith was unwilling to act on Almond's suggestion because he wanted to unite the 1st and 5th Marines on the north side of the Han instead of having them on opposite sides of the river. Almond told Smith that he would give him twenty-four more hours to make headway. If Smith could not, Almond said he would ‘change division boundaries’ and bring the 7th Infantry Division and its 32d Regiment into the battle for the envelopment of the enemy defenses in Seoul. Restating the important point from above, "Smith was unwilling to act on Almond's suggestion." [Author’s note: I have been informed that, in the Marine Corps, a "suggestion" by an officer is interchangeable terminology for an "order." [6] A disputable question is posed here. Who was officially in charge at that time--Almond or Smith? As is evident, it could not be both. Note as well the suggestion was given directly to Smith. "Even their own General Shepherd afterward challenged the sluggishness of O.P. Smith's move into Seoul: If a man who is in command of a pursuit is someone who likes to have his ranks dressed all the time, you might just as well not pursue." [7]
On the morning of 24 September, the North Koreans still held the Marines at the west edge of Seoul. About 0930 General Almond arrived at 7th Division headquarters and conferred with General Barr, the 7th Division commander; Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, assistant 7th Division commander; and Col. Louis T. Heath, the division chief of staff. Almond told Barr that he had tentatively decided that the 7th Division would attack across the Han River into Seoul the next morning. Almond then returned to his command post and there told Colonel Paik, commander of the ROK 17th Regiment, that he expected to attach his regiment to the 32d Infantry for the attack on Seoul.
His mind now made up, Almond called a commander's conference to meet with him at 1400 at Yongdungpo Circle. Present besides Almond were Generals Smith, Barr, and Hodes; Colonels Forney, (Marine Corps amphibious expert attached to X Corps planning staff) and Beauchamp; and Col. John H. Chiles (Almond’s G-3). In this open-air meeting, Almond quickly told the assembled commanders that he was changing the boundary between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division [8], and that the 32d Regiment, with the ROK 17th Regiment attached, would attack across the Han River into Seoul at 0600 the next morning. The meeting was brief. At its conclusion, the officers dispersed at once to make their respective plans. [9]
In the afternoon and evening, X Corps attached the ROK 17th Regiment, the Marine 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion (less one company), and two platoons of A Company, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, to the 7th Division to support the crossing. [10] Here Smith protested Almond’s action of attaching the Marine units to the 7th Division. He stated that they were Marine property. Almond’s reported reply was, "They are the property of the United States Government, and I intend to use them." [11]
South Mountain (Nam-san) extended from the river northwest two miles into the heart of Seoul, culminating in a peak 900 feet high--the highest point in the city--about one mile east of the main Seoul rail station. A long, ridge-like, shallow saddle connected this peak with a slightly lower one. On a western finger ridge of the main peak near the 350-foot elevation and only half a mile from the rail station, was a large shrine and a formally landscaped park. From the western base of South Mountain, a long series of steps led up to this shrine and park. Viewing Seoul on a north-south axis, the peak of South Mountain was halfway into the city. Government House lay two miles away at the northern edge of the city. The main highway and rail line running east out of the city passed about a mile beyond the northern base of South Mountain. On this mountain nearly three months before, a company of ROK soldiers had conducted the last action in the defense of Seoul, dying, it has been said, to the last man.
The 32d Infantry's mission was first to seize and secure South Mountain, then to secure Hill 120 situated two miles eastward at the southeast edge of Seoul. Finally, it was to seize and secure Hill 348, a large, high hill mass five miles east of Seoul that dominated the highway and rail line entering the city from that side. At the time, the regiment had its strength reduced to 4,912 men (5,114) as it prepared for the crossing. It consisted of 3,110 Americans (3,241) and 1,802 ROKs. (1,873)
Before daybreak of the 25th, General Hodes established an advanced division command post near the river from which he directed the crossing operation. At 0400, General Almond, Admiral Struble, and members of the corps staff departed the X Corps headquarters at Ascom City to watch the crossing of the 32d Regiment. General Barr went forward at 0430 to the 32d Infantry's command post. An hour later, he and Colonel Beauchamp left for an observation post near the river. At 0600, the 48th Field Artillery Battalion began firing a 30-minute artillery preparation and the heavy mortars joined in to pound the cliffs lining the opposite side beyond the river bank.
Colonel Mount's 2nd Battalion, selected to make the assault crossing, loaded into amphibious tractors in its assembly area and at 0630, F Company started across the Han. A ground fog obscured the river area. The entire 2nd Battalion reached the north bank without loss of personnel or equipment. The 2nd Battalion hurried across the narrow river beach, scaled the 30-to 60-foot cliffs, and moved rapidly to the slopes of South Mountain. An hour after the first troops had crossed the river, the bright morning sun dispersed the ground fog. Air strikes then came in on South Mountain and Hill 120. Apparently this crossing surprised the North Koreans, for their works on South Mountain were only lightly manned.
The 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Faith, followed the 2nd across the Han. At 0830, it started to move east along the river bank toward Hill 120. Just after noon, the 3td Battalion crossed the river and followed the 1st Battalion eastward, passing through it to occupy Hill 120. The 1st Battalion then took a position between the 3rd and 2nd Battalions. The ROK 17th Regiment crossed the Han immediately behind the 3rd Battalion and moved to the extreme right flank of the 32nd Infantry line where, at 2150, it began an all-night attack toward Hill 348. While the rest of the regiment crossed the Han behind it and moved eastward, the 2nd Battalion climbed the slopes of South Mountain, reaching and clearing the summit against moderate resistance by 1500. Once there, it immediately began digging in on a tight perimeter.
The North Koreans did not counterattack South Mountain as quickly as expected. The night passed tensely but quietly for the waiting 2nd Battalion. Finally, at 0430 on the morning of the 26th, the soldiers heard tanks moving about and the sound of automatic weapons fire to their front. In semi-darkness, half an hour later a large enemy force estimated to number approximately 1,000 men violently counterattacked the 2nd Battalion perimeter on top of South Mountain.
On the higher western knob of the mountain, G Company held its position against this attack, but on the lower eastern knob, North Koreans overran F Company. Using all its reserves, Colonel Mount's battalion finally restored its positions at 0700 after two hours of battle, driving the surviving enemy down the slopes. Mount's men counted 110 enemy dead within its perimeter and 284 more outside for a total of 394 enemy killed. They took 174 prisoners. E Company mopped up enemy troops on the rear slopes of the mountain and in the area at its base near the river. Later in the morning, elements of the 1st Battalion had a sharp engagement in the streets immediately north of South Mountain, capturing there some eighty enemy soldiers who were apparently a remnant of the force that had counterattacked South Mountain.
To the east, on the morning of the 26th, the 1st Battalion engaged in a heavy fire fight while the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Heinrich G. Schumann, advanced from Hill 120 toward Hill 348, four miles farther east. In this advance, L Company saw a large column of enemy troops on the highway leaving Seoul. The company commander, 1st Lt. Harry J. McCaffrey, Jr., seized the opportunity for surprise and immediately ordered his men to attack. His initiative paid off. In the ensuing action, L Company killed about 500 North Korean soldiers, destroyed 5 tanks, destroyed or captured more than 40 vehicles, 3 artillery pieces, 7 machine guns, 2 ammunition dumps, much clothing and POL products, and overran and captured a large headquarters of corps size. It may have been the principal enemy headquarters in the defense of Seoul. By mid-afternoon (26 September) the ROK 17th Regiment had captured Hills 348 and 292 dominating the highway four miles east of Seoul. That evening, the 32nd Infantry and the ROK 17th Regiment cleared their zone free from the enemy, and E Company established contact with the Marines on the regimental left at the western base of South Mountain.
About twenty hours earlier, just before midnight of the 25th, General Almond had announced the liberation of Seoul, three months to the day after the North Koreans began the invasion. Almond apparently based his announcement on air reports of North Korean evacuation of the city and the seizure of South Mountain during the day. On the 26th, General MacArthur signed and released United Nations Command Communiqué 9 at 1410, announcing the fall of Seoul. The communiqué said in part, "Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea, is again in friendly hands. United Nations forces, including the 17th Regiment of the ROK Army and elements of the U.S. 7th and 1st Marine Divisions, have completed the envelopment and seizure of the city." [12] In subsequent communiqués MacArthur made no mention of further fighting in Seoul, confining comment to combat operations in the Suwon area south of the city.
Here MacArthur ignored any further opposition over the capture of Seoul. However, he gave credit to both elements of the U.S. 7th and 1st Marine Divisions in its capture. This neglect angered the Marines to no end, as did the natural flow of other events overshadowing their efforts at Seoul. For example, the link up of Eighth Army with the 7th Division X Corps at Suwon, and MacArthur’s confining comment to combat operations in the Suwon area south of the city deprived the Marines of their much sought PR coverage for their division.
Regardless of the varied opinions of who captured Seoul, the 1st Marine Division promulgated the fact that they did it completely by themselves. They could have filled the spaces used by the 32nd Infantry, and they could then have all the glory. But Smith held them back and Almond changed the game plan--as he did in the upcoming 'cause and effect' of entrapment of the 31st & 32nd Infantry at Chosin. There, too, the Marines missed their chance to review all options open--options, recommended by Almond. But, history does not record the Marine Corps utilizing those options or that, because of that failure to utilize the options at hand, they lost the sole glory of seizing Seoul. The animosity between the egos of Smith and Almond soared to new heights and continued to expand at a rapid rate. Sadly, the 32nd & 31st RCT were committed to the disaster awaiting them at the Chosin reservoir in North Korea.
In hindsight, we should have remained spread out along the 38th Parallel to protect that area and await reaction from China. But, in haste, the ROK Army gave chase immediately across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. The 1st Marine Division had boarded ships at Inchon and was heading toward the northeast coast of Korea, while the 7th Division began a road march to Pusan. The intended integration of X Corps into General Walker’s Eighth Army was aborted and changed by MacArthur. It was a political move to separate all X Corps forces from his command because the two commands could not share the same territory as separate commands. This also should be kept in mind to fully understand the upcoming Chosin drama. A boundary line separating Eighth Army from X Corps was of prime importance between these two commands. Once merged, the X Corps would be immediately OPCON to Eighth Army.
Another sad reality of the planning for the Inchon Landing was the common disrespect, jealousy, and dislike of the fact that MacArthur had been given command of the entire operation in the Far East. There were many bruised egos. The disrespect for MacArthur began (and possibly actually never ended from World War II) before the first forces were committed to combat. Such disrespect would have seemed treasonous under the latter war's standards. Thus, it was a new precedent for generals and admirals to jockey for higher positions in matters of their own importance. Still, there were more separate commanders, generals, admirals, commands and commanders--ROKs and all UN forces--placed under MacArthur’s control than before. Certainly each and every commander--more so the ones directly in charge of ground forces--were of the opinion that they had been sacrificed and committed to an action with no reinforcements to back up their actions. Some forces, selected by fate, were the luck of the draw, and found themselves surrounded and overwhelmed by enemy forces, cut off from supply lines, and left to die on the vine. These men could almost predict disaster before they were committed to the action. There was an old adage among the ground forces from wars past which stated, "Ours is not to wonder why, ours is but to do or die."
Recalling that the success at Inchon was possible because of the combined efforts of the Eighth Army in holding the Pusan Perimeter against overwhelming odds and without the challenge to top superior authority is a credit, not a disgrace, to the young troops who gave their lives in defense of that perimeter. The obedience of these Army line officers to execute the orders given to them without any rebellion by them, failed to be mentioned or considered in replacing any commander. CG Almond simply replaced those with whom he was not satisfied. One of them was Colonel Richard P. Overshine of the 31st Infantry Regiment. He was replaced by Colonel Allan D. MacLean. MacLean was transferred from staff duty in Walker’s Eighth Army. "While Almond and Smith were outwardly civil, they grew to hate each other. Smith resented being under any army commander of any sort, and came as close to getting insubordinate as he could be." [13]
Smith’s refusal to accept Almond’s impromptu plan electrified the atmosphere. "Almond was appalled at the tantamount insubordination of Smith’s argumentative refusals. Given Almond’s propensity to relieve subordinates who gave him dissatisfaction, it was obvious that Smith’s globe and anchor saved him from sacking." [14] However, due to past interservice rivalry events of WW II, Almond knew he had to use extreme caution in any consideration to replace General Smith of the Marines, no matter how much he may have wanted to do that. It is evident that, had Smith been an Army officer, Almond would have relieved him yesterday. Almond’s caution and timidity to react at Seoul created a cancer within X Corps--one that grew without treatment in South Korea, and was allowed to grow even larger during the next months. That cancer spread into North Korean operations, and its eventual growth required sacrificing combat units much like severing limbs. Even though this cancer was diagnosed early, it was allowed to continue its growth without arrest.
The success of the Inchon Landing relieved the pressure on Eighth Army and allowed a link-up of that force with the X Corps at the 38th Parallel. For all intents and purposes, the war was over. The North Korean Army south of the 38th Parallel had been defeated. The X Corps could be deactivated, or, as intended, be made a part of Eighth Army. But fate and politics had much more in store for these forces in North Korea on the closing days of November and in early December of 1950.
The United States X-Corps numbered less than 70,000 men. Included as its major units were the 1st Marine Division, minus its 7th Regiment; the 7th Infantry Division, minus its 17th Regiment; the 92nd and 96th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion; the 19th Engineering Combat Group; and the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. The 187th Regimental Combat Team from the 11th Airborne Division, en route on September 6, with about 4,400 men, arrived on September 20.
The 7th Marine Regiment arrived on September 21, as did the displaced 17th Regiment of the 7th Division. The 1st Marine Division had a strength of 25,040 men. Included were some 2,760 attached Army forces and some 2,786 Korean Marines. With the arrival of the 7th Marine Regiment, another 4,000 men were added. The 7th Infantry Division had approximately 10,000 men. Of this group of men, one third were at Chosin as players within that drama yet to come, inclusive of ROKs minus the 17th Infantry Regiment in floating reserve off Pusan some 180 air miles in the sea of Japan. An exercise for North Korea yet to come, that regiment was an equal road mile distant between Task Force MacLean and Faith, they being on the Yalu River. The latter forces were at the Chosin Reservoir.
The Inchon-Seoul victory cost the United Nations forces approximately 3,500 casualties. The 7th Infantry Division suffered 572 battle casualties, including 106 killed, 409 wounded, and 57 missing in action. Of the total, 166 were ROK soldiers integrated into the division. Within the division, the 32nd Regiment lost 66 killed, 272 wounded, and 47 missing. [15] The total accounting here includes the ROK force--as it should. They were "attached" to the 7th Division as fillers, not as separate individual units. Note as well that the Army doesn’t list those who died of wounds received. The time space between those casualties would be hard to gauge without reference of some kind.
The heaviest losses in X Corps occurred in the 1st Marine Division, which suffered total casualties of 2,383 men*-364 killed, 53 who died of wounds, 1,961 wounded, and 5 missing. Marine losses were heaviest for the six days from 21 to 27 September. During that time it suffered 1,482 battle casualties, the greatest single day's loss being 285 on 24 September. [16]
[Appleman, fn.66] X Corps WD, 30 Sep 50; 7th Div WD, Narr, 30 Sep 50; 32d Inf WD, 30 Sep 50; 1st Mar Div SAR, vol. I, p. 50, and an. A, G-1 Sec, p. 6; Smith, MS review comments, 25 Feb 54. In a letter to the author, 13 February 1954, General Smith claimed the 1st Marine Division suffered 2,430 battle casualties in the Inchon-Seoul operation. Montross and Canzona, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, page 297, gives Marine causalities as 366 KIA, 49 DOW, 6 MIA, and 2,029 WIA, for a total of 2,450. *The figure 2,383 is that given in Marine G-1 records cited.
In the above, the Marine Division G-1 was responsible for the accounting of all personnel in that division. Their records should be considered an ‘accurate one’ at the time they publish them. Appleman used those G-1 numbers. The Marines had three different numbers. Why the discrepancies? Why are the other two unofficial ones listed?
Since it marked a turning point in the Korean War, the middle of September 1950 is a good time to sum up the cost in American casualties thus far. From the beginning of the war to 15 September 1950, American battle casualties totaled 19,165 men. Of this number, 4,280 men were killed in action, 12,377 were wounded (of whom 319 died of wounds), 401 were reported captured, and 2,107 were reported missing in action. The first fifteen days of September brought higher casualties than any other 15-day period in the war--before or after--indicating the severity of the fighting at that time. [17] On October 1, 1950, South Korea was secure. Its government was reestablished. The 38th Parallel was again in friendly hands, The American forces had won what was lost. For the moment, the war was over.
[1] Here: Smith would accept the 32nd as replacement for the 7th Regiment of the Marines.
[2] At Chosin, Smith had three days of delay. Two days longer than here at Seoul.
[Author's Note: Chapter note; A large part of this chapter contains research by Roy Appleman, in the GPO Army history, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.]
On August 26, 1950, the X Corps was established and activated under the direct command authority of General Edward (Ned) Mallory Almond by General Order #24. Thereafter, the constant speed of Almond would shine forth. On September 21st, he assumed full and complete control ashore as Operation Chromite ceased to be an amphibious operation. It then became an inland ground command force, and Almond was in charge of that force as the corps commander. He exercised complete control of the mission from there on in, or (once again) so it seemed. What really happened to his superior authority in the military planning after the Inchon landing is hard to imagine. Regretfully, all controversy revolved around this X Corps commander and the individual commander of the 1st Marine Division. The problem itself requires some deep analysis of the situation as it existed between the Army and the Marine Corps at the time.
That some natural hostility existed between these two military branches of the armed forces is understandable to some degree. In World War II, the Marine role was one of amphibious operations. But the Corps was entirely too small in force size or divisional strength to invade and secure a beachhead on every island that was required to be invaded. That necessity therefore required that several combat Army divisions also be updated and trained to duplicate and become proficient in amphibious assaults, as well as retain their own combat roles as complete land assault forces. This additional amphibious training placed Army forces over and above the Marine Corps' primary mission, therefore diminishing the Marine role somewhat in future conflicts. Likewise, this also diminished some of the glory given solely to the Marine Corps. (Army-combined amphibious landings on D-day June 6, 1944 in the European Theater exceeded on that one day alone the entire landings by Marine Corps divisions in the entire Pacific Theater.) The Army ended World War II with a total of 28 amphibious divisions, while the Marine Corps never had more than six. The 28 Army divisions were doing what the Marine forces were solely and specifically trained to do. Each Army division assaulted and secured its own beachhead, then secured its own sector of whatever island had been assigned to it. All four of the occupation divisions stationed in Japan on the starting date of the Korean War had some amphibious trained men.
MacArthur used the Marines during the Inchon Invasion because he had to utilize every force he could muster. His plan for an amphibious landing had not been approved as such in using them. He was therefore required to structure his amphibious landing plan without them. [1] In his book Reminiscences, MacArthur stated that then Chief of Staff Omar Bradley was against amphibious operations because he considered them long obsolete. Bradley stirred up a storm when he called Navy personnel (including the Marines) "Fancy Dan’s." [2] President Truman was likewise opposed to using the Marines as a major unit of our armed forces. See his reference to "A Propaganda Machine" [3]
The very first dispute about the creation of X Corps was the choice of its commanding general. General MacArthur picked his own Chief of Staff, but General Almond also remained as his Chief of Staff, in essence wearing two hats. Still, it was implied that once the Inchon landing was over and a link between X Corps and Eighth Army was complete, full command of X Corps would then pass over to General Walton Walker. After the JCS reviewed the information from General Collins and Admiral Sherman, the plan was approved for the Inchon landing. The X Corps was born and formed for action under the command of Almond (1892-1979). It was said of him that he was one of the most controversial officers in the Korean War and that he was especially detested by the Marine officers who served under his direct command.
It seems inevitable that from its very creation the X Corps was cursed with animosity between the Army and Navy-Marine units. But it should also be highlighted that X Corps was only one of three corps (I- IX & X Corps) employed in the Korean War. The Marine Corps contribution to the Korean War involved only one single (reinforced) division in Korea. The X Corps under Almond was unfortunately assigned that one Marine Division, it being linked directly to the Army on the X Corps organizational chart, the same as the 7th and 3rd Infantry Divisions. The three ROK (Corps) divisions were also OPCON to Almond as well.
In North Korea, the Marines Corps had to share its portion of the blame. While we are in the process of picking and confirming any general for command in Korea, we should focus on the Corp's general, Oliver P. Smith (1893-1977). Many degrading remarks have been made about the Army occupation forces being green troops. Yet the Marine Corps had a green general placed in charge of his first divisional command. He was required to rapidly form the 1st Marine Division for Korea. This was in contrast to General Almond's record of commanding the 92nd Infantry Division in the Italian campaign during World War II.
So, some blame is directly due to the Marine selection of its own divisional commander, as well as Smith's objections to and delaying attitude to activate his X Corps orders on schedule. His much-reported, understandable, yet unjustified dislike for Almond filtered down to the lowest line forces as well. This was, indeed, an unfortunate situation. As I record, and as history itself records, it was a deadly one, especially for the 31st Infantry RCT at Chosin.
General Smith directly challenged Army orders, including orders from GHQ (General Headquarters) in Tokyo sent to X Corps G-3. G-3 staff also included some Marine personnel. Therefore, the final draft of any operation order (pending General Almond's approval) was then passed on to Smith via General Almond's direct authority. Any refusal to act on those orders was in direct defiance of the X Corps commander himself.
At Seoul, Almond compromised with Smith. That was a huge mistake. He should not have, as the problem involved several more Marine objections and X Corps compromise in North Korea as well. This formed an increasing pattern of demand for more compromise to come. In the main event at Chosin, there was no time for any more compromise. It was high noon at Chosin, and time had completely ran out. There was no more time for further delays. The resulting change of American forces proved to be deadly. There were enough enemy forces around to vent one's anger on, so there was no reason whatsoever for General Smith to blame other Americans or United Nations forces for a screw-up he himself had helped to create.
That this Marine commander did not like the Inchon landing site, the upcoming Wonsan landing site, or his inland mission at Chosin was well-recorded in accounts by Ridgway, Hammel, Blair, Knox, and Appleman. [4] These writers all reflected Smith’s attitude about his missions. He behaved as if he stood alone--as if the Army division commander did not face the same challenges that Smith's division faced: waging this budget war with far, far less men, less equipment and ammo, and less food supplies than the Marine commander had to face it with his one reinforced division in Korea. The Marine Corps' one division was supplied directly through the Department of The Navy.
Even from the very creation of X Corps, it seemed the order of the day that every effort be made to pacify and glorify the Marine units, even to the extent of disregarding those Army units involved in the same campaign. Indeed, in many cases mention of those Army units was not mentioned at all, especially Task Force MacLean, the battle of Heartbreak Ridge, or to imply that other Army actions were solely Marine actions instead of being a United States Army or a United Nations combined action.
In the taking of Seoul, it was reported and implied (by Marines) that it was a sole marine operation. Yet the Marines felt slighted in the taking of Seoul because they were not given full credit for it. The 32nd Infantry Regiment seized the highest point--South Mountain, which overlooked Seoul itself. That high ground, like Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima, received high press coverage as a symbol. Had the Marines taken it, they would have placed an American flag on top of it. The Army is never really concerned with symbolic notoriety. [5] The important point here is that Seoul was returned immediately to the Republic of Korea government and its people. Restoring their government was the sole purpose for our American forces liberating South Korea for the second time within five years after World War II. One point of no vital interest is that the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division had invested over three years after World War II guarding Seoul before being pulled out to relocate in Japan.
Does it really matter who took Seoul the first time? After all, it was lost again within six months. The most important time was the second time. Then, the United Nations Forces held it and the ROKs walked right in. Frankly, I don't believe the Army really cares if the Marines are given credit for both of these. The Army is entirely too big of a force to be concerned with one individual battle by one individual division, even though that division's historian notes each event.
I was in the 1st Cavalry before I was transferred into the 7th Division. I was updated on the 1st Cavalry pride in being first in Manila and first in Tokyo during World War II. They are only two of many collective battle streamers on their Cavalry divisional flag pole. It is a matter of pride for them, but of no real concern for those men who never served with that division. The Army soldier serving with the 2nd Division in Europe during World War II could care less about amphibious operations in the Pacific. They had their own involvement in the Atlantic amphibious operations there.
The Army history, Ebb and Flow by Billy C. Mossman was published in 1990, one year prior to the declassification of Operational Orders #23 and #24. These two orders are now available from the National Archives. It covers the time frame between November 1950 and July 1951, but lacks the latest information on updated events at the Chosin Reservoir. The author of Ebb and Flow placed more emphasis on the Chosin Reservoir action from the Marine Corps viewpoint and Marine sources than from Army sources. For example, the book relies on USMC General Smith's notes and chronicles as sources, rather than on the "hidden" facts that actually exist about the Army force of MacLean-Faith. [6] The Marine Corps history of the Chosin Reservoir was written and released in 1957. It, too, lacks updated events about the Korean War that are forgotten to history. In neither publication was sufficient space given to detail the many extra events associated with the six or more Army divisions that served in the Korean War.
General Smith's many interviews and notes stand alone in the history of Korea. They reflected his contempt for the Army forces fighting there, showing through in his remarks about "Army Jokers" in his reference to the survivors of Task Force Faith. Still more degrading remarks can be attributed to the Marine Public Relations officer serving with the Marine Division. His interest in highlighting Marine achievements, whether true or not--is of no real concern. But as the years passed, the expansion of combative remarks that were directed at Task Force Faith and at Faith himself, seems to me to have crossed over the line. [7]
One must consider the source: a PR Marine captain criticizing a Lt. Colonel of the Army. Where did he get his model Marine officer’s obedience to his own orders? Certainly not from any supportive knowledge of General Smith’s conduct in obeying his orders. However, Smith had ordered Drysdale’s column forward at all costs. Certainly there was no latitude there to a lower commander's judgment on his own situation. To my knowledge, no Marine disputes the fact that General Smith delayed moving his division forward on schedule, nor do any defend Smith’s own delaying tactics as a direct cause for saving the 1st Marine Division. Indeed, in the book, The Gentle Warrior, its author quoted a source about Smith’s delaying tactics. He said, "It is generally agreed that his leadership saved the First Division at Chosin. It is not generally known that one reason that the division could be saved was that General Smith disobeyed orders...." [8]
Most veteran organizations have a code of honor which decrees that one veteran does not degrade other men or divisions, the exception being to educate and eliminate fatal mistakes in combat from happening again. However, to do that, those mistakes have to become public knowledge within the military branches of the service. Other than that, praise your own unit all you want, but leave the other divisions to their own history as they record it, even General Smith's recorded earlier remarks around Seoul about Yongdungpo. "O.P Smith, with typical Marine pride, blamed the annoying delays on the fact that the quality of the 7th Division was in no way comparable to that of the First Marine Division." [9] God, one could only hope that were true--that the quality of the First Marine Division would be at least a little better than an American infantry division with some 8,000-plus (38%) untrained ROK's attached.
But was General Smith correct in his criticism of the 32nd Infantry Regiment? (Remember--he didn’t want them involved in the first place.) But, as Army history records about Yongdungp’o, the 32nd Infantry had a minefield to clear, and it was also spreading its forces thin by advancing towards Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul to protect the Marine division rear from the south. Here is my example of a RED FLAG. General Smith blamed "the annoying delays" of his assigned mission on the 7th Division. [10] However, the truth is, the 32nd Regiment was only inserted in his zone to offset his own delay. Echoes of Chosin yet to come.
Yet, the Marine command consistently felt the need to point out Army deficiencies to the press. To what end? Was it merely damage control to divert attention away from their own delays and mistakes? Even 40 some years later, the Marine Public Relations Officer could not resist the urge to criticize the Army officers, degrading Lt. Colonel Faith’s Medal of Honor. Indeed, one other Marine intelligence officer who was at Chosin stated some 50 years after the event that it would have been more humane for our Army "senior" officer to have surrendered the entire remainder of Task Force Faith to the Chinese forces. One can only wonder why that would even be suggested, if not for damage control. [11] Those comparisons merely raise a RED FLAG, calling direct attention to that event. Why would these Marine officers feel so insecure and defensive about their own division? Was the press corps biased in favor of the Marines? One should hold that thought until one has read all the facts in the upcoming "Frozen Chosin" drama. Then one may form a true picture of the reality.
The Marine landing on the 15th of September, with two regiments of the 7th Division following a few days, preceded the landing of the 7th Marine Regiment (arriving on the 21st) by three days. The 32nd Regiment landed on the 18th. Out-loading from ships at Inchon meant a long road march toward Suwon twenty miles south. The mission assigned to the 31st Infantry Regiment was to relieve the 32nd units holding the airstrip at Suwon. The road march was stifling hot and dusty as the rear trucks debarked and raced forward to catch up with and supply the infantry troops. The smell of human fertilizer was everywhere, and particularly pungent after the men were used to the sea breezes of the ocean trip. Added to this unpleasantness was the sight and smells of bloated bodies littering the roadside, rotting and burning flesh. They were new sights and smells that turned one's stomach and created a foul taste in the mouth.
The realization of combat hit us suddenly. This was for real. Burning buildings and huts created smoke to almost choke off our breath. It was an overwhelming experience, but one that we realized had to be put behind us, for it was only the first day and there were hours of more destruction to come in the months ahead. We bivouaced overnight in a pepper patch, digging in for the night and seeking whatever rest we could prior to the next day's advance to Suwon. But sleep was evasive as our minds reeled to discredit what our eyes had seen that day.
Several truck convoys formed as trucks with attached howitzers that had been delayed by loading delays in Japan become available. We had to seek out those belonging to our units, our wire supplies had to be located to establish and setup switchboards and run lines for telephone service between the fire direction center and the CP headquarters, and then lines had to be set in place to each firing battery.
Suwon was a walled, gated city. The airstrip had already been secured by elements of the 32nd Regiment without too much trouble. Our artillery was located near the flat space along the runway. One pilot landing on the airstrip erroneously peppered the field with machinegun ammo. Our commander, Colonel Embree, was going to ream him a new one, but the pilot happened to be a full bird colonel--a rank above our commander. As no one was hurt, no more was made of it. It was our first event with friendly fire, and there was more of it in store for us as our time in Korea progressed.
Rapid link-up completed the action as the 1st Cavalry Division moved northwest out of the Pusan perimeter. Some friction developed here as well over harassing artillery fire missions between the incoming link-up with the 1st Cavalry and the 7th Division. The 1st Cavalry commander asked us, "What the hell are you guys firing at?" Our reply was that we were firing harassing missions to keep the enemy on edge. The veteran 1st Cavalry brass didn't take kindly to that explanation, stating that they had traveled at rapid speed to get here; they were tired and needed rest; and the one thing they didn’t need was a harassing mission from our very own artillery. The firing missions were aborted.
Once the area was secured, the 1st Cavalry continued forward under orders from General Walker. For three long months, the Eighth Army had been bearing the whole burden of the fighting. The fresh troops were in X Corps. Then, an illogical order fouled up the next movement.
Syngman Rhee had re-established his government in South Korea and authorized his ROK Division forces to be in hot pursuit of the North Koreans fleeing north of the 38th Parallel. The battle for North Korea was underway. At this point, some reason should have prevailed. What was the hurry? There was no immediate urgency to invade North Korea. Unlike our rush into the war, there was no immediate need to cross the 38th Parallel. That was proven in the two-week delay for X Corps to follow. We could well have allowed time to study supply needs and oriented troops about the country and conditions in North Korea. But that did not happen. As a result of our haste, we suffered devastating losses.
During those two weeks, the 1st Marine Division was pulled out of Korea the same way they entered--through Inchon harbor via ships. By that time, the port of Inchon had become a combination depot/dock facility. With the move north of the 38th Parallel a reality, much-needed supplies were required to support the Eighth Army. The tide timetable caused Inchon to be limited in its ability to provide supplies in rapid fashion. General Walker was not pleased with the limited dock facilities and had to decide on priorities. Was it to be troops leaving or was it to be incoming ammo arriving to sustain the war effort?
General Walker was still in charge of the ROK’s moving into North Korea. Apparently some balance was worked out, but Eighth Army was slightly pissed over the fact that the Marine tie up at Inchon interfered with the transport of their supplies. In hindsight, it would have been better to have shipped the Marines out of the area and back to the States all together. [SOURCE?] Here was also another problem of delay by MG Smith in his division departing Inchon. He did not wish to be there in the first place, and then he attempted a delay in leaving. In an interview, General Almond made the following statements about MG Smith’s attitude on his orders:
"The periods in which he had feelings, to my certain knowledge, in order here mentioned:" [12]
1) "In the planning for the Inchon Landing General Smith thought it was impossible, and certainly impossible of execution in September, and maintained this position until General Almond offered to substitute for the 7th Marine Regiment the 32nd Infantry Regiment, two battalions of which had had amphibious training. This brought General Smith to his senses and he finally decided that the landing might be made after all."
2) "There was his objection to the manner of execution of the landing at Inchon.
3) "Then came his objection to plans for the capture of Seoul."
4) "He objected to the outloading of Marines on 7 October, among other reasons, stating that his own supplies had to be abandoned and when I questioned what supplies he referred to, he began to describe whereupon I demanded to see what he meant and found a warehouse full of steel clothes lockers which had been brought from Japan for the service of the Marines after the landing, when General Smith, and everyone involved, knew that ship space was at a great premium. In spite of this General Smith brought material useless for the landing operations in the form of steel clothes-lockers."
I list above only the first four of seven statements that Almond made about Smith. The four deal directly with Inchon. The following three other statements will be listed once again in this study, at such time as they enter into the picture.
5) When the Japanese Stevedores struck at WONSAN about 25 October, General Smith objected to using any part of his combat troops to unload his own supplies, in spite of the fact that this was the only possible way to accomplish the operation; he wanted a "written order" before he would comply and he got it!
6) He objected to the advance against the enemy in the vicinity of the CHOSIN Reservoir area in the effort of the X CORPS to comply with Orders from General MacArthur;
7) He had many other objections on numerous other occasions, which an interview with the undersigned could establish
In my opinion, it is most unwise to quote General Smith on such matters as he has been quoted without affording rebuttal opportunities to those in opposition to his estimate, namely, the combat commanders concerned."
The 1st Marine Division was ordered back to the Port of Inchon to load ships there. On 29 September, General MacArthur assigned his priority to the outloading at Inchon for the 1st Marine Division. On 3 October, X Corps ordered the Marine division to initiate movement to an assembly area in Inchon. On 4 October, General Almond issued a Corps order for the projected operations at Wonsan. The 1st Marine Division had the mission of seizing a Corps base of operations, while the 7th Infantry Division was to start an attack west to join with Eighth Army in front of P'yongyang.
By 6 October, the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines had virtually completed their movement to Inchon. As it assembled at Inchon for outloading, the 1st Marine Division numbered 23,591 men, with 40 U.S. Army troops and 4,516 Korean Marines attached, for a total of 28,147. (Of special note is the fact that those Korean Marines were just under one half of the untrained ROK’s attached to the 7th Division.) The X Corps reverted to GHQ Reserve at noon on 7 October at that time, and Eighth Army assumed responsibility for the Inchon-Seoul area. The X Corps was not united in force until 29 October, which was another three weeks later.
The forces began loading at Inchon on the 9th and continued to 16 October, when all X Corps loading at Inchon was completed. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines went aboard their LSTs on 10 October, and were in these cramped quarters for sixteen days before they again went ashore. Ten LSTs were reserved at Inchon for the 7th Infantry Division's tanks and heavy equipment. However, during this time frame, the U.S. Eighth Army was already crossing the 38th Parallel in the west and was fighting its way north. But all of this was of no big concern to the 7th Division. What the Marine division was doing was also none of our business. We had our own problems. Instead of moving forward, we received orders to form another road march southeast towards the port of Pusan. While the I Corps of Eighth Army was driving into North Korea on the P'yongyang axis and the 1st Marine Division was loading at Inchon, the 7th Infantry Division was assembling at Pusan to outload there in the X Corps amphibious movement to northeast Korea. On 30 September the division had been relieved of its responsibilities in the Seoul area and its units began to shift south and southeast to the Inchon and Suwon areas preparatory to the long, overland move to Pusan.
The 7th Infantry Division was ordered (via train and truck) southeast to the Port of Pusan. On 4 October, Eighth Army indicated the route it wanted the 7th Division to take through its zone, specifying the road through Ch'ungju, Hamch'ang, Kumch'on, Taegu, and Kyongju to Pusan, a road distance of 350 miles from Inchon. At Taegu, the troops were to load on trains for the final part of the journey, whereupon the trucks were to return to Suwon and Inchon for others. The 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, led the 7th Division movement at Inchon at 0350 5 October, with the rest of the regiment following. The command group of the 32d Infantry led the movement of that regiment through Inchon four hours later.
The 17th Regiment remained at Inchon, holding its blocking position there until relieved on 8 October, and it then began the motor movement to Pusan. Both the 31st and 32d Regiments closed at Pusan on 7 October. On 8 October the 7th Division command post closed at Anyang-ni and opened at Pusan, although most of the headquarters was still on the road. [13]
The 7th Division movement to Pusan was not entirely without incident. On two occasions enemy forces ambushed convoys in the mountains near Mun'gyong. The first ambush caught the head of the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry at 0200 on 6 October, and inflicted nine casualties. The second ambush at 0230 on 9 October caught the division headquarters convoy in the pass three miles northwest of Mun'gyong. Enemy machinegun fire killed six men and destroyed several vehicles. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry succeeded in clearing the pass area that afternoon. Thereafter, that battalion patrolled the pass above Mun'gyong until it was relieved on 11 October by the 27th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division.
The division artillery was the last major unit to leave Inchon, clearing there at 1700 on 10 October. It and the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry arrived at Pusan on 12 October to complete the division movement to the port. About 450 division troops had been airlifted on 11 October from Kimpo Airfield to Pusan. In addition to the 7th Division, the X Corps Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, Chemical, and Signal units moved overland to Pusan for outloading. Altogether, in seven days approximately 1,460 tons of supplies and equipment and 13,422 troops had moved overland in division vehicles and those of the 52nd Truck Battalion. Note also that the number of troops that moved via division vehicles was 10,169 less than the Marine troops that left via sea.
At Pusan, we bivouacked and awaited further orders. Rumors were rampant of our returning to Japan. South Korea was secure and its government was back in power. As far as we were concerned, this war was over. We could honor our dead, and the occupation troops who had their enlistments extended for one extra year could perhaps return to the states. But such was not in the cards. The deck was being reshuffled while we waited, and a new game was about to begin. So we waited and accumulated supplies. We received no winter gear at that time because it was mid October. It was not cold yet, although the sea breezes cooled off the nights. We were again in a pepper path and dried out rice paddies around the Pusan area.
There was a lull in battle in the interval between October 8th and the 26th. X Corps could have and should have used the time constructively to seek information on our lost and missing in action forces. The 7th Division as structured with the many ROK's could have been utilized and of immeasurable value to search the countryside for those lost Americans. Small units could have been disbursed with South Koreans as interpreters to check out those areas fought over prior to their withdrawal into the Pusan perimeter. Our units had been in the Osan area, which was the area of Task Force Smith's first battle. It was the very same area where General Dean disappeared after his withdrawal from Taejon with the rest of the 24th Division. The men lost there could have been accounted for had they been sought out. But, that did not happen.
Near Pusan, while those MIA's were never recorded, our division bivouacked in rice paddies that had been dried out from the late summer drought. Then we boarded ships and for the following nine days we had to deal with cramped conditions, boredom, and nervous energy. The urgency to invade North Korea seemed of prime concern. However, in reality there was no urgency at all.
It should have been a strong requirement on the South Korean government newly re-established in Seoul to seek information on all MIA's--American as well as their own. Yet, the prime concern was to pursue the North Korean Army--decimated by then--across the parallel. Their independent action to do that was not sanctioned at that time by the UN. It was an outstanding fact that South Korea was never a member of that world body. Their disregard of that body and its set military commitment to them should have been under the command of MacArthur and weighed as to the effects of that invasion of North Korea. After all, it just gave credence to the initial propaganda claim that South Korea had invaded North Korea first on June 25th, 1950. The reality was that North Korea could not explain how the "defending" army got so deep into the "invading" army's territory in such a short time.
The result was that our forces were scattered, the Eighth Army having changed places with X Corps. Walker was on the 38th Parallel awaiting full control of both his forces and X Corps, as promised. X Corps was half out to sea-the Marines, and the 7th Division was en route to Pusan to await the next command for movement. As the ground force, we had no idea whether it was back to Japan or into North Korea. We were merely pawns in this "greatest of all games men play"--war, to be moved as X Corps G-3 staff was ordered to move us. So we waited and checked and rechecked our weapons, and boredom increased. The NCOs had more duties of minor detail such as trips to supply points with work details to pick up various items like food and clothing, extra telephone units, reels of wire. At least these details broke the boredom caused by the monotony of the daily routine "hurry up and wait."
We waited and waited, with no word of our coming adventure and disaster. We were ready to return to Japan. Our little taste of combat had made us official combat veterans with the ability to debunk the gory stories of glory in battle. Only a true idiot could crave more of the carnage that is labeled as war. But whatever it was, more of it was in store for all of the American forces located in South Korea poised to cross over the line into North Korea. Our nervous energy may have been only a premonition of doom yet to surface.
As General Walker assumed command and responsibility of Seoul on October 7, and the 7th Division moved via road and rail into the Pusan area, our move into North Korea took center stage. The drama about to be played out there was yet to unfold. An upcoming 13,000 casualties in North Korea were still in various positions below the 38th Parallel on that date. General Walker was still on the parallel line separating the two governments of Korea. He was highly irritated over the changes created by the link-up of both Eighth Army and the X Corps. He had understood that he was to be in command of all forces in Korea under one united command. One command, under one commander, and staff planner as Ridgway would later have. But as I previously stated, that did not happen during Walker's remaining lifetime.
As Walker fumed over "MacArthur's Pet's," the 7th Division was not a problem for him. We were already road-bound south as he took charge. However, the Marines were clogging the port at Inchon. The port became a one-way, two-way highway. Supplies arrived for Eighth Army through this port, so it had to remain as the main source of supply for Walker’s forces moving ever northward into North Korea. But the Marines of X Corps had to be pulled out via Inchon as well. Walker had just recovered from losing the 1st Marine Brigade a month earlier. Now he was stymied over the fact that their departure from Inchon took priority over his incoming supplies. Little, if any, consideration had been given to his efforts and needed relief and rest for his forces, many of whom had been on line since July 5th--a full three months of front line fighting. X Corps had only been exposed to combat for three weeks. Some compromise should have been in order for Walker's forces to even the playing field, as in X Corps being substituted for some of Eighth Army. Perhaps that would have been the case had Walker been in charge.
Within this interim between Almond turning over control to Walker on September 21 to October 7, the ROKs whether under United Nations command or not had launched their forces into North Korea. Who officially authorized that move is not recorded to my knowledge. South Korea's government under President Rhee had been reestablished one week before, but his authority as head of that government in regard to any "hot pursuit" doctrine of following the North Koreans into their territory before any United Nations forces moved across the parallel has been debated. When Rhee allowed this pursuit, MacArthur lost direct control of the South Korean forces as such. Rhee committed his forces without sanction of a United Nation vote. Had his forces been hit by a heavy resistance from either the North Koreans or the Chinese, the outcome may have been different. But history doesn’t record that--only that our American forces were reassigned into North Korea.
The South Korean (ROK) I Corps 3rd Division traveled from Pusan to Wonsan in just 11 days, and after securing Wonsan on October 11, turned back toward the northwest and the Chosin Reservoir area. Two weeks later on the same date that the Marines landed unopposed at Wonsan, the ROK I Corps 26th Division moved through Hamhung, Oro-ri, and Majon-dong to Sudong-ni just below Koto-ri. There they met strong resistance from two regiments of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 124th Division. The Marines were ordered to come up from behind a few days later and relieve the ROK forces. Between October 27-31, the Chinese first phase was launched.
A fresh CCF Division of the 126th that belonged to the 42nd CCF Army crossed the bridge across the Yalu River at Manpojin. The Chinese presence was already in the Chosin area, and as the Marines relieved the ROKs, they engaged the enemy at Sudong-ni. But the Chinese suddenly broke contact and disappeared into the countryside. That tactic was a plan pre-set by the enemy.
The harbor at Wonsan was cleared before the Marines arrived, and a new port of supplies for X Corps was established as a result. Later, it was moved into Hungnam a little further north of Wonsan between Wonsan and Iwon. The move gave X Corps the advantage of three separate ports to obtain supplies. The clearing of the Wonsan harbor had been a massive job. It was reported that some 2,000 mines of all kinds had lined the harbor. Because the Navy suffered from a lack of mine sweepers, clearing it in record time was not possible. Even though it was known to be heavily mined on September 4, it took until October 26 to clear the harbor. The delay also brought with it colder weather, for within two more weeks the icy Manchurian winds began to blow.
Had this time delay happened at Inchon, the total plan would have fallen apart. What happened in North Korea was a complete loss of time objectives. Every objective there seemed to be delayed. But the exception to the rule was the 7th Division. They did not remain idle for long. Almond had been busy locating another site for us to land. It was Iwon, 100 miles up the coast from Wonsan. That meant rearrangement for the division already aboard ships. Orders were changed from our organizational loading to combat loading for assaulting a hostile landing site that was not at the time fully known to be clear of enemy forces.
But there, too, events were delayed. While aboard ship, the Marines were temporarily removed from Almond’s command. The 7th Division forces who had not started for the Yalu River until November 14 arriving at the Yalu on November 21. This latter delay was due to orders that MacArthur was to use only South Korean forces near the Yalu and the Manchurian border. MacArthur allowed our forces there anyway, but he held fast to the ban on having any American forces below the Russian boundary line.
The political situation in North Korea required much of MacArthur's time. The instructions back and forth between the JCS and MacArthur began to get testy. They called for a review of objectives between the United Nations and President Truman. The weather in Korea got colder, but the political battles heated up. The Republic of Korea was committed to battle across the 38th Parallel on October 3. It was a commitment to disaster. For the American forces, our losses in casualties were some 13,000 men. I was one of those many casualties.
What I find so amazing in later reports is that blame was placed directly on MacArthur’s sole decision to extend our forces into North Korea. Yet it is also officially recorded that as early as October 25th, the JCS were of the opinion that the "conflict" was essentially ended. They were so hasty in their assessment that they canceled additional replacements. On October 26, the ROKs in Eighth Army territory who had seized the village of Chosan on the Yalu River were thrown back from there. That same time line, the Marine amphibious landings had just begun at Wonsan, followed three days later at Iwon by the 7th Division. The blame for North Korean problems were spread all through the diplomatic and military chain of command. But our forces moving into North Korea were not aware of this, nor were politics our prime concern. The die was cast. North Korea had been entered by United Nations forces to completely destroy the North Korean army.
One of the affects of the order to MacArthur that no force other than South Koreans could approach the Manchurian or Russian borders was that reconnaissance units were unavailable to supply the information desperately needed as to any enemy troop movement in front of advancing ROKs. Those forces were not adequately trained or schooled in the art and proficiency of obtaining the vital information needed. Thus, MacArthur was forced to rely on outside sources concerning the strength and disposition of the CCF forces in Manchuria and if they would cross into Korea. If they were planning to cross, when and how many would that be?
Other often conflicting reports of doubtful credence told of Chinese troops of Korean ancestry being sent into North Korea by the Chinese. Between July and August of 1950, the Department of the Army received a score of second and third-hand reports of troops moving from South China to Manchuria. But to determine whether the Chinese intended to intervene was impossible. The Chinese government itself offered no indication after the Inchon landing of any desire to enter into the battle. MacArthur so stated the latter to the JCS on September 7. Yet on September 22, the Chinese Foreign Office declared that China would always stand on the side of the Korean people, and on the 30th the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai publicly warned that, "The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they sublimely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists." [14]
On the day of China’s warning, the UNC intelligence staff reported twenty Chinese divisions were in North Korea and had been there since September 10th. While MacArthur's intelligence chief, General Willoughby, believed his reports, nine to eighteen of the thirty-eight Chinese divisions were massing on the Manchurian border near crossing bridges. As far as is known, he made no attempt to dissuade MacArthur from crossing the parallel. That could be due to the conflicting reports by the Far East Command intelligence officers of "no conclusive evidence" of Chinese involvement. President Truman therefore directed the JCS to instruct MacArthur concerning the Chinese intervention. On October 9, the JCS sent MacArthur this loosely-worded directive.
"In the event of open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offer a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."
MacArthur later stated that he once again reviewed this directive, and his interpretation of the words "should continue the action as long as in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offer a reasonable chance of success" were his authority to continue toward the border. One report to Truman on October 12 stated that while the CCF lacked air power and naval support, they could effectively but t not decisively intervene. The conclusion of the report was that the Chinese were not expected to enter North Korea to oppose the UNC in the foreseeable future.
Several factors were kicked around to support the above hypothesis:
1) The Chinese feared the consequences of war with the United States.
2) Anti-Communist forces within China might endanger the Communist stand.
3) They could damage their chance of gaining a seat in the United Nations.
4) If they engaged in war without the Soviet naval and air support, they would suffer heavy losses.
5) If they accept Soviet aid, they would become more dependent on Russia and increase Russian control in Manchuria.
These factors indicated that, from a military standpoint, the most favorable time for their intervention had passed. A report from Far East Command on October 14 said that "future expensive investment in support of a lost cause" was the Chinese position. [SOURCE?]
On October 3, the ROK divisions were inside of North Korea on the east coast. Walker was convinced by October 7th that it was time to move north, but he had no orders from MacArthur designating his starting date. He directed his chief of staff, General Leven C. Allen, to contact Tokyo for instructions. The response was, "Your A-Day will be at such time as you see it ready." [SOURCE?] Allen asked for and received confirmation by radio. On October 9, Walker and his forces moved out toward Pyongyang. Thus, our American forces were committed in North Korea.
That same day, MacArthur made several attempts by radio to persuade the North Korean government to surrender. "I as UNCINC, for the last time call upon you and your forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated to lay down arms and cease hostilities." Without any immediate agreement, he would proceed to take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations. Kim Il Sung rejected his demand, moving new units of fresh troops up who had not fought in South Korea.
The two ROK divisions on the east coast moved at rapid speed, but the old adage of "haste makes waste" was at work. After passing large numbers of enemy forces in the eastern coastal mountains, those forces turned to guerrilla warfare and annoying attacks. They had to be routed out by many patrols within the 7th Division area of operations and were always a constant threat to road-bound troops, supply trucks, wire repair line crews, and messengers between group areas.
In reply to Walker's request of what authority and control he had over the ROK forces, he was informed from GHQ in Tokyo, "They are to be considered as members of the team and working with the team in whatever area they may be employed." On the 11th of October, the ROKs captured Wonsan, still part of Eighth Army. General Walker flew into the city the same day it was captured. These ROKs seemed in a position to carry out the entire original mission assigned to X-Corps. By advancing from Wonsan to the Pyongyang axis, they could link with Eighth Army, thereby sealing off Korea to this line.
However, the ROK success had already caused MacArthur to change the employment of X Corps. He directed the planners to re-route the Marines to a landing at Hungnam. This plan was ready on October 8. Admiral Joy strongly opposed this change because it would split the two forces. There was less time for naval planning, and both harbors could not be cleared in record time. MacArthur reverted back to the original plan. Since General Walker had his Eighth Army ROKs operating in the Wonsan area, he put forth his plans for Wonsan. "It is vital to provide for the supply of five divisions of the ROK Army through the port of Wonsan." [ But MacArthur had to make it crystal clear to Walker that Eighth Army was not going to expand its mission. "Wonsan port facilities will be secured and utilized for operations of X-Corps in accordance with the UN Command Operations Order No. 2." MacArthur then reassigned the previously assigned ROK divisions from Walker’s Eighth Army to Almond’s X Corps.
[1] Operation Bluehearts, 1st Cavalry, review Chapter Two, Inchon.
[2] Gen. Bradley referring to interservice rivalries unresolved by the unification provision of the National Security Act of 1947, "This is no time for fancy-Dan’s who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals."
[3] Truman: "The Marine Corps is the Navy’s police force and as long as I am president, that is what it will remain, they have a propaganda machine that is about equal to Stalin’s"
[4] The Marine Corps is under the Department of the Navy, therefore its budget for men and equipment is appropriated through that department, as that one and only division could be better inventoried at any given time through their G-1 & G-4 sections. This one fact, the Army had to maintain all foreign UN forces in Korea, over and above their original supply, as well as those complete ROK units in all things required. The Army task overlapped even those in the Marine division itself.
[5] Seoul was liberated in 1945 and had an established government. The action to reclaim it, like it or not, was a United Nations mission. It also had its own ROK 17th Regiment forces involved in fighting for their own capital city.
[6] There are some hidden reference, but one must know the missing facts on Opn Orders to locate them.
[7] On Faith’s Medal of Honor, that a Marine was more worthy to receive it: "That Faith was just doing his duty and not very well at that." A fact overlooked is that this was an Army award, and only five Marines were ever on the east side of the reservoir under Colonel Faith’s command. Where did Captain Michael Capraro’s superior source come from?
[8] Clifton La Bree, p. 219, Quote from The New York Times, 1 September 1955.
[9] Clay Blair, Forgotten War. p. 277)
[10] One thing in his favor, however, as evident of his command: if anyone knew anything at all about "delays," it was General Smith himself. [ Smith deliberately stalled on the advance...P.261, Policy and Direction]
[11] [Red Flag] Since time would reveal that a Marine [Major] had surrendered a force from Task Force Drysdale to the Chinese, it would compensate and minimize that Marine event. For this Army force would have been a much larger force, thereby neutralizing this event for the Marines. However, that did not happen. Again, why the suggestion? To what end? Here, we were criticized for not surrendering over 900 men to the enemy. [Death of 31st RCT, Part Five, 2nd Lt. (Major) Patrick Roe, USMC.
[12] Interview by General H. C. Pattison, Chief of Military History, U. S. Army dated March 7, 1969.
[13] .....North to the Yalu. P. 632.
[14] Policy & Direction, p. 197, Ibid, p. 108
"In order to exploit to the maximum all forces under CINCUNC [Commander in Chief, United Nations Command] and to implement the full concept of operations..... X Corps, operating as an independent Corps of GHQ Reserve, will, effective at 1200 hours, 20 October 1950, and until further orders, assume operational control of all UN and ROK ground forces operating north of 39 degrees and 10 minutes north." - MacArthur
General Almond briefed all of his division commanders and staff members on the coming amphibious operations in North Korea. Again, General Smith was not pleased. He "viewed the plan skeptically" however, "the matter was not for Smith to decide," and the division officers began planning for the new operations at once. MacArthur ordered the 65th Regiment of the 3rd Division, already in Korea, and its other two regiments on call in Japan, to ship north to Wonsan. General Almond increasingly urged that the landings take place by applying pressure (to no avail) on Admiral Struble. Almond also made daily flights up the east coast line searching for a suitable landing site for the 7th Division. He decided to land the 7th Division at the small port of Iwon, 105 miles northeast of Wonsan. The 7th Division plans were thus changed to land deeper in North Korea and thereby advance to the Yalu border under MacArthur's new directive. The 7th Division sailed north from Pusan on October 27 and began landing at Iwon two days later.[1]
Throughout October, the optimism over this "conflict" ending continued to grow as plans were made for the occupation of North Korea. The X Corps was selected to stay in Korea for North Korean occupation duty. After that, the X Corps was to have only one American division, plus all other United Nations units, remaining in South Korea, including the ROK Army units and KMAC. The plan was for the United Nation's units to slowly be withdrawn, with the European units leaving first. If possible, no forces other than ROKs were to be stationed in North Korea. The Eighth Army with its original four divisions--the 1st Cavalry, 7th Division, and 24th and 25th Divisions, were to return to Japan, and the 5th RCT was to return to Hawaii.
This plan was interrupted on October 21 when the JCS told MacArthur that demand for troops in other parts of the world would force them to withdraw the 2nd and 3rd Divisions from the Far East Command as soon as possible after fighting ended in Korea. This meant that the forces to guard both Japan and Korea would have to be supplied from the four divisions originally based in Japan. But MacArthur protested. He had left an earlier Wake Island meeting with President Truman under the impression that the 3rd Division would be kept in Korea as part of the occupational force. General Omar Bradley requested that one division--either the 2nd or the 3rd--be made available for Europe by January 1951.
Following this line, Washington proposed a cutback of personnel support to MacArthur. He was informed on October 25 that, "Reduction of the scale of operations in Korea compels immediate reconsideration of the number of service enlisted fillers and replacements previously scheduled for shipment to FECOM. To reduce the number to the minimum, Department of the Army proposes to cancel shipment of enlisted reserve corps personnel presently scheduled for October and November, except 17,000 NCO grades. "[2] An end of the war mode of operation had taken hold. MacArthur was informed, "there would be no other replacements, except 17,000 NCO grades." The notice arrived just one day before the Chinese pushed the ROKs out of Chosan on a line parallel to the Chosin Reservoir. Shades of a disaster yet to come.
This might prove to be a most difficult question to analyze or answer. MacArthur stated that Inchon was only capable of receiving a maximum daily supply of 5,000 tons for all divisions in Eighth Army. Since little opposition was against those ROK Divisions in Eighth Army's advance into North Korea and its supply line was needed from Inchon, another harbor at Wonsan had to be cleared of enemy mines. Wonsan as an entry harbor would allow a second port to supply Eighth Army ROK forces moving rapidly into North Korea.
The mine-clearing operations involved some Japanese postwar mine sweepers to assist our Navy in that task. The Japanese lost one of their ships to a mine in this effort, and the United States suffered the loss of one of its sweepers as well, the USS Magpie. The Magpie became the first US Naval ship sunk in the Korean War when the 136-foot long, wooden-hulled ship hit a mine. There were 21 US sailors lost in the explosion. As soon as the Wonsan area was cleared, X Corps activated its landings. In the meantime, the 7th Division was reassigned to land 100 miles up the coast at Iwon, and its new objective was to seize Hyesanjin on the banks of the Yalu River. On 29 September, the Defense Department listed 20,756 American casualties in Korea as of that date.
MacArthur was at Wake Island for a meeting with President Truman. It was a short meeting at best, actually more of a walk and talk session concerning Chinese intervention. Few details from that meeting were recorded. Apparently troop reinforcement provisions were not a top priority at that time, although the Chinese government had stated through their radio network, "In its real sense the Korean War has just begun. This will be a drawn-out war of attrition perilous for foreign aggressors."
The previous plan was for the 1st Marine Division to land at Wonsan, followed by the 7th Division with their rear support. There was to be a lateral move across the waist line of North Korea from Wonsan to capture the North Korean capital at Pyongyang. However, events once again outran the planning (an old redundant issue). The Eighth Army swiftly captured the North Korean capital on the west side. The ROKs moved swiftly as well to capture the town of Chosan on 26 October 1950, on the downward slope of the Yalu River where the river flows into the Yellow Sea. The farthest point reached by the Eighth Army was between Mupyong-ni and Kanggye. After that, the Eighth Army stalled in its forward drive to the upper regions of the Yalu River.
General Walker was plagued with a logistical supply problem from Inchon. While on the east side, Walker's 1st Capital Division of the ROKs advanced toward Koto-ri and up the east coast toward the Russian border on the Tumen River. MacArthur was under strict JCS instructions at the time that only non-Korean forces were allowed near the Russian Border.[3] X Corps had easy supply access to three ports--Wonsan, Hungnam, and Iwon. However, Eighth Army had a bigger burden, with the bulk of their forces supplied from the South Korean port of Inchon. Material had to then be shipped by truck and rail into North Korea. But those rail lines were restrictive. Some were only single track, and damaged bridges also prevented any rapid movement of this additional material and forces into North Korea. General Walker activated a tactic his forces had used in the European Theater of World War II--use of around-the-clock truck convoys of that era, "the Red Ball Express."
The reaction to Chinese forces in North Korea was evident with the capture of the first CCF soldiers in the Eighth Army area of operations. General Almond's forces captured CCF prisoners on the same day. This became of prime concern to the field commanders, but General Walker continued his plan of advancing to the border. As the ROK II Corps met strong resistance at Chosan, was mauled and then pushed back on the first of November, the US 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division was also attacked by a full division of Chinese near Unsan. General Walker halted his advance, and he withdrew back behind the Chong-chon river. This withdrawal did not please MacArthur, and he wanted justification for it. Walker replied that his advance was stalled and "was based upon a calculated logistical risk," adding that "Every effort is being made to retain an adequate bridgehead to facilitate the resumption of the attack as soon as conditions permit."
In the X Corps area, General Almond at last completed his landing of American forces. The Marines landed at Wonsan, and the 7th Division landed with 'attached' ROKs at Iwon. Almond then ordered the 7th Division to advance upward from Pukchong through Pungsan and Kapsan, then on to Hyesanjin on the Yalu River. On November 6, the 7th Marine Regiment relieved the ROK units at Sudong-ni below Chinhung-ni. The latter area became the rear boundary area of the Marine zone of operations. Upon the arrival of the 3rd Division, the entire 1st Marine Division was reassigned their mission to push from Wonsan to the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, then drive straight north to the Manchurian border. General Almond give his divisions their border objectives on 11 November. The 1st Marine Division was to occupy a forty-mile stretch of the lower Yalu River bank due north of the Changjin Reservoir. The 7th Division was to hold the region between Hyesanjin and Hapsu. The two divisions of the ROK I Corps were to clear the remaining ground from Hapsu to the east coast on the Sea Of Japan. However the 7th Division plans had to be altered once again--for a third time-- to pacify General Smith's continuous objections to his own mission. [4]
The 7th Division's original zone of operations between Kapsan & Hapsu did not include the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir (see Map 5, http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map5_full.jpg). Both the Fusen and Chosin reservoirs were bodies of water which intelligently should have been assigned to a Marine unit because each was located well within the 1st Marine Division zone of operations. But how did this reservoir end up being the responsibility of the 7th Division? The date on the map is 26 November. The location of the 17th Regiment (Task Force Cooper) was located at Hyesanjin with the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment (Task Force Kingston on the 28th) being on that line drawn on Map 5 from Hyesanjin to Samsu. Notice as well that the boundary line on this Army history map also defines the boundary line for the 1st Marine Division. Their line flows north from the Pujon Reservoir into the Pujon River. Their line then follows the Pujon river, which merges into the Changjin River, then flows northward into the Yalu River. What this map fails to reveal is where Don Faith's 1/32 Battalion and MacLean's entire 31st RCT were located on that date, and where they are actively patrolling in the Pujon reservoir area.
Back to my original question: How does this reservoir end up being the responsibility of the 7th Division? For that answer, we should refer to Smith's own words as penned in an interview in 1969 by Benis Franks, the Marine Corps' official historian:
Question: Split your forces?
Smith: Yes. The Fusen Reservoir was about opposite the Chosin Reservoir, and we went out that way and had reconnaissance patrols go out, and there was no road from our side going to the Reservoir. The road came in from Gen. Barr's side, where the 7th Division was. I finally talked Gen. Almond into letting us off the hook on that, so the 5th could follow up the 7th.
In reality, the road did, indeed, come off at Oro-ri to the Pujon reservoir from the MSR running directly between the port of Hungnam to the Changjin reservoir. Map 5 shows this road leading northeast to P'ungsan. A small road lead from Sinhung northwest into the Pujon reservoir. There, if one continues the Marine boundary line downward from the Pujon reservoir, it intersects at Sinhung well within the Marine area assigned. However, it is a moot point, as Smith once again gained another compromise at the expense of Lt. Col. Don Faith's battalion. Ordered to patrol the reservoir area, Faith used that very road southeast to Sinhung on new orders to join his parent regiment at Samsu. However, that very same morning--24 November. he was stopped and re-routed to the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, as that zone was also reassigned to the 7th Division. Newspaper headlines of the era verify that this event was a "diversion of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir" to the 7th Division:
"Chinese Reds Desert Big Power Reservoir:
Communist Swing Hard in West Korea, Force South Koreans to Retreat 4 miles."
Tokyo, Thursday (UP) -
U.S. Marines reached the shores of the Chosin power reservoir--one of the great prizes of the North Korean campaign--Wednesday to find its Chinese defenders had fled. But the Chinese were striking back hard in the west, forcing the South Korean Eighth Division into a four miles retreat..... The Marines arrival at the Chosin placed American forces at the edges of both great reservoir systems in North Korea. American Seventh Division units diverted from the division drive northward, were reported on Monday to have reached the shores of the Fusen reservoir, 20 miles northeast of the Chosin . Some 1,500 Chinese troops were reported in the vicinity of the Fusen
Source: (Volume 94-209, Source, Belleville News-Democrat.)
The lower end of the Pujon was parallel on a line above the Changjin reservoir, and also above the 5th Marines' advance east of the reservoir. There, consideration of Smith's objections as stated in the newspaper headline, suggests that the 7th Division had been diverted from its drive northward. As stated above, the 7th Division was diverted because of a new concession to Smith. Why would his objection even be noted? [5] Why would a Marine division need a road leading to this reservoir in the first place? Map 5, shows the Marine zone still included the west side of the Pujon reservoir up to the shore of its western banks. My new question is: Why would the Marines need a road when they have a "water road", and over 6,000 Marines located with a "shore party" and an abundance of water navigating equipment back at the port of Hungnam. [6] The difference between the Naval view and the Army view of the war (ground) battlefield still prevailed as residuum of World War II. The Navy view of water was that it was their domain. That was not fully understood by Army "mentality" as commented on by a GHQ staffer of MacArthur's naval advisor, Rear Admiral Raymond D. Tarbuck, in 1943. [6]
It is surprising how little the Army officers at GHQ knew about water. Here was the mentality involved: At Infantry School in Georgia, they taught that every stream and every body of water was a potential MLR [main line of resistance]. They treated even the smallest stream as an obstacle. But naval minds thought of it as a highway. "We use rivers and oceans; to us they are roads. The things we are afraid of are land, coral reefs, and rocks. The Army's maps and their topography are very accurate... This hill and that hill are given in exact slope and height in feet, but when their map gets to a water's edge, it just stops. They think it is just blue... dead, deep water, with harmless bottom that goes on and on under the water... But that water is what we are interested in. The two mentalities are exactly the opposite, and some of the time Chamberlain didn't know what I was talking about. He didn't give it the proper weight, Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlain being an Army GHQ planner.
That Army mentality related just to that old question, "Why did the chicken cross the road?" The answer-"To get to the other side." Hence those Army Brockway bridge building trucks. The Army highway(s) were across, not up or down, any river. [8] The Navy was a fisherman of men. The Army role was that of hunters of men. The Navy planners were deeply concerned over the mission of their own Marines at Chosin. However, there appeared to be no objection posed from the Navy opposing the Marine division's orders to maintain their position east of the reservoir between the eastern edge of Chosin and the western edge of the Fusen Reservoir. Both of these reservoir areas were to be turned over to the 7th Division [via OPN O 25]. Apparently here was a clue to Smith's objection over the Navy doctrine as stated above: "The things we are afraid of are land, coral reefs, and rocks." There the Marines were locked inland (deep within the Army domain). On land were many, many, many rocks and mountains. That was where Smith penned his doubts over the survival of his own division. In a letter to his own Marine commandant on 15 November, he wrote, that he believed "a winter campaign in North Korea is too much to ask of the American.... Marine." [9]
Yet the Navy planners had their own conflict of interest in having their Marines that far inland and far away from shore. The two commands (Army and Navy ) had to clash at times over the mission assigned. Yet the reality was that this command inland remained a total MacArthur responsibility. All losses are listed as X Corps losses, with the cost in lives in the X Corps area attributed to those men (KIAs) who were lost deep inland in an area assigned to Almond's X Corps. Rapid land locations and planning, and missions assigned exclusively and directly by the Marine general are recorded as separate missions. Task Force Drysdale. was formed under the Marine command. General Smith's Marine mission disasters were not widely dissimilar too those of Task Force Faith. However, the survivors of Task Force Faith used the center of the reservoir ice as their own highway into Hagaru-ri, thus their own feat of walking on that reservoir water in question.
As Smith's forces were landing, another of his "objections" surfaced over his Marines ordered to unload their own equipment from naval ships. Here is number 5 of his "objections" noted in the last chapter. 5) "When the Japanese Stevedores struck at Wonsan about 25 October, General Smith objected to using any part of his combat troops to unload his own supplies, in spite of the fact that this was the only possible way to accomplish the operation. He wanted a "written order" before he would comply and he got it." While others may state that General Smith never refused an order, that would not stand the test here. For any man to object with a condition attached implies that he will not comply, unless or until his conditions are met. This is the equivalent of a refusal. (In this case, Smith's condition was met.)
The sudden open hostility by the CCF against the UN forces caused a swift reversal of the Pentagon's plans to reduce support to MacArthur's command. General Charles L. Bolte, the Army G-3 (Operations), met with MacArthur and (his-G-3) General Wright concerning the cancellation and reduction of forces to be sent to Korea. This, indeed, seemed unrealistic to the line troops, if they knew it. All they needed was a further reduction in replacements. The frostbite casualties alone were going to be massive, barring any combat action. The replacement change was negated by the Chinese attacks on General Walker's forces that same day (26 October). But a reversal to reinstate those replacement forces a moot point--one entirely too late for any North Korean defense. Far East Commander G-1 (Personnel) General William A. Beiderlinden again demanded more troops. On November 5, he stated, "Shortages of essential replacements is continuing and reaching critical stage." He pointed to the fact that battle casualties had risen from 40 per day in October to 326 per day in the first week of November, indicating that the periods of time which the individual soldier had to spend in combat would probably increase. On 7 November, MacArthur requested the JCS send more combat strength. What remained puzzling with the intervention of the Chinese forces was their designation of their forces as "volunteers" instead of organized regiments. By labeling these troops as such, it void the claim of intervention as a full-scale commitment.
That same day, MacArthur made his first reference to what he termed a "reconnaissance in force." He told the JCS that, "Only through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of enemy strength." Surely no man in the history of warfare knew as much about a reconnaissance in force as he did. His use of these smaller size forces in World War II verified this many times over. Plus, MacArthur was not directly challenged on his intended use of this tactic, although he, in fact, suffered some (second guessing) criticism for failing to use such a force. [10] The evidence and facts point to his continuous use of these tactics in both North and South Korea, re-labeled as task forces.
Indeed, when given command in South Korea, General Ridgway depended on the reconnaissance in force tactic to seek out the Chinese forces there--forces he could not locate by regular reconnaissance units or by constant air surveillance. Still, Ridgway's own stated opinion about the North Korean "Home by Christmas" offensive was that the combined offensive of Eighth Army and X Corps on 240800 November '50 was merely an "advance to contact" enemy forces. The dispute was over the wording of MacArthur's use of the word "attack." That is, it was not possible to attack an enemy whose position was not known or whose very existence had not been confirmed as such. But the "attack" ordered by MacArthur on that date had an unexpected result that could well refute General Ridgway's contention. On 24 November our Air Force conducted a massive bombing raid which scored a direct hit on Marshal Peng's CPVF Headquarters, just missing commander Marshal Peng Dezhi who had reluctantly moved into a cave only moments before those bombs hit his headquarters. The exploding bombs, however, killed Mao Anying, the oldest son of Chairman Mao Zedong.[11]
The delayed amphibious landing at Wonsan proved an embarrassment to the Marine Corps in more ways than one. They landed in an area secured by ROKs. A Bob Hope road show was already set up before they arrived. It was an administration landing (one unopposed), not a combat assault. General Smith again "objected" to his forces unloading their own equipment from the Navy ships. The 1st Regiment was required to back track below Wonsan to Kojo and relieve the ROKs guarding a supply dump there. At Kojo, a surprise attack caught many in this Marine force off guard. "Some would be killed while in their sleeping bags." [12] Their first battalion commander, Lt. Colonel. Jack Hawkins, was immediately replaced in his position once he returned to Wonsan, and was ordered back to the States. [13]
It was a prerequisite for any area in enemy territory to be fully reconnoitered before advancing. Reconnaissance required time, but time was not available to MacLean at Chosin. His first casualties there were his own reconnaissance patrol. This may be due to the many erroneous reports that Smith had kept his line of retreat open and secure at all times--a pure myth. From this first Marine/enemy engagement at Kojo, reconnaissance efforts were a requirement not to be overlooked. But it was still not the best test for the Marines in North Korea, as they were at the bottom of an X Corps staircase in North Korea. The ROKs advanced rapidly to the east coast where the Marines felt they should be. But some ROKs were detached to hold the Chosin Reservoir road south of Koto-ri. The Marines were to relieve them there on 2 November. Once relieved, the ROKs joined forces and continued their push to the Russian border on the eastern coastline.
Within this same time span (26-31 October), elements of the 7th Division were afloat at Pusan. We were to hit the beach behind the Marines at Wonsan. In his haste, Almond scouted out another area further north. It was not totally secured, therefore a combat setting of an amphibious assault was required. However, we were already administratively loaded on ship. A combat setting change required our transferring from various transports to LSTs (Landing Ships Tank). The 17th Regiment was to lead the assault at Iwon. This, too, was a seemingly routine unopposed landing. But Colonel MacLean's 31st RCT was bogged down by weather which eroded beachheads and required bulldozing sand-filled ramps to the LSTs. So MacLean's force was also delayed in debarkation at Iwon. (It was the reason Faith's battalion was required to fill in at the Fusen reservoir.)
The areas assigned, reading right [east] to left [west] were: the ROKs on the east coast, the 7th Division holding the middle position, and the Marines as the rear force behind the 7th Division (although they stated that they were to be the "Spearhead" of X Corps). The 7th Division's western flank was open at all times above of the Chosin reservoir and westward into the Yellow Sea. Each force was separated by their own time of arrival from South Korea. The ROK forces started to cross the 38th Parallel first on 3 October. The Marines landed at Wonsan on October 26. And lastly, the 7th Division landed at Iwon on 29 October 1950. We operated within that boundary line set by MacArthur, and were assigned under an increased authority of General Almond's X Corps command.
This separated Almond entirely from Walker's Eighth Army Jurisdiction. On November 17, Almond got the 3rd Division to add to X Corps. On 20 October 1950, the authority of General Almond was again restated and reestablished as the X Corps commanding officer. That authority came directly from MacArthur [CINCUNC]. No one disputed his authority in establishing this command. His command was totally inclusive of the 1st Marine Division at 1200 hours. X Corps was to, "until further orders, assume control of all UN and ROK ground forces operating north of 39 degrees and 10 minutes north." To state once again, Nowhere within this directive was it implied or directed that the 1st Marine Division Commander was equal in command to or above the X Corps commander. They were OPCON to Almond's command.
MacArthur outlined his plan for the future of Korea. Once his forces had secured the North Korean area and were aligned along the Yalu River, he would then replace American forces with ROK forces. That was stated to the Chinese people. American forces were to return to Japan. All prisoners of war would later be paroled to their homes, and civil procedures of a government would be restored under the auspices of the UN authorities. In mid-November, evidence of Chinese "Volunteers" disappearing from the battle front seemed evident in both Eighth Army and X-Corps areas. They suddenly just seemed to vanish. On 20 November, UN command reported to Washington that the enemy was apparently withdrawing further north in Eighth Army area.
On 21 November, General Walker notified MacArthur that his logistical problems were solved, and that he was now ready to resume the northern offensive. He reset his new "attack date" for 24 November. There was much dispute over the hydroelectric plants. Should they be exempted as a military target or not? The ROK unit that had reached the Yalu at Chosan in the Eighth Army area on 26 October found that the hydroelectric plant there had been shut down a month before and much of the machinery had been removed. It was noted as well that neither Chinese nor Russian sources had made any real issue about that loss of electrical power. MacArthur's UN force were therefore committed to seize the entire border area. In General Almond's sector, he was already occupying a portion of the Yalu River, and there had been no notable military reaction by the Chinese or the Russians.
By 23 November the X Corps' assault divisions had advanced against spotty resistance to separated positions spread over a space of 150 air miles. The 1st Marine Division held the town of Hagaru-ri at the lower end of the Changjin Reservoir. Seventy miles to the northeast, the 7th Division occupied Hyesanjin on the Yalu. Thirty miles east and slightly south of Hyesanjin, the ROK 3rd Division had moved inland to the town of Hapsu, and some forty miles northeast of Hapsu, the ROK Capital Division was at the outskirts of Ch'ongjin on the coast.
General MacArthur, however, chose to revive his concept formulated, but not used, in October of sending X Corps forces westward toward the Eighth Army. Since the UNC front slanted across the peninsula with the Eighth Army holding the more southerly portion of the tilted line, a westward attack by Almond's forces placed them deep in the enemy's rear, giving them an excellent opportunity to ease the Eighth Army's progress. [14]
But that other enemy--the weather--was beginning to invade the area. Swift and icy winds rapidly moved in around the troops. The temperature plummeted to readings from 10 above zero in the west to minus 20 degrees in the higher mountains of northeastern Korea. General Walker ordered his field commanders to use extreme caution and to use phase lines in order to have control at all times. The days of reckless pursuit had apparently ended. On 24 November General Willoughby's intelligence staff predicted that UN forces were opposed by some 82,799 North Koreans and a Chinese force of between 40,000 and 70,000.
As General Walker opened his forward thrust on the 24th, he met little resistance and gained twelve miles in just thirty-six hours. But after dark on the 25th, Walker's forces were struck hard in the central and eastern sections. For all intent and purpose, the forward offensive of the UN had stalled. There was no more forward movement beyond the 27th of November. That was it--the end of the line in North Korea. It was as far as we went toward the Yalu (with the only exception being Task Force Kingston of the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division reaching the Yalu on the 28th of November). That same day, MacArthur reported to the JCS, "No pretext of minor support under the guise of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war."
MacArthur then shifted the responsibility back to Washington, as Washington restricted movements before. He then awaited the JCS's next directive. MacArthur got the troops that far north, then he ordered a defensive line position, "making local adjustments as the ground situation required." Regardless of how his forces got to this point, who was responsible to get them out? The inadequate and inconclusive intelligence reports concerning the number of Chinese being in front of our forces were 100% in error. That aside, the enemy was there.
At the later MacArthur hearings (in mid 1951), MacArthur stated, "that the intelligence that a nation is going to launch war, is not an intelligence that is available to a commander, limited to a small area of combat." As he informed the JCS, "It is quite evident that our present strength of force is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The resulting presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world-embracing consideration beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander." He was restating as a private citizen what he had stated from the beginning since the first shots were fired by Task Force Smith. "Our present strength of force is not sufficient." It always was from day one. How many times and ways could he state it?
Then, the political and high ranking military officers began jockeying for damage control to defend their own position and stating who was really and truly responsible for the disaster in North Korea. On the national level, the authorities declared the Chinese intentions was not known or clear enough to make an educated guess, nor to pursue a definitive judgment. Yet that judgment continuously denied replacements of line troops. It denied the need during those five months of "conflict" to declare a State of Emergency until December 16, 1950. That old vulgar adage, "The shit had hit the fan" had come true, and it stained all those involved. Truman had authorized the troops; Congress had authorized the funds; the Senate had approved the action. But there was no declaration of a war, nor would there ever be one. It took the Chinese to force a Proclamation of a National Emergency. But on that date, before that time--December 16, the men of Task Force MacLean/Faith were gone in all reality. The formality of their removal from the official record was a political ploy to save face and bury a tragedy at Chosin.
Two nations faced each other on a field of battle--the United States and China, neither with a declaration of war. A massive force of Chinese faced our "police" force. As MacArthur ended a communiqué to the JCS, it was "beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander." [SOURCE OF QUOTE?] In other words, Washington's timidity and reluctance to commit the nation had boomeranged on the national leaders. Their lack of resolve and support had permitted a weak force of America's sons to face a new enemy. These forces had already done the job that was required of them. They had totally defeated the North Korean army. It was then entirely too late in history to blame anyone. The loss in North Korea for the three weeks between the last one in November and the first two of December stood at 13,000 plus.
Korean fate unfolded with whatever world events affected Korea and our interest or political needs at the time. Whether South Korea would have been invaded by Russian Forces instead of North Korean ones was a moot point. The United States' strength in the region of the Far East was in decline. Regardless of the power or ancestry of the invading force, the situation on June 25, 1950 had to be played out with whatever cards we held militarily at that time. From Day One, just as South Korea could not support a war effort on their own, so too North Korea could not sustain any prolonged effort without outside material and ammunition to achieve a complete victory outside of a purely divided country's civil war.
The great powers supplied each on their side with much needed war material. Russia, however, limited its commitment to supplies and equipment only, with minute filler troops. China on the other hand, always considered Korea as a little brother to protect if need be. The threat of any conflict escalating into an all out war had to be understood in light of the world events of the time frame in which they occurred. While history records rumble of war in Vietnam with those of Korea, it, too, was given "back burner" status in the late 1950's. So the Korean War---regardless of any known or unknown government policy--shifted into North Korea. Whether this would have made any difference whatsoever in the Chinese entry, only the political analysts' could insure. But between October 7-16 and December of 1950, it was an irrelevant point. We were there, and so were the Chinese.
A new battle began in North Korea. The decision to enter North Korea was a foggy one. Neither North Korea nor South Korea had been a member of the United Nations. MacArthur was in charge of all UN forces, but that did not include South Korea--the "host" country of the war. Syngman Rhee's decision to cross the parallel a week before Walker's Eighth Army was authorized to cross it as well would create a murky situation if Rhee's forces were defeated. On September 25th, Rhee and his government were reinstalled in South Korea, and the forces he had assigned to MacArthur's command reverted back to him. His ROK divisions operated independently of either Eighth Army or X Corps until reassigned to X Corps on 20 October. However, those ROKs attached to American divisions remained with them, to be released as Army replacements arrived. Still, Rhee's independent action to commit his forces prior to the backing of the UN meant that the repercussions of his action were not entirely the fault of MacArthur. He did not independently authorize UN forces in North Korea.
But to return to Dairen... Since it did not seem to concern the state department as such, it "could" pose a threat to MacArthur moving forces north of the 38th Parallel into the 39th and 40th Parallel. Moving our forces into North Korea also involved moving our naval fleet above the 38th Parallel, thereby adjacent to Dairen. As Stalin informed Truman earlier, that zone was within the Soviet military zone. A dangerous situation faced the Soviet Union's military zone. UN forces of Eighth Army were operating in waters directly across the Korean Bay at Pyongyang. The US Navy ships were in and out of Korea Bay. This posed a direct threat in Russian shipping lanes into that port. Since other military zones faced NATO forces in Germany, this was of prime importance to the powers that be in Washington.
In Europe, we were at our weakest point in manpower. The immediate solution was to cut divisions from Korea and relocate them to Germany. But in Korea, we were caught between two communist powers--Russia & China--in an ever expanding "conflict". The American solution was to cut troop strength in North Korea at the same time the Chinese committed massive amounts of men to that battlefront.
That major snafu required some massive damage control. The United States needed to let the world know that our losses were not as bad as reported. Our losses were light. Many "heroes" and Medal of Honor (MOH) winners were created, especially around the Chosin Reservoir. But those awards excluded all Army forces that were there at that same time. If one was only smart enough to just manipulate all the facts to fool those in power and save face, then what possible harm could be found in that? Yet, while yielding ground gained weeks before, we gave up that real estate while engaging in excessive creation of "eroes." Public relations efforts were created to minimize the action to smaller isolated events hiding within other larger events. Those hidden events were far more tragic and highly more heroic that any reported. Common truck drivers were much more deserving than battalion commanders who were given praise and MOH's for merely leading their own battalions. One would think that was their common assignment, not "above and beyond it."
In all reality, Russia's threat did not really concern MacArthur. He had called China's bluff, but lost. He had also outright challenged Russia--and won. He had left Hokkaido Island weak and undefended as of August. Japan was then wide open in that region closest to Russia. As Russia had wanted to move forces into Hokkaido before, here was their opportunity to move. Yet they failed to move, nor did they even threaten to move in either area. Still, Europe--their front yard--was the main concern in Washington. That section of the globe did not directly concern MacArthur's command, yet he was continually denied forces even to the point of being told that he would have to sacrifice one of his divisions to relocate to Germany because the threat posed was there instead of in Korea. Apparently MacArthur could not understand any rationale within this logic. One could believe that the Russian interest was in the threat posed directly along their own border line in North Korea. It could expand the fighting. In short, erroneously or otherwise, concerning Russia we were pulling the tiger's tail and he did not respond. Yet others in the State Department were afraid the tiger would be unconcerned with his tail, and stick his head into a noose at the European end. This highlights the frustration MacArthur had in trying to wage a winning war. In the Senate hearings on MacArthur's dismissal, Major General Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell, Commander of FEAF, Bomber Command, testified over the boundary line violations as well as the difficulties of destroying the Yalu bridges in November 1950:
"We were not, however, allowed to violate Manchurian territory. I mean we were not allowed to fly over an inch of it. For instance, the Yalu has several bends like most rivers before getting to the town of Antung, and the main bridge at Antung we had to attack in only one manner. There was one manner you could attack the bridge and not violate Manchurian territory, and that was a course tangential to the southernmost bend of the river.. So you draw a line from the southernmost bend of the river to the bridge and that is your course, and these people on the other side knew that, and they put up their batteries right along the line and they peppered us right down the line all the way... In addition to that, they had fighters come up along side... join the formation about 2 miles to the lee and fly along at the same speed on the other side of the river while we were making our approach, and just before we got to Bombs-away position, they would veer off to the north and climb about 30,000 feet and make a frontal quarter attack on the bombers... So they would be coming from Manchuria in a turn swoop down, fire their cannon at the formation and continue the turn back into sanctuary-and the boys didn't like it." [15]
And this testimony from MacArthur:
"By some means, the enemy commander must have known of the decision to protect his lines of communications into North Korea or he never would have crossed those bridges in force." MacArthur; [16]
All these restrictions were in place while we had two task forces of the 7th Division of Americans and ROKs located at Hyesanjin-Singalpajin on the very banks of the Yalu River bordering Manchuria at the very foot of one of those bridge crossings in November (21-28). And the rules were set down in stone: Don't irritate your enemy more than necessary. It was truly an odd and curious way to conduct a war.
Again at the MacArthur hearings, in regards to waging a war and his earlier choices in facing the Chinese in North Korea, he stated, "The situation, at times, may require the taking of calculated risks." He explained later about his northward advance as a "reconnaissance in force." He said that he had three choices:
Go forward - "to ascertain the truth of the strength of what he [the enemy] had."
Remain immobile - "to set where we were."
Withdraw - "go in precipitate retreat."
In an earlier emergency council of war at Tokyo attended by Generals, Almond, Walker, MacArthur, Hickey, Wright, Willoughby and Whitney, the concern was focused above all else on saving the forces in North Korea. Walker's new orders were: "Withdrawal as necessary to keep the Chinese from outflanking him, Almond was to maintain contact, but, to withdraw the X Corps into the Hamhung-Hungnam area." It was agreed that "Eighth Army seemed in greater danger then Almond's corps." The conference centered on what X Corps could do to help Eighth Army. The same question, posed one week earlier, had no conclusive solution. Remember, this was the evening of the 29th and Almond was not at Chosin but in Tokyo. He had issued orders to withdraw one regiment from Yudam-ni back into Hagaru-ri . He also OPCONed the task force east of Chosin to General Smith as well. That was a fatal error.
Some later press agents' reports of General Almond's sudden panic seemed fabricated, as were many other reported events at Chosin. This was evident from what is mentioned in the previous paragraph of this narrative. Walker's forces were the ones at greater risk. They always were the most battle weary, and were the most ill-equipped in all logistical material. As I have stated, the proof of this was the losses Walker's Eighth Army suffered in his withdrawal overland back into South Korea while the X Corps withdrew by sea. The naval bombardment kept the Chinese at bay in the X Corps area of withdrawal. Unlike Dunkirk, no ships were lost. The only real disaster in X Corps was to Task Force MacLean/Faith, and that could have been greatly reduced--but it was not.
Interservice rivalry had enacted a heavy toll. The confluence of all road networks within Eighth Army area was turned into road blocks. While more press coverage was given X Corps, notable the 1st Marine Division sole withdrawal from Chosin, that road could have been protected by the full force of the air power of the 1st Marine Air Wing and the planes from the Navy Fleet assigned to them. Remember also that this was one single road out of Chosin. All enemy might was also highlighted there, yet the return trip was not that costly. The casualties had already been created 12 miles north of Koto-ri. Likewise, as in Eighth Army area, the Chinese forces had no long-range weapons to continually stop that force. A road gap was created when a 16/24 foot span of a road bridge was destroyed by the enemy. It was repaired from afar after bridge spans were flown into the area. This feat of accomplishment highlights the team work and time span that X Corps had compared to Eighth Army, which was continually under heavy fire.
I do not wish to downgrade what either Eighth Army or X Corps did in their withdrawals. But the reader of this research should be aware of the difference in the situations. That difference can be no better highlighted than by the casualties that ensued: Eighth Army - 7,337; X Corps - 5,638--a difference of 1,699 more American casualties for Eighth Army, with the 2nd Division (Indianhead) responsible for 4,131 of that figure.
What was so amazing here is the JCS trying to direct this rapidly changing battlefront from the States, some 7,000 miles distant. In the council meeting on the 28th, MacArthur--the man above all others who knew the lay of the land, believed that, while X Corps might have seemed over extended at the time, the terrain conditions made it extremely difficult for the Chinese Army to take any real advantage of that fact. MacArthur's plan to pull the X Corps back into Hungnam sector was of concern to the JCS. Their suggestion was to extricate the Marines and the 7th Division troops from the Changjin Reservoir, then establish a line to "sufficiently coordinate to prevent large enemy forces from passing between them or outflanking either of them." MacArthur was against their proposal, as he neither had the forces (of which the JCS should have been well aware) nor the freedom of movement. There was no timeline since the Chinese attacks. With no reserves, winter weather, and the irrefutable fact of the full Chinese intervention, his previous announcement that, "We face an entirely new war and enemy" failed to impress anyone, particularly those who were so blind as not to see that within the last five months of fighting in Korea, the term "war" was still avoided. However, at long last a serious consideration was finally given at the national level. A State of National Emergency was at long last declared by President Truman. It makes one wonder how we won the Second World War, considering that most of these same top officers were still in a position to make strategic decisions.
MacArthur had doubts about the JCS because of their lack of understanding of the many difficulties he faced in Korea. His intelligence reports stated that twenty-six Chinese divisions had been identified so far, and had on line an additional force of 200,000 men in reserve. There was also word that the North Korean Army was being reorganized in the enemy's rear area. It was also difficult to hit supply lines away from the main roads by air strikes and sea bombardment because the Chinese stayed out of direct range of the 16 inch guns of the USS Missouri battleship--the "Big MO." Their backpack method of moving supplies was primitive, but effective. They took advantage of a lesson we had failed to learn and grasp in pursuing the North Korean Army into North Korea. Their use of heavy weapons was a burden to them, easily knocked out by our air power. The need to stick to the main road (MSR) and rail lines, were reciprocal problems for us as well, but the Chinese avoided that same trap. While it deprived them of long range weapons, they had the manpower to overcome that burden.
Meanwhile, others were critical of MacArthur's direction from Japan, a shorter distance of some 700 miles. MacArthur had more input than was necessary. Every other unit and military branch outside the Army had different views of the objectives, yet in the end, all of them truly had to share some degree of blame. Each hour brought a new change to the situation. Field commanders had to continually review and issue rapid changes in operation orders to address new conditions. The lower echelon commanders also had to react to the rapid changes, as they found the Chinese were suddenly around them. This change of events also required those battalion and company commanders to make rapid decisions in haste. MacArthur replied to the JCS and their suggestion of a line across the waist line of North Korea with the following words:
"If the entire United States force of seven divisions at my disposal were placed along this defensive line it would mean that a division would be forced to protect a front of approximately twenty miles against greatly superior numbers of an enemy whose greater strength is potential for night infiltration through rugged terrain. Such a line with no depth, would have little strength, and as a defensive concept would invite penetration with resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction." [Source of Quote?]
Besides, this had already been done. And far reaching deployment of forces caused them to be too scattered and too few to hold the line. MacArthur had stated this over and over again. Why it didn't resonate in Washington is unclear.
MacArthur, as commanders before him, never gave--nor were they required to give, a full and complete reason behind his final decisions. He had stated his three choices, and it was his decision alone to go forward. Those seeking to blame MacArthur dispute his use of a smaller force to locate the enemy, but in reality, he had no massive forces to begin with. We had to probe every corner to seek information that was not readily available. Furthermore, the information that was available concerning the Chinese forces in front of us was unreliable. "Have they withdrawn for good?" and "Would they show up again and where?" were questions that hung in the balance. We knew we were superior in numbers to the North Korean Army forces, but what about the Chinese ?
Each unit had its Intelligence & Reconnaissance (I&R) platoons as part of a regiment. Someone had to probe forward for information to determine what lie ahead, what had really changed between what the corps intelligence group G-2 had obtained, and the reality that faced the advancing force of infantry units. As recorded at the island of Tarawa in World War II, the charts were 100% in error for the landing there, and that force of Marines went in with that incorrect information at a high cost. It is inconceivable that the Marine commander knew the amount of enemy in front of him at Chosin without his reconnaissance company being forward at Chosin on 24 November to determine the enemy forces immediate in front of him. It is stated: "He felt there were enemy ahead." [SOURCE OF QUOTE?] That was a purely asinine statement. Of course there was enemy ahead. Who else were we pursuing in North Korea, and isn't that the mission of an armed force in a hostile country? Had they not been there, we would not have been that far into their territory. Their force had been effectively destroyed, but not entirely captured. The President of North Korea was still not accounted for, and the powers that be had not declared an end to hostilities--neither the United States nor the United Nations.
The battle went on, however, one of its biggest mysteries was over. At that point in time, we faced a new war and a new enemy. His strength was great in manpower, and we had to respond to that new enemy. Unfortunately, we were unaware that the press corps had dramatically changed from friend to foe. There had been little for them to report and cover as we were moving forward towards the Yalu, and before the Chinese forces appeared. They had yet to pen their reports of the 2nd Division hoarding all of that "bug-out gas," or that the Army troops were just waiting for any excuse to break for the rear lines. The war correspondents just seemed to be holding back all those 'juicy stories' from the American public.
The reports wrote that from the Inchon Landing, out of Pusan, and on to the Yalu, it seemed unreal how ineffective the Army forces had been between September 15 and November 24th. They reported the ease that these forces had in getting to various locations in North Korea--the lack of difficulty in the X Corps high mountains regions and the low ground levels in Eighth Army area. If the reporters were to be believed, it was just a walk in the park for these forces. There was no hardship at all--that is, for the Army forces. Somehow the Marines always seemed to draw the short straw. If it had not been for them, there would have been no interesting action to report.
But what was so amazing was the location of the press corps when the battle for Chosin started. Where were they? They were not flown into the area until the 5th or 6th of December, and just as they had missed the very first casualty of the war, they had also missed the opening of the events at Chosin prior to 24 November. Because they weren't there when the action took place, they relied on the reports and printed whatever hearsay was given to them. Since late 29 November, all forces within the Chosin area were transferred to Marine (OPCON) command. So also were the press corps reports that were issued from there. The reporters had to play "catch-up" because they were some three to four days behind in coverage and their reports were subject to Marine-approved dispatches released about Chosin action. Certainly nothing constructive was said about Task Force MacLean/Faith--of how or why they were there in the first place. The Stars & Stripes newspaper reported that the Army survivors of a force east of the reservoir, "Had been in the open for five days." Surely curiosity should have overwhelmed them to ask, "What were they doing those five days?" Let us begin to research and travel that route to Chosin and to unravel the next great mystery of why the 7th Division forces were reassigned to the Chosin Reservoir in the first place, and what those Army forces were doing there those five days.
[1] While the Marines stated that they were the "spearhead" force of X Corps, the reality was that one could not be the "tip of the spear" by being behind the leading force of X Corps. Rather then being the spear they were bringing up the rear.
[2] See Policy & Direction the First Year.
[3] General Smith objected to being overlooked for this mission as well, as the coastline was his Marine domain and he could have that naval gun fire available for support from sea to the shoreline.
[4] First at Inchon, second at Seoul, and then at the Fusen Reservoir.
[5] Here is apparently where the paper trail on this question of why the division and who was responsible starts to build.
[6] Recall Smith resisted Almond's use of this equipment at the Han River crossing at Seoul, insisting these units were Marine equipment. Question: Why didn't he use them there?
[7] As stated in Clayton James' book, The Years of MacArthur, 1941-1945, page 359.
[8] The Brockway trucks were used to bridge the gap at the gatehouse south of Koto-ri. They were used in setting bridging spans in place to link the roadway over that destroyed gap into the MLR back to the port of Hungnam. Thus the Marines benefited directly from the Army "mentality" to have equipment readily available to bridge rivers and gorges and gaps. Question: Why would Smith miss the Navy "mentality" which should imitate the Marine Corps' tactics to cross a reservoir over its water bed
[9] Smith included the "soldier" as well, however, his concern over them was a moot point. He had no control over placement of Army forces at the time he wrote his letter to Commandant Cates on 15 November.
[10] Marguerite Higgins, War in Korea, p.175. "His critics do not disagree... Instead of an "end the war" offensive they believe there should have been a reconnaissance in force."
[11] Mao's Generals Remember Korea, p.121. (CPVF=Chinese Peoples Volunteer Force) Chairman Mao was the Chinese government official who was equivalent to President Truman.
[12] A Marine-promulgated point about the 1st Cavalry at Unsan on the west side was downplayed with the Marines. RED FLAG - This diverted attention directly from the Marines to the Army forces.
[13] For more information regarding this event, see Marine! The life of Chesty Puller by Burke Davis.
[14] Ebb & Flow, footnote 39, X Corps Opn 0 6, 11 Nov 50; Ltr, Gen Wright to Gen Almond, 10 Nov 50.
[15] Policy & Direction, p. 246.
[16] Policy & Direction, p. 420.
"I have always deplored this incident as far too typical of the amount of top echelon time and effort expended in the Pacific on matters not pertaining to the winning of the war. Inter-service disputes, given unmerited prominence, can grow into the greatest enemy of victory when they take priority over all other interests in the minds of generals and admirals. Equally deplorable is the effect upon the men who carry into peacetime the animosity thus engendered in wartime."
- General Holland M. Smith, USMC
Unlike a rivalry between two competing teams of any athletic event, where only one of those teams will win, inter-service rivalry of the kind I am referring to is more of a belligerent, combative, quarrelsome nature between the military forces assembled as one team for one purpose: to defeat the enemy. The end result of their teamwork is supposed to be glory in the defeat of the enemy, not the glory of the integrity of the individuals on the team. Unfortunately, that was not the case in Korea, since each win was in turn followed by two defeats: loss of territory purchased with human life. The dispute over which method of attack was best was debated, but like inter-service rivalry, it has never been resolved, and the events intertwined with that rivalry found their way into the X Corps of the Korean War. It interfered with planned corps operations. It upset timetables. It was costly in human life. These things by themselves added absolutely nothing to the victory sought. The CCF Marshal Peng was the prime beneficiary of the snafu created by two American generals and their own private war of egos at the Chosin Reservoir. The 7th Division caught in the trap sat there on the banks of the reservoir. Indeed, history does repeat itself.
Inter-service disputes were never completely solved and were still kicked around in 1947, long after World War II had ended. As noted in my research below, it continued into the Korean War, but in an inverted manner. In Korea, the corps commander was from the Army and a Marine commander was the subordinate officer. However, had General Almond sacked Oliver P. Smith at Chosin reservoir, his major problems would be:
1) Smith's own ADC (assistant division commander) was not in Korea at the time to immediately replace him, General Craig being on an emergency leave
2) Major General Almond was outranked by the Marine Commandant, who in turn was the one to replace and select a permanent replacement for the division that would have created an even bigger Army-Navy-Marine battlefield inter-service fiasco than the one earlier at the two islands of Makin and Saipan.
3) General Almond also remained General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, in absentia. Therefore, there had to be some other legal military solution found for Oliver Smith's failure to move his forces in a timely fashion to support MacArthur's own UN final offensive in North Korea, set for 24 November 1950. [1]
An identical World War II solution was for a Naval admiral to issue an order for O.P. Smith to be relieved of his command. This latter solution would keep the Marine dispute, within the Navy family circle. But while these things may have been, they were not. So what other option remained in the Army X Corps commander's bag of tricks? Only one, in my opinion, and that was to place that division in X Corps reserve and reassign the entire mission to an Army division. Therein lies the alpha of Task Force MacLean and the omega of Task Force Faith at Chosin.
Since the planned UN offensive failed in North Korea, the resulting fallout seemed to require massive damage control. To minimize that damage, the convenient withdrawal of all those legal relocation orders relating to the smaller Army force (31st RCT) ordered into the Chosin Reservoir arena on 24 November 1950 seemed to fit neatly into that damage control.
General Smith of the Marine Corps was continually in conflict over his orders from General Almond, who was his superior. As Five-Star General MacArthur was fired by the President, however, MG Smith ended his career with four stars instead of two. What was Smith's magic? He was continually being saved by those earlier reactions to inter-service rivalry from World War II. No one dared to relieve a commander from another branch of the service. The glowing memory of Marine General Holland Smith versus General Ralph Smith was still too fresh in the minds of military high command.
In that Pacific fiasco, General Holland M. Smith (Marine) relieved General Ralph Smith (Army) of his command due to the fact that he did not move his troops forward as fast as Holland Smith liked. Even though he had been warned of the consequence of his actions, he encouraged the relief of Ralph Smith anyway, and in the end that action affected his own career and his standing with the Navy brass. [2]
The conflict between Smith versus Smith was over the combat assault actions on the islands of Makin (and later, Saipan). But, there General Ralph Smith was not being insubordinate as such. It was not his movement into the battle that was at issue, but rather the forward momentum at the speed Holland Smith demanded. The argument was over combat tactics of a frontal assault opposed to securing a position before advancing forward. There was more to consider, too, as once again the commanders' egos were over the lives of their men. The issue was that Marine frontal assaults, though costly, saved time as well as many lives as a slower line of attack. There were two schools of thought on combat tactics between the two services. That was a major difference between the two Marine and Army commanders. As for the Army, MacArthur had long since ruled that "the days of the frontal assault are over." [3]
This inter-service rivalry between the Smiths resulted in the island of Iwo Jima being a solely Marine operation. For General Marshall (JCS) decreed, because of this past rivalry, that "Never again would an Army General serve under the Marines." [4] This decree can be recalled in Korea when General Ridgway placed O.P. Smith in charge of IX Corps in South Korea (in 1951). That placement could not stand, as this research will covered later.
One of the strange things about Makin island was that, in Holland Smith's words, it was lightly defended. "I considered Makin a minor operation, which a single regimental combat team from the 27th could handle easily." so Ralph Smith (per corps G-3) assigned only his 165th Regiment to that task. To me, Holland Smith had two problems. the first was as General Almond did at Seoul. Both corps commanders expected the objective to be taken in record time, and each division general in charge felt rushed--Ralph Smith at Makin and Oliver Smith at Seoul. The second problem was the assault on Tarawa. When it was in progress, Holland "Mad" Smith was at Makin, but his bigger problem was at Tarawa. "No matter what happened to my Marines at Tarawa," he said, "I could not be with them because (Admiral) Turner insisted that I remain at Makin"--not on land but aboard ship. Tarawa, as Holland Smith himself stated, "was a mistake." The main point here is that his absence from the surrounding waters was of no importance whatsoever. General Julian Smith had that responsibility on shore at Tarawa, and he handled the situation and the difficult problem he faced there. Someone in higher command, which included Holland Smith, underestimated the conditions and problems to take Tarawa. [5]
But Holland Smith was positive that he had overestimated the number of troops required at Makin, stating, "Any Marine regiment would have done it in that time." It took three days. Here was a severely bruised ego. Holland Smith was not at Tarawa, nor was he needed there. As he wrote in his book, "I am not going to describe the fight for Tarawa... besides, I was not there." Enough said. But he turned his criticism against the naval bombardment of Tarawa nevertheless, stating that "not one of the pillboxes had been hit-save one."
In my limited research on the situation over the battles of Makin or Tarawa, this much is known: Each of the islands were behind schedule. Whether Ralph Smith was "dragging his feet," I can't say. But Holland Smith was stuck aboard ship and the news from Tarawa was not good. Commander Julian Smith reported, "The situation is in doubt." [6] He asked Holland Smith to release the 2nd Division regiment held in reserve. "Julian Smith would not have asked me to commit our last reserve unless conditions demanded this desperate action." Admiral Turner would not release him (required damage control?), and he blamed Ralph Smith for the delay. "Makin should have been cleaned up in one day fighting. It dragged on three days and chained me to this insignificant skirmish."
On Makin, the island was taken in three days, and that was the main point. but Holland Smith continued to let his anger grow. He was a general acting like a small child, apparently not letting go of the past. At the very same time within this same week, he was in deep trouble over his joint operation on the island of Tarawa. There he was severely criticized for his frontal attacks as being extremely costly. In the end he admitted to the error. But Tarawa was his baby alone. There were no Army troops to spread blame to so he was still steaming some seven months later on the upcoming invasion of Saipan, again over Ralph Smith and the Army, and over the previous battle of Makin Island. There was an unusual amount of time between the invasions on Makin and Saipan. [7] (In fact, enough time for the Navy to build its namesake ship--see footnote 7) and for General Holland Smith to receive his third star.
Then came the battle of Saipan, and again Ralph Smith was involved. Holland Smith's anger was still growing, and it seemed to reach a boiling point. The fact that the Marines had two divisions and the Army one division was the center of the problem. When the Marines moved forward, the Army troops did not move as fast as Holland Smith liked, and that slow movement created a "U" in the offensive assault which left a center open flank on each side of the Marine force. Holland Smith stated earlier, "Had Ralph Smith been a Marine, I would have relieved him on the spot." But before he acted on his own, he sought advice from Admiral Kelly Turner. "Turner agreed that Holland Smith had every right to relieve the other Smith if he wished. But both knew that since Army troops were involved, there would be hell to pay between the services. They agreed to talk it over with Admiral Raymond A. Spruance,...he drafting a dispatch to Holland Smith, authorizing and directing him to replace Ralph Smith. Thus Spruance took full responsibility for the relief of Ralph Smith." [8]
With the changing of commanders, apparently the situation improved, according to Smith. "Finally the line was straightened out until the Second Marines were pushed out at Garapan, and the line across Saipan was held by the 27th on the left and the Fourth on the right." Holland Smith ordered the 27th Infantry Division into reserve and vowed that he would never use the division again. [9] (Apparently Almond was a student of Holland Smith's method in his own dealing with O.P. Smith at Chosin.) "A few days after the incident the news broke in Washington. The implication of the stories was that Holland Smith was the 'butcher' he had been declared to be after Tarawa, and that Ralph Smith was relieved because he refused to obey Holland Smith's orders, not wanting to send his men to almost certain slaughter." [10] At Chosin, all Marine defense favored O.P. Smith over his refusal to move as scheduled, which "saved" his command.
"Perhaps Spruance's chief of staff, Captain Moore, spent a good deal of his time refereeing arguments between the strong minded Turner and the equally opinionated Smith. Sometimes Moore said Smith was a 'crybaby' so great was his affections for his Marines, and so deep his suspicion of the Navy in relation to the Marine Corps." On the island of Kwajalein, "There was friction again. Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote with some indication of glee that General Corlett (Army) threatened to put General Smith (Marines) under arrest if he came ashore and interfered with Corlett's operations with the 7th Division. Smith did not go ashore, but he was critical of the slowness which the Army division moved ahead on Kwajalein when the assault began on February 1, It was called a "beautiful"" assault, and it was true, Holland Smith deserved much of the credit in more ways than one, because the 7th Division had been his baby in the beginning, back in the days when he trained those troops for the Adak invasion." [11]
In my own review of the generals involved, I see more behind the scenes in the relief of General Ralph Smith. Admiral Spruance issued the order to relieve him, but he also authorized "and placed Major General Sanderford Jarman ( Holland Smith's choice) in command of this division." That, in my opinion, is what rubbed and added salt to the wound. While Ralph Smith was under Spruance's command, he was not a battle casualty as such, necessitating immediate replacement. Therefore, the one responsible to replace him was Army Commander Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., he being over Army forces in the Pacific area. However, Ralph Smith's dismissal aside, he was then replaced by Major General Jarman. This was not the choice of General Richardson to head that division of the 27th National Guard. Within days he replaced Jarman with Major General George W. Griner, commander of the 96th Division. There was the rub. There was where egos clashed. Holland Smith was offended because he (Richardson) "didn't direct him to report to the corps commander. In other words, Richardson completely ignored me." But General Griner had to report to someone, and Admiral Spruance should have been that one. Besides, Richardson had equal rank to Holland Smith, and he was ALSO solely under Army command. It would appear an ethical change of command should have been through the Army commander of that force. Also, the Army Lieutenant General was not OPCON to the Navy command, and therefore was not required to report to another general of equal rank within a lesser corps of that department.
The bitterness built. Richardson, of equal rank, dressed down Holland Smith. He "had no right to relieve Ralph Smith." The Navy backed Holland Smith. Admiral Kelley Turner, in turn, dressed down Richardson for "irregular interference" with Holland Smith's duties. The situation grew hotter between all commands. Admiral Spruance referred the matter to Admiral Chester Nimitz, who had "verbally approved Richardson's visit" within his command area. General Richardson, in turn, referred the matter to General George C. Marshall. Repercussions followed close on Richardson's heels. Lt. Gen. Richardson also publicly expressed his low opinion of a Marine officer's ability to handle units above the division level. There seems to be supportive evidence of this fact at Chosin, even on the division level, when additional army forces were assigned to the operational control of General O.P. Smith on the evening of 29 November. That action paralyzed the Marine command to react to this additional force placed under their command. Indeed, General Oliver P. Smith had difficulties of his own with his division officers.
Holland M. Smith believed that Ralph Smith lacked aggressiveness. At Seoul and Chosin, Almond believed that Oliver Smith also lacked that same aggressiveness. So in the cases listed above, one could merely equate the name and position of Holland M. Smith for Edward "Ned" Almond, both corps commanders. Holland Smith was over V Amphibious Force, and Almond was over X Corps. But in the case of Holland Smith, the Army commander was ordered to move only one regiment at Makin instead of a whole division.
Lest I leave the impression that General Holland Smith was drummed out of the service over the sacking of Ralph Smith, that was not the case. The furor over that event had far reaching effects to his career, but it didn't end it. He went on to command at Iwo Jima, then he returned to the Marine Training and Replacement Command at San Diego from which he retired at age 64 in May of 1946. He did, however, miss the invasion of Okinawa. That island, being a larger land mass, required more Army personnel, and therefore was under more direct Army command.
I believe that Holland Smith was plagued more by his open criticism of Naval forces rather than Army ones. But that rivalry created open wounds between others extending into Korea. "I was not invited to attend the surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 1, 1945. This was a great personal disappointment after fighting all those weary miles from Tarawa." [12] "This is the summation I must make on the Pacific war: If the Marines had received better cooperation from the Navy, our casualties would have been lower." [13]
In spite of his many contributions and the many islands he assaulted and took, his outspoken criticism of the Navy cause them to snub him at the end of the war. In the end, in spite of the Iwo Jima victory, when the victors of the Pacific campaign were invited aboard the Battleship Missouri for the signing of the surrender papers, even though Admiral Harry Hall had invited Holland Smith as his guest, Admiral Chester Nimitz vetoed it. As a result, Holland Smith was absent--a cast out. Not only had he infuriated the Army, he had also inferred that "Nimitz was riding to fame on the shoulders of the Marines." [14] A victim of inter-service rivalry, he was shunned. He should have remembered one cardinal rule: that you don't knock those to whom you are subordinate. Because Marines are on Navy ships isn't due to the fact that the Navy is under the Department of the Marines (there is no such thing). They are under the Department of the Navy, and if I know that, surely how can the Corps forget it?
In the European Theater in World War II, the commander there--Eisenhower--had "absolute power" over the forces employed there. MacArthur never had that "absolute" power in the Korean War. With 21 foreign nations assigned under his United Nations Command, there was still one problem remaining from World War II.--a major general one. Question: How does the Corps commander relieve/replace a regimental commander? Answer: Through his authority as a Corps commander, to exchange or "sack" that commander and replace him with another one of his choice. In the Army, this is done without fanfare or notoriety and does not upset the divisional mission to any large degree. Almond relieved the 31st Regimental commander of his command after Suwon in South Korea. He was replaced by Colonel Allan D. MacLean, he serving as an Eighth Army staff member. Note here that the regimental commander was replaced, not the division commander as such. While the 7th Division Commander Major General David Barr was replaced after the Chosin Reservoir campaign--recommended by General Almond to his new commander of Eighth Army, General Matthew B. Ridgway, who was then the one responsible to replace General Barr with another division commander.
In World War II in the Pacific region, still other like incidents created more inter-service rivalry disputes between the two military branches: the Department of the Army and the Department of The Navy. The command was divided between MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, each having five stars. Admiral Nimitz was in charge of the Central Pacific region. Inter-service rivalry is dismissed as trivial in nature, and, indeed, on the lowest level, is. The incidents are merely street brawls or barroom fights between over-zealous servicemen defending their own claim of pride in their own outfit or branch of the service. The Army had its own issue between its Army Air Corps and its ground forces as well.
While these disputes required some "stockade" or "brig" time, other than a few broken noses or cuts and bruises, that was generally the extent of it in most cases. Such rivalry was not so trivial in the higher ranks of command. Four earlier isolated case can be cited. The first one was the case of General Billy Mitchell of the Army Air Corps between World War I and II, setting the stage for a precedent and a warning for any future Army officer to be very cautious of his own comments. The other two cases were from Admiral Nimitz's zone of operation in the Pacific in World War II. The earlier one was the 1st Marine Division's clash with General MacArthur's placement of this division after its transfer to his command following operations on Guadalcanal. The second was the hotly disputed case of Holland M. Smith versus Ralph Smith over the islands of Makin and Saipan, already reviewed. The fourth, of course, was in North Korea and involved the Chosin Reservoir campaign.
The outcome of the case of Army General Billy Mitchell was over his opinions and statements on the important use of air power. It was considered one of rivalry on air superiority over the battleships of that time. Billy Mitchell firmly held and advocated to the value of air power. This was not a popular view at the time with the powers that be. They trying to downplay this new weapon of war. When the Navy air ship Shenandoah crashed in a storm, killing 14 of the crew, Billy Mitchell issued his famous 1925 statement to the press accusing senior leaders in the Army and Navy of incompetence and "almost treasonable administration of the national defense." He was, as he expected, court-martialed and used the December 1925 trial as a platform for his views. He was found guilty of insubordination and suspended from active duty for five years without pay. (Note: A single dissenting vote was cast by Colonel Douglas MacArthur.) The charge: "Conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline." In other words, he was "rocking the boat." While a one-star general in 1920, in 1925 he was demoted to Colonel. Billy Mitchell elected to resign instead on 1 February 1926. The important lesson for other Army officers is that, if someone higher up wants your opinion, they will ask you for it. Take heed the result of one Army officer who was censured for his outspoken views, "accusing senior leaders in the Army and Navy of incompetence." [15] He later was given a special Medal of Honor for his stand after the proven worth of air power, for upgrading American National Defense.
The other two cases involved two different Marine officers, but unlike the Billy Mitchell case, being Marines, neither of these men lost their positions, although Holland Smith was shunned for his remarks by the Navy over his remarks about them. His biggest claim to fame in history was his dispute with the Army. (O.P Smith's main claim to historical fame was excessive delays.)
In Korea, a corps commander was the force of command to the commanding general in OPCON charge attached to that corps. Its orders were delegated and flowed downhill through that corps commander through his planning staff. A final order was agreed upon, and primary goals and dates were set in stone. However, this required a reciprocal regulation for the Navy to be in charge over any Army forces under its direct OPCON duty. In either case, however, the issue was over delay in carrying out the mission at hand. Indeed, the Marine Corps Commander, Major General Holland Smith, as outlined in the pages above, set the precedent at Makin and as a Lieutenant General at Saipan because the Army force was slow to activate the set attack hour. (His decision was never rescinded.) He felt that this delay jeopardized the lives of his Marines and the very mission itself. Surely no one with any military training would disagree with that premise, it being all important to the mission's successful completion. But one would be walking a fine line in choosing sides. A Red Flag could be inserted here, as one cannot hypocritically support Holland Smith at Makin and then reverse opinion on Almond at Chosin. The only thing is that Holland Smith's bias showed, not only over the division commander, but also over the Army division as well.
To attempt to connect MacArthur's mind set on the Inchon invasion date: His rush to fit an invasion between a time frame set by nature and tidal waves regardless of the forces assembled at that invasion hour. For MacArthur to completely reverse his military policy in North Korea and reset an already delayed offensive to November 24 for Eighth Army, yet allow a joint supporting flank movement offensive by X Corps to delay an additional three days, was totally out of systematic function with MacArthur's persona and his "keen sense of timing." The one fact with continuity throughout the arrival of O.P. Smith was his constant desire to delay. Yet, he was separated from the Marines in that action. It was Smith that delayed, not the Marines as such. But he was their one sole division commander to order that command to move whatever the direction X Corps assigned it. So a separation disclaimer could not be justified. General Walker of Eighth Army did not please MacArthur with his delay on November 21. MacArthur wanted justification for that delay, it being due to logistics. Yet when that offensive was reset three days later on the 24th, General Almond was allowed another additional three days. Almond had a total of six days delay. Why was that? Was there an unusual problem concerning Almond's forces at Chosin?
Almond reversed his aggressive nature that one time as well. It was strange timing and weird personality shifts for both MacArthur and Almond. While no sane person might believe that to assign the solution used by Holland Smith--to replace a division commander in the heat of an offensive battle--would entirely solve the inter-service rivalry controversy, nevertheless, it immediately solved a leadership role on that battlefront. That is always done anyway when a regimental commander is killed in battle, as a replacement is provided immediately, or the leadership role shifts to a lower officer. A case in point was Colonel MacLean at Chosin. It was better to solve the problem there and save lives in lieu of delaying its aftermath in some military tribunal somewhere far removed from the field of battle--somewhere in Washington in some warm courthouse with scheduled breaks for meals and sleep, and drinking refreshments in a liquid state. If one can learn anything about the Korean War it should be this: That never again should the Army and the Marines be placed as an "attached units" under another uniform command.[16] The inter-service rivalry runs too deep. It was deeper after the Chosin Campaign than ever before, as attested by this research. It was also fueled by the press corps, which compared every move by the Marines as being superior to the Army in all things. There is the rub. There is the problem.
Having stated that, it is important to note that this was not about the individual Marine. It was weighted heavily against their commander, Major General Oliver P. Smith. There is no personal satisfaction in that for me. While most reports of the actions in Korea are lacking about the other six Army commanding generals, that was not true of the Marine commander. Why so much was written of his actions and so many attempts were made to paint him colorful and all-serving in every event is suspect in itself. His contrary and controversial actions are separate from the image of "the Marines". But he was their commander. His actions are reflective of the Marine history in Korea. What made it so different between the Marine command and the Army command was the fact that the Army commanders were replaced for various reasons and the Marine command remained intact. While that was strictly their business-so long as Army forces were not involved--it should have been center stage about the conflict between the X Corps command and its authority to issue orders and expect those orders to be carried out. It is to the 1st Marine Division's credit that the inter-service rivalry finally did subside when O.P. Smith was at last replaced. But that cannot truly be measured in any degree since press censorship was in place after December 20. While more was written about O.P. Smith after that censorship, little was written about the Marines after he left Korea .
Inter-service Rivalry W.W.II and Korea, 1945-1950--An Uglier Side of War--Changes
The JCS made an attempt to create some kind of unification between the services after World War II. However, it seems to me that that was one of those oxymorons where one aims for a reduction but agrees to a plus. The result: Spin off the Air Force from the Army. Instead of two departments--Army and Navy, each with their own air support, we had three departments--Army, Navy, and the Air Force. This added an extra link to the chain, for if we won the BIG ONE with only two departments, why fragment and weaken the chain? If unification was the goal, I seem to have missed the point somewhere. The interaction between the services, each fighting for their own piece of the pie, become a new battlefield. One could conclude that the Navy be required to spin-off one of their two units, either their Air Force or the Marines Corps. That, however, did not happen. They lobbied for more sea transports and airplanes for their Marines and larger land tanks and bigger ground defense and offensive equipment to expand the Marine ground assault roles, while the Army also spinned off their own ship transports.
This controversy was between the Army and Navy. Now the new Air Force department was busy with their new command structure. The Army wanted more control for two reasons: (1) "to gain greater control over the navy, on which it wholly depended to go places, and (2) to control drastically the Marine Corps, which it viewed as a duplication of its ground and air forces." The timing was wrong, as the debate took place following the war in December of 1945. Taking advantage of the national adoration, the admirals and the Marine Corps generals fought unification with a vengeance. "One war hero after the next took the witness stand to punch holes in Truman's proposal. They mocked his proposal and vilified Truman and the Army and airmen for daring to suggest they might have fought better being directed from a central authority in the Pentagon." [17]
The Navy won a victory out of the water between World War II and Korea. In contrast, the Army is required to go through a separate chain of command--the Department of the Air Force. Yet, in early 1951 in Korea, the Marine Air Wing was placed under the OPCON of the Department of the Air Force. Marine ground forces remained independent of the Army, having their own air wing while the Army had completely lost theirs. That deficiency was highlighted as nowhere else but east of Chosin the Marine commander "granted us ‘priority' of 'his' air cover."
Due to the confusion as to who controlled or had "priority" over the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW), on 1 January 1951, the 1st Marine Air Wing was reabsorbed into the Far East Air Force. General Smith of the Marines bitterly protested. He appealed the decision to the Fifth Air Force General Pat Partridge, but to no avail. "Close in air support frankly doesn't play dividends," Partridge had told Smith. Case closed. Smith then appealed to General Ridgway. (It didn't seem fair to take support away from someone else.) He asked Ridgway if merely one squadron could be assigned ‘exclusively' to the Marine Division. Ridgway replied, "Smith, I'm sorry, but I don't command Fifth Air Force." Again, case closed. [18] For the first time, the Marines were forced to undertake a major mission without full control of their air wing. At last--but far too late for Chosin--some sanity came into the war. There was a unification of command. More importantly, Gen. Oliver P. Smith's independent status was ebbing and flowing away from him.
Early in the war, General Stratemeyer had taken steps to improve air operations in Korea since there had been no provisions and the Far East Command (FEC) General Headquarters Staff had no organization for joint responsibilities of the Navy and Air Forces, each a separate department from the Army. The central command of air operations was not immediately possible below the level of MacArthur himself. As a result, inefficiency and duplication of missions resulted. One example was that, in July 1950, the Navy had sent planes from its Seventh Fleet--Task Force 77--against targets that Far East Air Force planned to attack the next day. As a result, the Air Force medium bombers sat on the ground the next day since it was too late to set up other targets. It was a situation crying for a solution. Someone had to assume responsibility, and General Stratemeyer made the first bid for overall control of air operations in Korea. On July 8, he told MacArthur:
"It is my understanding that the Navy contemplates bringing into your theater some land based aircraft. Also as you know, the Seventh Fleet contemplates another strike with air at your direction in North Korea. I request that all land-based naval aviation and carrier based aviation, when operating over North Korea or from Japan, except those units for anti-submarine operations, be placed under my operational control."
Stratemeyer got that control and authority--to a lesser degree. Stratemeyer took some drastic measures in the use of his planes. They were aircraft normally used for interdiction missions behind enemy lines to assure good support missions. MacArthur ordered Stratemeyer to send his B-29s, "to strafe, if necessary" in order to stop the North Korean drive. General Collins expressed great concern in the way the B-29's were being employed, and asked to be kept informed of their use. Stratemeyer recommended the creation of a target selection committee, and with MacArthur's approval, that method took over the actual selection of targets for interdiction. They were new methods developed as the war required, and they were things that should have already been in place prior to, not after, a war had begun. They were things solved at the creation of the new Department of the Air Force.
The menace of shore batteries was removed on 17 October when ground forces of the ROK I Corps which had already captured Wonsan gained control of the peninsulas and islands commanding the harbor approaches. Casualties from mines continued. On 18 October two ROK Navy vessels struck mines in the Wonsan area. One was disabled at the entrance to the harbor, and the other--a minesweeper--was sunk. The next day, a Japanese minesweeper struck a mine and sank. Because troops of the ROK I Corps were well past Wonsan, the military situation did not warrant an unnecessary risk in unloading the Marine units. Admiral Struble, therefore, recommended that they not be unloaded on 20 October as planned, but that D-day be deferred until the minesweeping could be completed. Admiral Joy and General MacArthur concurred.
After arriving within the objective area, the flotilla carrying the 1st Marine Division steamed slowly back and forth from 19 to 25 October in the Sea of Japan just outside the Wonsan channel. The restless Marines called it "Operation Yo-Yo." It had some serious implications. Food threatened to run short and ideal conditions were presented for the spread of epidemic disease. Only a few days earlier, dysentery had hit the crews of two cruisers of the Formosa Patrol during "Yo-Yo." It broke out in epidemic form on the MSTS transport Marine Phoenix, afflicting 700 of the 2,000 embarked troops and a like proportion of the crew. The fifteen LSTs came into the harbor on 25 October and dropped anchor off Blue and Yellow Beaches. By the close of 28 October, all combat elements of the Marine division were ashore. Their mission had been to secure a corps base of operations while the 7th Infantry Division was to spearhead an attack west to join with Eighth Army in front of Pyongyang. That mission was changed by fast moving events by the ROK forces. After a delay over Smith's objection to his Marines unloading their own equipment, the Marines moved one battalion thirty miles south to Kojo to relieve and free the ROK forces of guarding a supply dump. The others moved toward the port of Hungnam. From all indications, the Marines were not to be a major offensive force at that time.
The loading of the 7th Division vehicles and equipment at Pusan was completed on 17 October within the deadline set by X Corps nine days earlier. The loading of corps troops at Pusan began on 19 October. The 7th Division loaded ship again at Pusan Harbor. I spent my 20th birthday aboard ship--ironically, the very same ship that had brought me to Japan in late October and early November of 1948. Two years later, the notation "US Army Transport" was missing from beneath the ship's name, the M.(ason) M. Patrick. I was informed that the name had changed because the ship had passed from the Army to the Merchant Marine Service.
I had spent fourteen long days aboard this ship heading towards Japan, and I expected the bunks to be the same as they were then--a canvas stretched and tied to the frame by a rope. But when I boarded her at Pusan, the old bedding had been replaced by a spring and mattress as in our Army cots at camp. We were administratively loaded, as opposed to being combat-loaded. I was able to get one of the new bunk beds.
I was not sure if this ship was heading back to Japan or not. Time aboard the ship passed slowly. Reading and crap games were the highlights of the day. We were paid while on board ship. Big deal. There was no way to spend it. The sailors "cleaned up," selling apples and oranges for one dollar each. That was a bargain, for the military script [bills] we were paid with had little value there. Most of us exchange it for money orders and sent it home. The word was out that we were heading into North Korea. It required outloading of most RCT troop to rearrange for a combat loading.
In regard to our loading for North Korea, "The difficult logistical and outloading problem given the 2nd Logistical Command on such short notice was worked out successfully only by the constant mutual effort and cooperation of the staffs of the logistical command and of the 7th Infantry Division. The outloading was completed in time. It was an outstanding performance." [19] The delay in landing forces at Wonsan sent the X Corps planners back to the drawing board once again. The original plan had been for the Marines to secure a corps headquarters area around Wonsan. Note here that, as in Army and Navy history, their schedules were completed on time. It was even a pattern for the 7th Infantry Division history. While landing in North Korea, this same honor was not to be extended to the 1st Marine Division, due in large part to their commander's reluctance to obey his scheduled timeline. In Chapter 4, I outlined General Almond's list of General Smith's objections, one through seven. Number four was his delay in loading at Inchon. The next one in order applied at the landing at Wonsan.
5) "When the Japanese Stevedores struck at Wonsan about 25 October, General Smith objected to using any part of his combat troops to unload his own supplies, in spite of the fact that this was the only possible way to accomplish the operation. He wanted a 'written order' before he would comply and he got it."
One can only wonder what General Smith's problems were with his unloading. Surely he had the manpower available. His landing shore party numbered about 6,000 out of his 25,000 plus men at Wonsan. Admiral Struble and his staff decided to form the Advance Joint Task Force (JTF 7), which proceeded to the objective area and began minesweeping at the earliest possible date. All minesweepers available were to be concentrated for the task. The group was comprised of 21 vessels, including 10 American and 8 Japanese minesweepers, and 1 South Korean vessel used as a minesweeper. Minesweeping operations at Wonsan began on 10 October.
At that point, the novel idea was advanced of exploding mines along a narrow passageway by aerial bombing, which would permit the lead sweeps to pass. The Navy was trying its level best to speed up the landings. However, it seems that General Smith was not completely aligned towards that same goal. At least eight Japanese vessels, as well as Japanese personnel were employed due to the lack of available American ships and American personnel. The Japanese also had some cargo ships involved. Were those Japanese Stevedores General Smith's problem? Was he merely fighting World War II all over again?
This seemed reminiscent to my being on prisoner chaser duty earlier in Sapporo, Japan. My duty was to have two prisoners--veterans of the last war--clear snow from a driveway leading from the motor pool. The problem was that Japanese men were employed to drive some of the American Army trucks out of our motor pool. The men rebelled. They would not clear a path for an enemy they had fought years before. The solution was to take them back to the stockade compound for further action by higher authority. Whatever MG Smith's problem was at Wonsan, it should have been a Navy one to solve. As long as that equipment was on board a ship, it was the Navy's responsibility to see to it that it was unloaded.
The X Corps began a quiet, administrative landing at 0730 on 26 October. At 1000 27 October, the command post of the 1st Marine Division closed aboard the USS Mt. McKinley and opened in Wonsan. Thus the Navy brass gave way to a whim of General Smith as well. Again, what was his magic? Why was he the only division commander of seven to be singled out for extra favors and press notoriety? [20] That old adage, "The squeaky wheel always gets the grease" seems to apply here. The "grease" was in the form of a "written order." The emphasis in Almond statement--"and he got it"--seems to indicate that someone other than Almond gave that "written order." But common sense also dictates that a squeaky wheel was never going to correct itself. That "wheel" would eventually have to be replaced or that wagon would have to be parked on the side of the road while others went around it.
The last scenario seem to have been the case later at the Chosin Reservoir. Some applied "pressure" of some kind from some unnamed source might reveal that the past problems were only illusory and merely corrected by application of "pressure." The squeak suddenly disappeared at Chosin. Only under that "pressure" did Smith move his 7th Marines into Yudam-ni as ordered. [21] There, indeed, was an opportunity missed. The problem of "objecting" to a order should have been solved on shore at Wonsan. Note that CG Almond didn't use the term "refused." Rather, he used the milder term of "objected." But an objection with a condition attached is a "refusal" until your terms are met.
The Navy itself should have stepped in to solve the dilemma and issue MG Smith an ultimatum (as Almond did to Smith at Seoul). If MG Smith would not act, the Navy in turn would react. Had that been the case, the issue of who was in charge could have been resolved one way or the other. Let us compare the Marine unloading problems to those of the "inferior" 7th Division:
"The lack of amphibious craft in the 7th Division convoys, the absence of local lighterage, and the need to improvise a beach party made the operation a slow one; everything in the transports and cargo ships had to be offloaded into LSTs and smaller craft, a process which resulted in considerable superficial topside damage owing to swell in the unprotected anchorage. But by the 30th one regiment had landed all its personnel and vehicles and much of its gear." [22]
Once off the ship, the problem of interaction with the Marine general was not a daily, routine one for the Navy. Instead, General Almond receive the problem once the Marines were on land.
Meanwhile, the 7th Division remained idly afloat at Pusan for ten days. Finally, it received orders to proceed to Iwon and to unload there across the beaches. The X Corps 7th Division major mission changed to advance northward instead of westward from Wonsan to Pyongyang. On receipt of the changed orders, the 17th Regimental Combat Team, which was to be first ashore, had to unload its unit equipment from its transports at Pusan and reload combat equipment on LSTs in order to be prepared to land on a possibly-hostile beach. This done, seven LSTs with the 17th Regimental Combat Team aboard left Pusan on 27 October and headed up the coast for Iwon. The landing proved to be without danger, for the minesweepers found no mines there, and the ROK Capital Division had captured and passed through the town several days earlier. The 17th Infantry landed over the beaches at Iwon unopposed on the morning of the 29th. Except for most of its tanks, the 7th Division completed unloading there on 9 November. Iwon was 100 miles further north of Wonsan, and thus placed the 7th Division many miles ahead of the 1st Marine Division.
Even while we were at sea, some of us were required to change ships. On the date of our landing (29 October), it is a significant point that the 7th Division was without any flank protection whatsoever on our left flank, even though we had flank protection from the ROK Capital Division on our right side to the coast. How did this tie in to the mission? It was a prime complaint and concern of MG Smith that his Marine division had no left flank protection on his later move northwest into Hagaru-ri. For the record, as the Marines towards the north to relieve the ROKs at Sudong below the left flank (no matter how difficult the terrain or the mission), the 7th Division advanced forward on a scale of two miles to one without any left flank protection from the Marines. Each mile of Marine delay endangered the mission of the 7th Division. Someone had to be the left flanking force. To that end, the 7th Division had to provide their own defense.
The above paragraph puts things in their proper perspective. That is, the 7th Division landing across a line from Hagaru had absolutely no left flank protection from the Marine division for its main mission to the Yalu. The left flank of the 7th Division remained wide open at all times from the Yellow Sea to the outskirts of Hapsu--the point above the 1st Marine Division position of their withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir. Smith's command post of 27 November was the farthest point of Marine operation at Chosin. The Marine division was alone there before 25 November when Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith arrived with his one battalion from the 32nd Infantry Regiment to replace the entire 5th Marine Regiment east of Chosin. I explain this only to highlight MG Smith's concern and complaint to his commandant (15 November) about his force having no left flank support from Eighth Army. He seemed to divert attention away from the fact that he was not under command of Eighth Army, and was failing to advance on line with the 7th Division force, thereby leaving their left flank fully exposed. Through history it has been erroneously implied that Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith was to provide flank protection for the Marines. His mission placed him once again above the Marine force at Yudam-ni with his left flank open as well.
All of this was of no immediate concern to the 7th Division mission. We moved north towards Hyesanjin on the Yalu River, with our left flank anchored at Samsu and our responsibility east of the Fusen Reservoir (prior to 21 November) assigned to Faith's battalion. The 17th Regiment led to the Yalu River at Hyesanjin, arriving there on 21 November. The leading elements of the 1st Marines arrived at Hagaru-ri on the 14th. The newly-arrived 3rd Infantry Division joined the X Corps on 17 November.
The 7th Division reached the Yalu River at Hyesanjin on 21 November, and the 32nd Infantry, Task Force Kingston, reached the Yalu on 28 November, seizing Singalpajin. It was another reassigned Marine mission. Kingston's effort was not public knowledge via authors and historians until the 1980's. However, Appleman's Army history, South to the Naktong - North to the Yalu", recorded its seizure in 1961. [23] But reaching the river was down-played for any Army benefit. One can only wonder of the true magnificent feat it would have been had the Marines reached Singalpajin (as ordered) instead of the 7th Division. But they did not reach any of their border assignments, and the one by Task Force Kingston was in reality the Marine mission to start with. There is no disgrace connected to reaching one's assigned objective, nor even in trying to reach it, whether one realizes its importance or not. Still, there is honor in taking the objective assigned, especially when unobtainable by others.
The assigned mission was therefore the responsibility of the lowly regimental mix of the combat teams (RCTs) in Korea--those non-commissioned Army officers and soldiers who wore gold combat stripes on a blue background--that combat group sent forward by G-3 to seize the objective. [24] How much and to what depth that section planned the attack was not the direct concern of the individual line soldier. The line soldier or Marine didn't know the extent of the storms brewing at higher headquarters, nor the pros and cons of the mission underway. Their main concern was to take the assigned mission that higher command had set. "The man in the front line is blessed with a sense of immediacy."
As the chain of command decreased from the top level down through the lower ranks, The man in the front line had no direct knowledge of the amount of casualties anticipated in the completion of the assigned mission. One had, however, to be concerned that, whatever it was, the higher command had deemed the mission objective to be worth the cost involved in men's lives--at least on our side of the battle line. That may not be true on the other side. The CCF had the odds of our excessive firepower against their side in regards to the men to be sacrificed. The maxim of that one side with the ability to "throw more lead" shifted more so to our advantage. But Korea was a battle devoted to staying power by the opposing government's aggressive resolve for staying in the battle for the duration and its final outcome. The ultimate cost was in enemy lives lost on their chosen battlefield. The study of enemy capabilities should have been the prime concern of the planners in this budget war.
[1] A date set in stone to aid Eighth Army and its advance north. Any failure on Almond's part would embarrass him with MacArthur's set schedule to end this war.
[2] Holland Smith at this time was only a Major General equal in rank to MG Ralph Smith, a like copy in Korea. Holland Smith received a third star before the Saipan Invasion.
[3] MacArthur book, Reminisce
[4] Nimitz and his Admirals by Hoyt)
[5] General Homma underestimated his timetable to secure Bataan in early 1942. He was two full months behind his victory schedule. The Japanese reinforced his command with twenty-two thousand fresh troops between February and March, and still our force held until April 9, 1942. Miscalculating one's foes resolve can prove costly in time and lives, regardless of the nationality of that foe.
[6] Coral & Brass, p.123, by Holland M. Smith
[7] November 21, 1943, Americans invade Makin and Tarawa. Not until June 14, 1944, did America invade Saipan. Class: CASABLANCA MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93) was laid down 12 January 1944 by Kaiser Shipbuilding Co., Vancouver, Wash, launched 5 April 1944, sponsored by Mrs. B. B. Nichol, and commissioned at Astoria, Oregon, 9 May 1944, Comdr. W. B. Whaley in command. From the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, (1969) Vol. 4, p. 205.-Flagship of the Escort Carrier Force. (Armament: 1 5", 16 40mm, Aircraft-28)
[8] Nimitz, p. 401
[9] By this time, H. Smith had had enough of the 27th infantry Division, and various reports stated that he ordered the entire division withdrawn from Saipan. In reality, only the decimated battalions were withdrawn from Saipan by destroyers. However, H. Smith did order the 27th Infantry Division into reserve and vowed that he would never use the division again. (Invasion of Saipan by Brian Blodgett. Website: Author has link.)
[10] Nimitz, p.402
[11] Nimitz, p.340
[12] H. Smith, C&B, p.12
[13] C&B, p.17
[14] Nimitz, p. 365
[15] In his letter to Commandant Cates on 15 November, O.P. Smith seemed to be "accusing senior leader Almond of incompetence."
[16] This could have been solved with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
[17] Clay Blair, p. 10, The Forgotten War
[18] Clay Blair, p.718
[19] Navy History
[20] Other commanders, 1st Cavalry, 2nd , 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th Army Divisions
[21] The reference to that "pressure" by General Smith himself in his later interviews
[22] United States Navy History
[23] This is a very important point in that the date of Kingston's jump-off was after 22 November. Tie in to the transferred date one day earlier to the 7th Division. A point to be covered later.
[24] Support and service units have the reverse color striping, blue on gold.
"The man in the front line is blessed with a sense of immediacy. He knows only of the danger directly in front of him. The general, however, knows far in advance what is to come and the picture is always there, spread before him. He goes into battle with the price of victory already calculated in human lives. This knowledge is a terrible burden, never to be shaken off, night or day. There is no escape."
- General Holland M. Smith, USMC
Each one of these two generals were of an aggressive nature. Each man reviewed the orders transferred to his command from a higher command, and then through his immediate planning (G-3) staff officers who outlined and defined the mission. In both cases, they set a timetable at their own discretion. The mission was then assigned to the number of men to complete the mission. In both cases, parallel problems were found between events passed. Holland Smith assigned only one regiment--the 165th of the 27th Division (Army)--to take the island of Makin. He stated, "I considered Makin a minor operation which one single regimental combat team from the 27th could handle easily." It took 2 days longer than he allotted.
It was said of Almond that he was courageous--at times to the point of recklessness, and expected everyone else to be as well. But his attitude was interpreted by many subordinate commanders as having a callus indifference to casualties and the welfare of his men. Regardless, they were subordinate to his command without choice, and he was in charge. A general's persona seems very complex. Their obsession over trivial matters dominates their military command-while men are dying all around them. It would seem that what bothers or irritates any general is any other general, whether above or below his rank. Each of these corps generals were faced with his own personal irritant over delays over scheduled missions. Those delays were by some division commanders' direct defiance of corps orders. The delays were unexpected and unacceptable. The main problem facing each of these generals was in their having no direct authority or immediate disciplinary authority over certain division commanders--especially a problem commander from a different branch of the service.
As Ralph Smith (Army) at Makin and Saipan was accused of dragging his feet, Holland Smith demanded speed as did Ned Almond from Oliver Smith (Marine) at Seoul and Chosin. Each corps commander recorded his experience and reactions to the division commander’s delays. The Marines were quick to respond to the commands of the Marine Corps commander Holland Smith. The Army was slow to react in his view. The result was to change the Army commander. That action was supported and encouraged by the Navy. In Korea, the scenario was just the reverse. The Marines did not respond to the commands under General Almond, but his Army forces were quick to respond as ordered. [1] At Saipan, General Holland Smith sought consultation from the Navy to solve his problem. Solution - change that Army division commander. At Chosin, General Almond sought consultation directly from CINCUNC (MacArthur). Solution - place the Marine division in X Corps reserve, transfer the Marine objectives to the Army 7th Division. [2]
Earlier at Makin Island--as later at Saipan, Holland Smith failed to realize that the training tactics of the Army were different than those of his Marines. His planners were primary G-3 staff planners of his choice, and his orders were issued through the Navy staff planners as well. Consequently, General Almond was against Marine frontal assault tactics, as was MacArthur. To return once again to the battle for Seoul and Almond’s allotment of 24 hours before committing the 32nd Infantry to the action, as he was not pleased with the time delay due to Smith's tactic of frontal attacks. "He repeated his strong disapproval of frontal attacks." He did not like Smith's concept of battering away at the same spot with more troops, and the fixation of charging straightway into the fray just ignored the wider range of options open. [3]
While the Marines sought credit for taking Seoul, the Capital of South Korea had no military value of its own. In other words, it was not worth a costly battle in lives to obtain it. Its only importance in September was to reestablish the South Korean government and signal an end to the North Korean invasion. MacArthur said to Ridgway (1951), "As far as Seoul is concerned, the reoccupation of Kimpo airfield and the harbor would unquestionably be of marked value, and if they present an easy prey, they should be taken. Their use to us would greatly relieve the supply difficulties and increase the power of your air support. The occupation of Seoul itself would, of course, present certain diplomatic and psychological advantages which would be valuable, but its military usefulness is practically negligible." [4]
Thus, in reality, any relationship to the action at Makin and Saipan to Seoul was limited and related only to the method of attack and not directly to any defiance to any delaying movement outside of any assault mission. O. P. Smith had little justification in North Korea in delaying orders to move his forces forward and complete his mission during the following recorded lull between any combat assault. "Thus it was that with virtually no enemy opposition, the Marines advanced at an average rate of only a mile a day between 10 and 23 November." [5] That last date was one day prior to O. P. Smith’s (Draft Two) order to cross the boundary line into Eighth Army zone for a "combined" assault ordered by MacArthur.
There was the slow movement precedent set for Chosin yet to come. Almond's ultimatum at Seoul could very well re-echo at Chosin prior to the Chinese intervention there. If there was no advance or progress within twenty-four hours, the Marine sections would be narrowed to permit the 7th Division to attack through that zone previously assigned to the Marines. Three Marine sectors had been extremely narrowed by Almond. The 7th Division was expanded into the Marine zone east of the Fusen Reservoir previously assigned to the Marines. There, Almond compromised his command at the expense of the 7th Division. I have already listed O. P. Smith’s objection to the Fusen Reservoir being assigned to him in MG Smith’s listing of Compromise #1):
Smith: "Yes. The Fusen Reservoir was about opposite the Chosin Reservoir, and we went out that way and had reconnaissance patrols go out, and there was no road from our side going to the Reservoir.... I finally talked General Almond into letting us off the hook on that, so the 5th could follow up the 7th." [6]
Almond did not include this in his seven points of objections in his interview. [7] Nor did Almond list this connecting link by Smith concerning his (Almond’s) exchanging Smith’s rear left flank position to the 3rd Division at Sach’ang-ni below Koto-ri.
MG Smith’s listing of Compromise #2):
"... I was given an order to move out to the Northwest, out another road from Hamhung and establish a blocking position out there. I went to Almond and said, 'After all, we can't make a main effort in two directions. We've got one main effort, which is going up this road by the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu, and here you are telling us to be prepared for a major attack out to the Northwest.' By that time the 3rd Infantry Division had landed, and I said, 'Why can't they take over that job?' And they did eventually."
RED FLAG: There is an important point here. The road leading to Sach’ang-ni had to come through the 1st Marine Division’s zone below Chinhung-ni to Sach’ang-ni. Thus, the 3rd Division had to travel through the 7th Division and below the previously assigned Marine zones to protect their own disputed far-most left flank between Eighth Army and the Marine forces.
(See http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/maps/map8_full.jpg. Note 1/7 Infantry lower left of map 8.
To quote from the general in charge of such assaults at Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, etc, "The mission of the Marine Corps is primarily offensive. Any other role deprives us of our effectiveness. For a small, well trained force, capable of great mobility, the best deployment is offensive, not defensive. This is sound military principle." [8] However, General O. P. Smith apparently had his own tactical change of operations from the past. In my opinion, in his letter to General Cates he degraded his own corps history. All around him were the effects of "task forces"--the splitting up of Army forces, yet he went on to record to the Marine commandant that the Marine Division "could not help but lose its effectiveness when dispersed." But amphibious operations required the splitting of units, each required to land on different sections--each end or side--of an island. The units could not always be united as one. There were times when they had to be dispersed.
General Almond set a dangerous precedent for Smith and the Marine Corps under his command. There is no doubt that Almond would have relieved General Smith "yesterday" had Smith been an Army officer. But the reality was far, far more complicated than it may seem to be at a glance. Still under review, the dispute between Holland Smith and Ralph Smith in World War II had lingering effects into Korea. Plus, there was a review of the Billy Mitchell case with its serious charges. If applied to O. P. Smith, the Department of the Army would have to file charges of insubordination on O. P. Smith’s inaction. That would require a like charge of "conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline," as well as a court-martial requiring excessive time and effort and many facts to support the charge. That would have directly involved the Department of the Navy, as they would have had to conduct the trail. Therefore, it was far, far easier to invent some other avenue and sidestep the Marine Division all together.
President Lincoln replaced General George McClellan and President Truman replaced General MacArthur. Holland Smith replaced General Ralph Smith, and General Ridgway replaced General Barr of the 7th Division. The latter was because MG Barr was the scapegoat that had to be sacrificed. Had MG Barr objected or refused to move his forces in a hasty manner as ordered, thereby retaining the solidarity of those units but also offsetting his orders just 24 hours, history not only could have, but would have been recorded differently. The Chosin Reservoir Campaign would then have been true to Marine-recorded history. It was a sole Marine campaign. This scenario would have been true only IF Almond had never required the 7th Division to be involved in the first place. In either case, MG Barr would have been replaced anyway, he being trapped in a no win situation.
General O. P. Smith survived his own test by failing to yield to Almond’s "suggestion" at Seoul. General Almond did not react by relieving him on the spot. He did, however, react to reduce his zone of operations. That indicates that Almond could not, as opposed to would not take that controversial action. Almond had the equal rank of two stars to Smith. Holland Smith had that extra star over Ralph Smith. Still, it was Admiral Spruance in his role as commander over that force and the larger Department of the Navy who issued the order to remove Ralph Smith from his command. Yet Spruance did not have the authority to replace that division commander with a permanent replacement. He could replace him with a temporary one, yes. But a permanent one, no. General Ridgway was cautioned on this matter over placing O. P. Smith in charge of IX Corps in South Korea in 1951. When the IX Corps commander had a heart attack, Ridgway replaced him with General Smith, placing him over Army forces. That could not stand in light of the past controversy of Holland Smith. Ridgway was ordered to explain that the appointment was only of a temporary nature, pending appointment of an Army IX Corps commander. General Smith even expressed surprise at the rapid speed used to replace him in that command position.
One of the underlying causes of the criticism of the Army role at Makin was the friction that existed between the Army and the Navy during that time frame. In a meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt held for staff strategy in the Pacific, the Navy sought to avoid the liberation of the Philippines. MacArthur pleaded his case to the President. "Admiral Nimitz put forth the Navy plan... I was in disagreement with the proposed plan, not only on strategic but psychological grounds." [9] He had promised to liberate the Philippines, but Admiral Nimitz wanted to avoid that at the time, and his remarks should be taken in that context. "I argued against the naval concept of frontal assaults against the strongly held island positions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. I stressed that our losses would be too heavy to justify...." Iwo Jima was, indeed, costly. With a three-to-one attack ratio in our favor, the Marines suffered 40% casualties--over a one-for-one ratio in casualties. MacArthur wanted to take Luzon, resulting in this statement to the President: "My losses would not be heavy, any more than they have been in the past. The days of the frontal attack should be over. Modern infantry weapons are too deadly, and frontal assault is only for mediocre commanders. Good commanders do not turn in heavy losses." MacArthur did his own version of "island hopping" to avoid the heavier-defended ones, leaving the enemy forces, "to die on the vine." Still, in Korea the Marines held to their frontal assaults. That was their business and their tactics. But those tactics did not please Almond's time schedule, which was a continual irritant to him. It highlights why units should be separated. Since tactics are different, the units should be different and separated to thus highlight teamwork of training units' specialties.
As for the difference between United Nations forces in Korea: That instinctive British parsimony with ammunition, when the Americans believed in intensive bombardment if the rounds were there. Marine rifle company commander to Drysdale: "Suppose we were going up that hill over there. We'd expect to put 200 rounds before we left the start line." The British officer replied dryly; "We wouldn't go up the hill at all. We'd go around it." Also as the Marines named many of their hills, the Army numbered them in height. [10] So the tactics of the various military branches were different. Training was different as well. Some tactics resulted in more casualties than others. As a lesson in Korea, we found out that the Chinese had different tactics as well, and we had to adjust to them. Battle tactics--like a football game plan--are continually upgraded due to the situation in front. The difference for the Marine Corps was that they had to shift to defensive positions while the CCF dominated the Marines' favorite frontal assault strategy. That CCF tactic seemed to stun the Marines at Yudam-ni. Evidence seems to support this by the Marines' delay of three days to launch an offensive breakout from Yudam-ni.
General Oliver Smith's defense was that all things were not considered within the speed required. His excuses for his many delays were many. Most asinine of all was over map scales. He said, "Planning is done on a 1:1,000,000 map. We execute on a 1:50,000 map." Though there was a scale difference in the maps, the distance between points remained the same. Or is one to believe that, if a map of one inch equal to three miles scale is used as opposed to a one inch of a six mile scale, one can get to his objective in one half the time by using the three scale map? I don't think so! One merely reduces the map scale, not the miles between the objective. If one should change the map scales, should it be the six Army divisions to match the one Marine division, or would it cause less confusion to change the latter? The Marine planners used nautical miles to the beach (note their maps, 17, 18, 19). These had to be calculated in the mix before hitting the beach: 1 nautical mile = 6076.1 feet. Ship speed in Knots (a different instrument to measure.) One just doesn't change the distance between points. Only the measuring device and terminology changer.
One other confusing difference in terminology was that the Army land maps had all hills accurately measured and assigned numbers as to height. But the Marines, while using the same maps, renamed the local hills in their area to their liking. Examples of this were Fox Hill, Howe Hill, and North, South, East, West, and Turkey Hill, etc, while still alternating the numbers. That had to confuse the Air Force TACP units calling in close air to ground support as well as the Air Cargo command for supply drops. If only one is used, why alternate the standard terminology in the first place?
One must face reality here. The Army was not piloting battleships through the Korean northern mountain terrain, and neither was the Navy. As stated by World War II Rear Admiral Tarbuck in 1943 (reviewed earlier), "It is surprising how little the Army officers at GHQ knew about water." It was equally surprising how little the Navy knew about land combat operations. That the Marine Corps was devoted to dual purpose operations and elevated (by the press) to one historical event in a mountainous region of North Korea, fails to neutralize the expensive cost of Naval-Marine operations on land at Tarawa and Iwo Jima, in World War II.
Smith knew above all else that he would not be sacked by Almond, as no one had applied enough "pressure" to make him move his 7th Marine Regiment force (until November 23/24) into Yudam-ni. That is a mystery until this day. Also why he doubled up on this force on November 26/27 at Yudam-ni instead of having his newly-freed 5th Marine Regiment defend Hagaru-ri is also a mystery. I cannot understand what the pressure was and who finally applied it. But the Navy had to influence it in some fashion. Apparently whatever force or support General Smith had received prior to 23 November date was overruled and withdrawn. The new reality was that this offensive--as did the Inchon invasion--was going forward with or without the 1st Marine Division. The Marine objectives under Plan 8, Draft 2, was transferred via Draft 3 to the 7th Division. The plan was to assist Eighth Army--just as the plan was at Inchon-to save lives by assisting General Walker’s forces in the southwestern section and zone. It was the very same logic used at Inchon.
As Smith wrote to his commandant on November 15 about his problems with the Army brass and the Army tactics, it is highly unlikely that the Marine commandant would take the side of the Army. While there is no report of what he told Smith or advice he may have given him, there is, however, some reference in Appleman’s report, of the Marine liaison officer on duty with X Corps, Colonel Edward H. Forney. [11] He was concerned that the Marine division would be cut off over the mountains at Yudam-ni. He argued that the Marine division was on loan from the Joint Chiefs, and if they were in any immediate danger of being used up, they should be notified first. But, one could well understand his anxiety in this matter and his position in it. A mission this far inland was not part of his expertise. He was the amphibious landing expert on Almond’s staff. Past experience with Marines under Holland M. Smith indicated that the estimates of Marine planning more often than not underestimated the number of casualties expected on an assault.
So the Army planners were under restrictions as to their use of the Marines, and it would seem that the best course and least line of resistance would be to pull them out of the action, and replace them with the 7th Division. That was apparently the new plan. In other words, the Joint Chiefs were saying, "You can use the Marines, but don't abuse them. General Smith had to know how secure his position was with regards to Almond and his orders. I believe his command was saved by the Chinese attack taking place when it did. CCF Marshal Peng had set his offense date for the full moon 24 November. When urged to start earlier, he had stated, "One has to be patient to catch a fish."
One of the dangers that still exists is interservice rivalry, and there is an ever present danger in that. It has to be solved. There is absolutely no reason to place a division of men at risk under a commander that can pick and choose the orders he intends to obey. As General Marshall decreed concerning the interservice rivalry between Holland Smith and Ralph Smith in World War II, never again would an Army general serve under the Marines. That decree should be a reciprocal one: that never again would a Marine general serve under an Army general. When one considers that for whatever reasons, the President, General Bradley, General Marshall, and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier opposed to use of the Marine Corps' use inland, this should be a red flag that something was wrong. Was it just "petty jealousy" or did it have a real basis in fact? Surely there was some reason for their positions. The Joint Chiefs even included the Navy brass, and they were not wild about the idea either. Yet when one considers the others, Truman and Bradley, as well as Marshall, had to be aware of the problems of rivalry between units. For any one of these men to make a public, derogatory remark about the Marines could be suspect. But for all three of them to make such remarks must relate to some basis in fact. [12] To deny MacArthur this division of Marines by the addition of the Joint Chiefs further signals "red flags".
MacArthur was responsible for the outcome of North Korea. All UN forces were his responsibility. X Corps was the subordinate force. Almond was the one responsible there, not Smith. The Marines being a single division were concerned for their own welfare. The Army had others to worry about. As reported in the case between Holland Smith again, the conflict between Holland Smith and his Navy friends was largely a matter of different views of the war, from different vantage points. Admiral Turner was responsible for the landing and protection of the troops and the safety of his ships, as well as the overall success of the invasion of an island, two islands or three as the case may be. Had the Marines been driven off Tarawa, Turner would have been responsible to Spruance. [13] But Holland Smith did not have to worry about the Japanese fleet or submarines or planes. (Those were Navy worries.) His criticisms of naval operations had to be judged within the frame work of his responsibilities.
Likewise at Chosin. But there O.P. Smith was under direct X Corps orders. As at Inchon, the Navy turned over the finished operation to Smith, but Smith was then under Almond and his further orders. No one seemed to dispute that the orders were from X Corps and that Smith and his Marines were under X Corps command. One must also view his responsibilities at Chosin. They were Army ones, as all UN troops were under Army command.
On 16 December 1946, the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated General MacArthur Commander in Chief, Far East Command, effective January 1947. Three general missions were assigned him:
1) Occupation of former enemy territories in which he discharged U.S. responsibilities in Japan, Korea, and former Japanese islands
2) Support U.S. Policies within the areas controlled by his forces
3) Be prepared to meet a general emergency at any time.
The top headquarters within the Far East Command--General Headquarters (GHQ) was located in Tokyo, Japan. It was essentially an Army Headquarters, staffed almost entirely by Army personnel, and it resembled the same structure of MacArthur's headquarters of World War II. It should be noted that the separate command in the Pacific during that latter war was split between MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. His staff, as was MacArthur's, was heavily-weighted with his own naval personnel.
But as of late 1947, the Air Force was no longer the Army Air Corps under the direction of the Department of the Army. It was then a separate department of its own. The Navy and the Air Force felt that their activities within the Far East were being directed totally by Army staff under an Army commander. MacArthur, however, complained that he could not exercise sufficient control over the internal organization of these services in his area. This proved to be true and costly to lives at Chosin. Neither could he directly control, direct the troops outside Army control of their units, or supervise fully their logistic operations. Thus, it would appear that the Marine Corps' responsibility remained more under the direction of the Department of the Navy--little dispute there. The Marine Corps commander surely would never oppose lawful orders if he believed those lawful orders had to be carried out in a timely matter. Thus, those "delays" that were so prevalent in Korea between the Marines and X Corps directives upset the entire corps offensive dates. Surely had each of those UN forces assigned did their own thing on their own time table, chaos would have been the order of the day. The only variable in the plan should have been the enemy location and strength.
One glowing example at Chosin was Task Force Drysdale. What if he disregarded his orders in defense of his own better judgment between Koto-ri and Hagaru? He believed that mission should have been aborted due to the enemy force, but he was 'ordered' by General Smith of the Marines under the Department of the Navy to continue forward at "all cost." He obeyed that order. Who should bear the responsibility of that cost? To those men of the 7th Division "attached" to this task force, who officially assigned them to the Marines? We know Drysdale was assigned as a UN unit to the Marines-the British yes, the 7th Division, assigned NO, not at that time. The date and time frame doesn’t fall within the official time frame that Almond assigned "all forces within the Chosin area" to be under General Smith’s command. That was not authorized until the next day. How did Smith assume he was in command? What authority did he have as a division commander to grab forces (7th Infantry Division) moving through his area on an independent assignment and to reassign them to a task force with a United Nations unit attached as its lead commander? By all means, this should have been a small Army task force named after its 31st "B" commander, Peckham.
Since General Smith opposed Army time tables and he was yet to receive command from them, how did he assume or get command of this 7th Division group, s MG Smith denied any attached Army relationship to this force. [14] Was that a lawful order? If it was, than it had to be authorized by Almond at that time. This is doubtful since he was in Tokyo at the time. But if it was true, then the orders issued to Smith prior to that date would also be lawful ones and bound his division to execute those orders as well. One cannot depend on orders issued one day, delayed, and then rely on those orders as lawful from the same source later. As Almond "all over Smith," why did he leave Hagaru so weak? This indicated that Task Force Drysdale would never have been needed at that time had Smith reinforced Hagaru with his 5th Marine Regiment. Question: Why was Hagaru left weak in defense? That was not by order by Almond or his staff. General Almond was reported to be at GHQ in Tokyo at the time of the creation of Task Force Drysdale.
The facts reveal, though quite late, that the Army could not directly control or direct all the troop movements accurately and on time in Korea under General Almond's X Corps command. That fact caused chaos at Chosin. Its aftermath and results of the operation listed as a "sole" Marine operation. Those Army forces of MacLean’s were removed from history as to their ever being at Chosin. Still, if the Army was the dominate force in Korea, why was a force from the Army the one to be removed from the Chosin action? Everything was in place but the cause for those troops being there in the first place. Yet, the Marine history records a disclaimer: "[T]he Marines at Hagaru had little to do with the higher levels of strategy. It was evident that the continued retreat of the Eighth Army in west Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of X Corps" as Plan 8, Draft 3, affected Eighth Army destiny. [15]
This implies that the Marines were issued their orders due to that higher level of strategy. Those X Corps orders to all divisions--be they Army or Marine--were considered within that higher level of strategy. Any sudden division change could affect that strategy to a larger degree. The division commanders were not to alter those orders issued in relationship to those higher levels of strategy. They could react to emergency changes after the plans proceed, but not unilaterally stall in lead off time. Again, as Marine history states, "Almond was also much concerned about the attacks on the Marine MSR. He had been given a firsthand account that morning by the senior Marine officer on the X Corps staff, Colonel Edward H. Forney, who had just returned from Koto-ri." [16] This indicates that X Corps was a vital part of this "sole" Marine withdrawal. It was the staff planners of X Corps that had to coordinate the withdrawal, not MG Smith. The Department of the Air Force, plus the planes and ships of the Department of the Navy were needed. Time schedules had to be tightly followed to coordinate all forces and units. This was all outside the function of a division commander. All division commanders had to be included within this withdrawal to the sea mission. Each was assigned a part. This was no time for independent action of one division, especially since that division was already intermixed with two other divisions--the 3rd and 7th and the British Royal Commandos under Drysdale.
Here one should take time out to explain some difference between rank and position outside of combat unit commanders. As stated above, Colonel Forney (USMC) briefed General Almond on road attacks on the Main Supply Route (MSR). One may wonder why that was not General Smith's job, he being two ranks higher than Colonel Forney, yet both Marine officers (this one outside exception to an event not credited to Smith). The answer is in the position each held at the time. Colonel Forney was a Deputy Chief of Staff--one of three in X Corps under its Chief of Staff Major General Clark L. Ruffner. [17] General Ruffner, therefore, was of equal rank to Major General Smith, as were all other division commanders. General Ruffner's position, while not in a direct command position, nevertheless made him privileged to advance planning orders to all X Corps division assignments before and until those plans were issued to the division commander. Colonel Forney also had that information available to him prior to General Smith being issued his final objective. Above the X Corps Chief of Staff was X Corps with the Commanding General (same rank as Smith), Major General Edward M. Almond, with three aide-de-camp. Each of them (at the time of Chosin) held the rank of Captain. So the position held could be of more importance than a division general. That is what stands out about the reports from Chosin--always "Smith"--his sole importance, his dislike for the mission, his dislike of Almond, his dislike of the planning, and his effects on the need to re-work the plans to his own liking for his division within X Corps or other sections all pertaining to each combat division in some respect.
Under X Corps and the Chief of Staff were:
All of these had their own jobs to do to support each division. G-1 was the biggest section with Personnel, Adjutant General, Chaplain, Civil Affairs Officer, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Occupation Court Officer, Postal Officer, Provost Marshal, Public Information Officer, and U.N. Public Heath Welfare Officer. So everything from getting paid, to getting mail, to getting to the Inspector General to review conditions was under the umbrella of G-1. It didn't take the division commander to deliver the mail. The point is that, when a bridge span was needed--as at Koto-ri--we informed X Corps Engineering Section of that fact. They swung into action to locate one or as many as we needed. If it had to be delivered by truck, that was related to the Transportation Section. If by air, then it would have to be delivered through the Air Cargo section of the Corps support section. How did we get that ammo dropped to us at the Reservoir? How did the Marines get their ammo air dropped to them on the other side? Pure and simple: by Fifth Air Force cargo planes, coordinated by X Corps staff planners, not their division commander. We relied on our support systems, not our commanding general as such. He did not take that assigned objective. The infantry did.
To return again to Colonel Forney, he was attached to the GHQ office in Tokyo prior to the full Marine division being given to MacArthur's command. With or without the Marine division, the Inchon invasion was in the works. All divisions within MacArthur's occupation force in Japan had made amphibious assaults in World War II.
There had been an earlier aborted attempt [scheduled for late July] using the 1st Cavalry Division as the basic landing division. Its code operation was named "Bluehearts." It was to be used to link up with General Dean’s 24th Division at Osan, but the 24th Division had been pushed back and was unable to link up. As such, this plan was not activated. Lack of manpower negated the use of the 1st Cavalry Division as it was needed on Walker's lines in the defensive against the North Koreans' push south toward Pusan. Colonel Forney was then tapped by GHQ to formulate plans. Second in line was the 2nd Infantry Division on its way from the United States, to be joined by the 1st Marine Brigade, also coming from the States. The main units in each case were Army. The main point: Inchon didn’t totally depend on a Marine amphibious division.
The planning stages for Inchon began as early as July 4. The port was designated by MacArthur as the invasion point--long before he had any approval of ever getting any Marine forces. On August 6, Colonel Forney, the previous commander of an elite Pacific Fleet troop training unit in Japan, was added to Force X as a Deputy Chief of Staff. (X Corps had not yet been created on that date.) MacArthur picked Almond as corps commander because of his loyalty. The mission would be testy at best, and he needed someone "who would not shrink before the apparent impossibility of the task." Almond's reward was that third star required by corps status that came before MacArthur was relieved of his own command by President Truman in April of 1951.
Almond kept Colonel Forney on his Corps Chief of Staff. So in reality, General O.P. Smith's arrival at Inchon was at odds with Forney's amphibious plans. His arrival created opposition to the planned site. Inchon was MacArthur's set site--his choice on July 4--the date to execute two and one-half months later. It was, therefore, Colonel Forney's responsibility and his commitment to X Corps and its set mission. His responsibility was not to continually hurl darts at a spinning board to locate the best site and position for another amphibious landing as an alternative to Inchon--the main one, with all its tides and timetable to fit an invasion between them. All of these drawbacks to Inchon were stated before hand. Colonel Forney had formulated that plan (plus those lesser one indicated earlier at Kunsan and even Wonsan). When one considers Inchon to Tarawa, the latter charts listed as 100% in error, yet, the planners of that offensive used those charts. The ground forces had to compensate for those errors. and the landing went forward on the date planned.
The Navy errors at Tarawa were costly. MacArthur’s hasty Inchon landing was not. MacArthur's keen sense of timing was on target. That sense of timing was continually delayed at Chosin and the delays continually changed the pattern and position of the enemy forces already uncertain to begin with. The results there, as at Tarawa, are recorded for history. Colonel Forney later had at best one week to rearrange the landing of the 7th Division from Wonsan to Iwon in North Korea. Still, during this time he had to arrange for a reverse amphibious transporting of two battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment out of Kojo back on LST to re-land at Wonsan. While not stressed by the press, Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller ordered his 1st Battalion to move from Wonsan to Kojo and secure a ROK supply dump at that point. After being hit by North Korean soldiers and suffering several casualties, Puller sent his 2nd Battalion to Kojo to assist the 1st Battalion. After less than two weeks in Kojo, this force returned via those LSTs to Wonsan on 1 November.
"He goes into battle with the price of victory already calculated in human lives." - Gen. Holland M. Smith
"Part of the job is to send men into places from which you know they are not likely to come out again." - Gen. William F. Dean
"I made strong efforts therefore to drive home to Corps and Division Commanders that no unit was left to be overwhelmed and destroyed; that units that were cut off were to be fought for and brought back unless a major commander, after personal appraisal, should decide that their relief would result in the loss of equal or greater number." - Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
"I believe a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier or marine." - Gen. Oliver P. Smith [to Marine Commandant Cates
Three of the above quotations cover battlefield anticipated losses. Only the last one concerns discomfort due to the elements of nature. The top three concern the mission regardless of hardships, of terrain, weather elements or forces available. Each of the top three accepted their command responsibility over the mission assigned, the high cost in lives attached to the mission assigned. The weather was never a completely disabling factor. American military history records an abundance of weather related difficulties: Valley Forge - the cold; New Guinea - the sweltering heat; South Korea - the monsoon rains; and the frozen reaches of North Korea. Surely morale was affected on both sides. We defeated the Japanese in World War II, yet the Japanese were in North Korea building the Chosin Reservoir power plants under severe seasonal conditions.
Once again, the words of MacArthur ring true. "Nature is neutral in war, but if you beat it and the enemy does not, it becomes a powerful ally." In other words, if it rains, both sides get wet. If it continues, both sides must deal with the mud. The men of Task Force Smith fought without air support, as did the North Koreans, because the monsoon season was underway in South Korea. That was not to be a factor there. The commanders had to accept and fight under all weather conditions. The commanding officers who didn’t care for the inconvenience of the weather in combat could resign their commission at any time, for any reason, as MacArthur did in 1937 in the Philippines. He returned to the US Army in early 1941, one grade below his previous rank of a full general.
The common soldier, on the other hand, is not given the same option as the commanding officer. He is stuck in place in the battle line he is assigned. In the 1950s, his orders were not his to refuse. He could bitch about them, yes. But refuse to obey them, no. When the order was given to move, one moved. When given the order to attack, one attacked. When fate decided whether a soldier or Marine could be wounded or killed, that was part of the job. Surely each man would have loved to have been elsewhere. If the men in charge with the responsibility to order troops forward had refused at Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Midway, Normandy, Inchon, etc., Chosin would never have taken place. The Marine Corps above all others espouses their tight discipline on line. White markers cry out around the world of men sent there because of plans of others. Enlisted men or draftees, it makes no difference on the field of battle. Each was a "hero" perhaps, remembering that it has been stated, "A hero is only a coward that got cornered and fought frantically to get out."
But the outcome of most battles is not the result of one hero named within one battle. he is only an event within it. The hero doesn’t attribute to the outcome of the entire battle. he is only one isolated incident within its historical record. There were heroes on both sides--winners and losers of the battle fought. As Holland Smith stated, the combat man "knows only the danger in front of him." He does not know the storms brewing behind the scenes, by interservice rivalry or the weather charts issued by the weather advisors. This is also in the over all mix of the factors when the commander orders his forces to attack. While the Air Force is included in the mix to provide much needed air cover, the changing pattern of the weather might prevent their vital and essential cover. Whether that changes the timetable or not is the call (and educated guess) of the top commander. Eisenhower had to be the one to order D-Day on the 6th of June 1944, in spite of the storm brewing at sea. He had to decide whether to go or not go. The invasion of Normandy was his decision alone, just as it was MacArthur's decision at Inchon, the weather reports already analyzed for the difficulties of the landings.
Such decision-making is an enormous responsibility of the commander. But to carry out the plan of attack as given, within the boundary of the educated guess of the losses calculated for that battle--that calculated loss in lives spent in achieving the assigned mission or objective--is part of his job. No one had ever stated that Korea was the ideal place to fight a war. To the contrary, it was said to be the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time. MacArthur stated on November 13, 1951, at Seattle that "We have been told of the war in Korea, that it was the wrong war, at the wrong time and in the wrong place. Does this mean that they intend and indeed plan what they call a right war, at a right time and in a right place? These are questions that disturb us, because there is no answer forthcoming."
"Although the Chinese have withdrawn to the north, I have not pressed Litzenberg to make any rapid advance. Our orders still require us to advance to the Manchurian border. However, we are the left flank division of the Corps and our left flank is wide open. There is no unit of the Eighth Army nearer than eighty miles to the southwest of Litzenberg. When it is convenient, the Corps can say there is nothing on our left flank. If this were true, then there should be nothing to prevent Eighth Army from coming abreast of us. This they are not doing. I do not like the prospect of stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120 air miles from Hamhung to the border. (The road mileage is nearer 200.) I now have two RCTs on this road and when Puller is relieved by the Third Infantry Division I will close him up behind. What concerns me considerably, is my ability to supply two RCTs in the mountains in winter weather. Snow, followed by a thaw and a freeze, will put out my road. There is nothing but mountain road.
As I indicated to you when you were here I have little confidence in the tactical judgment of the Corps or the realism of their planning. My confidence has not been restored. Planning is done on a 1:1,000,000 map. We execute on a 1:50,000 map. There is continual splitting up of units and assignments of missions to small units which puts them out on a limb. This method of operating appears general in Korea. 'I am convinced that many of their set backs here have been caused by this disregard for the integrity of units and of the time space factor.
Time and again I have tried to tell the Corps commander that in a Marine division he has a powerful instrument, but that it cannot help but lose its full effectiveness when dispersed. Probably I have had more luck than other division commanders in impressing my point. Someone in high authority will have to make up his mind as to our goal. My mission is still to advance to the border. The Eighth Army, eighty miles to the southwest, will not attack until the 20th. Manifestly, we should not push on without Eighth Army. We would simply get further out on a limb. If Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision will have to be made as to what to do next. I believe a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier or Marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this area during the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick or wounded."
General Smith stated, "My mission is still to advance to the border." The letter to Cates was on November 15th, yet, he would not move his forces beyond Sinhu, east of Chosin (nor into Yudam-ni except "under pressure"). If his mission was to hold until changed, that would be different. But that was not the case. The last order-this one-is in force until rescinded or changed. That was not recorded until November 26, after Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s force was in place.
General Smith’s letter to Commandant General Cates said, "Time and again I have tried to tell the corps commander that in a Marine Division he has a powerful instrument, but that it cannot help but lose its full effectiveness when dispersed " But a powerful instrument left idle produces nothing. A bayonet in its scabbard is no threat to the enemy. It must be thrust forward where it belongs at the end of a rifle. A pen in a shirt pocket produces nothing on paper until it connects with that paper. A plane on the ground covers no great distance until airborne.
The same day, he wrote the pessimistic letter to Cates, Smith was visited by Admiral Albert K. Morehouse, chief of staff to Admiral Turner Joy, the FEC naval commander. Smith stated, "I found in my deals with the Army, particularly with X Corps, that the mood was either one of extreme optimism or extreme pessimism. There did not seem to be any middle ground." Here Smith was also vocal to his parent department, the Navy, to cover all the bases.
With all this Marine history behind him, he seemed more pessimistic than optimistic. Why that was only he could have given the proper answers. Had that same pessimism manifested itself in the Pacific in World War II, the Marines would not have achieved the glory of defeating the enemy if they had not engaged them. But they did engage them--at tremendous cost and loss of life, as did the 7th Division. Both the 1st Marines and the 7th Division were at the Ryukus in World War II. There, the Marines paid a high price in casualties, as did the 7th Division. The 7th Division's casualties were 10,893, and the total Marine casualties were 25,912. Of the Marine casualties, the 1st Marine Division had 13,002, the 2nd Marines had 95, and the 6th Marines had 12,815.
I cannot understand the mindset of the Marine commander--his criticism of the Army in Korea. Indeed, in his letter to General Cates, he stated about X-Corps, "There is a continual splitting up of units and assignment of missions to small units which puts them out on a limb." But those units were Army ones. They were not his, and thus not his responsibility at the time. Task Force MacLean/Faith later became his responsibility, and it is recorded within these pages how he respected them.
The point in all of this is that he refused to move his forces as regiments or regimental combat teams, and in the end, he had to create his own task force out of necessity because of that refusal. MacArthur had ordered all units forward, but the Marine commander would not move forward. Instead, he said, "If Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision will have to be made as to what to do next." He further stated, "Manifestly, we should not push on without Eighth Army." But Eighth Army began moving forward on the 24th as planned. The Marine commander did not respond on that date. Perhaps there is the answer to the 'pressure' put on him to move the 7th Regiment to be in place "with regards to Eighth Army." For their move had negated his excuse to be in position at Yudam-ni on the 24th of November. It appears there had to be a substitute excuse--the 5th Marines ultimatum and the 'dispersed' excuse. Eighth Army was on the move as of 240800 November. His force was not.
In further search for middle ground (the possible instead of the negative view), one can only wonder whether or not, when the orders were given, if the pessimistic view was predominate. If it was, failure was knowingly built into the plan. Or, were the plans issued with the overall view that the attack plan would be successful, an optimistic view regardless of the obstacle faced?
I have reviewed this letter throughout these pages, but let me make another small review of the letter at this time. Smith was concerned about a thaw and a freeze putting out his road, but the weather chart and a simple calendar can shed some light on this. It was going into December in a Siberian setting, so a thaw was out of the question. The 7th Division's weather chart for Hyesanjin on the Yalu--a position 45 miles higher on the border than Changjin--list the Mean Daily Temperature (the minimum) as November = 9, December = -11, January = -19, February = -12, and March = 7. The years recorded were 16. So it would seem unlikely that anyone would have a worry about a thaw as he got nearer to the border.
Smith joined the First Marine Division in New Britain in January 1944. He had been called to active duty as a Marine Corps second lieutenant on May 14, 1917. He spent World War I on Guam. During the inter-war years, Smith commanded the Marine detachment on the USS Texas, and served on the Marine Corps staff in Washington. When the United States entered World War II, he was commanding a battalion of the Sixth Marines in Iceland.
In 1944, he commanded the Fifth Marine Regiment at Talasea and in the Peleliu operation. He served as deputy chief of staff for the 10th US Army for the invasion of Okinawa. (Here, it would seem, was the position he could not cut loose--that of planning, as Colonel Forney then had that position with the Army. Apparently, he felt he could still do both jobs.) Named commanding officer of the First Marine Division in June 1950, he led his men ashore at Inchon in September 1950. During the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir in November to December 1950, he won the Army's second highest award for bravery, the Distinguished Service Cross, for his heroism in breaking the enemy's stranglehold and leading his division in a fighting 70-mile march to the seaport of Hungnam. [19] However, the medal was given before the completion of the force return to Hungnam. He advanced to a four-star general. He retired from active duty on September 1, 1955. General Smith died on December 25, 1977.
"But the pressure was being put on me to get going. Finally, I had to tell Litzenberg to go on over and occupy Yudam- ni." [19]
His legacy is one of detachment from the Marine Corps history itself. Its hymn, "First to Fight" was elevated under his command to honorable "delay". For it is written in history, "Smith deliberately stalled on the advance because he didn’t like the prospect of stringing out his division...." P&D (261) Fact: His division was concentrated as no other in North Korea. He had placed his forces of three regiments (5th, 7th, and 11th Marines) at Yudam-ni, leaving only one battalion to defend the vital hub at Hagaru-ri, the supply point for these three regiments. Specifically, an airstrip was carved out for this supply point. It was the vital point to be protected. Still, Smith downplayed its importance until the CCF attack cut his ties to all forces north, west, and east of Hagaru, and south to Koto-ri.
Smith is praised as a "gentle" leader or warrior. But the facts, promulgated by earlier authors and reports, point to his being more of a timid leader. The recorded facts that his regimental commanders ignored his orders without disciplinary action on his part seems to bear out his timidity of command. The fact that he sought advice from his commandant by asking his opinion about what he should do before doing what he felt he should do, is the overwhelming evidence. The responsibility was his alone as division commander. Plus, there is also the fact that after he sent his letter--not before--pressure was applied to him and he moved the 7th Marines into Yudam-ni. There, he lost his anticipated support--a criticism of him as well as of Holland Smith. He endangered his own command.
This latter he should have done without that "pressure" applied. After all, the move to Yudam-ni was reported by him as one of a "blocking position"--a necessity to prevent enemy forces from attacking Hagaru-ri, the center hub of a >Y< with Yudam-ni as the western (left) blocking limb, and Sinhu, east of Chosin blocked by the 5th Marines on the other (right) limb. The downward leg was guarded by the 1st Marines at Koto-ri. He then transferred his 5th Marines westward rather than relocating them at Hagaru-ri. This was a fatal mistake as they passed that point. The 31st & 32nd Infantry took over the eastern bank of the Chosin reservoir arena.
[1] Nor would they respond to their own General O.P. Smith’s timely command to clear the road from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri on the date he issued that order. It took three additional days. The order to withdraw was issued 28 November and reinforced by Almond’s order 29th November. However, no Marines returned to Hagaru-ri until 4 December. Recall that he issued orders for Drysdale to advance to Hagaru from Koto-ri (same time frame "at all costs").
[2] As H. Smith placed the 27th Division in reserve after Saipan, and transfer the mission to his marines. (See fn 9 chapter 6.)
[3] The Marine Corps had long insisted that a frontal assault proves more effective over time. While costly at the beginning, it saved lives over all. That is highly questionable on the battle numbers given under H. Smith’s operations. One only has to do the math to determine the cost. ( Author has examples.)
[4] Whitney, p.461, on MacArthur
[5] South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p.773
[6] O. Smith interview, Benis Frank, 1969
[7] General H. C. Pattison, Chief of Military History, U. S. Army dated March 7, 1969
[8] (H. Smith, Coral & Brass, p.57)
[9] MacArthur, Reminisces, p. 214
[10] Max Hastings, book Korea
[11] East of Chosin
[12] Notwithstanding the fact that all three men had been Army officers
[13] Nimitz and his Admirals
[14] Denied a PUC award on the grounds that "they attached themselves" to Drysdale’s column
[15] USMC, Volume 3, page 238
[16] USMC, Volume 3, page 239
[17] Staff officers had no direct troop command responsibilities. They were assigned to Almond.
[18] Clay Blair's book, The Forgotten War, refers to this award as being given without a 'written citation' (page 536). Smith stated, "I never did get a citation for that cross. I suppose I would have to write my own."
[19] O. Smith interview, Benis Frank, 1969.
The main problem encountered within the first five months of the Korean War related directly to the press corps in having the complete freedom extended to their correspondents to report as they elected between the start of the war until December 20, 1950. This latter date was the date "press censorship" (since World War II) was once again imposed on them. What was thereafter considered as press censorship was only an attempt to control or stop run away "propaganda." General MacArthur had overruled censorship in Korea from day one, so as contradictory as it may seem, the press corps itself pressed for that censorship as serious security leaks had been reported. "The Inchon Invasion, for example, was reported in American newspapers while the troops were still at sea." [1] However, some distinction should be made between the two terms "propaganda" and "good press". In order to separate one from the other, one should define the terms, then look to facts and try to reconstruct the scenes to isolate the truth from any exaggeration.
In Webster's Dictionary, the word "propaganda" is defined directly as "The propagating of doctrines or principles: the opinions or beliefs that spread." And a "Press Agent" is "One employed to advertise and secure publicity for any person or organization." Both definitions were totally devoid of any relationship concerning the truth or known facts.
One of the very first doctrines spread about the Korean War was over the degradation of this action as merely a "police action." That phrase originated from a response to a question put before the President of the United States. The question: "Mr. President, everybody is asking in this country, are we or are we not at war?" The President replied, "We are not at war... The members of the United Nations are going to the relief of the Korean Republic to suppress a bandit raid on the Republic of Korea." And again the follow-up question, "Would it be correct under your explanation to call this a police action under the United Nations?" The answer: "Yes, that is exactly what it amounts to." Here a doctrine was created and spread without fact. For President Truman had never originated or used the word himself. Neither had the United Nations. But that phrase stuck, and was even more reinforced by those very same correspondents that spread this doctrine. They did not belittle themselves or their reports with that label. How many reports are there on record from these correspondents highlighted as a "police action correspondent" rather than a "war correspondent"?
It should be noted here that Korea was also the last war covered exclusively by print journalists. On July 5, 1950, there were some 70 reporters in the country. By September there were some 238 American and foreign reporters. This increased to 270 during the course of the war. As I have stated within this research, my purpose here is to look at events of the United States Army and the propaganda and innuendoes directed against its members, regrettably slanted in favor of the United States Marine Corps.
This is clearly evident in events at the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea. There, General Smith was in critical need of press coverage and the creation of another Marine legend to bury all the discrepancies surrounding his controversial actions--and inactions--at Hagaru-ri and all points east and west of that reservoir. Therein lies our Army drama and the fateful neglect of any press coverage concerning the Army Task Force Faith. Therein lies the restricted information of Task Force MacLean's RCT even being there in the first place. Therein lies our mystery. Was this Army participation merely a "secret mission" or was it merely the intended withholding of important vital truths and vital facts? The Army's total silence over the years concerning these events suggested its full acceptance of published reports as being the truth. But as this research will reveal, those published reports were far from factual.
While President Truman's answer to the question about a "police action" became a doctrine, his following direct statement created a furor within the Marine Corps. "The Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President, that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is about equal to Stalin's." Within this statement, is Truman's direct reference to a "police force." Yet, the force that it was aimed at was highly offended because his remark degraded them. This doctrine was swiftly suppressed as being discourteous, as was General Omar Bradley's reference to interservice rivalries unresolved by the unification provision of the National Security Act of 1947. He said, "This is no time for fancy Dans who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals."
Be that as it may regarding the truth or facts over those opinions, the Marine Corps reacted in kind. However, the following Marine doctrine was accepted and often repeated by the press (as agents) and became a new legend in the Marine Corps relating to their action at Chosin. The correspondent in question had just been flown into Hagaru-ri to cover the ten-mile withdrawal from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri. The next day a British correspondent asked Smith for help on an article he was writing. Should he call the Marine movement a retreat or a withdrawal? "I just pointed out to him that since we were completely surrounded, we could neither retreat or withdraw, but had to fight our way out." The press quote that emerged, which Smith did not challenge, was "Retreat hell, we're simply attacking in another direction." Here, General Oliver P. Smith, like President Harry S. Truman before him, had not coined the original phrase. Here, just as "police action" became a doctrine by the press, so too "retreat hell" also became one. Only here, the press acted as a press agent for the Marine Corps, "to advertise and secure publicity for any person or organization." In contrast, only one spokesman was designated to disseminate the official Army response to news reporters due to the fact that they might misquote an answer (as evident within the above examples). Still, those statements produced in print during that time period continued to live on into the future, and will continue to do so unless some reasonable consideration is given to review new facts as they come forth.
In her book, The Korean War, Marguerite Higgins wrote: "I have read President Truman's accusations that the Marines have a propaganda machine equal to Stalin's. Actually they have almost no organized propaganda at all.... The Marine as an individual is extremely proud of his origination. He welcomes correspondents because they are there to tell the rest of the world about the job he is doing. Also, since they are a smaller organization than the Army, the Marines are less stuffy and less involved in red tape. It is easier for them to help you out." [2]
The Marines are, indeed, a smaller organization than the Army, and that is understandable of their hunger for headlines. However, in Korea their firepower and manpower eclipsed that of any one of the other six Army divisions in November of 1950, indicating that, division for division, the Marines overall were larger.[3] No one wanted to deny them what was rightfully theirs, but the main point of contention is why the press reporters degraded the Army by elevating and comparing the difference in operations between the two services. Those reports were even picked up by others and repeated. One example was General Ridgway. [4] While he was not yet in Korea at the time of the action he refers to, he commented on the 7th Division reaching the Yalu River (45 miles above Chosin) at Hyesanjin, saying "Fortunately, Chinese resistance, as contrasted to what the 1st Marine Division would encounter, was light and sporadic." [5] He had not been there, nor had the Marines. However, if one knew the situation whereof he spoke, his words "as contrasted to what the 1st Marine Division would encounter," his "would encounter" indicates the Marine action at Chosin followed the 7th Division achieving their mission to advance to the Yalu River.
Since three Army battalions were also inclusive of that Marine division action at Chosin, Ridgway himself became easy prey to press propaganda against the Army forces. So an unreliable comparison? He also failed to state two important facts, one of which was unknown to him at the time. One was that the large death toll (KIA) of that small Army Phantom Force at Chosin from this very division ‘exceeded' that of the entire 1st Marine Division. So his division comparison is invalid. The second point is that the rest of the 7th Division had traveled twice the road miles that the Marines had traveled, and their Army areas were totally lacking any left flank Marine coverage. This last was a major concern of the 1st Marine Division commander. His complaint was that his Marine division had no flank support from Eighth Army. My point is that, if one is going to compare, compare it all--not just parts of the operation.
When the Marines arrived in Korea at Inchon, the press reporters were busy tearing down the Army occupation forces from Japan as "green troops", again compared to the Marines from the States. They were a mixed collected group of men from both sides of the oceans. Since it was not an intact division at the time, how could one compare? There were also those full Army divisions stationed in the United States and Germany. So what standard was used to compare? The statement concerning the occupation forces as living the "good life" is a statement without any depth. We had no idea how to equate the two. One group was on active duty and the other was in reserves. The active duty forces surely were more physically fit than those in the reserve units. Here again was a fact omitted which reflected on the condition of the press correspondents as well. There had been no war to cover for over five years, thus no need to move with the armed forces to stay fit. Below is some background listing on this.
On June 30, 1950, Congressional action granted the President authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserves Corps and units of the National Guard into active federal service for 21 months. When this first order was issued for involuntary recall of individual reserve officers, no real distinction could be made between the inactive and the volunteer reserve since so many were not in the volunteer reserves and were therefore rated as inactive. Compare this to the confusion that would exist if the draft system was ordered overnight in the year 2005. Who knows the medical condition of those men signed up for the draft, and where are they in relation to when they signed up?
The first recall program authorized by the Extension Act of 1950 of the Selective Service Act of 1948 specified that officers be recalled from either the volunteer reserves or the inactive reserves without establishing a priority between the two categories. The Army had no clear picture of the physical condition of those available for duty. On June 30, 1950, it had numbers only: 416,402 in the inactive and volunteer reserves, and 184,015 in the organized reserves. Yet, the Army did not know how many of these reservists were qualified for duty. The required periodic physical examination for reservists had been suspended in February of 1947. This required calling up a larger number than needed because of the many found physically disqualified. Also, many reservists had changes in status after entering the reserves, providing numerous exemptions. Records of reserve officers were not current, and many did not exist for enlisted men. All this a recall did not set well with the public or the press, and the Congress, since there existed no proclamation of a national emergency (December 16, 1950). This indicated that there was no great need for any additional forces.
On July 22, 1950, the day General Walker withdrew 100 miles into his "Stand or Die" line in the Pusan Perimeter, the Department of the Army appealed to reserve officers to volunteer for active duty. So few did that the Army recalled 7,862 reserve officers--captains and lieutenants from both the volunteer and inactive reserves. That the nation was not ready for its commitment into this action was well evident, and the burden on the active duty forces was primal. To even suggest that any reserve units was on a par with an active division was stretching the truth just a fraction, not to mention that we were all America had at the time and this action of words only degraded our own country's defense forces without any corrective action in the works.
Green forces or otherwise, this was all America had on the eve of the North Korean invasion, and for the press corps to attack them from the rear was without merit. That these so called "green troops" sent into Korea very soon would be exploited to a baptism of fire, thus to become veterans--many of whom were disabled for life--was not an issue. Grass is green, but when exposed to wear and tear or without any care and water, it dies. Thus was the case with these so-called "green troops" sent to Korea. Is it any wonder that this was a "Forgotten War" from start to finish? Who really cared what difficulties the forces faced in Korea? The Army itself could not adequately support and defend them, and the so-called Press Corps could, but would not. MacArthur tried over and over again to get more forces, but he was continually denied them. Yet, history records we are still there in Korea, never having been driven out by an enemy. Results. There is the answer.
American sons had to fight this war on the cheap. The store houses were empty of men and material. The four occupation division forces, many of them now outside the States for more than two years, had to be recycled until unfit for combat, even that man just entering the battle lines beyond his discharge date--the same one that should have been headed back towards the States, sorry his enlistment was now extended by one year. (Tough. One punch for their TS Card.) When the Korean War broke out, all of these men had to turn their faces towards battle in Korea.
Here on occupation duty contributing to that ‘good life', we received $95 per month plus an additional $8 for overseas duty. With the "good life" status, it would seem we should have returned that $8 to ease our own conscience. That huge pay increase began in 1948. However, those in the military were required to pay federal and state income taxes on their service pay. There was a new clothing allowance, too--another first for the military. All of that was supposed to justify that huge pay raise. There was no additional pay for combat time. After all, that was what the big bucks per month were for. But we could receive a tax deduction for those months we were in a combat area, providing, of course, we survived to file for it. This was the very first war fought by forces paying their own way and contributing from their own pay for their own equipment. It gave an entirely new meaning to the term "contributing to the war effort".
Where was all of this equipment we were paying for? It was certainly not there in the Far East Command. Where were those additional forces for the replacements we needed so urgently? They were not t here. We were "it"--those "green troops" on line. Under MacArthur's roll-up program, we were to reuse ancient (World War II) equipment in a new war in Korea that was degraded to a "police action."
News reporters in Korea at the beginning of the war were the eyes and the ears of the Korean War, and that was the one saving grace of it becoming a "forgotten war." For in reality, those reporters were not totally effective with all their negative reports. Why? Because there were far too many World War II veterans scattered around that knew first-hand the trial and misery of war. Just a few years before, they were also green troops themselves and in 1950 were busy moving on with their lives and would not care for negative reports. This eases some of my own bitterness. For I personally would rather have the Korean War forgotten in that sense rather than to be remembered through innuendo and degradation of the forces and the actions covered. Some of the reports I refer to were written within the first six months of the war. They said that low IQs would not hold the line. They bugged-out, and they implied that wounds were greater than they were. The reports said that the green troops exhibited shameful conduct under fire. They said that these troops had had the "good life" in Japan. I have a comment on each one of these.
In matters of heath, Japan only slowly pulled ahead of Korea. "Japan was twenty years behind that of the United States. Such diseases as smallpox, cholera, diphtheria, typhoid, and paratyphoid would spring into epidemic's overnight. Tuberculoses was evident everywhere. Contrary to popular belief in the west, the Japanese were seriously lacking in modern hygiene." [6] But five years later at the start of the Korean War, Japan was still far behind in modern hygiene, except on an Army base. To establish showers and provide clean running water on bases was a task in itself for the first forces setting down in Japan. The familiar latrine field ‘slit' trench in a combat area was little more than a step up to those Japanese barracks.
At Camp Drake just outside of Tokyo, the barracks were drafty old two-story high Japanese block-long buildings housing between two and three hundred men. Commodes and sinks were put in, but the outhouse concept was still there. To do the required morning four "S's" (GI jargon for shit, shave, shower and shampoo), one had to leave the main building and go outside under a covered but unheated walkway to the heated latrine. While doing one of the four "S's" one could look out the window and see "the honey bucket brigade" at work, loading human feces into wooden buckets. Our occupation forces had been inoculated against all known diseases, with one exception. "Even dysentery, for which there is no known immunization agent, was reduced 86%." The occupation forces were continually cautioned about eating the vegetables grown with Japanese home-grown human feces fertilizers that were distributed by ladles on rows of vegetables by the honey bucket brigade.
Recalling memories of old, green troops and the good life had to be grouped together. For any veteran that had served in the European theater, there was one outstanding feature of Japan and Korea that was common to both, in the late forties and early fifties. Even General Matthew B. Ridgway was totally "green" to this "good life". I am referring to the smell of both areas. Those who served there instantly know what I am referring to when I say "the honey bucket brigade." As General Ridgway commented, "There is one feature of Korea that every fighting man will remember--the smell....a fragrance so overpowering that the soul at first rebels." He did not have that problem in Europe. In that respect, the rating scale of smells in Japan and Korea was equal. Walk down a back alley in Japan in the early fifties where they were butchering a pig. Add to that the odors from each house that was sun-drying fish. In that respect, we were true veterans of those pungent smells in Japan. Score one point for the occupation force and the "good life."
How about these: No overnight passes. Lights out at 2200 hours. Bed check was at 2300. Occupation duty was to maintain order, not for individual men to be unaccounted for after hours. May 1 was Communist Day. No one--but no one--was allowed in town. All forces were ordered on standby alert with full field gear, backpacks ready with rifle and bayonet in case of trouble. An alert this day each year--no trouble. How many reservists in the States were ordered home each night at ten? Score one more point for the good life.
An important point about food and water off base is that long before being sent to Korea, the occupation forces had their bouts with dysentery and diarrhea. The forces coming from the States just returning from that good life there were plagued with the dysentery virus, especially the 1st Marine Division on board ship, during Operation Yo-Yo. Score one more point for us. That makes three.
The 1st Marine Division was also plagued with frostbite in excess, more so then the 7th Division. Why was that? We had different equipment in gear and winter training. We had winter maneuvers with the "Polar Bears" (31st Infantry) in Hokkaido. There was much snow there, piled to three feet at times. The snow was great for building a shelter. We just had to carve out a square hole in the snow to the ground, take two tent shelter halves, button them together, place it over tree branches stretched over a hole, then cover the shelter halves completely with snow. When we crawled inside with our winter sleeping bag, we were as warm as toast and completely out of the wind. It could even be used as a fox hole, and it slept two. We also took many road marches across the snow with oversized tennis rackets (snowshoes).
We had summer heat, smells, and winter cold training. Most of us from Sapporo, Japan, had and preferred the World War II combat boot in Korea, while the Marine division had the newly-designed ‘arctic boots.' The sweat inside froze and invited frostbite to their feet while at rest. Our leather boots could breath and evaporate that water and sweat. To keep the water out, we supplemented with the rubber overshoes. Score another one in our column. That Marine arctic boot could have been tested in Hokkaido, an ideal winter area, prior to its use in Korea. That alone could have saved some misery for the Marine Corps.
RED FLAG: General Smith went on the defensive over his own excessive frostbite cases at Chosin, implying they were Army ones instead of his higher Marine number. He downplayed and shifted the focus of a higher Army death total to defend (damage control) his own majority of wounded and frostbite cases. In the same interview in which he made remarks about the "Army jokers," one can see a major shift in his logic between the two standards he held for the Army and his Marines. [7] Consider this: When the Army survivors returned to Hagaru for evacuation, he stated, "What these jokers would do is, some of them might have frostbitten fingers, something like that. They would go down to the strip and get a blanket and a stretcher and the(n) groan a bit. The corpsman came along and put them on a plane....Nobody after that got on a plane without a ticket."
Camp Crawford, Sapporo, Japan
This picture of me showing the height of the snow up to the windows. This area between the two barracks -- the one I'm facing -- was not cleared for a pathway, Also taken in January '50. Important point here, Sapporo is located on Hokkaido, that northern island of Japan, it shares the 44th latitude parallel, an area just slightly north of its parallel line at Hudong-ni in North Korea. Ironically, this same parallel line became the killing field for the final phase of Task Force Faith's convoy of wounded and its total demise on the early morning hours of 2 December 1950.
There are two points of interest here as I see it, and here is my analysis of both of them. Number one - a timeline: "Nobody after that got on a plane without a ticket." This indicates that the system was tightened up before any Marines returned from Yudam-ni. Therefore, only serious cases of frostbite were allowed on planes. But no man that was at Chosin can deny the fact that any man that was wounded also had severe frostbite to the point of gangrene. Bullet wounds cut vital large and small blood vessels that nourished exterior limbs, and thus that part froze and died over time. Blood loss could not be replenished due to frozen blood plasma. In most cases it took longer for the frostbite to be treated, in many cases months longer then that of the wounds themselves.
Second point - that the medical staff in Japan would be highly critical of these excessively severe cases of frostbite which required the amputations of fingers and toes. The medical staff there was totally unaware of the combat situation which caused the cases of frostbite to be so severe due to neglect. The doctors in Japan thus criticized those in command who allowed them to happen. My own case is an example. A missile cut the blood vessels in my upper arm. After five days in freezing weather, blood was deprived to my lower arm extremity and the fingers of my right hand. I had already been transferred to a second hospital in Japan, with only the missile wound being treated.
The second doctor was not concerned about the wound, for nature had also frozen and sealed the blood around the entry and exit wound. But the frostbite below that wound was a different case. Large fluid blisters had formed on each finger, and colored streaks of red, blue, and black were shading the skin under those blisters. The doctor quizzed me on how and why this happened. He wanted to know, "Where was our medical team? Why weren't those blisters lanced before reaching this stage?" I never knew the answer until thirty years later. Our main medical team had never gotten through to us. It was ordered back to Hagaru along with our full 31st RCT tank command of 16 tanks from Hudong-ni. Our forward surgeon was a casualty, and we were fully cut off from Hagaru as well. My case was just one of hundreds as the survivors of the Chosin Reservoir campaign flowed into hospitals and hospital ships. Our medical teams and combat corpsmen could not be faulted in any way. They also were overworked, overburdened, and suffered frostbite as well. In my opinion every single one of them deserved a Medal of Honor. MG Smith stated about the Army wounded in his interview, "I am afraid that some of these 900 Army troops which were evacuated shouldn't have gone out, because over in Tokyo GHQ looked over some of these cases that were coming into the hospitals with only minor frostbite. And GHQ sent over a directive---sent it to Admiral Joy--for the Marine Corps." [8]
In the directive, the GHQ (Surgeon General) strongly admonished the generals in charge of these men, stating that there was a lack of leadership because there shouldn't have been this frostbite if there had been good leadership. "That made me mad as a hatter. I wrote General Cates. I said, this just didn't make sense at all. What are you going to do? Here I have just given a Silver Star to a sergeant who pulled off his mitten in order to heave a grenade and he got frostbitten fingers. Are you going to court-martial that man for not taking proper precautions against frostbite? Are you going to court martial his battalion commander, his regimental commander, his division commander?" In Smith's interview, he took these reports passed through the Navy to him as a personal affront on allowing these frostbite case to get to that state.
Back to point number one, if they were only Army personnel, why his concern? The fact is, his frostbite cases were in the thousands (verified at 7,313). The Marines' complained that the arctic boots were worthless and added to, rather than decreased, their rate of frostbite. For the wounded men, so did the extra three days on line when their regimental officers followed Smith's direct order to return to Hagaru, but his Yudam-ni force ignored it, remaining there three days longer after being ordered out. This has to be considered in Smith's letter to Commandant Cates about his own regimental commanders. He ignored any follow-up action in this case rather than issue a reprimand to his two commanders for their delays and passing a copy on to his commandant (action taken-case closed), referring the question to his commandant, "What are you going to do?"
MG Smith's timidity to act shows here. Out of 4,500 men flown out of Hagaru, 3,500 were Marines. It stands to reason that the majority of the frostbite concern had to be over those Marines. One could only surmise why MG Smith referenced the term "court-martial" twice. Might this have been a hang-over from the pressure applied after his last objection to move the 7th Marines into Yudam-ni in the first place? [9] Also, was this guilt over his utter neglect to order his own 5th Marine Regiment to protect Hagaru?
General Smith seemed highly upset, but here is a typical red flag--a Catch 22--"frustrating situations involving contradictions." General Smith seemed to have his own guilt trip over the excessive frostbite cases, and he seemed intent to try easing his conscience by highlighting the Army men being evacuated. For once again within this very same interview, he commented on his stenographer. He was a man within the unit Smith ordered and created--Task Force Drysdale's column. He was wounded and took refuge in a hut. The force returning to Koto-ri found him. "He had on his parka and his shoe-pacs and everything, but he'd been wounded and had lost blood and circulation and his legs were frozen. We got him to Koto-ri and flew him out to Japan. They had to amputate both legs." There was a strange self-contradiction in the Marine general's interview. He vacillated between irritation over the frostbitten fingers of Army troops, while at the same time being highly defensive of his own Marines' frostbitten finger cases, calling them heroic and highlighting the severe symptoms of frostbite. His rational concerning frostbite is thus hard to understand.
Marines told Monday how they rescued some 300 GIs--most of them survivors of a Communist ambush against a convoy of wounded men--from the frozen surface of Chosin reservoir and from Korean huts along its edge. Some soldiers, horribly wounded, had been in the open as long as five days. The most fortunate had spent at least one night on the ice and almost all had frostbitten hands or feet in addition to wounds.
A handful of Marines and courageous North Koreans worked together under Chinese Communist machine-gun and rifle fire to bring in the men of the 31st and 32d Regiment of the 7th Division. The Marines were Col. Olin L. Beall, 50, of McGueenie, Texas; Lt. Fred Van Brunt of Cucamonga, California; CWO Russell J. Waggoner of Concord, California; Lt. Robert J. Hunt Jr. of Coronado, California, and PFC Ralph A. Militon of Pine Bluffs, Wyoming. All of them minimized their own part in the episode and I got the story only after being told by others what had happened.
They brought in most of the wounded Saturday, but got half a dozen more Sunday from Korean huts along the reservoir's edge and were still checking leads from the natives as to the whereabouts of others. Most of the men got out on the ice after Chinese Communists ambushed a convoy of wounded soldiers on Friday night. The Chinese riddled the trucks with submachine guns and grenades, overturned some, and set others afire with men in them.
Van Brunt said the men were located about 2 1/2 miles north of the southern tip of the reservoir. "They were scattered over the ice almost as far as I could see," he said. "It was the most horrible sight I've ever seen. Many were crying and hysterical. Some were sick and vomiting. Some had so many wounds you could hardly touch them without touching a wound. The Chinese would not shoot at the wounded on the ice, but would shoot at us when we started toward them. We drew fire all the time and water would spurt three feet high when a bullet went through the ice. The men's hands were black with frostbite. Some had no shoes. The Chinese had taken them. Some of those able to walk were so dazed they didn't know where they were and just walked in circles. Some of them were practically dismembered. One man had an eye shot away. It makes you want to cry to see our people shot up like that. All of them had been wounded before the Chinese hit them again in the convoy. We took them to a field hospital and many went directly onto planes from there. They had got hold of themselves by then and I didn't see one man make a move for a plane until told to get on."
Beall said, "We went out there, saw some men on the ice, and went ahead getting them in. All day we got at least 300. Lot of them were in very bad shape. The Chinese had thrown grenades into the trucks and many had fresh fragment wounds. Some had their faces blown to pieces. Others had their hands or feet blown off. At least 50 of them had no shoes."
The Chinese took all their food and a lot of their clothing. "The Chinese would shoot at us if we'd pick up the wounded and start to carry them. Then we would crawl up to them and when we did that, the Chinese would not shoot. Maybe they thought we were wounded too. I saw a lot of brave men yesterday. There was one man pulling himself along the ice with his arms. 'Don't bother with me,' he said 'get that man there. He can't move.' He could even joke about himself. He started across the ice as fast as he could go pulling himself with his arms and asked. ‘Did you ever see a man double-time like this on ice?' There were men with good arms and wounded legs and men with wounded arms and good legs. They would help each other. There were Americans helping ROKs and ROKs helping Americans. There was a man with a belly wound 24-hours old and still helping his buddy. That is something I'll always carry in my heart."
For his own part in the rescue, Beall said, "I had no idea I'd find what I found. When I did I stayed until it was over. That is not something you do for the record. Anyone would have done it." Van Brunt said Beall worked until completely exhausted and paid no attention to Chinese bullets. "He worked until his legs buckled under him when he tried to pick up a wounded man."
Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith commander of the 1st Marine Division, had high praise for all of them from 50-year old Beall to jeep driver Milton who drove back and forth over the ice under fire all day. Beall is commanding officer of a motor transport battalion and in Smith's words "as good an infantryman we have."
"I Saw a Lot of Brave Men Yesterday"
High praise indeed, and it came from a Marine colonel--a man who personally brought in some of the wounded. There was valor beyond searching for publicity. It was just something one did. It showed the mix of ROKs and Americans helping each other. "We took them to a field hospital and many went directly onto planes from there. They had got hold of themselves by then and I didn't see one man make a move for a plane until told to get on," Brunt recalled. But the Marine commander was not nearly as compassionate as these men that directly participated in the rescue operation.
It was, indeed, a tragic scene. But sadly, the above article that told about it was the only thing in print to my knowledge about what happened. I came across this article in the hospital in Japan, and it was the only real information I had for some 30 years. But as I mentioned earlier, it is devoid of why these men suddenly and mysteriously appeared in the middle of the Chosin Reservoir. And, as reported earlier, the reporter missed the gist of the story. What was reported in the Stars and Stripes was the disaster of a battle, with no substance or subject of the battle itself. It mentioned that, "They had been in the open as long as five days." Surely there should have been a follow-up. What were we doing those five days? But history was elusive here as it had been so many times in the past concerning the first six months of the Korean War. Of the many print journalists in Korea, most of the reports were entirely negative towards the American Army forces fighting there. Also, the logic of reporters' implication that the reserve forces would be better trained--or a veteran of World War II jungle fighting could better handle winter condition in Korea escapes me. There was one main complaint by General Smith to his commandant. He felt the winter conditions in Korea were too much to ask of his Marines. So score one more for the Army's "green" troops.
To compare the Chosin campaign to another battle in our nation's history--the "Battle of the Alamo," neither defeat was the main event. The defeat was only the end result of a gallant battle to buy time for others. Such was the relationship between that historical event in American history and the action east of Chosin. There was a shorter span of time, perhaps, but buying time for others nevertheless was an important aspect of both battles. Although not mentioned as such, the fact is irrefutable. For had Task Force MacLean and Faith failed to buy those five additional days, the Chinese troops would have had easy access to reach Hagaru-ri in great force, placing it in severe jeopardy.
The Stars and Stripes article mentioned, "Some 300 GIs-most of them survivors." This number was one-third of the wounded that were evacuated, meaning another 600 other "survivors" were wounded (325 able-bodied). Some suffered from intestinal problems from eating frozen C-rations. Some of the men had pneumonia. All had some degree of frostbite. Some survivors had severe burns from earlier friendly fire air drops of napalm on this force. Some had burns because of the enemy setting fire to the convoy. As with the burns, here were degrees of frostbite--1st (nip) 2nd (blisters) and 3rd degree (death of tissue). Yet those survivors attached to a provisional unit assisted in the Marine withdrawal to the coast. But the press agents still got a little more mileage out of this group, for they reported, "The Marines even brought some Army wounded out with them." The very group that had already made the biggest commitment of lives lost to the defense of Hagaru-ri still "assisted the Marine withdrawal" to Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. And the reporters applied their own negative spin on that as well.
I have an opinion about the remarks of low IQs as well. IQs are the measurement of one's intelligence as determined by a written test. But does that test highlight in advance the next Medal of Honor recipient on the battlefield? Who could undermine the country kid of that era? Compare the infantrymen who grew up in the country to the infantryman who grew up in the city. Perhaps the country boy had less education, but he generally had an abundance of common sense. Furthermore, he was raised in the backwoods with a rifle, while the city kid was not. An RCT is not made up entirely of intellectual experts nor those trained to perform brain surgery. If they were, there would be very few infantrymen available for the frontline. They would be in technical schools instead. Some of those so-called war correspondents were ex-service men from World War II. I believe that some of them were trying to build on their own egos. They were trying to compare the battles in Korea with their memory's eye to the distant battle they may have fought. Had press censorship been as careless during that war, they too may have been degraded as well. A quote from MacArthur seems in order here: "Wars are never won in the past."
As to the remarks about not holding the line, and the "bug-out" myth, The reporter had to be positioned somewhere on the high ground to have his own overview of the area of battle and the action, otherwise his report would merely be hearsay. For us as well as the enemy, the most sought out tactical observation position was always the high ground. So logically, his overview of any bug-out action would most likely have to have been above the lower ground. There the reporter himself could have been more valuable as a forward observer for our side. They could have reported the distance between units--that frontline yardage each man was required to cover. That distance was extremely important. Most of the positions were defended by small task forces (there were 25 task forces by the end of that year) and the frontage was more important in lines not holding, more so than the men manning those lines.
As an example, "There are specific historical statistics that bring into sharp relief the defense picture of the Pusan Perimeter. The yardstick employed was the density per yard on front, i.e. the actual battlefield frontage in relation to total infantry employed thereon. This line of thought is common to all analytical military literature."
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"This density per yard factor represents a coverage of one or two riflemen every ten yards and nothing behind them... there were mile gaps through which enemy infiltrated... it is a miracle that the perimeter held at all, though caving in locally, here and there, to be patched up by General Walker shunting his weary reserves from one crisis to the next." (Willoughby, "MacArthur"-'41-'51)
"Periodical War Department reports on relative casualties tell their own irrefutable story".*
The dates are unimportant. The relative percentage remains the same, November 1950 or March 1953
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Remember, these dates are only for November 1950 and March of 1953, with some three months of fighting left to go before the truce was signed. Recall also that the numbers for Seoul had been added as well. But another chart breaks them down in smaller increments. The following is a review of ratio to the final number of dead to the total overall casualties--a percentage of those killed to the total group, wounded, missing, and prisoners of war. These figures bear out the intensity of the fighting. The number of mortal wounds--those that could not be saved, bear out that fact. There are various differences in the amounts. The listing is by divisions, from information found in "Facts on File" in the Korean War Almanac. I am listing only the two divisions in question here. (A comparison of the 2nd and 3rd Division will come later.)
"This density per yard factor represents a coverage of one or two riflemen every ten yards and nothing behind them... There were mile gaps through which enemy infiltrated.... It is a miracle that the perimeter held at all, though caving in locally here and there, to be patched up by General Walker shunting his weary reserves from one crisis to the next." [10]
There also exists a controversial analysis by Samuel Lymam Atwood [S.L.A.] Marshall on the ratio of fire in Korea as compared to World War II. The ratio of fire was increased due to reduction of combat squads and platoons within the interim of the last war and the Korean War. Marshall stated that more firepower was laid down by more combat soldiers in the Korean War than in World War II. This seems borne out in the above example, "the density per yard on front," that reduced squad and platoon manpower covering larger areas. Heavier weapons were employed within smaller task force units, each spread thin. There were more air-cooled 30 caliber machine guns, as opposed to the heavy water-cooled guns.
My own experience in advance infantry training with the 1st Cavalry Division resulted in cross training with almost all weapons of employment by an infantry regiment. [11] Most men alternated between infantry and weapon squads. I was transferred to the 7th Division artillery, although my MOS was one of the wire section, laying telephone lines. In Korea, I had the MOS 4812--a Heavy Weapons Infantryman. This was due to the employment of an additional .50 caliber machine gun to my duty of Field Wireman. How again could the reporters who were the eyes and ear of the war miss this coverage? Were they sleeping at the time? This yardage was where most of the missing in action came from and where gaps were created. Why wasn't this detailed? They missed this event just as they missed the east of Chosin drama completely as well.
I recall too a report from the IX Corps, 25th Division, to the effect that "Elements of the 5th Infantry were counterattacked and withdrew." No details were given at all. when I did learn the facts, it developed that what really happened was not a counterattack, but merely an advance by a company-size unit of the 5th Infantry against a hill, followed by a withdrawal under fire on personal orders of the Division Commander, who wanted to put artillery and air strikes on the hostile forces there.[12] Here someone reported something that was not factual, enough so that Ridgway consumed his time to check it out. There are huge discrepancies on the difference in the CCF attack on the 2nd Division as compared to that on the 1st Marine Division. The deficiencies were in the Marine area, not the 2nd Division's. This is borne out forcibly in the casualty rate for the 2nd Division. When its survivors broke through to the British Commonwealth Brigade lines on December 1, 1950, the 2nd Infantry Division had 4,940 casualties, or almost one-third of its strength. By infantry regiment, the casualties were as follows:
The 2nd Division took a bum rap. It was reported that their was tons of supplies abandoned to the enemy. The war correspondents' report said, "Gasoline was hoarded by motor transport units. This reserve supply could not be touched because it was 'bug-out gas".
That report was not true. Instead, it was pure propaganda. To what end? Indeed, as was reported before, that group was operating part of the "Red Ball Express" route. There had to be a supply of gas at each end of the route. The trucks ran twenty-four hours a day, according to the Army's official history. "During September, October, and on into November 1950, 76% of Eighth Army's trucks operated on a 24 hour basis." Drivers worked 12 to 18 hours straight. Ordnance companies kept maintenance patrols on the road 24 hours a day. Aircraft were used to spot disabled vehicles, which were then repaired on the spot or evacuated to the rear for depot repair. Transportation units' utilization approached 100% of their truck capacities. Those trucks also had to transport some 135,000 prisoners from North Korea back to the southern islands of South Korea. Remember - all of these vehicles were only available from the Roll-up Program.
How did the news reporters think those needed supplies got there from Inchon into North Korea in the first place? Gas was the life blood of the Red Ball Express. [13] It was bitterly cold and there were other needs for gas. How did those so-called correspondents keep warm, and where did they get the gas they needed to jog around the country for their next story? Maybe they got their feathers ruffled since they were the ones needing that gas and diesel fuel. One could still siphon gas for personal use such as warming food or mix with earth in a can for a slower, lower, and longer burning rate. Starting fires and melting ice in canteens was not authorized, but it was done. The gas and diesel fuel was needed, which was the reason that it was high priority, whether that fact was widely known or not. The same logic applied to an airplane. If it had to fly as far as it could to the other end of the line and then return to its base, it could only do that if it could be refueled at the other end of its run. Otherwise it could only go halfway before returning for fuel.
Even the war correspondents had a better system. Suppose their typewriter ribbons of that era had to be discarded at the end of the spool as they do now. That was not the case. Instead, they had a supply built in to return to reverse time and time again to the other end. Not so with a truck. The heavier the load, the more gas required.
S.L.A. Marshall made this candid appraisal in a letter to a Marine friend: "There were critical shortages which weighed against the defense. There were not enough grenades. No pyrotechnics. Some of the positions had been too loosely organized. The communications were definitely bad. But, for all that, 2nd Division behaved like men. I am speaking of the line. Perhaps a few ran, but not many. I exaggerate nothing in my statement. Further, anyone who tells you that 12,000 men ran back to Seoul is a lying son-of-a-bitch.... By the time this division lost 4,200 men killed and wounded in the first four days of battle, it only had 6,700 men left.... One shouldn't traduce Americans who fight. The regrettable thing is that our press sometimes takes the lead in this and the country is never wiser." [14]
It was reported that some men implied that their wounds were greater than they were. Consider again O.P. Smith's statement about "Army jokers." The validity of that statement was very easy to check through medical sources. Recording casualties was their exclusive job, not the division commander's unreliable opinion. But there were also reports of his group of Marines hiding their wounds and injuries in order to stay with their outfits. They were damn fools with inflated egos, as they were not really helping their unit. Instead, they had become a huge liability to that unit, and that was against the regulations-at least in the Army. Also, under the recycle status, one could be patched up and back on line in no time at all. I think these casualties should have been macho heroes on their own time, and that they should not have endangered their own unit survival.
I believe that "shameful conduct" can be applied more accurately toward the early reporters. "If the Korean War was different in kind from any other which the United States had fought in the past, its press coverage was curiously different too. MacArthur learned this most clearly in the matter of censorship. He had many reasons for the decision he took at the outset of the Korean War to forbid censorship....There had been some wild and hysterical distortions, but this was very much the exception to the rule, and almost entirely traceable to those few who would always warp the truth in order to secure sensational headlines or would unerringly follow a propaganda line. In cleverly worded propaganda, attributed to anonymous sources but calculated to create the impression of the highest authority, they attempted not only to blame MacArthur personally for Red China's entry into the war, but also to disparage the courage of the fighting qualities of his men." [15] As MacArthur himself stated, "I have always been able to take care of the enemy in my front, but I have never been able to protect myself from sniping in the rear."
After the Chinese entered the fray, the American Army was forced to face odds never before encountered in the military history of our nation. There was nothing remotely comparable, even in World War II. But the press agents were ever prophesying doom and defeat. Their archives, reels, and newspaper articles were not tapped for compatible sources and statistics. "We fought harder in Korea then in Europe, and given the time frame of the first six months, as well as the estimated Chinese forces against us (a small force of six divisions), we fought just as successfully." [16]
The allied campaign in Europe can be compared to Korea. "Some striking similarities existed between the two countries of Italy & Korea. The Italian front was approximately 100 miles as compared to 140 miles in Korea. Italy faced the allies and employed two allied armies--the American Fifth and the British Eighth with thirty-two first class divisions against a variable twenty to twenty-seven Italio-German divisions that were battered and reduced to half the allied strength. Italy was a strategic sideshow. Nothing vital was at stake. The war could not conceivably be won there. "One need not strain one's imagination to guess what thirty-one Anglo-American divisions, instead of nine, would have done to the Chinese in Korea, at any stage of the war..." [17]
Regardless of the needs in the Pacific battlegrounds, the JCS provided "great superiority of men" to the Italian front. These same military high commanders in the JCS were still in power or were advisors to the Korean battlefield. Why they changed their calculations of manpower between Anzio and the Yalu and accepted the staggering odds against our American forces in Korea, only they can answer. Yet one of the oldest maxims of warfare (which the old southern battle-weary sergeant repeated over and over again) was, "Don't bunch up. One grenade could kill you all." Fact: In Korea per man lost to the enemy, American forces were still economical with the lives they gave. America again got a bargain from its sons' lives in Korea. They did not deserve the disrespect they got in return.
Let me clarify one point in all of this rhetoric. I personally do not like to compare one battle to any other. To do that would make me guilty of the reporters' conduct mentioned in this chapter. The comparisons here are those of others, and I do feel they relate to Korea. The 7th Infantry Division made no claim to fame because of the enemy forces they met or killed. But the ratio of killed seemed to be a major point with the Marines. They controlled the press releases from Chosin. That, again, was a difference between services. With our own overwhelming missing-in-action rate, the Army has never been given credit for our even being there. We were not concerned about giving an account of the Chinese killed in action ratio or their missing-in-action rate. If America was not concerned about us, why burden them with the enemy losses? Indeed, to this day there is no accurate report or accurate account of the 7th Infantry Division forces east of Chosin. They remain as a phantom force lost to history.
Keeping track of war statistics is one hell'va ledger-keeping process. The debit is those lives lost in battle. Since we had our own problems keeping the records straight, why should we concern ourselves with the enemy losses, especially in a retrograde movement from enemy territory? In Korea, as at Pearl Harbor, this was the one and only "hot war" we had going at the time. Those forces available as of November 24, 1950 and in Korea at that time were 178,464. Of these, 153,576 were Army and 24,928 were Marines. The total U.S. military strength was 1,032,617, with only 372,519 posted overseas. That was less than half of the forces overseas and about 15% of the total strength committed to Korea. [18]
Reviewing the casualty figures in this chapter, one will find that the percentage of Killed in Action [KIA's] casualties for each division employed ranged from 15% through 50% (15 to 20 men) of those units engaged. These battle deaths were out of every 100 American men so listed as a casualty. These men were far removed from the reasons and necessity of why they were short of the supplies they needed. They were there in Korea, but adequate supplies were not. Still, they faced the enemy with the World War II mentality that assumed that America was truly behind them. They did not realize how very, very far behind the lines American interest was. The haunting phrase, "the Forgotten War" had some base in its origin.
No other item is so misstated than the casualties suffered in Korea. And no other division seemed to so highlight and over-exaggerate them than the 1st Marine Division. Nor did it stop there. The number of enemy facing the Marines alone was highly exaggerated by the Marine command as well. While their own history engaged in pure speculation as to where the enemy units were at various times, they never exceeded over six divisions engaging the 1st Marine Division in the Chosin Area. Nevertheless, the Marines established a legend that 12 divisions of 10,000 CCF--a total of 120,000 men--faced the 1st Marine Division alone rather than the larger X Corps.
It has now been over 50 years since the battle of the Chosin Reservoir was fought in North Korea. In military history there is a maxim that states, "The greater the odds, the greater the glory." That "glory" was sought by the Marines by exaggerating the number of enemy forces against the Marine Corps at Chosin. Many medals were awarded to them for their actions on the west side of that reservoir. For over 30 of the 50+ years since Chosin, few (if any) events were recorded about the Army participation in that campaign. The Army's main commitment was on the east side of the reservoir. As new facts were uncovered via Chinese sources and history itself, new light shines on the Army effort. This changes the "odds" retroactive to the beginning of the entire battle, and it deserves to be revisited from Day One.
As mentioned, earlier Marine reports placed twelve CCF divisions (120,000 men) at Chosin, and they were solely facing the 1st Marine Division. That figure was derived from the total number of CCF massed, but it was not those numbers actually indicated to have engaged Marine forces. Today we know that number was greatly exaggerated and is now reduced by 50% to 60,000 men in eight CCF divisions. The number was reduced further by two of these eight enemy divisions engaging the Army units of the 31st RCT. The Army was originally given one division of these eight CCF enemy forces as its enemy at the Chosin. Then after 40 years, that figure was raised to over 100% as a second division (81st), and possibly part of another (94th) was added. That is embarrassing to the Marines' glory-wise, as the odds against them in the very beginning were never as great as they claimed. That embarrassment, highlighted forever within their own written history, engaged in pure speculation as to where this extra division of the CCF 81st Division "may" have been located.
Marine history states that there was "no contact reported." Enough said. They should have left it at that statement. But someone could not resist an additional comment on where that enemy division may have been and that speculation was, "may have been in Yudam-ni area." And strangely enough, no other force of the X Corps was in that area except the Marines. History could care less where they may have been in relation to the Marines at Yudam-ni, since "no contact reported" was the criteria concerning any action between them. Still, this 81st CCF Division was engaged with Task Force Faith east of the reservoir. RED FLAG. But even that requires more speculation and implication in that, when contact was made, it was implied to be against Marine forces at Hungnam. In reality, it was against the 3rd Infantry Division, not the Marines. [19] The ratio of killed is proportional to the time of exposure. *(Willoughby, 360)
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Note the ironic fact that even though the Marine Division had 30,112 men in their total and the 7th Division had 15,126 men, equating their percentage at 25.8% for the difference in the Killed in Action for the 7th Division was only short by 99 men. Why would that be? Again, "The ratio of killed is proportional to the time of exposure." What is so ironic as well is that the 7th Division supposedly messed up east of the reservoir, were already gone, and the counting had stopped for them two days before the Marines activated Smith's order--issued three days earlier--to return to Hagaru-ri. This means that the Marine time of exposure in days had to be greater, but their KIA casualty rate was not. Again, why would that be?
Although most MIAs were officially written off long ago as ‘presumed dead,' there are some 8,177 Americans still missing in action and unaccounted for still today. Most are truly ‘missing'--that is, as airmen who went down at sea or in rugged mountainous terrain, soldiers or Marines who disappeared in the confusion of battle and those whose bodies were never recovered. Although the issue has been raised periodically at meetings of the Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, the CCF and NKPA have denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of these missing Americans for over three decades. [20]
Recall also that Holland Smith's view of frontal assault tactics was they would save more lives. At Chosin, O. P. Smith's division was faced with CCF tactics of the frontal assault and still the formula held the same ratio of KIAs to WIAs for the Marines there. Why anyone would want to hype the KIA figures beyond what they were is a mystery to me. A KIA cannot be returned to duty, and in many cases, his remains are never returned to his home state as well. Certainly any Army division would have enjoyed the 1st Marine Division lower ratio of KIAs to WIAs.
General O. P. Smith seemed overly concerned about the Army wounded arriving at Hagaru. Here are numerous red flags flapping in the breeze. The innuendos about the demise of our truck column of wounded was highlighted and criticized. Still, there was little, if anything, stated in the press about the Marine wounded in their truck convoy. We know as verified by MG Smith that these Marine casualties exceeded many, many times the wounded returning to Hagaru from the east side of the reservoir. Yet there is little, if any, information on Marine progress of evacuating their forces unable to walk out. The distance for Task Force Faith's travel to its final and fatal roadblock was only four miles. It took four miles (and twelve hours) to reach the point where our own 31st Tank Company had been located some thirty hours before. [21]
The only information I find recorded about the Marine truck column is that written by war correspondent Marguerite Higgins. "On December third and fourth the ten mile-long Marine caravan finally broke out of the Yudam-ni valley..... They had cracked half a dozen roadblocks and fixed numerous bridges under fire. Time after time they had fought off the Chinese, who would swoop down on them and throw phosphorus hand grenades into the truckloads of screaming wounded." It seems that the Marines shared the same misfortune and fate of having their trucks attacked as well. The mystery is why this was such a secret. [22] All press reports instead were turned to the Army misfortune on the east side, three days prior to the Marines entering the Hagaru-ri perimeter, though the Marines seemed to have suffered the same fate. Indeed, General Smith himself stated in a later interview, "The only time I had cause for great concern was when Litzenberg and Murray were fighting out from Yudam-ni and I got a dispatch from Litzenberg along midnight somewhere and he said 'situation grave.'"
Common sense and reality should therefore dictate that the Marines, too, suffered. Their truck convoy of wounded had to be far, far more venerable than Task Force Faith's ever was. After all, the Marines had those three extra days and ten miles or six miles further than our task force. Could this be what set MG Smith off in his tirade on the Army wounded? MG Smith added to the press coverage by highlighting and degrading the Army wounded caught up in this evacuation event, stating that no "able bodied man" was flying out. But at the same time, he sent out 138 frozen bodies to be "buried by the Army" at Hungnam. They were his own dead.
Again criticizing the Army, he said that they were kind of careless in identifying these people. Was all his rhetoric just a ploy to raise a red flag and divert attention away from a like tragedy of his own force from the west side? At least one press correspondent reported their tragedy as well, while the Marines left the impression that they had cleared the hills completely of long range firing. But this did not happen to any degree warranting full press coverage, still given their own claim of the additional CCF mythical divisions attacking them. They could not escape the same like fate of Task Force Faith. By increasing the enemy numbers, they seem to have downplayed part of their own tragedy. They had been on the road longer and there were more of them bunched up in one area, while Task Force Faith was criticized for one single dash without a stopover point. That would have required extra time, and warming tents or barrel fires to keep the wounded warm and safe from hypothermia. We had no warming tents. Still, the three regiments of Marines and their wounded had to be transported ten miles over three days with hills on both sides of the escape route.
MG Smith stated about Task Force Faith, "As near as I could make out, 2,800 were in Task Force Faith..... and we evacuated 900 0f them. We salvaged 385, so there must have been over 1,200 killed, captured, or what have you." His figure was close to the actual ones. Still, the smaller battalion units being inclusive of these 1,200 KIAs exceeded his own division's four regiments: 1st, 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines entire 556 KIA's amount of 100% Marines casualties by a full 216% (see Chart(s) 8-3-4 end of this chapter), that force exclusive of the 7th Division 1/B/31 troops with Task Force Drysdale who were captured and killed to fold into the KIA column. Yet on casualties, MG Smith stated that the 7th Division --other than these men lost--"had none."
Had General Smith held true to his own judgment, objected, and remained defiant against the pressure on him to move the 7th Marines to Yudam-ni in the first place, he would never have had this complex problem. Giving in to that pressure against his own better judgment had tragic consequences for his troops on line. This was as evident as for Task Force Drysdale following MG Smith's orders to proceed forward "at all costs" against his own better judgment. If General Oliver P. Smith had held firm against applied pressure and demanded a written order before he complied (as he did with unloading his supplies at Wonsan), that would have been an historical event in the Korean War. Under the circumstances and with hindsight, no action could have been taken by Almond against Smith, and Drysdale would not have been needed with the 5th & 7th Marines, both located at Hagaru.
In this scenario, the enemy could not have inflicted the casualties they did. History would now record what that pressure was and who issued it, and Smith's wisdom would have been highlighted as brilliant, just as MacArthur's judgment on the Inchon landing. This was just one of many, many, "ifs" at Chosin. But that did not happen in history, and damage control had to replace reality and truth, utilizing the press agents for maximum results. It has been written, "Truth is the first casualty in battle." [23]
As a private citizen, MacArthur stated in October of 1951 that, "We have just passed another anniversary of the end of the war with Japan. Six years ago with the stroke of a pen, a calm descended upon the battlefields of the world and the guns grew silent." In Korea earlier that year, there was explosive gunfire. The press once again used mighty strokes of the pen, but this time not to praise--but rather to degrade--American forces committed once again to a new battlefront.
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Consider that each and every one of these men had to be checked and so designated as a numbered casualty in each category on this chart. Marine Non-Battle Casualties exceeded their total battle casualties (of 100%) by 38 men. Surely this number had to upset the medical corpsmen and field doctors who had to treat and separate such a large number of non-battle casualties mixed with those of battle-wounded. However, the Navy only listed one-half of the numbers given by General Smith of the Marine frostbite cases as 7,313. What accounted for such a large, excessive number of NBCs in only one division? RED FLAG - If one merely adds the Marine total of 3,610 battle casualties to those non-battle casualties, it totals 7,258. It seems that Smith was not separating these two categories.
As MG Smith stated about Task Force Faith, "As near as I could make out, 2,800 were in Task Force Faith..... and we evacuated 900 0f them. We salvaged 385, so there must have been over 1,200 killed, captured, or what have you."
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One should keep firmly in mind that these comparisons are only justified due not only to the fact that Task Force MacLean-Faith was removed from the action, but highlighted by the exaggerated claims by General O. P. Smith who said that his one division had taken "all" of X Corps casualties. That is unjust and unsupported by facts and figures--but nevertheless. that is the reality of his claim. So the isolation of this battle at Chosin per one Marine Division highlighted as their sole individual battle is open to comparison from start to the finish date of this campaign between 27 November - 11 December 1950. However, one should also keep in mind the bloodiest battle and loss of American lives by that one individual division was not one within X Corps in North Korea but within the southwestern Eighth Army arena at Kunu-ri. That battle involved the Army 2nd Infantry (Indianhead) Division. But the press agents failed to highlight that battle as well. [25]
Also once again, press censorship was not imposed until 20 December 1950, meaning that the Chosin campaign was within that uncensored timeline to be covered. The articles already written and published could be expanded and restated. But it was not probed for details or reports given to the press, or if they were, they were ignored or totally suppressed. Now over fifty years after the event, with the new declassified document information and with other source available on the Internet and the era of electronic mail, it is a national disgrace to learn from these media sources that the many families that lost loved ones at Chosin in the Army battles never knew to this very day that their loved one was directly involved and lost his life in this battle east of Chosin Reservoir. The fact is that many who fell there will forever remain one member of this Phantom Force lost to history. Such was the success of the propaganda campaign to bury the Army men under cover of silence or innuendos that these men were disgraceful under fire, although they gave their own ultimate sacrifice and commitment to that battle. Why so much negative press five decades later is given and promulgated about a force totally listed as Missing in Action is of itself a total mystery.
See Ridgway Map and Map 5, also OPN 25, & Map 6, Map 7. There is one other chart to consider.
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[1] Korean War Almanac, Facts on File, 181
[2] Higgins, The Korean War, p.150
[3] However regiment for regiment, the 1st Marine Division had only three while the Army had twenty-six regiments engaged and three separate individual RCTs.
[4] Ridgway, The Korean War, page 67
[5] Ridgway at the time was assigned to the JCS in Washington, DC, some 7,000 miles away from the action. Neither he nor his forces ever got that far into North Korea to trod that land in which, to this very day, American forces lost in battle there remain buried in NK territory.
[6] Whitney, MacArthur, p. 277
[7] Frank Interview, 1969
[8] The Navy was the proper one to receive it. The Marines are under the Department of the Navy.
[9] Note: MG Smith's use and defense of "frostbitten fingers" as a critique for his Marines. Here he elevated the cause, but used it for criticism of the Army "jokers." Also it seems perfectly logical that any real pressure could be either one of removal from command or a court-martial.
[10] Willoughby, MacArthur, '41-'51)
[11] In spite of reduction to two instead of three battalions per division, recall effective fire power, as 84% for the 1st Cavalry Division, leading all others in Japan. One third reduction in regiments equaled 66% firepower in not beefed up after World War II standard.
[12] Ridgway, p. 118
[13] Red Ball Express was a method used by General George Patton in Europe to move material at a rapid pace to the battlefield as it moved forward.
[14] (W. Hopkins p. 211)
[15] Willoughby, MacArthur, ‘41-'45
[16] Willoughby, p. 403
[17] Willoughby, p. 404
[18] Mossman, Ebb & Flow, p. 13)
[19] Ebb & Flow, page 171, "Parts of the Chinese 81st Division, 27th Army, appeared to have made the attacks on the 3d Division"
[20] Korean War Almanac, Facts on File, 185
[21] The discrepancies between the two withdrawals has to relate to TF Faith's rear tank guard being withdrawn back to Hagaru on orders under Smith's operational control 292039 Nov.
[22] See Appleman, Escaping the Trap, p. 240. He added some credence to this as well.
[23] Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward was Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, in 1951.
[24] Non Battle Casualty mostly frostbite cases. If system allowed 1% (or .01) to slip through, the figure would have been 3,648=36 NBC Marines flown out. Chart 4, TF Faith = 900 WIA's. If 1% amount slipped through, 9 Army men at best would have been flown out.
[25] However, SLA Marshall highlighted the Marine battle at Yudam-ni, and I will highlight that in a later chapter.
This Phantom Force
"Apparently pressure was put on Gen. MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get closer contact between the X Corps and the Eighth Army. Then they devised a new plan by which they rushed up some troops of the 31st and 32nd Infantry to relieve the 5th on the east side of the Reservoir..."
- General O. P. Smith. [1]
Concerning the above quotation that General MacArthur was acting under some "pressure" by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the events at issue in this chapter were not only known but also encouraged by the JCS. There was a plan to use X Corps forces to assist Eighth Army through an attack behind the CCF's lines. This new plan of operation was designed to cut the enemy rear lines of supply to their forces crossing the bridge over the Yalu River via Manpo'jin and into North Korea. This new plan, which was also devised to directly aid Eighth Army, was known as Plan Eight. It had two separate drafts drawn up by Almond's G-3 planning staff, to be activated by X Corps. The main force was to be the 1st Marine Division, by that time operating in their own western zone directly adjacent to Eighth Army's boundary line. That line separated these two commands in North Korea.
RED FLAG HERE: The big mystery is what happened to the 7th Infantry Division documentation and the information concerning their direct involvement within this new plan? [2] General Smith himself created a continuous forty-seven year controversy--beginning 3 Mar 1952--over the exclusion of those units he himself listed within this new plan. But he again opposed within a PUC Award. Why is that space missing in military history? That missing space was filled instead by pure speculative opinions over a redundant and consistently repeated version as to what General MacArthur changed in regard to this new plan.
One recurrent version was agreed upon and reported by all past authors. It was also widely publicized, being over one small change made by MacArthur, that change recorded as only a "minor" one. However, this "minor change" merely indicates an oversight on MacArthur's part. While he approved the new plan, he failed to lower the boundary line which maintained and separated Eighth Army and X Corps commands. Without this change being made, by crossing its original boundary line, X Corps forces then came under the direct command of General Walker's Eighth Army control. This was apparently such an important change in the plan that Almond sent his G-3 to GHQ in Tokyo to confront MacArthur over this huge mistake. This part of the new plan was then on hold pending the minor change by MacArthur. His "minor" oversight then delayed X Corps' combined major offensive with Eighth Army scheduled for 240800 November. This indicated that General Walker had to launch his own offensive without aid from X Corps, as MacArthur allowed Almond to pick his own date for X Corps' new offensive. Almond set the new time for 270800 November. This same speculative version has been repeated by every author concerning the Changjin Campaign in North Korea.
Note the following examples of various authors' statements:
Historian Blair states on page 420, "The Forgotten War" that: "MacArthur made only slight technical changes."
Historian Appleman states on page 8, "East of Chosin" that: "MacArthur: Making only one minor change, that moving the boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps further west and south."
Historian Schnabel states on page 266, "Policy & Direction" that "On November 24, MacArthur directed plan be carried out with one modification, a shift of the proposed boundary line between X Corps and Eighth Army further west and south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division."
Historian Roe states on page 260, "The Dragon Strikes" that "General MacArthur approved X Corps Operation Plan 8, draft 3, with minor changes of boundaries."
No reference whatsoever is made as to the 7th Infantry Division having any new mission within that 1st Marine Division zone. That is indeed very strange since those authors totally ignored General Smith's reference to the 7th Division forces in his interview of 1969, a full ten years prior to their own publications. My own research has uncovered no other version in existence. Being verified by so many published authors, their redundant statements should be true and factual, but are they? To unravel this mystery we must dissect the "new plan" and its two drafts, as well as the reason both drafts were rejected.
The 1st Marine Division were assigned their X Corps border mission under Plan 6 on 11 November. Their orders sent them upward to Hagaru-ri, which was used as a base of operations and a new CP for General Smith. The outward spokes (>Y<) from this hub at Hagaru-ri extended westward to establish a blocking position up to the Eighth Army's boundary line at Yudam-ni. The northeastern spoke, now revised (see compromise #2 below) extended from Hagaru-ri between the east shore of the Chosin reservoir and the west shore of the Fusen reservoir. [3] The Marine units assigned to this northeastern mission were required to travel to the town of Changjin, which rubbed the right flank of the Eighth Army's line as well. From that point well above the reservoir, the Marines were to travel due north to the Yalu River, rubbing the right flank(s) of the Eighth Army at Huchangu'gu, and Singalpajin, and rubbing the left flank(s) of the 7th Infantry Division zone. See www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map5_full.jpg.
"I was told to occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni with the 7th, and to have the 5th go by the east side of the reservoir and continue on to the Yalu. I told Murray and the 5th to take it easy; that we would fix an objective every day. The only objective the Corps gave me was the Yalu River. I told Litzenberg not to go too fast. He didn't want to go over the pass and down to Yudam-ni because we had this tremendous open flank. But the pressure was being put on me to get going. Finally, I had to tell Litzenberg to go on over and occupy Yudam-ni." [4]
The new Plan 8 was routed through two separate drafts for a coordinated mission to aid Eighth Army before the 24 November date. The first draft of plan eight had elements from plan six "to occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni with the 7th, and to have the 5th go by the east side of the reservoir and continue on to the Yalu." Hence the necessary change in plans. The 5th Marine Regiment was already supplying forces to continue north along the east side of the Changjin Reservoir toward their next big objective to seize the town of Changjin. The 7th Marines were also to provide a blocking force at Yudam-ni. The mission change in Draft One of Plan 8 was that, after seizing the town of Changjin, the X Corps 5th Marine RCT force was to then pivot left toward the Kanggye-Manpo'jin axis which ran westward to the Yalu River at the Yellow Sea along the Chinese border. General Walker's new boundary line was therefore reset and lowered just below Kanggye and Manpo'jin. General Walton Walker's Eighth Army was then only required to continue due north to reach his new boundary line, which had been reset and reduced immediately south of Kanggye. It still, however, required Walker to seize Mup'yong-ni as well. This placed Walker's eastern force adjacent to X Corps and above the 7th Marine Regiment blocking position at Yudam-ni. The Marine force already anchored at Yudam-ni was still required to stay there in a blocking position. There was to be a coordinated and combined attack between Eighth Army and X Corps to commence at 240800 November. Regardless of the end results, what incident or what ingredient was in the mixture that caused this draft one as written to be rejected?
1) The 5th Marines were not going to reach Changjin by 240800 November '50.
2) As listed below, Smith's own words to Benis Frank were that, "We can't make a main effort in two directions. We've got one main effort, which is going up this road by the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu, and here you are telling us to be prepared for a major attack out to the Northwest."
This prior objection notwithstanding, Draft One required that he once again shift westward, away from his "one main effort," simply reversing the spearhead of his main effort into Kanggye. But first and foremost under Plan 6 or Plan 8, he had to seize the town of Changjin above the reservoir. Only then could he turn westward. Since Changjin already was well within this X Corps boundary line, no minor changes had to be made to this line before it could be seized.
A minor X Corps internal change in boundary lines under plan 6 placing the 3rd Division protecting the Marine division rear flank between their division as a blocking force at Sach'ang-ni. MG Smith's listing (Compromise #2) said, "...By that time the 3rd Infantry Division had landed, and I said, 'Why can't they take over that job?' And they did eventually." See: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/maps/map8_full.jpg).
RED FLAG: Important point here - The road leading to Sach'ang-ni had to come through the 1st Marine Division's zone (at that time) below Chinhung-ni to Sach'ang-ni. Thus the 3rd Division also had to travel through that lower 7th Division zone and then below the previously assigned Marine zones to protect their disputed (gap) left flank between Eighth Army and the Marine forces. [5] Again we must look and quote from General Smith's interview:
"What I was trying to do was to slow down the advance and stall until I could pull up the 1st Marines....I was unable to complete that until the 27th of November."
What was his problem? He had already been rewarded for his objection over the Fusen reservoir--transferred to Lt. Col. Faith, and then the 3rd Division had taken over his rear guard flank at the gap below Koto-ri. Reality: This also gave the enemy those same number of days to mass their own forces. Right, wrong, or indifferent, CG Almond had one major force working against his X Corps planners. So Draft One had some built-in variables to work out.
Question: Would a force be at Changjin to pivot westward? Answer: They were not anywhere near there on 24 November. Certainly the notoriety and dispute over delaying this Marine mission is no secret by any means. The border missions outlined by General Almond on Map 5, November 11-26, were well known. All forces were to unite due north at the Yalu River. Likewise, the border missions assigned to the 7th Infantry Division, indeed even more so, verified in the notoriety in American newspapers headlining the 7th Division in achieving their border assignment at Hyesanjin, on 21 November.
Again, without any 7th Division forces involved, this latter mission of Plan 8, Draft One, changed as of 21 November, as General Almond picked Draft Two (GHQ, G-3, General Wright's preference). Within this second draft, the push toward Mup'yong-ni was to be made directly west through the Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni, Mup'yong-ni axis using those 7th Marine forces already in place on 24 November and thereby eliminating any delay in operation and combining a joint offensive of Eighth Army and X Corps.
Draft Two was also controversial, and was objected to by General Smith. As such, Smith did not activate it on 24 November. General Smith objected to this change in his mission. He insisted that since his 5th Marines on the east side were the fresher units of his forces, they should be the leading element of his offensive attack out of Yudam-ni. But they were already aligned for his main effort on the east side of the reservoir, although nowhere near the pivot point at Changjin.
Since the new change simply reversed the axis of direction to the westward below the reservoir by his 7th Marine Regiment blocking force already in place at Yudam-ni, Smith had a new dilemma. The change merely required that his force east of the reservoir be the new blocking force remaining in a stationary position at their present point of advance. [6] However, under Smith's new plan, the 5th Marine Regiment had to be realigned and relocated to be the forward force at Yudam-ni. This, however, was not Almond's new plan.
Here is our replay of Inchon and Seoul. However, unlike the Seoul controversy, there were no 7th Division forces anywhere within this Marine zone. They had their individual boundary line and zone of operation. Still, this was MG Smith's third objection, with an ultimatum attached. The first at Inchon withdrew the 1st Marine Brigade from Pusan, and replaced them with the 32nd Regiment. At Wonsan, a written order was required before he had his men unload their own supplies. Then at Chosin he had a new demand--to exchange his own forces from the east side to the west side. This latter change left his east side wide open from the north, thereby threatening the security of that vital hub at Hagaru-ri. In reality, it involved exchanging both of his own regiments to secure both flanks leading into Hagaru-ri.
The 7th Marines, already in place at Yudam-ni, had the assigned mission to advance through their zone to seize Mupyong-ni (per Draft #2, Plan 8), they having slowly moved into place before the 240800 November combined X Corps-Eighth Army offensive date. However, neither the 7th Marine Regiment nor the 5th Marine Regiment would lead off on that date. As stated above, there remained a new dispute and new objection by General Smith as to their use. The Marine G-3 had moved their own 7th Regiment slowly into a blocking position at Yudam-ni, but then failed to acknowledge or order this particular regiment any operational order to move out towards Mup'yong-ni. [7] General Smith insisted that the 5th Marine Regiment leap-frog or jump over the 7th Marine Regiment and realign to lead off towards Mupyong-ni. [8]
There was no indication what he planned to secure his own open eastern zone, which had been vacated by the relocation of his forces. Nevertheless, the plan was on hold until Smith's new ultimatum conditions were met. This set into motion a reaction by the Army G-3 staff to have an Army force lead off westward from Yudam-ni and seize Mup'yong-ni, instead of the 7th Marine Regiment. Almond then had an obligation to also secure the eastern flank to protect Hagaru-ri.
So it seems that a new battle line had been drawn--mot between American and Chinese forces (friend and foe), but an internal dispute between X Corps G-3 Planning Staff and the 1st Marine Division's G-3 staff. The dispute was between one division of the Marine Corps OPCON to the Army X Corps. Whatever pressure had been applied to force the Marine advance westward into Yudam-ni, it then seemed that it had been assigned to the wrong regiment of that division. There would to be changes made to the alignment of forces. How could that be arranged?
It is then high noon at Chosin on 24 November. It was time for an Army and Marine G-3 show down. The Marine mission and its forces were on hold, reminiscent of the Inchon Landing ultimatum to MacArthur to do it the Marine way or not at all. X Corps G-3 had a serious dilemma in their planning section. [9] Just as the Inchon Landing repercussions were an Army problem to solve in a short span of time, an exact duplication resurfaced at Chosin. As I stated about the Inchon case, Chosen was a clone copy--a blood-chilling duplication of that past event.
The only known solution was too drastic for X Corps G-3 planners to execute on their own. The 7th Division forces were too far removed from Chosin reservoir to narrow the Marine zone as was done on a short 24 hours notice at Seoul. At Seoul, both divisions occupied the same zone. That was not the case at Chosin at 240800 November. Then, the entire Marine mission ordered under Plan Eight, Draft Two, was on hold. "Then they devised a new plan by which they rushed up some troops of the 31st and 32nd Infantry to relieve the 5th on the east side of the Reservoir..." Here began the origin of a new plan.
Any changes then required MacArthur's direct intervention; thus the requirement on 23 November for a plane flight to GHQ in Tokyo by X Corps, G-3, Colonel Chiles for a face to face meeting with General Douglas MacArthur. It was, indeed, difficult for anyone to reconstruct such a meeting between Colonel Chiles and General MacArthur, but it may have gone something like this: Colonel Chiles informed General MacArthur that Plan 8, Draft 2, originating from Draft #1 had to be changed. [10] It could not work because no forces were at Changjin. That force was stalled over 20 miles south of that objective.
To save time, a new offensive into Eighth Army zone had to be launched from a distance below the reassigned Eighth Army boundary line at Kanggye; that line previously extended sometime earlier by MacArthur's approval for Draft #1. General Almond approved Draft #2 on 21 November to activate on 240800 November, that time line to coincide with Walker's attack on the same hour. The 7th Marines were in a blocking position at Yudam-ni. Already in place, they could lead off from there. However, they had been issued no division orders to do that. Surely MacArthur wanted to know why the plan had to change at that late hour. Draft One being the plan he had sent to the JCS in Washington. It was that plan that General Ridgway of that body described in his book.
What IS the problem? Why was this change needed? Was there a problem with the ROKs or The United Nations forces? Or was it strictly an Army problem? The answer to all three is, "No." But the problem which had been created made it exclusively an Army problem to solve in a short time.
Here were the options:
Almond had picked and ordered Draft #2. That draft could not work as the wrong regiment had been moved into place, per that divisional commander. It had to be replaced by his preferred unit. The offensive was stalled until that change occurred. The solution -- As recorded, MacArthur "made only minor changes", moving the boundary line below Kanggye farther south below Mupyong-ni as required to activate Draft #3. That highlights the only change recorded as the end result of this required face to face meeting with MacArthur. MacArthur apparently neglected to authorize the lowering of the boundary line below Mupyong-ni. However, time also had eroded the coordinated general assault schedule of Eighth Army and X Corps. General Almond could not activate this minor change by 240800 November. He needed more time. MacArthur allowed Almond to pick his own date for the new offensive. With this minor change approved, Colonel Chiles was in flight back to Korea, as most authors state, as a Draft #3 was approved with the new boundary line. General Almond had the prerogative to set his own new date to activate. It is recorded that he set that date as 270800 November 1950.
While these changes, three days delayed, were listed under Plan Eight, Draft Three, they could not officially be related to that plan number. In reality, Plan Eight had been discarded completely. Hence Smith's reference of a "new plan" replaced by Opn 0 7, 25 November ‘50. It was "a new plan by which they rushed up some troops of the 31st and 32nd Infantry to relieve the 5th on the east side of the Reservoir..." This major change required a new order from MacArthur himself. its changes were much more than "minor ones." They are major, major, major changes. They directly involved and ordered the entire 7th Infantry Division to relocate to the Chosin Reservoir arena. [11]
Problem: How did the Seventh Infantry Division enter into this farce?
How did Draft 3, (O 7 25 Nov.‘50) and the 7th Division enter into the picture? Their involvement was a major, major, major change. Their boundary lines between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division had been completely removed to: "The 7th Division will extend its zone westward, through that zone previously assigned to the Marines." [12]
How does one read this? The 7th Division boundary line to the westward was completely eliminated. Every "zone previously assigned to the Marines" under Plan 6 was reassigned to the 7th Division. As recorded by a X Corps Staff report, "We planned an orderly transfer of all three regiments to Chosin, but Almond ordered his nearest units there as fast as possible." But unanswered is what mission remained for the Marine regiments?
General Almond had intended the westward mission for the Marines. [13] But that was switched to the 7th Division, which returns us back to the Intelligence Summaries of MacLean's Order 25. It states that 1st Marine Division's sole remaining mission to seize Mupyong-ni was also transferred and belonged to the 7th Infantry Division. But the haste of the Chinese intervention interfered with this drama's finale between the two American generals. The late-arriving CCF enemy divisions also had the benefit of those additional three days to relocate more forces as well, while Lt. Colonel Faith was also moving his 1/32 Battalion towards Chosin Reservoir.
Colonel MacLean's 7th Division OPN Order #24 on 250800 November was merely a move order to relocate a portion of his 31st RCT to merge at the railroad station at Pukchong. Part one, (1.b) relating to what the rest of the 7th Division was required to do was recorded as "OMITTED." There was no indication whosoever of what the rest of the division was alerted to do. It was over 50 hours before the next attack (Operational Order 25) order was issued. Operational Order 24 was issued at 242400 November at 7th Division headquarters at Untaek Korea. Order 25 was issued on 27 November 1950, the same date to activate the 270800 November 7th Infantry Division attack at Chosin.
But the reason for the removal of Colonel MacLean's records and operational orders at the 7th Division level seems to have been buried beneath a staged smokescreen of controversy immediately following the Chosin Campaign. The powers that be in the Army collected MacLean's operational orders #23, #24.and #25. Each one of these had several copies sent to others concerned in this deployment of forces. (Order #25 alone had seven individual copies to other units.) These also had to be pulled or buried within the action somewhere. [14] Undoubtedly the original copies with MacLean at Chosin did not survive intact. The copy I have from the National Archives is very likely one of those many others--actually 31st Infantry, LTC Anderson, MacLean's S-3.
I pose the question, "Was this mission on the east side of Chosin truly an official 'Secret Mission?' Or was this simply a sin of omission? Either way, why codify it "Secret?" The enemy damn well knew the 7th Division was there at Chosin. General Smith and his officers knew it as well. It was no big secret to them. Our trucks were not disguised with any other division stencils on their bumpers. Those men who wore the 7th Division (Hourglass) insignia on their left shoulder were still allowed to wear them. And most of all, if this was a "Secret" mission, why would the Marine Corps own history be allowed to place the three Army battalions at Chosin, 22 years before (1957) the order placing us there would be declassified (1979)?
The Navy maps do not place us there, nor does General Ridgway's map. However, Marine history Map 20 does place Task Force Faith on the east side of Chosin with the implication that the 32nd Infantry Battalion could [may] be coming downward from the north, in "an attempt to rescue Hagaru-ri," and just got trapped on the eastside of that reservoir. That map 20, does not however, indicate that our withdrawn 31st Tank Company was ever located at Hudong-ni, the area of our truck convoy breakup. [15] Were we merely innocent victims of a hoax of some kind? Or was someone really worried about the end result and the fall out of the revelation of MacLean's Phantom Force being relocated to Chosin?
Were we merely used as pawns to save face for another lesser corps? The number of 7th Division men involved was too great to hide. It covered too large a span in ranking officers and non-coms. The tragedy was well-known in Army circles and throughout the 7th Division. The loss to the division was just too great to hide. Nevertheless, that was the end result of our drama at Chosin. The mystery remains: Why were those Army officers to our rear, as well as all others, so silent concerning our tragedy? Only the Marine general's negative remarks kept our memories alive at the time, as did his constant attempt from 1953 to deny the PUC to this group of men from the east side of that reservoir.
Recall General Ridgway's map and his date of publication of that map. He relied on the official Marine historical history. The interservice rivalry, an over abundance of MOH's and press reports, and unreliable political spins had all taken their toll against the neglect to mention the Army forces' direct involvement at Chosin. Yet those lives lost were too big an investment to ignore the problem that doomed this Phantom Force. Regretfully, the problem still exists. Will it be solved and the 7th Division be given its rightfully-earned place in history before all of those missing in action men buried there are accounted for? One can only hope.
Until that day comes, I believe this serious sin of omission will plague and stain our military establishment. What safeguards are in place to review documents that are to be marked secret in the future? I have no quarrel whatsoever with the premise that some situations are so explosive that time must be placed between the actual event and a reasonable time to release that information. However, 30 years (three decades) is just a little too long in my mind. Had the law not been changed at the time it was, those seeking these very documents would still not be able to obtain them from the National Archives to this very day. One can but speculate what benefit was derived by keeping this secret for all that time. Surely if the interservice rivalry was known at the time, it would have fared better between forces to keep commands separate and independent. At least that is my firm opinion.
In the beginning, this drama was plagued by lack of teamwork between the services--interservice rivalry--that uglier side of war. The difficulty in all of this lay at the feet of the X Corps Commander, General Almond. By not relieving General Smith of his command (to hell with the controversy that would have resulted), many lives were at stake.
It all revolved around the three days delay, offset by the offensive from 24 November to 27 November. The reason given for that delay was entirely too weak to support its own weight. Most references stating that Almond was given his freedom of choice to assign his date are unsupported by rational documentation. Why did he not issue orders before that date (November 24) to align his 7th Division forces to be in place on that date, given the very benefit of his having those extra three days? To the contrary, he did not reassign Faith's 1st Battalion to Chosin until early morning of 24 November, as Colonel Chiles was returning to Korea with those changes.
It seems evident that General Almond had the advance authorization or either anticipated his new orders to involve the 7th Division in the Chosin arena. He therefore set his plan in motion, narrowing the Marine zone of operations as he had done exactly two months earlier to the day at Seoul. Once again, he involved and burdened the 32nd Infantry, that regiment rejected outright by General Smith at Seoul. (There were ROKs still involved.) Unfortunately for him and American history itself, the end result was far different at Chosin than at Seoul.
The "new" plan, Operation Order 7 (25 November) directly involved the 7th Infantry Division. The one towering deficiency in the earlier two drafts was that each one of them involved crossing the boundary line between Eighth Army and X Corps--that line set by MacArthur. He set it to justify the two commands' separate but equal existence. Even on the so-called "final" Draft #3, that issue was highlighted by other authors. The X Corps was not authorized to step beyond that line previously established by General MacArthur himself. A line set by the highest authority, it applied to X Corps and ROK independent divisions as well. As recorded in Ebb & Flow, General Walker issued "only one order on 25 November," lowering his boundary line of responsibility "below Mupyong-ni." [16]
There is no dispute recorded to the contrary. Instead, it is reinforced by historians Blair, Appleman, Stanton, Mossman, and Roe that the "only" change MacArthur made in the final draft while Almond's G-3 Colonel Jack Chiles was at GHQ in Tokyo, was at that time and that place to extend the boundary line of X Corps into Eighth Army zone of operations. In effect, it bent the then current line (Map 5) at Yudam-ni to the southwestern slope of the Yalu River where it flows into the Yellow Sea, from that prior line to reach the Yalu on any angle from Yudam-ni just below Mupyong-ni. Thus Mupyong-ni and the area north to the Yalu were also that of an original Eighth Army boundary line. They became the zone for X Corps area of operations. The more important point was that it opened that entire area to the 7th Division as a new left flank zone of operations.
Still, Eighth Army already had their attack fully under way before Colonel Chiles returned to Korea. The discrepancies were these:
The question is, why later? What was the underlying reason for these major changes--all later--to a plan on the drawing board since November 15? General Walker had delayed his earlier offensive by three days in his Eighth Army zone-not yet changed, so his area still included Mupyong-ni. The delay was from the 21st to the 24th of November. MacArthur was not pleased with Walker's delay. But he granted Almond an additional three days from the 24th to the 27th, as well.
General MacArthur went on record and was criticized for his "Home by Christmas" speech in advance of this offensive. On November 24, MacArthur announced his "Home by Christmas" offensive, underway as of 240800 November 1950. He stated to the JCS on 9 November:
I believe that with my air power, now unrestricted so far as Korea is concerned except as to hydroelectric installations, I can deny reinforcements coming across the Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the destruction of those forces now arrayed against me in North Korea.[17]
On the day the U.N. attack began (24 November), General MacArthur gave further evidence of the degree to which this view guided his thinking. In a communiqué that day, he announced:
"The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our Air Forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the North so that further reinforcement there from has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited". [18]
Perhaps even more revealing of MacArthur's state of mind was his special communiqué to the United Nations later the same day in which he said:
"The giant U.N. pincer moved according to schedule today. The air forces, in full strength, completely interdicted the rear areas and an air reconnaissance behind the enemy line, and along the entire length of the Yalu River border, showed little sign of hostile military activity. The left wing of the envelopment advanced against stubborn and failing resistance. The right wing, gallantly supported by naval air and surface action, continued to exploit its commanding position." [19]
Here MacArthur related to the "entire length of the Yalu River border" and the "left wing" and the "right wing" in a joint effort in a "giant U.N. pincer" movement "according to schedule today." That total confusion existed over this offensive was a gross understatement. However, it could not be unraveled at any one division level in X Corps. That will become evident as we move on to detail what happened at Chosin.
Reason for change of Draft One to Draft Two "Apprehensive, after further consideration that supply lines of the attack force would become precariously extended in any drive westward from a point as far north as Changjin town, Almond offered the alternative of an attack over the road leading into the Eighth Army zone from Yudam-ni at the western edge of the Changjin Reservoir. The enemy supply routes were to be cut at the village of Mup'yong-ni, fifty-five miles west of Yudam-ni and forty miles north of Huich'on. Almond intended that the 1st Marine Division make the westward effort into Mup'yong-ni and then press an attack northwestward to the Yalu, pinching out in the process the ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible". [Mossman p 48,] (note 41, X Corps WD Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn Plan 8, 16 Nov 50; Rad, CX69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 23 Nov 50.)
Note: Important time line - The bold print date of Mossman footnote (Rad, CX69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 23 Nov 50.) [20]
Message to Almond from CINCFE, "MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible". This meant without delay-- one of Almond's standard terms of usage in his own orders to the division commanders. For Almond to delay any order from MacArthur by three days was unthinkable, especially when forces were already in place to lead off westward in consolidation with General Walker's offensive. Almond's Army mission started (Day One) 240800 November, with the 7th Division other forces catching up later.
In the early morning on the 24th, Lt. Colonel Faith was well en route to join his parent regiment--which leaving the Fusen reservoir area--at Samsu. Since there was no direct route northward through the 7th Division MSR to the Yalu river (directly disputing General Smith's claim to the contrary), Faith had to use the MSR vehicle road southeast between Sudong and Hamhung. Faith's Executive Officer, Major Crosby Miller, was stopped on this road at Hungnam before turning northeast. There, an X Corps liaison officer had missed Don Faith, who was moving well in the lead of his battalion. Major Miller was ordered ASAP to X Corps Headquarters for a change in orders--directed by General Almond and Barr--and issued an about face order. Major Miller was ordered to relocate this 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry to the east side of Chosin. Faith was also sent back after meeting with his regimental commander near Pukchong at the 7th Division Rear CP.
For all intents and purposes, the 7th Division forces were in motion that same date. Almond was in complete alignment with CINCFE. Later that evening, Colonel MacLean received his relocation orders via a phone call from Major General Barr. Colonel MacLean issued an order 242400 November to move his RCT, effective 250800 November, to the railroad station at Pukchong. The end destination was not specified.
Almond's prior apprehension--a speculative spin at best as Operational Order 25--completely disputed and overrode Almond's apprehension with his new order for one Army unit to "seize Changjin, and advance to the Yalu without delay." What was implied without Order 25 was Almond's change of forces at Sinhu-ni as being the end of the line for MacLean's force--as it proved to be. His force was to create a blocking mission only and proceed no further north toward Changjin and beyond to the Yalu River. [21] Later history and Operational Order #25 reveals that was not what happened. Instead, Almond's supply lines increased rather than decreased because of this additional force of MacLean's.
What General Almond intended (for Plan 8, 16 Nov 50) in using the 1st Marine Division was difficult to execute within reality from that force to be moved into Yudam-ni to lead off from there. The 7th Marines were only moved into place due to pressure applied to their commander to move them there. Their G-3 required that the 5th Marine Regiment, still under orders to advance east of Chosin, be relocated to the lead off position at Yudam-ni. Therein was our core conflict and our created drama at Chosin.
Without MacLean-Faith and 7th Division forces involved, Draft 2 merely revised the end objective to be seized. It just reversed the forces (the 7th Marines) to seize it. These Marines were a force already in place at Yudam-ni, and led off from there. The 5th Marines were then the required blocking force east of Chosin. They were to block any enemy forces from the reverse direction of X Corps offensive in Draft 1, and prevent their seizing those important Headquarters' of X Corps, 1st Marine Division, and the 7th Division now moving into Hagaru-ri.
Yet, Almond, still MacArthur's Chief of Staff -in absentia, reluctantly gave a full three additional days to Walker to start his own campaign. This was strange behavior for MacArthur, and blew the hell out of his past "keen sense of timing." General Walker, could (if luck was with him) move at a rapid pace and be at his new line below Mup'yong-ni before the 27th, thereby negating and totally embarrassing Almond's plans. Yet, Almond's aggressive persona did not allow that to happen, as all units of the 31st RCT and two units of the 32nd Regiment were in motion.
Task Force Faith was in motion before Colonel Chiles returned from Tokyo. Task Force Kingston was in motion towards the "previous marine mission" to seize Singalpajin. Task Force MacLean was active at midnight on the 24th of November. These forces had urgent assignments under an unreported directive from MacArthur to Almond through X Corps G-3, under Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50. (Plan 8, Draft #3)
Almond set the 27th as the opening date. The 7th Division meanwhile was to expand its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir for an advance through the zone previously assigned to the Marines. The ROK I Corps was to continue to the border from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin while Almond's remaining major units, the U.S. 3rd Division and 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the Corps' rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam. [22] Note: There was no mention whatsoever of a 1st Marine Division mission. Where did they go? Note as well: Almond's remaining major units were the U.S. 3rd Division and the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment.
The X Corps commander issued his new orders (Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50.) to attack westward from the Hagaru-ri/Yudam-ni axis to Mupyong-ni on the east side, to advance and seize Changjin, and proceed to the Yalu river on orders. His orders and those issued by X Corps G-3 are the ones of importance here. Therefore let us consider what orders were left for General Smith in the placement of his own forces after 25 Nov 50. To connect to his placement of the 5th Marines, let us connect the remaining part of the opening statement of General Smith from the opening quotation of this chapter:
"Then they devised a new plan by which they rushed up some troops of the 31st and 32nd Infantry to relieve the 5th on the east side of the Reservoir, and then the 5th would be moved over to Yudam-ni; and the 5th and 7th would attack northwest from Yudam-ni to relieve the pressure on 8th Army." [23]
The confusion here is, who was "they" that devised a new plan? Without dispute "they" was X Corps G-3. But did "they" order the 5th Marines to move in front of the 7th Marines at Yudam-ni? For that answer we must look to the Army history Ebb & Flow, pages 88-91, as recorded by its author Billy C. Mossman.
"North of Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th Marines had extended the division's holdings up both sides of the reservoir. The bulk of the 7th Marines, commanded by Col. Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., held Yudam-ni, fourteen miles to the northwest, and the 5th Marines, under Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray, had gone ten miles north over a road following the east bank of the reservoir. Orders for the Mup'yong-ni attack had halted the 5th at this point. Considering Colonel Murray's regiment fresher than the 7th, division commander Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith had designated the 5th to open the advance to the west. Murray's forces consequently had begun to shift west to Yudam-ni, the starting point of the attack. The 2nd Battalion was in Yudam-ni, having left the area east of the reservoir upon the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry. The remainder of Murray's regiment remained in place awaiting relief by the balance of Colonel MacLean's combat team."
My comment: If the remainder of the 5th Marines remained in place, it must be in line with the same order from General Smith as well.
"Near the southwest corner of the Changjin Reservoir, roads from the west, north, and southeast met just outside Yudam-ni. Because enemy forces had not defended this rare road junction, the Marine division G2, Col. Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr., believed the 5th Marines would encounter only weak opposition when they started toward Mup'yong-ni. The absence of enemy patrolling and the failure of ground and aerial reconnaissance to reveal any large enemy concentrations nearby supported his judgment. Contradicting it were reports from civilians of sizable enemy concentrations around Yudam-ni, but these reports were considered misinterpretations of North Korean Army remnants moving away from and around the Yudam-ni area."
"General Smith, on the other hand, believed his Marines would meet Chinese in strength west of Yudam-ni, a belief that had prompted his decision to pass the fresher 5th Regiment through the 7th in the opening attack."
"Supporting Smith's judgment of probable resistance, three Chinese captured by the 7th Marines on the 26th asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th Army were in the Yudam-ni area and would move south and southeast from Yudam-ni to cut the marines' supply road. This information, however, had no effect on plans for the Mup'yong-ni attack. Neither did incoming reports of strong attacks against the Eighth Army. Smith ordered the 5th Marines to strike first for the village of Yongnim-dong, twenty-seven miles west of Yudam-ni, where the Marines' route of advance joined a road leading southwest along the upper reaches of the Ch'ongch'on River to Huich'on. The 7th Marines, when passed through, were to protect the division supply road between Yudam-ni and Sinhung-ni, a village located in the Toktong Pass midway between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri. Smith appointed the 1st Marines, in and below Hagaru-ri, as division reserve. His reconnaissance company, then pulling west flank security duty off the left rear of the division, was to reconnoiter north of Yudam-ni; the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, only recently attached to the division, was to come forward from Hungnam to protect the marines' left flank by reconnoitering southwest of Yudam-ni."
My comment: It seems that the Marine G-3 had totally shut down offensive operations and rescinded their own orders to the 41st Independent Commando Royal Marines, and their own reconnaissance company, rescinding both units' move forward to protect the Marines' left flank. Why would that be? Why would both of these units remain in division reserve at Koto-ri--some ten miles to the rear, unless their mission had already been rescinded? If this was true, then the following Army accounting is irrelevant concerning the 1st Marine Division.
"In planning the advance, Smith had assumed the full relief of the 5th Marines east of the reservoir by noon of the 26th. He apparently expected the entire 7th Division combat team to arrive by that hour, but General Barr had called for the relief of the Marines by a minimum of one infantry battalion, an order satisfied by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 32rd Infantry. In any event, the remainder of Colonel MacLean's forces did not reach the new zone by noon on the 26th, nor by 0800 on the 27th, the scheduled hour of the Marine advance. The full 5th Marines consequently did not reach Yudam-ni on the 26th, and the plan of attack had to be changed. Since Colonel Murray was with his forces east of the reservoir, Colonel Litzenberg, commanding the 7th Marines, took charge of the opening effort."
[Important point: an "order satisfied" by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry.]
"Forces available to Litzenberg included the bulk of the 7th Marines and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. The 7th held a perimeter rimming the valley in which Yudam-ni was located. The 1st Battalion and two companies of the 2nd occupied high ground north of town and the terminal heights of two ridges to the south and southeast overlooking the road to Hagaru-ri. The 3rd Battalion held the terminal hills of a ridge to the southwest. Between the latter and an unoccupied ridge to the northwest ran the road to Mup'yong-ni. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, was to attack over this road from an assembly at the edge of Yudam-ni."
Significant point; OPN 0 25; Part 1b, "7th Inf Div atks 270800 Nov. seizes Mupyong-ni, adv to Yalu Riv. Destroys en in Z Secures the Pugsan area.". This was the 7th ID's new mission together with that of the 31st RCT--seizing the town of Changjin via the east side of the reservoir. Hence all orders for the Marines advance originated from General Smith himself and was not supported by documentation or orders by X Corps or General Almond.
Here is our answer to the pressure applied to General Smith. From the preponderance of this evidence, it seems appropriate that the pressure for his move from east of Chosin Reservoir placed that regiment in reserve status. Smith's own orders to move them rapidly to the west side, in my opinion, is now strictly a RED FLAG exclusively for damage control, his objection being that he wanted them as the fresher force to lead off at Yudam-ni. General Smith had totally and utterly confused his own situation.
As stated above, the arrival of Faith's battalion satisfied General Barr's order. Thus the east side of Chosin officially belonged exclusively to the 7th Division, and Smith's two-thirds remainder of the 5th Marine regiment was sparsely displaced within a 24-hour delay. The Army chain of command was united without delay under Colonel MacLean's arrival on the east side. However, total confusion of command reigned at Yudam-ni. They established a joint command there. As Smith stated in his interview, "You could only attack with one regiment at a time." RED FLAG. But he did not have one regiment to attack. He only had one battalion from his preferred regiment. Again, he stated, "The full 5th Marines consequently did not reach Yudam-ni on the 26th, and the plan of attack had to be changed." Here is a major clue to our mystery: "The plan of attack had to be changed."
Another Red Flag: Thus, whatever CCF resistance was claimed was not against that one regiment, but rather against only one battalion. "Murray made...about 2,000 yards, and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there." Smith's dispute had been opposed to any movement of his forces unless they were consolidated. He failed to follow his own logic. "I had Murray come back to Yudam-ni--to come back the 2,000 yards...." His attack was halted at Yudam-ni, as if it had never started.
The 1st Marine Division had no adequate 5th RCT in place on 270800 leading westward out from Yudam-ni as ordered by General Smith. The westward offensive was stalled at Yudam-ni sometime after General Almond's visit to that side of the reservoir. That night brought the CCF in force to both sides of Chosin. General Almond was at GHQ in Tokyo the next evening (28th) with General Walker to discuss the changing situation in North Korea, and did not return to Korea until the next day (29th). In that interlude, Smith had ordered Colonel Litzenberg "to use as much of his regiment as he could to try to clear the road back to Hagaru-ri." Smith had also ordered the creation of Task Force Drysdale. Had General Smith pulled in the reserve 5th Marine Regiment into Hagaru-ri as he should have, he without question or contradiction would have greatly reduced his own casualty listings, both battle and non-battle. He could have, but he did not.
Some supportive facts within this total confusion are outlined in Eric Hammel's book, Chosin. There are those who call his book political. While Hammel mainly concentrates on the Marines, he seems to avoid the hype of those within the Marine Corps that cover events and color them by elevation to a higher degree than history ever authenticates. The one single event which ties into any order to advance from Yudam-ni towards Mupyong-ni as being an X Corps order is recorded in Hammel's book on pages 211 and 212. [24]
On 29 November, the Assistant Marine Division Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Winecoff, was sent via helicopter to Yudam-ni to survey the situation. Before collecting facts, he filled in the forward officers of Colonel Litzenberg's staff, outlining an astounding proposal to Operational Officer Major Hank Woessner. Corps, he said, had talked Division into sending the 5th and 7th Marines over the mountains to relieve pressure on the 8th Army by mounting an attack into the PLA's inland flank. Strange indeed, since they were supposed to have been acting on that order over the last two days
One tends to remember strange oddities in orders given, more so than normal ones of operations. As to my fixation on OPN O 25, I obtained Appleman's book East of Chosin after I had the archive document, OPN O 25. I got stuck on Appleman's page 7, where it stated that we would proceed no further north. That was a strange contradiction to MacLean's order to attack all the way to the Yalu River. Yet Appleman's and all other authors' accounts could not be challenged without it.
Red Flag - Catch 22: Tie in to Eric Hammel's book accounting of LTC Winecoff's visit:
"Corps was not making sense....The suggestion that the Yudam-ni garrison attack overland into the flank of the Chinese destroying 8th Army came after a Corps directive authorizing the 7th Marines to attack southward to clear the MSR as far as Hagaru-ri." [Emphasis on "after" as printed in Hammel's book]
Surely this was an exception to the rule of normal orders--"Corps was not making sense..."
This is supportive of my opinion that General Smith had no official orders from X Corps to seize Mupyong-ni after 25 November, and that a copy of MacLean's OPN O 25 had been sent to the Marine Division SP's for road clearance to Chosin. What could this Catch 22 confusion mean? Again the suggestion as contrary to being ordered by X Corps. But all earlier reported sources from historians and authors excessively and redundantly rely on that order, already in effect authorizing the 1st Marine Division's mission westward at 270800--only a suggestion that appears after the X Corps withdrawal authorization to Hagaru-ri.
General Almond's withdrawal order was issued, according to Marine History, on 292027 November [8:27 P.M. that evening indicating the suggestion came after this time line]. It also placed the 1st Marine Division in total operational charge, not only of their own force but over any and all other forces in the Chosin area. It also ordered that a regiment be withdrawn to Hagaru-ri. At issue is the fact that there was no X Corps order for the disposition of a second regiment. This is understandable if X Corps had never ordered the 5th Marines there in the first place. As with the Army force, the entire force was listed as missing in action as far as X Corps was concerned. The X Corps had no idea where these units in transit were at any given time. Also, since the 5th Marines were in motion between the east side and the west side of the reservoir, they could not know their final destination as well. This is the reality, in spite of written history and various books laden with contradictory reports.
The above paragraph is the reason for my earlier statement that this event must be revisited from Day One to solve this mystery. As with the issuance of the PUC to the Army forces, the mere awarding of that citation corrects and connects the event back to the date of its covered time line. And that is not fifty years later. Either those other CCF forces were there fifty years ago, or they were not. My effort here is to place forces where they belong at the time they were where they were. If that sounds like a Catch 22 too, that is actually what it is--a Catch 22 created by the late reality of the PUC Award.
To clarify this, the Marine history speculates where various other CCF unit were in relation to their own forces at Yudam-ni. What haunts their history as written is where the 81st CCF Division "may have been," after their recorded comment that there was no contact with this force until 13 December. Some 50 years later it is known from CCF documents that the 81st Division engaged the Army force at Sinhu-ni, adding to the 80th Division. This means that the Marine division over-exaggerated the enemy opposing them when it speculated that one of those divisions was the 81st CCF Division. Given this purely speculative scenario, why couldn't they also be east of Chosin? The facts now change the recorded Marine history. One extra phantom CCF division did not face the Marines at Chosin. Instead, they faced the smaller force on the east side.
How does that translate in history? Since only one division had been estimated to face the Army force, one additional division raises the CCF percentage from 7,500 to 15,000 men or a 100% increase in enemy forces. On the Marine side, their enemy forces are now reduced by this like number. As I stated early on, the Marine claim to fame was 120,000 Chinese in twelve divisions facing them alone at Chosin. That consensus is actually reduced to 60,000 in eight divisions if inclusive of the two hitting the Army units east of Chosin (leaving the Marines at Yudam-ni facing two and one half CCF divisions or a total of 18,750 men.)
One can see how facts can change the battles and shift the intensity of them from one side to the other. The PUC Award given to Army veterans of the Chosin fifty years later is recognition of this second CCF division increasing the intensity of the battle east of Chosin. It changed the battle completely, and it highlighted an error expanded for fifty years. General Smith was wrong in opposing giving the PUC Award to the Army force at Chosin. Furthermore, one would be completely insensitive to believe that by finally awarding the PUC, the error and neglect to recognize the Army forces role in the Chosin campaign is now completely rectified.
Putting the Chosin Reservoir numbers in perspective via General Smith's accounting:
14 Apr 1953 ELEVENTH ENDORSEMENT on Maj Gen O.P. Smith's letter, ser 9532 of 3 Mar 1952 - (Units covered):
a. Only those units were included which made a direct contribution to the successful breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir Area.
b. The significant operations which insured the successful breakout of the Division occurred between Yudam-ni and Chinhung-ni.
What is so interesting to me is General Smith's vision of a "direct contribution." Here is that earlier Bacon and Eggs definition once again--that the Army force (prior to facts revealed in later enemy documents) taking out an enemy division of some 7,500 + men had absolutely no contribution to the survival of Hagaru. That comment is extremely hard to justify, but he managed to do that for the remainder of his lifetime (1977). Viewed in light of his panic to invest the cost of Task Force Drysdale's "commitment" to that breakout, while denying the PUC Award at the time to 1/B/31 force involved with Drysdale's unit. The excuse that they attached themselves to Drysdale's force, points to his exclusion, and it had more of another underlining cause to it. This last was not a mere oversight, but a deliberate cause on record for denial of one Army unit to be inclusive of that award. Also of interest is the fact that while this was recorded as an endorsement, it was concentrated on those units to be excluded from the official Army request earlier to add these units. [25]
4. Direct participation of Marine, Army, and other units was as follows: (figures given for each phase are the maximum before the effect of casualties was reflected.)
a. Breakout of the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, Marines and Navy Medical - 8,290 (approx) Army - None
b. Defense of Hagaru-ri pending the arrival of the 5th & 7th Regimental Combat Teams at Hagaru-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 3,540 (approx) Army (including integrated South Koreans) - 325 (approx) Royal Marine Commandos - 180 (approx)
c. Defense of Hagaru-ri pending the arrival of the 5th & 7th Regimental Combat Teams at Hagaru-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 3,540 (approx) Army (including integrated South Koreans) - 325 (approx) Royal Marine Commandos - 180 (approx)
d. Defense of Koto-ri pending the arrival of the bulk of the Division there: Marines and Navy Medical - 2,820 (approx) Army (including integrated South Koreans) - 1,885 (approx) Royal Marine Commandos - 0
e. Attack from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni, including attack of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, from Chinhung-ni toward Koto-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 12,880 (approx) Army (including integrated South Koreans) - 2,450 (approx) Royal Marine Commandos - 155 (approx)
A question may justly be posed here (Marines and Navy Medical - 12,880 approx) as to the number of men in the Marine division being over 25,000. Here is a much smaller number. The answer may well be found in the Martin Russ book Breakout, which said, "In the rear were ten thousand combat support troops, including the 1st Marine Air Wing." [26] These men were not at Chosin, plus some were Shore Party personnel in amphibious landing units. These men should likewise be excluded from the 1st Marine Division Award of the PUC, except for some 500 plus men--those flown into Hagaru as replacements. These men later made a connecting link to those on the beach.
Restated from above: (Units covered): "The significant operations which insured the successful breakout of the Division occurred between Yudam-ni and Chinhung-ni." MacLean and Faith's Army forces were not included in this accounting, thus the justification for General Ridgway's [1967] map.
The PUC could no longer be denied due to the new facts coming forth. The Navy Department had supported the defensive position and General Smith's continuous controversy to deny it to Task Force Faith. In reversing their own opposition to Smith's dissension after all these years, the Navy is now merely making a continuous effort at damage control in an attempt to ease into those historical facts omitted. Honor has now given and rightfully belongs to the Army task force at Chosin.
Purely ethical behavior surely should dictate that the Navy remain in the background rather than now attempt to amend events to read "t he Marines, with the 7th Division." Even with this new scenario and revelation, one must go back over fifty years and reverse and rewind the tape to Day One at Chosin, plugging in this new material. Only then can we retrace our steps at Chosin. Reservoir from 24 November 1950.
I state again that to do justice, this must be revisited from Day One of the involvement of the 7th Division into the mission at Chosin since this area and this new mission belonged to them.
[1] Benis Frank-Smith interview, 1969
[2] Time line of Smith's interview is ten years prior to Opn O 25 being declassified in 1979.
[3] Since the Marines have no amphibious equipment located at Hagaru, to ferry any men across any reservoir body of water.
[4] O. Smith interview, Benis Frank, 1969.
[5] See http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/maps/map8_full.jpg. Note 1/7 Infantry lower left of map 8.
[6] Two views on this: That the Army force replacing this force will only have a "blocking mission." However, what is implied is that this was not the reality. Mossman, Ebb & Flow details the removal of all other X Corps boundary lines.
[7] See Montross, Wonsan to the Reservoir. [KWE]
[8] The end result of that delay 270800 November was that only one battalion of the 5th Marines was in place at Yudam-ni.
[9] Remove the 5th Marines from the Pusan perimeter, and relocate to Smith's direct command at Inchon.
[10] Draft #1 canceled because no forces were at Changjin at the time the 5th Marines were to turn left into Kanggye. Draft #2 was then canceled due to scheduled time for combined offensive to proceed. It did not effect Walker's part of his plan.
[11] X Corps - We planned an orderly transfer of all three regiments, but Almond ordered his nearest units to Chosin as fast as they could get there.
[12] Ebb & Flow, p.48: [fn 42] 42 X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn 0 7, 25 Nov 50.
[13] Ebb & Flow p.48[fn 41] 41 X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn plan 8, 16 Nov 50; Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 23 Nov 50.
[14] Those documents did not get from North Korea into the National Archives by themselves.
[15] A revised map detailed in a later chapter. Navy history does place us --but not their maps--in the Chosin arena, Navy maps 17 & 18 show the 7th Division as a unit withdrawing in center of X Corps on both maps.
[16] Walker issued a single order on the 25th, one that shortened the final objective line of the ROK II Corps to conform with the 27 November attack by General Almond's forces. Otherwise, he intended that the Eighth Army would continue its advance on the 26th as originally conceived. Ebb & Flow 66, [fn14] 14 Eighth Army G1 SS Rpt, 25 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30007 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 25 Nov 50.
[17] South to the Naktong....[fn, 54] [CINCFE 10 DA for JCS, C68572, 9 Nov 50.]]
[18] [fn, 55] South to the Naktong....
[19] South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, page 765
[20] Message precedes Colonel Chiles return to Korea.
[21] See Appleman, East of Chosin, page 7.
[22] Mossman p.48 (footnote 42, X Corps WD Sum. Nov 50; Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50.)
[23] Smith interview by Ben Frank 6/1969
[24] Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War ..pages 211-212
[25] Ninth endorsement
[26] Martin Russ, Breakout, P.6.
"[T]he circumstances that led to the tragedy are not documented in records or command reports. There are no records on deposit in the National Archives for the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, or the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, for the Chosin Reservoir action in November, 1950. I found none when I worked in the records there in 1974-75."
[Appleman, East of Chosin, p. 391; bibliographical note] (Those records were not declassified until 1979.)
14 April 1953 Eleventh Endorsement on Maj Gen O.P. Smith's letter, ser 9532 of 3 March 1952, Presidential Unit Citation
These earlier dates established an earlier (firm) timeline for General Smith USMC placing the Army units east of the reservoir, while at the same time consistently denying their value as being there. Smith opposed the Army recommendation on its endorsement for some Army forces to be included within the Navy PUC award. Smith remained strictly against Task Force Faith's inclusion with his Marine Division receiving the PUC award. His stated reason was, "Only those units were included which made a direct contribution to the successful breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir Area."
Note Smith's implication that Task Force Faith's commitment was not included because they failed to make a "direct contribution." But here is where Smith failed in his logic and attempted to change past history rather than write it as it should have been written. Consider this: Over those Army units named in this same paragraph, "Part of these units had been destined for Task Force Faith but had been unable to reach that force. The remainder were detachments of units sent forward by X Corps in anticipation of the setting up of an advance Corps CP at Hagaru-ri. These detachments were likewise stranded. The principal units in this group were the Tank Company, 31st Infantry, and Company D, 10th Engineer." [1]
Fact: The Tank Company, 31st Infantry, was never "stranded" at Hagaru-ri. Instead, it was merely used there as a connecting link to Task Force Faith. They had been four miles northeast at Hudong-ni and located behind Task Force Faith. They withdrew back to Hagaru-ri on orders under the operational control of General Smith immediately after 292027 November. That move sealed the fate of Task Force Faith, and sacrificed them entirely to the enemy forces. That timeline changed Smith's zone of operations from the prior 7th Division area of responsibility between 25 November and 29 November, once again back to General Smith's command--thus, his sole legal authority to designate who would receive the naval PUC award.
We have documentation as early as 14 April 1953 in reference to 3 March 1952 concerning our task force at Chosin and concerning a renewed interservice rivalry involving the Navy also--on going over this one issue for the next 49 years. The real evidence was in the Pentagon Army pipeline, but it was never used to educate the public as to the PUC being denied to the Army force. This fact indicated a total lack of real interest to even recognize those Army forces east of the reservoir, they being ignored completely. (The PUC was not finally awarded to them until 1999.) However, the real end result of the fact that the Navy yielded on their PUC was a direct surrender of their own ethical principles in failing to review this case in the first place. It also retracted and fully established the fact that General Smith was dead wrong in his denial of this Navy PUC to the Army forces. [A personal note here: I could care less about that award--only the end result just stated.]
The so-called endorsement by Smith tied up some loose ends in regard to the number of men he placed in the three areas of Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Koro-ri. We read various reports on the number of Marines involved at Chosin, ranging from a full division of 25,000 to 15,000. Here General Smith clarified his force numbers facing the enemy:
"Direct participation of Marine, Army, and other units was as follows: (figures given for each phase are the maximum before the effect of casualties was reflected.) a. Breakout of the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 8,290 (approx) Army - None b. Defense of Hagaru-ri pending the arrival of the 5th & 7th Regimental Combat Teams at Hagaru-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 3,540 (approx) Army (including integrated South Koreans) - 325 (approx) Royal Marine Commandos - 180 (approx)"
As stated, the total number given for each phase is, "the maximum before the effect of casualties was reflected." Therefore, if we extract that number at Yudam-ni as 8,290 (approximately) and place the [approx] number of the Army forces east of the reservoir as Smith's quote of 2,800 from his interview of 1969, we can establish some idea of ratios to CCF enemy. West of Chosin, the 89th CCF Division had split one half of this division to move south below Koto-ri to engage the 1/7 Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division at Sach'ang-ni (the Gap). On the Marine west side were the 59th, 79th, and one-half of the 89th CCF Divisions. Army east side - 80th, & 81st (and "possibly 94th," since never verified, is not used here.) CCF Division = 7,500 X 8 Divisions = 60,000 men. Marine force at Yudam-ni versus Army force at Sinhu-ni: 2.5 CCF Divisions at Yudam-ni versus 2 CCF Divisions at Sinhu-ni = 7,500 X 2.5 = 18,750 men versus 7,500 X 2 = 15,000 men. 18,750/8,290 = 2 to 1 (rounded to nearest #) 15,000/2,800 = 5 to 1
Here identifies that "massive force" spotted early morning of the 27th at Yudam-ni. The 59th remained around Toktong Pass engaging Fox Company, and the full 79th at Yudam-ni, with one-half of the 89th Division engaging the bulk of the 5th, 7th, and 11th Marine Regiments around Yudam-ni.
In historian Roe's accounting, he provides some valuable data on the 79th and 89th CCF division. The 79th was the only division to remain in the fighting throughout daylight hours, which exposed them to the fire and napalm from the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW). His outline on the 89th Division split between Yudam-ni and Sac'hang-ni. After engaging the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni and driving H/3/7 off Hill 1403 on 280300 November, the forces on Hill 1403 received permission to withdraw. This withdrawal left a breach in the Marine perimeter, which the 89th then dominated and was well capable "of driving a wedge between the heart of the two Marine regiments." The 89th stalled and made "no further move to exploit the gains, and posed no further threat to the forces at Yudam-ni during the remainder of the action there." [2]
My point here is that the Marines totally lucked out. The 89th withdrew from the attack early morning of 28 November, leaving only the 79th in the battle at Yudam-ni where the bulk of the Marine forces--the 5th, 11th, and 7th Marines--were located. (The 59th was some seven miles east in the distance, engaging one company of F/2/7 Marines around Toktong Pass.) This was supplemented in Smith's interview. "When I gave Litzenberg the order to try to clear the road, I had Murray come back to Yudam-ni--to come back the 2,000 yards to relieve the 7th Marines on the hills they were defending in the vicinity of Yudam-ni. Then they defended there. As a matter of fact, after the first night they didn't have such a terrible time. The first night was the worst, they really were attacked in force that first night." Still, that Marine force remained at Yudam-ni, contrary to Smith orders, until 1 December. They took three additional days to clear into Hagaru-ri.
Note to above: If only that one 80th CCF Division had attacked the Army, its ratio would have still been equal to the Marine ratio of 2 to 1 against the enemy. No matter which figure is used, it doesn't take a math professor to equate which force "made a direct contribution and commitment." It gives the benefit of the difference in larger numbers to the Marines and Navy Corpsmen. Nevertheless, the point to be highlighted was that our Army medical team (remaining attached to the 31st Tank Company) was assisting the Navy Medical personnel--and assisting Marine wounded at Hagaru-ri who never reached the forward Army forces at Sinhu-ni. This latter was highlighted as well in the use and the sole priority of using Marine helicopters to evacuate the Marine wounded from Yudam-ni, on a 25 to 1 ratio to those Army wounded on the east side of the reservoir (100 men evacuated at Yudam-ni to four men evacuated at Sinhu-ni). [3]
With the aid of these documents, how does one insert events that could change history as written? The answer is, you can't and you don't, because OPN O 25 as written and dated 27 November 1950 by Colonel Allan D. MacLean changes every past historian's accounting to date of the 7th Infantry Division's involvement and order of battle at Chosin. It therefore poses a direct challenge over every past author and historian's speculation as to what was changed at that meeting between General Almond's X Corps (Colonel Chiles) G-3 and Five Star General Douglas MacArthur. Prior speculation by those authors was promulgated without knowledge of those vital missing pieces of the puzzle. It also changes their redundant version concerning that one 'minor change' cited by all historians as designated to be the only mission change involving the 1st Marine Division. Past authors previously quoted only "moving the boundary line" below Eighth Army zone. Pure reality indicates far more than any mere minor change and also indicates the total Marine confusion at Yudam-ni on the so-called opening hour of their attack.
Past history records that only one Marine battalion led off westward from Yudam-ni on 270800 November. A two-regiment "joint command" was newly formed there, and neither the senior officer nor the junior officer was to be directly responsible for final command decisions. Rather, there was one united chain of command. This confusion was not to the same extent on the Army east side, as Lt. Colonel Faith's 1/32nd Battalion held his forward position between 27 November and only withdrew two miles south into MacLean's perimeter under cover of darkness early 29 November under official orders of Colonel MacLean. The Marine offensive was called off after an advance of only some 2,000 yards, as if it had never started.
Per General Smith, "Murray made, as I said, about 2,000 yards and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there." However, General Matthew B. Ridgway directly contradicted Smith's statement. Per Ridgway, "It was then that Murray and Litzenberg decided on their own, without consulting Smith, to call off the attack and go on the defensive, disregarding Almond's orders, as they figured the show was hopeless." [4] Question: Did they disregard Almond's orders? (Dispute is over whether or not they have any orders from Almond. My research evidence points to the fact that they did not.) Or, did they disregard Smith's orders?
Throughout both popular and unpopular wars in American history, hundreds of thousands of individual man hours have been energetically spent by numerous veteran organizations in efforts to remember and honor those men and women killed in combat and those listed as missing in action. Regretfully, all that effort has not been entirely productive in either the Korean or Vietnam Wars. Over five decades, the men missing in action in Korea have been neglected in our own annals of military history. Those men have sadly been phased into our past American history, deserted and neglected for the sole cause of "closure." Now marked, "Died of wounds while missing in action," they are forever missing in action.
Regretfully, many family members never learned where in Korea their loved ones fought and lost their lives. Indeed, this new era of the computer and Internet has an abundance of sad requests begging for information on the 7th Infantry Division soldiers that died at Chosin. All of this while the 1st Marine Division commander boasted of the return of all their dead from all areas around Chosin within that 90-day window granted though the Korean truce agreement to return all human remains. General Smith himself stated that the North Koreans by themselves did that task for the American Marines. [5]
But Smith's own claim raises a red flag here. His claim cannot be substantiated, as there are Marine Corps MIAs whose remains have never been recovered. The main mix up was not through North Korean forces retrieving the Marine Corps dead, but the fault lies over the identification of a few of those 138 bodies Smith simply "slipped in" with the wounded and transferred to the Army, Smith having no direct knowledge on where his dead would end up. The purpose was to evacuate the wounded. Per Smith:
"The doctor came to me and he was fit to be tied because he knew how many seriously wounded he had that should be evacuated, and he knew how many had gone out by air, and it just didn't make sense. Somebody was getting out of there who wasn't seriously hurt. It was our fault probably, because the Air Force had sent up what they called an Evacuation Officer, and the doctor assumed that the Evacuation Officer would see that the proper people got aboard the planes, but that was not his function at all; he was just thinking in terms of planes, not on what was flown on the planes. After that I couldn't have gotten aboard a plane without a ticket. Nobody after that got on any plane without a ticket that showed that he was due to get out."
Here one should follow General Smith's vacillation in his own logical shift of evacuation of the wounded: "But at Hagaru-ri, when we caught up on the wounded, we just slipped the bodies in and it was very simple - they were frozen stiff, there was no putrefaction or anything like that. The corps wanted us to quit, and Gregon Williams handled the phone on that. (Laughs) So he just stalled them. We sent them all out. We didn't pay any attention."
Here is where Smith's negligence in handling of his own men took place. He signed a "ticket" for each of the 138 dead Marine(s), and transferred the blame on the Army forces to bury his own dead.. Per Smith, "Where we shouldn't have had unidentified was in this well organized cemetery at Hungnam. We had two or three unidentified there because the 138 bodies we sent in there were buried by the Army, you see, and they were kind of careless in identifying these people." There is a point of interest with regard to "the 138 bodies we sent in there." Smith had no direct knowledge as to where those bodies were sent.
When relocating to Chosin, our own 7th Division forces passed the cemetery at Hungnam. Some 844 of the men in these forces would never have the respect or honor in being identified as even dying at Chosin. Nor would any one of them be enclosed in a white mattress cover with identity facts encased in a burial bottle placed under their left arm, respectfully buried in this same cemetery at Hungnam. In all reality, however, it did not matter one iota at the time, because this very United Nations cemetery was soon abandoned completely, as all UN forces pulled out of North Korea on Christmas Eve of 1950. Smith was merely transposing a burial site within enemy territory. The major difference was that his men were retrieved and our division's dead was not. They remained fully unidentified and had no official credential where they fell in battle.
RED FLAG: The Marines Corps had no direct responsibility to care for their own wounded in action. That task was handled by the Navy corpsmen, thus freeing the entire Marine Corps from taking pride and credit for the burying of their own dead. In contrast, the Army had special units to take care of both of these tasks within each division--another major difference between the two services. The Army provided its own medical detachments to care for its own wounded within a division. It also had Graves Registration units to bury their own dead. [6]
RED FLAG: Smith blamed the Army for his own failure to bury his own dead at Hagaru-ri. Yet MG Smith used the Army 31st Medical Team, withdrawn from the forward trapped unit of Task Force Faith, to care for his own Marine wounded working side by side with those Navy corpsmen at Hagaru. The Red Flag is flapping in the breeze here over his comment on flying out 138 of his dead, having no idea as to where they were flown. The men being evacuated were originally intended for some MASH unit. Now he transferred them exclusively to an Army GRO unit for burial.
This adds to the shameful and dishonorable part of the neglect--the real neglect and Marine failure to record any Army battles or action which cost those lives, and the location those men were missing from. In reality, those Army men were completely withdrawn from military history and records, those Army soldiers having documentation only as numbers on a X Corps chart. They had no real credentials to establish proof that they were ever at the Chosin Reservoir. Instead, they were a secret for some 30-50 years, being a blot on American military history as to those men giving their lives in the defense of American foreign policy.
One of the sad realities of military history is the interservice rivalry between different branches of the services--that need for space in history. The Marines hunger for that space, and try to justify their own delaying mission assigned to be carried out. The importance of that mission, one they never had in the first place. Certainly anyone with any military hindsight can challenge the importance of any past mission as to the need and speed set to seize an assigned objective, as in Korea, that Army excessive use of ‘task forces" during the first six months.
The responsibility to seize any military objective flows downhill to the men manning the front lines. These men are not directly responsible as to what units that mission will be assigned or its importance in the overall scheme of the big picture. "The man in the front line is blessed with a sense of immediacy. He knows only of the danger directly in front of him." Their responsibility is only to seize that objective, no matter what the reason picked and assigned by higher command.
One such mission was assigned to Colonel Allan D. MacLean, commander of the 3/31st Battalion and 57th Field Artillery Battalion, and 1/32nd Battalion for the Chosin Reservoir action in November, 1950. These three battalions--mixed with 38% ROKs, were from the 7th Division. Colonel MacLean's mission, as history records, leaves a highly controversial issue of his being assigned east of Chosin Reservoir. The result is that his three battalions were removed (by design) from military history. His orders were completely removed and hidden from history, too. [7] MacLean's force became merely a phantom force lost to history. Why that would be remains a huge mystery.
Much of our American history is made of "heroes" and many exaggerations about them. I recall a movie skit in the early 1940s by the Three Stooge's Larry, Curly, and Moe. Their lines said, "There we were, three against a thousand, and we fought three against a thousand. We reloaded our rifles over and over again and continued the fight, three against a thousand. And when after many, many days that battle finally ended, we all had to agree, they were the toughest three men we had ever fought in our lives." Satire? Yes, as it was meant to be--the inference being on the three men. One was led to believe they were the ones telling the story, relating the events of that battle. The reality was entirely different. The battle may have been rough on the thousand, but in the end they won, they being the "heroes" of that battle.
Such an inference may also be made concerning the hyped history at the Chosin Reservoir. The publicity issuing from that event intentionally leads one in the direction that the number of Marine forces facing the Chinese forces there was far less than the military reality of the actual number of American Army/Marine mixed forces in combat there. Also, the number of enemy (120,000 minus 60,000) was far greater than reality. This fact is supported by the complete removal of some 4,000 Army soldiers between Koto-ri and Sinhu-ni. [8] Those 7th Division soldiers and their mission were marked "secret" and then removed from public view because they were only mentioned in classified documents. This highlights, supports, reinforces the mythical claim that the 1st Marine Division was the one and only force that history should record being at the Chosin Reservoir. It allowed them to enlarge their achievements as being all inclusive of the Army commitment and the sole division in the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir. The Marine Corps has basked in the sunlight of that achievement over the decades since 1950, while the neglected Army forces have been frozen out. The Army forces who were at the Chosin Reservoir were delegated to remain in the shade and shadow of another force, MacLean's efforts all now inclusive within Marine division accounts. That is unjust, but that is reality.
The neglected 7th Division Army force was not entirely removed--only separated from their acts of valor and honorable commitment to their own achievements. The Army numbers were there in a X Corps report between 27 November-10 December 1950. However, much to the contrary, this Army force has been maligned and degraded while there within the midst of a Marine force that controlled all news releases from Chosin. This neglected army group had received no major medals or recognition of any kind other than Missing in Action footstones in cemeteries throughout America. The Army effort to include this Army force within the Presidential Unit Citation [PUC] awarded in 1952 exclusively to the 1st Marine Division was energetically and continuously denied for 49 years. That denial was vigorously defended by General Oliver P. Smith and the 1st Marine Division itself.
Here I should sincerely thank General Smith in his efforts to keep the Army under the spotlight for 49 years. For had it not been for negative press about us, we would have had absolutely no press coverage at all. The events of reality will not greatly change these facts, as the outcome of the Army tragedy will remain the same no matter what multiplier we use to place an increased number of men at Chosin, the risk being to diminish the effort made by all forces there. But those events as recorded were misstated, misunderstood, and misplaced. My intention is to place those events of Colonel MacLean's 31st RCT forces where they belong. I, however, am not so presumptuous as to believe it will change anything to any large degree. It will, however, place forces where they belong. That, hopefully, may provide a small comfort and sense of closure to those having friends or relatives connected to those 844 American men killed in action east of the reservoir between 27 November and 2 December and connected to Task Force MacLean and its survivors through the same force renamed Task Force Faith.
Most early reports list Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr. of the 1/32nd Infantry Regiment as being there, instead of Colonel MacLean's complete force in the Chosin area of operations on the 25th of November. This means that the Marines were mixed with Faith's force and his one battalion on that date through the early morning hours of the 27th. Indeed, it was reported that his Army force was "attached" to the Marines on that earlier date. Colonel MacLean's end forces did not arrive until the afternoon of the 27th. This indicates that neither he nor any of his 31st Infantry forces were interacting with the Marine command. The inference is that the action on the west (Marine) side far, far exceeded the action on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. However, it is not factual by any means that those enemy forces that were not there on the west side "may have been" around the Marine area, although the Marine force had three times the number of battalions on the Army east side. One is intentionally led to believe the scenario of "three against a thousand" was being played out on the Marine side more so than the east (Army) side of the reservoir. Let me explore that scenario in depth throughout this accounting.
The fact of Lt. Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr. being with that Marine force locked Faith into Marine history. And, as Marine history records nothing about Colonel MacLean's force as such, it cannot deny that Lt. Colonel Faith was there. [9] While Marine history does record concern of Almond over three Army battalions east of Chosin, only one battalion was originally commanded by Faith. That may be a minor point to some, but it reduces the extra burden assumed by Lt. Colonel Faith in taking command of those three battalions after the death of MacLean. His duty to the three battalions required a higher ranking officer--a full bird colonel. That fact alone is neglected in his citation for his upgrade to Medal of Honor. That award superseded the prior award of the Silver Star (first Oak Leaf cluster) G.O. No.32, Headquarters X Corps, dated 23 February 1951, for gallantry in action on 27 November 1950. Faith's personal actions far, far exceeded those of any other battalion commander within the Chosin area of operations--bar none--be they Army or Marine.
One should keep in mind that this is not about any decision made by any lower ranking front line American fighter in the trenches. Each man in X Corps, whether a soldier or Marine, had the additional burden of an arrogant and egoistic commander directly in charge over them--one an Army General Almond, the other a Marine General Smith. Both were of equal rank, but one was not equal in aggressive conduct toward the assigned mission, which fueled the fire between both of them. As this drama increased in tempo, so too these two commanders individual egos soared to new heights. Yet, a general in charge over men and their lives can have a complex persona. Any man in any of life's endeavors is far more aggressive if he smells victory in the wind. Yet, he may also miss a vital warning sign, such as in North Korea, to a vital change of direction in that wind. Again, unlike the American Civil War; generals no longer led men directly into battles. They merely sent them there. [10] Regretfully, in the first six months of Korea, too few of those men ever came out of those battles.
Of course, all of this would be totally irrelevant and have absolutely no value whatsoever without the Intelligence Summary of MacLean's Operation Order 25 which stated, "The 7th Inf. Div.....to seize Mup'yong-ni." Granted, no 7th Infantry Division forces were in place to seize Mup'yong-ni (Red Flag). But neither did the 1st Marine Division have forces leading there as intended, by either General Almond or General Smith. But damage control is now fully activated and at work here. The Army men were removed from the active pages of history. The innuendos and accusations overwhelmed and overpowered the events of "the circumstances that led to the tragedy," falsely tainting the effective commitment of the Army force. The majority are buried around the shores of the reservoir and in the archives. Those men and officers were robbed of their very existence at the Chosin Reservoir. They have no personal records or credentials to challenge the facts that came forth about the action at the reservoir.
If you will recall, I stated earlier that most veterans organizations have a code of not speaking ill of any other veteran, and that is usually followed with the increased exception of exposing wannabees who have fake and forged credentials. That is not the ethical practice here. As follows in item number two below, Roy Appleman had earlier covered the Army force in his book, East of Chosin. His book and the years of research and work he did to write it are a valuable accumulation of personnel accounts from some of the men who were there and who took part in that battle. Appleman devoted much effort in telling the story of our "Phantom Force." Other historians fell into the quagmire of equating the battles on each side of that reservoir. Unfortunately, gross injustice has been done in other past authors' and historians' accountings.
As I also stated, had it not been for most of the negative reports about us, there would be no reports at all to keep our involvement a secret. But, those very remarks now come back to haunt history. Those past authors rushed to publish--unwittingly in many cases--their version degrading all Army fighting forces at Chosin. When closely scrutinized, those reports which were overzealous in unwittingly hiding their own deficiencies, can disclose vital facts about the other side.
Damage control was required and played out against the Army force at Chosin, and they were used as scapegoats. I have long been amazed and confused over why so few of our Army officers that knew better would never speak up to correct the record. In my own mind, I have tried to perceive why we were totally abandoned. My own (Libra) logic therefore leads to the conclusion that the least line of resistance was at work here. An easier road was taken rather than the harder, factual one. I think that a part of the answer lies in the position of the military structure itself. The Army needs transportation from others to get from one point to the other. It must depend on the other two departments, the Navy and the Air Force.
Realistically, the Navy does not need their Marine Corps ground forces. That corps places a tremendous burden on them to justify any Navy ground corps' continuous existence. In my opinion, the Army is the public press' ideal whipping boy of all the services. The Army as a department and the constitutional defender of land operations can and will suffer losses due to events like North Korea and Vietnam. Those unsuccessful missions are observed and absorbed within American history. The Army, by necessity, will survive any great campaign loss or any other mission. The Army was the dominate ground force committed to Korea by President Truman. He was uneasy and opposed to committing the Marine Corps to that battle arena, and he so stated his objections.
One of the huge delays in my finishing this research was in being torn between that code which disapproves of degrading any other division and their battle exploits and my desire for the truth to be known. I felt I had no business on the west side of Chosin because I was not there for any comparison of events, although I believed those events were blown out of proportion in comparing one battle to the other. In my research of written events, I found something interesting. I found that for every Army event, there was a Marine event that equalized and duplicated it. What was stated as a snafu on the Army side of the reservoir had a duplicate or greater clone copy of the same snafu on the Marine side at Yudam-ni. Some of this reasoning and analysis will begin to unfold below. There is no great sin in pointing out mistakes in one division battle. In fact, it can be beneficial in many respects to help avoid duplicating it in later battles. The sin is to compare and degrade the other division's duplication without any benefit of constructive criticism. Merely pointing out the differences, without the comparison results, is what is the issue here.
The 7th Marines in place at Yudam-ni previously had the assigned mission to "advance through their zone to seize Mupyong-ni." All historians support them in that controversial claim. The Marines reluctantly moved into place before the November 24th offensive date. However, they did not lead off on that date, because there remained a dispute as to their use. After moving their own 7th Marine Regiment into a "blocking position" at Yudam-ni, the Marine G-3 failed to acknowledge or order this particular regiment operational orders to move out towards Mupyong-ni on 240800 November. Rather, they insisted that the 5th Marine Regiment leap-frog (jump over) this regiment and be realigned to lead off towards Mupyong-ni. [11]
That set into motion a reaction by the Army G-3 staff to have an Army force lead off westward from Yudam-ni. RED FLAG: Thus, the CCF resistance claimed was not against one Marine regiment at 0800, but only one battalion. "Murray made...about 2,000 yards, and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there" (a 2 to 1 ratio). Still, overall MG Smith was totally opposed to any movement of his forces unless they were consolidated. But he failed to follow his own logic. He did not have his full 5th Marine Regiment at Yudam-ni. [12] "I had Murray come back to Yudam-ni--to come back the 2,000 yards...." His attack was halted at Yudam-ni; the end result being that it was as if it had never started.
The circumstantial evidence here revolves around several facts:
1) Why would General Smith order only one battalion forward? Why not continue his pattern of delay and wait for the other 2/3rds of 5th Marine Regiment to be fully in place for that offensive, rather than just leaving the east side of the reservoir, requiring a 24-mile relocation through his 7th Marine Regiment? As recorded in Ebb & Flow, the plan of attack had to be changed. Surely that change required extra time. After all, MacLean postponed his offensive by 24 hours, awaiting the remainder of his RCT, missing that of his 2nd Battalion, and "B" Battery of the 31st Field Artillery (155mm howitzers). That reason should apply here as well. Smith's own statement was that, "you could only attack with one regiment at a time," and his letter to Commandant Cates mentioned "losing their effectiveness when disbursed." Here he had disbursed only one battalion of his fresher force.
2) In Roy Appleman's book East Of Chosin, he concentrated on the Army forces east of Chosin. He did a tremendous job of recognizing their effort and sacrifice and the commitment of the Army forces on that side of the reservoir, and I thank him for that. He did, however, make one statement of criticism over Faith's one battalion that he deleted from his later book, Escaping the Trap. In his later book, he included a condensed version of his first book, adding details of the action of the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign. His early analysis and personal criticism was over Lt. Col. Faith's request or his enthusiasm to start his mission by moving his battalion forward two miles into that vacated 5th Marine advance position. That now has credence to #1 above. "Faith in making this proposal, did not follow the Marines' caution in assembling regimental strength before moving forward into the unknown.... probably the first important mistake and command failure affecting the fate of the 31st RCT at Chosin." [13] History records Faith's men yielded little or no ground for two nights (5 to 1 ratio), only withdrawing to the rear perimeter of the 31st Infantry, on MacLean's order. Therefore, that exact mistake, "Marines' caution in assembling regimental strength before moving forward into the unknown" seems to have greater impact on that 2/5 Marine Battalion at Yudam-ni within those four to six early daylight hours. The Marine damage control was a military spin revolving around a "massive force"
3) Concerning the CCF forces "blocking" this one battalion of Marines from moving forward more than 2,000 yards, was this just pure luck? The facts established by the Marines were that the forces facing them were all elite. They were the cream of the crop. But if that be so, how did the CCF goof so badly with this one major error in violation of their own orders? For over two weeks they had eluded our air reconnaissance flights. They did that by freezing in place to avoid detection, moving only at night and only attacking under cover of darkness, thus allowing their enemy to advance as far as possible through their lines into an inverted "V." After dark, they closed the end by roadblocks, trapping their prey inside that inverted "V". Yet, here on this date at this place, at this early morning hour, the CCF exposed themselves to block one battalion from advancing as far as they could before night fall. This would indeed qualify as a Catch 22, an irrational military move on their part. They exposed their position, with many hours of daylight yet to highlight their positions, to the 1st MAW overhead. Was this a fabricated event or was this simply a major, major snafu on the CCF part? If the later, this one Marine battalion purely and plainly lucked out with that advance warning. That would be a failure by the enemy and highly beneficial to the 2/5 Battalion.
4) The indication in number three above concerns the 89th CCF Division's late arrival. They were the last division coming eastward from Mupyong-ni. As history maps record, this one division had split its force to swing downward below Koto-ri. There, they engaged the 3rd Infantry Division elements below the 1st Marine Regiment located south of Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.. But this highlights the event of why the 3rd Infantry Division was located in front of the gap between Eighth Army and X Corps and the Marine Division. It was the result of a dispute that the 1st Marine Division block westward at this gap to aid Eighth Army. Smith's interview highlights this event: "By that time the 3rd Infantry Division had landed, and I said, 'Why can't they take over that job?' And eventually they did."
Here is a definitive example for the westward campaign yet to come from Yudam-ni within two weeks. General Smith had already stated his earlier opposition to any move from his main effort which was still to go up the east side of the reservoir to the Yalu. passing through Changjin either way. Yet, strange as it may seem, he was the only one who insisted that the 5th Marines lead his "one main effort, which is going up this road by the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu"--that this effort be changed and his "one main effort" now be switched to place this force in front of the 7th Marines at Yudam-ni.
In earlier chapters, I stated Almond's comments on five of seven objections by General Smith. Here are numbers six and seven:
#6. "He objected to the advance against the enemy in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir area in the effort of X Corps to comply with orders from General MacArthur."
#7. "He had many other objections on numerous occasions, which an interview with the undersigned could establish."
Right, wrong, or indifferent, Smith himself verified that Almond had on numerous occasions compromised over his objections. General Smith apparently was led to believe that he was the one main man in equal control of any assigned mission.
The two examples cited above about the transferring of the Fusen Reservoir zone to the 7th Division, expanding its responsibility, plus the additional zone assignment to the 3rd Infantry Division, exceeded Almond's numbered objections by a like amount. But the real point is that the disputes of excessive objections are not headed off by some disciplinary action of others higher than Almond's command. The pressure that was eventually applied to Smith was far too late to prevent the utter confusion of the moment by relocation of the 7th Division. Two examples of this are (1) the transfer of the Fusen Reservoir to the 7th Division. Here, Almond used his last trump card. (2) He then narrowed the Marine zone, but used Faith's battalion once again to narrow the Marine zone at Chosin.
The lack of planning and short time allotted therefore defeated MacLean's forces and was a beneficial aid to the enemy already in place east of Chosin. As enemy documents point out, they were of the opinion that they were attacking the 5th Marine force at Sinhu-ni. The rapid deployment of additional forces had not reached their CCF higher commander Marshal Peng until a few days later, Peng recovering from a bombing raid of his own HQ's. The latter is a major point. Ironically, however, a large force of enemy firepower was reported to be just westward of the Hagaru-ri perimeter at noon on the 27th. But there was no notification of the ongoing attack of that CCF "massive force" against the 2/5 Battalion from Yudam-ni just 14 miles away, as the other two Marine battalions passed Hagaru and the Army forces were halted at the eastern road junction. This seems a strange inconsistency, as the Marine sorties flying over to Yudam-ni from Yonpo field near the coast line had to be passed through the Marine Air Controller stationed at Hagaru. He was busy as a beaver directing air attacks where needed. Yet neither Smith nor his G-3 had any knowledge of this at the time. What we need here is a timeline for that order to halt the advance. In Martin Russ' book Breakout, he stated: "Murray Okay hold up for now... It was 2:30 in the afternoon. 2/5 had advanced about a mile." [14] In his book Chosin, Hammel also verified and supported this time line.
While there was no restriction on any enemy timetable, it is accepted that Marshal Peng (MacArthur's equivalent on the Chinese side) was also late in his start date, it being 24 November (first night of the full moon) as well. That he was late in starting his full-scale attack by two days in the Eighth Army area, 26 November, is borne out by other authors as well. The lack of enemy clashes in the Marine zone on this very same night seems to fade with time as new authors and historians overlooked those events they deemed of no importance. But those authors dealing with one personal individual and his accounting of battles are more accurate in bringing events forward. The reason for this is the fact that those men who participated in those battles--many of them wounded--vividly remember them because they carry the scars from them for life. As with the Army forces forgotten at Chosin, these men have restated their own involvement in neglected clashes with the enemy.
At Chosin, we are again intentionally led to believe (as in the Three Stooges skit) that after the battle below Koto-ri, in early November, the enemy had completely disappeared from the entire area. We thought that the next clash would be on 270800 November with the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni. Individual facts and related battles dispute this.
Let me fill in a little background here to support this. In the book Breakout, its author (a Marine) cites the Marine Public Relations Officer in reference to Lieutenant Colonel Faith receiving a Medal of Honor, which he implied should have been given to a Marine officer who was more deserving of it. Author Russ said that Lt. Colonel Faith was "just doing his duty and not very well at that." (This will be covered later in depth since it is not the issue here.) Russ' comment was the spark to move me to explore the citations on the Medal of Honor awards given during the Korean War to filter out what was the reason for Faith's award.
I found yet another confusing paradox in my research. There was a Medal of Honor awarded to one 7th Marine Regiment officer who was reported MIA after action on 26 November. The award raised a RED FLAG to me. There was no widely-known action reported anywhere prior to 0800 27 November. What happened on this night while two-thirds of the 5th Marine Regiment remained east of the reservoir, especially in light of no one reporting any prior night attack? The information is only recorded in books written by Hammel (Chosin) and Russ (Breakout) covering Marine individuals involved in that action. These two authors concentrated on the Marine action at Chosin. No one truly covering the action would ignore this MOH award to those Marines. Since the citation sets forth the reason for the award, it is best to let it speak for itself as well.
Citation - First Lieutenant Frank N. Mitchell - United States Marine Corps
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Leader of a Rifle Platoon of Company A, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 26 November 1950. Leading his platoon in point position during a patrol by his company through a thickly wooded and snow-covered area in the vicinity of Hasan-ni, First Lieutenant Mitchell acted immediately when the enemy suddenly opened fire at point-blank range, pinning down his forward elements and inflicting numerous casualties in his ranks. Boldly dashing to the front under blistering fire from automatic weapons and small arms, he seized an automatic rifle from one of the wounded men and effectively trained it against the attackers and. when his ammunition was expended, picked up and hurled grenades with deadly accuracy. at the same time directing and encouraging his men in driving the outnumbering enemy from his position. Maneuvering to set up a defense when the enemy furiously counterattacked to the front and left flank, First Lieutenant Mitchell, despite his wounds sustained early in the action, reorganized his platoon under devastating fire and spearheaded a fierce hand-to-hand struggle to repulse the onslaught. Asking for volunteers to assist in searching for and evacuating the wounded, he personally led a party of litter bearers through the hostile lines in growing darkness and, although suffering intense pain from multiple wounds, stormed ahead and waged a single-handed battle against the enemy, successfully covering the withdrawal of his men before he was fatally struck down by a burst of small-arms fire. Stouthearted and indomitable in the face of tremendous odds, First Lieutenant Mitchell by his fortitude, great personal valor and extraordinary heroism, saved the lives of several Marines and inflicted heavy casualties among the aggressors. His unyielding courage throughout reflects the highest credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.
(signed)
Harry S. Truman, President of the United States
Facts inclusive of above battle: Marine casualties, enemy sighted, enemy engaged, Marines unable to capture or destroy them, therefore this enemy remains a viable threat. Q) Who was notified in division? This engagement of forces at Hasan-ni precedes the daylight attack by some 12-14 hours at Yudam-ni. Being probed by 1/A/7 Marines, this one company had invaded a staging area of the 59th CCF Division. [15] This seems as a major battle and was aborted only due to A/7 Marine withdrawal? Highlights the credibly of this action, since no reaction reported in destroying the enemy or in retrieving Lt. Mitchell's body.
As stated, I was alerted to this date to seek out this event that took place on the evening hours of 26 November. Why would this event be overlooked? This to me is an important issue to a timeline and what the Marine G-2 & G-3 knew or should have known of this enemy engagement some twelve hours prior to the next morning advance from Yudam-ni. [16] Also, Company A/7 Marines was going to use daylight hours to search and retrieve First Lieutenant Mitchell's body. In other words, it was an ongoing mission, set by the Marine Corps code. Related are such innuendos about Colonel MacLean's MIA status on the east side on the 29th--that MacLean had mistaken the CCF for his expected arrival of his 2nd Battalion. Here that damage control shifts blame as to who knew what, when, and where. Also, the question of communications between units is brought to light. Both are reciprocal questions for the 1st Marine Division to answer over reporting this 26 November battle.
Now reconsider this earlier scenario. Colonel MacLean moved his forces into the Chosin arena during these same hours of darkness. He had no knowledge of this attack at Hasan-ni. With the events listed above on 26 November and the enemy initiating attacks, as in Eighth Army area, the entire CCF cover was blown. There was no reason for any further delay in attacking any moving force in truck convoys, as they would expose their forces to challenge Task Force Drysdale. The issue of a daylight attack therefore has become a mute one. Had the enemy coordinated their east side attack from East Hill as on the west side of the reservoir at 270800 Hours, MacLean's moving units (and Murray's remaining two battalions) would have just been arriving at that junction leading east from Hagaru. The 57th Field Artillery Battalion was delayed there due to that bottleneck road traffic created by the transfer of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 5th Marines moving from Sinhu-ni to Yudam-ni, a distance of only some 24 miles. Unexplained is why these two Marine battalions were delayed one extra day by General Smith in an area officially turned over to the 7th Division. They started their move on the 26th. Why wasn't it competed by the morning of the 27th? Marshal Peng missed a huge military opportunity of creating mass confusion during those early daylight hours.
The reality of moving at night was, although dangerous, was not a viable option for MacLean to get there without delay from a distance of over 140 road miles. Therefore, neither could that be a valid excuse for the Marines to remain in place overnight. Not only did that delay the Marine rear support for their own regiment, it denied MacLean's men the extra time to settle in his own perimeter. That would have given him additional daylight hours to pull up the tank command on the east side. Our Medical Collecting Company was to move at midnight to reach the three Army perimeters. They were cut off north of Hudong-ni by enemy road blocks (note enemy attacking under cover of darkness) on this side some sixteen hours after hitting the 2/5 Battalion of the 5th Marines leading off from Yudam-ni, with no notification of the attack concerning either Hasan-ni or Yudam-ni reaching MacLean at that late hour. Why? Given the facts that the 7th Marines had been hit twice within 12 hours from each of these CCF positions, it was obvious that that pocket of enemy (59th CCF Division) had not been destroyed. They were still there. The Marine company-size mission had been to determine the enemy existence and strength (in Army jargon, a reconnaissance in force). The two-thirds remaining force of the 5th Marines could have been pulled into Hagaru-ri for analysis of the changing G-2 situation at Yudam-ni. The reported Marine air to ground support in increased activity was a reality, but should have made those planes fully visible in attacking strikes over Toktong Pass and Yudam-ni. Their circle and diving patterns should have been clearly seen by ground forces around Hagaru. That alone indicated and signaled a major air to ground offensive.
The Marine reports of enemy in their area came from captured Chinese prisoners who stated that they would attack "after two regiments advanced through Yudam-ni." This poses another question. How would they know that? Given the confusion of Colonel MacLean's own mission, complete changes of OPN 0 25 forces indicated that the move to exchange MacLean's own units was never formally finalized by X Corps. Neither was adding that second regiment of Marines to the west side (unless the enemy was referring to the 11th Marine Regiment). This scenario relied only on speculative enemy evidence, whereas the attack on the 26th was one of reality. And some doubt about that night attack exists as well.
In Escaping the Trap, Appleman stated that on 26 November, "At dusk...patrols had encountered enemy groups,... The largest group sighted, about 50 men, was dispersed by an air strike. Other elements of the 7th Marine Regiment ...received small-arms fire in the afternoon. This enemy opposition was silenced by an air strike." [17] In contrast, Eric Hammel stated, "The action was hot, and getting hotter....Gene Hovatter realized that his one hundred-seventy-man company could not possibly hold through the night against an enemy force whose size he could not begin to determine." [18]
A 170-man company patrol is an exceptionally large one, unless it is a reconnaissance in force mission. This recon information surely was supplied to the Marine G-2. At the first indication of CCF attack, this also should have supplied information for an earlier aborting of the next morning's mission. Contributing to all this confusion was the report about General Almond being in the Yudam-ni area until as late as 271630 hours, some four hours after the halt of the advance. Ironically, there is no record as to his reaction to this change. That would seem strange given his aggressive nature and his "laundrymen" remark to Faith that next day. [19] However, perhaps it is not so strange when one factors in Colonel MacLean's OPN O 25. General Almond had anticipated this delay, more so planned on it, and had that 7th Division Army contingency plan for back up.
Reason would dictate that some kind of cause had to be behind some or all of the animosity between Generals Smith and Almond. I list Smith first in this review because he was the one with all the objections. As recorded, Almond continuously changed objectives for Smith's division to comply to his many objections. I have already covered those. However, some study of the 1st Marine Division relationship to MacArthur. may stand out as a possible cause for any animosity towards him. In World War II, Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur had separate commands in the Pacific region. Nimitz controlled the Guadalcanal and the Makin, Tarawa, and Saipan islands, as well as the Iwo Jima campaigns. MacArthur had nothing to do with those Navy campaigns. The JCS had established two commands in the Pacific--in the southwestern region, inclusive of Australia, New Guinea, and most of the Netherlands East Indies, as well as the Philippines. The commander was General MacArthur. His forces were a mixture of American and Australian forces. Most of Admiral Nimitz' forces were American. His command included all other Pacific regions divided and delegated into lesser commands of his own choice of his admirals and planning staff. My point: The Marines were not assigned to MacArthur's command. until after the Guadalcanal Campaign, the .1st Marine Division then serving under MacArthur. This division had been assigned to his command in the Pacific, having been reassigned from Admiral Nimitz's command at Guadalcanal .They were possibly substituted for the 25th Infantry Division's relocation to Nimitiz' command, covered below.
In all fairness to the 1st Marine Division, their experience and exposure to MacArthur's command carried over into Korea. That might not have been so had any other Marine division been assigned to Korea. As I have reviewed, each division is alert to its own history. Whether or not that carried forward into the next battle, the previous animosity in that history was there. Again, whether that carried over into the next battle zone cannot be determined with any real accuracy as to being an underlying cause to oppose new orders from that same command headquarters. That can only be proven over time. The dispute between Smith versus Smith in World War II is only the tip of the iceberg concerning interservice rivalry between the Marines and MacArthur. But we will never know the end result at Chosin had Almond been given that third star as Holland Smith had been promoted to a Lieutenant General between Makin and Saipan.
Just as Chosin is the most famous publicized battle in Korea for the 1st Marine Division, its most famous battle in the Pacific was Guadalcanal in World War II. But just as Chosin was not a complete "sole" Marine operation, neither was Guadalcanal. "Not many even of my generation know that about mid-November 1942, the US Infantry was doing most of the fighting on Guadalcanal, and from mid-December was doing it all. The doughty 1st Marine Division, dead beat, ill and tired, decimated by wounds, tropical disease, but evolved into soldiers at last, had been relieved and evacuated." [20]
During World War II, the 25th Infantry Division, which was later in Korea and originally slated to join MacArthur's command, was reassigned to Guadalcanal and Nimitz's command. The 1st Marine Division had suffered as many as--if not more casualties--at Guadalcanal than later at Chosin. The understanding with MacArthur was that when the 25th Division relieved the 1st Marine Division, which was to be in mid-December, the Marines were to be transferred to Australia. "As it developed, the exhausted, battered, malaria-ridden Marine division needed a year before it was ready for combat again." [21] Instead, as the 1st Marine Division was relocated into MacArthur's theater of operations, "Beginning with the 5th Marine Regiment on December 9 (1942), they were gradually relieved on Guadalcanal by Army units .... and assigned then to an abandoned camp forty-five miles from Brisbane." An Army surgeon had assured their commander, General Alexander A. Vandergrift, that the site was free of malaria. "This fact was vital because the incident of malaria in the division then was 75 per cent, with the time for rehabilitation estimated at three to six months." On December 21, their commander "discovered it to be smack in the center of an anopheline mosquito area--the same malaria bearing breed we encountered on Guadalcanal. The director of the Queensland Health Service, whom the GHQ officers had not consulted, backed the Marine surgeon's findings. Within days hundreds of men were re-infected, and the number of new cases of malaria mounted rapidly."
Vandergrift appealed to MacArthur to authorize their movement out of that area to one free of malaria--a site they had already reconnoitered in cooler Melbourne region. On January 1, MacArthur approved that transfer, "but he added that no transportation facilities--truck or rail--are available." Vandergrift radioed Admiral Halsey for help and he responded to transport the Marines by sea from Brisbane to Melbourne. Still, 7500 men were hospital cases. [22]
"Nevertheless, one thing is certain about the Marine experience in Australia during the winter of 1942-43. They were not likely to forget soon the camp near Brisbane. It was fortunate that the division had nearly a year not only to recuperate, but also to lose some of the bitterness before MacArthur ordered them into combat in his theater." While most historians overlook the past history of this event, it is likely that some of the division reservists that may have experienced that problem were later assigned to the frozen reaches of North Korea, locked inland into a frozen campaign during the Christmas season. No one in America cared the least about it. But that feeling was not exclusive to their division alone. The Army forces shared the same dislike for the mission. However, those missions were not to be aborted. That was the bottom line, unless and until we were challenged by large enemy numbers. History records those numbers.
While General Oliver P. Smith was not pleased with the overall United Nations and MacArthur's Command Organizational Chart over his attached status, the 1st Marine Division was officially assigned to the Far East commander. They remained outside of the official planning stage of operations at X Corps and also at GHQ in Tokyo. Those first six months were to be a total Army operation as far as planning went. This production was directed totally by MacArthur from his headquarters in Tokyo. He received advice and counsel from the JSPOG- Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group. As always, however, MacArthur was the final judge. This apparently changed at Chosin, when events suggested most strongly that the Army forces were attached not only to the 1st Marine Division, but that at this time the Marine division was returned to the Navy control. This reasoning is borne out by the dominate role the Navy played in the PUC Award. There was no official X Corps approval or input, but the Navy had its own dominate stance on denial of the inclusion of the Army forces east of Chosin to grant that PUC Award. [23] The Navy insisted that the Navy criteria had to totally and exclusively be met, even though the Army had included and requested these men be added in a ninth endorsement. Above all else, this was in the area controlled by the Army X Corps command. The Navy superseded Almond's X Corps command authority in this regard.
It has been stated: that the Marines win battles, while it takes an Army to win the wars. The latter is all inclusive of the battles themselves. The end result is the important factor, not the smaller battles within it. That is why the Army itself never elevates one battle over the other. Sadly, that is borne out by removal and lack of support over its own Army participation at Chosin. It is the underlying reason why this neglect could happen. However, that one battle is the all important factor to the Marine Corps to justify their existence. The 1st Marine Division shoulder patch contains a white number "one" at its center, with the name of their one important battle, "Guadalcanal" As just reviewed, the Army wrapped up the final stage at Guadalcanal. Chosin was their one chance to shine if they could do it alone. But past history--though hidden and delayed--eventually denied the 1st Marine Division that sole victory as well. Fabricated, biased, and scripted past history will always come back to haunt those that invented it.
[1] Oliver P. Smith from Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC to Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals. Subject: Presidential Unit Citation, case of 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), recommendation for award of. Copy to: CMC (see Changjin Journal 04.15.00).
[2] Patrick Roe (USMC), The Dragon Strikes, page 301.
[3] Marine Corps History, Changjin Reservoir, Volume III, 1953, Appendix H.
[4] Benis Frank interview, 1969, http://www.chosinreservoir.com/Chosinarticle.htm.
[5] Benis Frank interview, 1969.
[6] Graves Registration established cemeteries and handled the remains.
[7] Recall my earlier footnote that those documents did not get from North Korea into the National Archives by themselves.
[8] American and ROK mixture.
[9] Marine history, via a footnote on page 243 of Volume III. The Chosin Reservoir Campaign. RED FLAG - Based on research by K. Jack Baur, PhD. Footnote 20 reads as follows: "The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, unless otherwise noted, are: Statement by Capt. Edward P. Stamford, n.d, 2-15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, n.d. Capt. Stamford USMC was directly attached to TF Faith's command and had no direct relationship to Colonel MacLean, 31st RCT.
[10] General Dean, the exception to the rule.
[11] The end result of that delay 270800 November was that only one battalion of the 5th Marines was in place at Yudam-ni.
[12] Smith interview, 1969. Question: Where was the other two-thirds of Murray's regiment?
[13] East of Chosin, p. 31. See also "Escaping the Trap," p. 80.
[14] Martin Russ, Breakout, page 93.
[15] See Patrick Roe, The Dragon Strikes, map page 259.
[16] Standing orders in 7th Division, any enemy contact information to be routed without delay to G-2 sources.
[17] "Escaping the Trap," pages 38-39.
[18] Chosin, pages 18-20.
[19] Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, page 462 (28 November). "We're still attacking....to the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you."
[20] As stated in World War II by James Jones, page 75.
[21] Clayton James, page 222, The Years of MacArthur, 1941-45.
[22] Ibid, page 259. The battle for Guadalcanal started with the 1st Marine Division landing on August 7, 1942. The Japanese sent reinforcements and the canal did not officially fall until February 9, 1943. Between 6-9 February, Japanese abandoned the island as destroyers evacuated 13,000 survivors. Note: Lest we overlook the fact that the Army forces replacing the Marines on Guadalcanal also faced the same malaria threat there as the Marines did at Brisbane.
[23] "That all forces must meet" (since Task Force Faith was totally destroyed, only those survivors forming a provisional force could be included.
This group was a concessional group to the principle of a unification of command within the General Headquarters (GHQ). It was to aid "and advise the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on matters pertaining to the exercise of a unified command over Army, Navy, and Air Force allocated to the Far East Command." This group consisted of three Army officers, three Naval officers, and three Air Force officers [1], but it hardly constituted a joint command staff as envisioned by the JCS instructions of December 1946, this provision apparently never clarified in the National Security Act of 1947. Once again the Marine Corps was to be fully represented by the navy officers as they were not a part of this body. The Marine forces were to come under JSPOG planning operations once given to MacArthur's OPCON command authority.
The plan to "assist" Eighth Army had been in the JSPOG planning stage since November 10. General Edwin Wright (MacArthur’s G-3) was the principal spokesman for the group. One has to keep in mind here that this body did contain Navy officers, and that those officers fully represented the Marine Corps forces within that group. So the importance of any move westward into the Eighth Army area was approved and encouraged by the JSPOG and the three separate departments--Army, Navy, and the Air Force. Whether or not the Navy fully supported the plan, the Marines would be required to fully support it logistically once it was approved. General Almond's input was his suggestion, supported by MacArthur, of the most direct route to use.
In that light, Plan 8, Draft One, was considered first, this being General Almond’s X Corps choice. However, the dominating controversy (totally within the Army domain) was over just how close to General Walker’s Eighth Army line of advance should be used, this being merely a replay over the Inchon Navy domain landing. For example, the X Corps forces turning westward through the Changjin--Kanggye--Manpo’jin axis was considered too far north. There was a similar disagreement over Inchon to immediately assist General Walker’s Eighth Army. Therefore, the recommendation favoring Draft Two was for the lower attack out of Yudam-ni through Mupyong-ni. It could immediately assist Eighth Army offensive, supported by the fact that a 7th Marine Regimental force was already in place at Yudam-ni to execute the combined scheduled date and hour already set by Eighth Army. Thus, its selection would solve two problems at once. Draft One was scrapped for Draft Two on recommendations from the JSPOG and GHQ in Tokyo, and was approved by Almond on 21 November 1950. "MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible". (Mossman, page 48. See footnote 41, X Corps WD Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn Plan 8, 16 Nov 50; Rad, CX69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 23 Nov 50.) Note the important date lines: Messages to Almond on dates in Mossman footnote; X Corps WD Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn Plan 8, 16 Nov 50. The first part of above involved Draft One, while the Draft Two change is under this second part (Rad, CX69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 23 Nov 50). This appears to be the new plan of agreement. However, it did not include the 7th Division in either Draft One or Draft Two. Another connecting and supportive note of interest and a timeline observation can be found in Colonel MacLean’s ("Declassified" 9/13/1991) OPN O 23:
1) b. 23 November 1950 (hat the rest of the 7ID was doing within the zone of operations)
1) b. 7th Inf Div. Continue adv in Z to N. (Continue advance in zone to north)
1) c. C Co. 13th Engr Bn, sup RCT 31.
31st RCT operations:
2) c. 3rd Bn. (1) Blocks en mvmt into Z from S and east.
(2) Prep to reinf 1st and 2d Bns. (3rd Bn was issued a move order via (OPN O 24) MacLean's next operational order number. This places and dates its present mission and position within the 7th Divisions Zone.
While Draft Two met the majority of requirements of the three individual services, something still seems wrong at the X Corps execution end of the order. Ironically, however, since Plan Eight originated in Tokyo, an obvious question arises. Why should Almond's G-3, Colonel Chiles, be required to leave X Corps staff headquarters in Korea between 23-24 November and fly to Tokyo to clarify "a minor change" in the boundary line which in reality only concerned Eighth Army’s limitations in moving north under the latest draft two of that older plan? As recorded in Ebb & Flow, General Walker issued "only one order on 25 November," lowering his boundary line of responsibility below Mupyong-ni. [2] As widely stated and never denied, "MacArthur made only one minor change." Here is that one minor change. It merely limited the forward advance of Eighth Army, revising it to just below Mup’yong-ni.
But Draft Two also has that combined Eighth Army and X Corps scheduled date and time of 24800 hours to move out together. Eighth Army moved out on schedule, but X Corps, 7th Marine forces did not. X Corps failed to comply with their order to launch their part of the combined offensive. Once again, I point out that, In the U.S. Army, "An order calls for instant compliance, a view sometimes difficult for the American soldier to understand. ... Once an order was published it could not be changed except by the issuing authority." [3] Since the published order in X Corps failed due to a delay within its time schedule for the 7th Marine Regiment, it required a new directive to exchange the 5th Marine Regiment to activate it. However, it could not be changed except by the issuing authority. Thus, that new order was required by General MacArthur . His "new plan"--Order O. 7. [4] (footnote 42, X Corps WD Sum. Nov 50; Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50.)--superseded Draft Two.
The 7th Infantry Division replacement forces then had an urgent realignment under a new directive from MacArthur to Almond through X Corps G-3 under Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50 (Plan 8, Draft #3). "Almond set the 27th as the opening date. The 7th Division meanwhile was to expand its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir for an advance through the zone previously assigned to the Marines. The ROK I Corps was to continue to the border from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin while Almond's remaining major units, the U.S. 3d Division and 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the corps' rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam. [5] At that point, the 7th Infantry Division became involved big time, expanding its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir.
Colonel MacLean's 31st Infantry Regiment's new mission, per Part 1b, was: "7th Inf Div atks 270800 Nov. seizes Mupyong-ni, adv to Yalu Riv. Destroys en in Z Secures the Pugsan area.". This was the 7th ID new mission together with that of the 31st RC--seizing the town of Changjin via the east side of the reservoir. The order definitely involved the 7th Division in a huge and dangerous exchange of division responsibilities. Note: There is no mention whatsoever of any 1st Marine Division mission. Where did they go? Note as well, Almond’s remaining major units were only the U.S. 3d Division and the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment.
Day One, 24 November 1950: Opn O 24: 242400 Nov 50; 1) b What the rest of the 7th Infantry Division was doing within that zone of operations. (1) b. omitted: OPN O 24, (2) a. RCT (-) moves 250800 Nov 50 to assy area vic area RR station PUKCHONG. Prep for further mvmt to S & W by RR & mtr, (3) a. 1st Bn: Continues present mission. b. 2d Bn....Continues present mission.
Consider the X Corps statement, "the 7th Division planned an orderly transfer" of three of its regiments to Chosin Reservoir, but Almond rushed his nearest troops into Chosin, etc., we have no indication whatsoever, prior to Colonel MacLean’s issuance of his Operational Order #24 at midnight the 24th, that there were any standing orders from X Corps staff to transfer any 7th Division units prior to that time frame. [6] Nevertheless, Lt. Colonel. Don C. Faith. Jr., without any artillery or tank support units, was already moving his 1/32nd Infantry Battalion toward Chosin, his force being urgently reassigned early morning on the 24th. Colonel MacLean was ordered there as well via a phone call from General Barr shortly prior to midnight on November 24. On that midnight hour, he issued his move order effective for 0800 the next morning. Either way, the latter movement was under X Corps' Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50. The addition of the 7th Division was by GHQ, thus implying that GHQ would not override, but rather would change the X Corps' new offensive with two "major changes." An Army division was involved to execute it. Number two, the offensive date was offset by three days. [7] Colonel MacLean then was ordered to execute his movements without delay. Draft Two was also scrapped by GHQ & X Corps for Operation Order 7, issued 25 November.
A Draft Three (equals O 7, 25 Nov 50,) as stated by all earlier historians and authors, was approved by General MacArthur with much more than slight "boundary change." However, all historians and authors tie into an earlier redundant spin that a boundary change was the only reason to change and update the Draft Two number by one digit. Draft Two never did contain any requirement for the 7th Division to be any part of it from Day One. That was only in the revised Order 7, as approved on 25 November while Colonel Chiles returned to Korea from GHQ with an historical change. The reality is, NO lead off force was fully in position to execute either plan. The 7th Marines was on hold at Yudam-ni, and was not to lead off from there. Instead, that mission was reassigned by the Marine G-3 to their 5th Marine Regiment. But the 5th Marines remained at Sinhu-ni, some 24 miles distance. They were reassigned to the task west of Yudam-ni, never to be fully assembled there until after the scheduled attack hour of 270800 November. Yet the only change recorded is lowering the boundary line.
The Plan which changed the forces assigned and the new date was approved by General MacArthur, the JSPOG, the field commanders, and X Corps staff. Each division commander had his own responsibility to carry out that order without change or delay. Who was responsible for the delay? Certainly one could imply it was Colonel MacLean, for he did not get his force there in time. In the Army, the best answer to the question, "What is your excuse?", was, "No excuse whatsoever, Sir." For whatever the excuse, it was not valid with higher command which regards to failure to execute a timely order. But if that be the case, MacLean's failure was only on the east side of Chosin Reservoir--his responsibility only, not the west side. Or, was it the responsibility of General Almond himself?
The answer: hardly. For with either Plan Six's border assignments or the later Plan Eight, speed was Almond's number one factor to reach his objectives. As with Operational Order 6, the JSPOG staff did not endorse Almond's plan in northeast Korea. "But the planners hedged." Two factors may have caused them not to speak out against the plan. First, they must have known that MacArthur was fully set on attacking to end the fighting. Also, they as a body had no more acceptable solution to the problem than that presently under consideration. It would be insane to stop in place. Some line would have to be drawn, but by whom? It was that group's responsibility to suggest that time and place, General Smith already having stated his position was to remain in place.
What the staff read into Almond's plan for the Yalu "were so innocuous as to seem fabricated" concerning the advantages, yet Almond had plainly stated and honestly pointed out the dangers. But the JSPOG did not believe that Almond's border mission would directly assist Eighth Army. The advantages as stated in Almond's Plan 6, the momentum of X Corps forces advancing along the established direction in its zone, would be maintained. North Korean forces would not have time to dig in and resist. Logistics problems would be minimized, and "the advance (to Changjin thence north to the Yalu) would pose a threat of envelopment to the enemy."
The X Corps advance would not immediately affect enemy forces facing the Eighth Army, which was believed from the start to be the main effort. The advance would be away from the main strength of the enemy. The most significant disadvantage noted was that "X Corps incurred a real danger of being over extended." However, if one created a 45-mile compass circle from Changjin to Singalpajin, its circle would pass through Manpojin. The air miles were the same. But this latter part was of prime concern to General Smith in his complaint to his Marine Commandant on November 15 regarding his left flank being exposed. His concern was addressed by the JSPOG. "For all practical purposes, that flank was already exposed." However, so was the entire 7th Division’s all the way above the Marine division completely up to the Yalu River at Hyesanjin, east of Singalpajin.
The JSPOG staff studied Draft One regarding the advance of the Marines. "As the 1st Marines move toward Changjin they will tend to be extended. The left flank of the Marines will be on that mountainous ridge that divides the watershed of the peninsula." [8] Again, reality. By not moving forward towards Changjin, the Marine Division deprived the 7th Division of those additional miles north of their left flank protection, so all points were directly related. But the problem that so concerned General Smith was being considered by the JSPOG. JSPOG officers believed that if X Corps operations were to effectively assist Eighth Army, only one general course of action lay open. "Almond should attack to the northwest, thereby threatening the rear of the Chinese formation facing Eighth Army, and forcing their withdrawal to avoid envelopment." So the revised plan, Draft Two, was at their direction, not Almond's as such.
This plan required Almond to negate his northern Yalu border approach. (This stated but not factual, 7th Division still seized Singalpajin 28 November.) Since this new line of attack would probably develop on a narrow front as a struggle to control the route of advance, "Concentration of forces for a coordinated attack would not be necessary" and "The attack could be launched at once using forces already in place." [9] What is indicated by the following is that the attack plan north under Plan 6, per Almond, was not immediately changed. 7th Division was still to seize Hyesanjin.
"The JSPOG staff concluded that the X Corps must eliminate enemy forces in the reservoir area 'before’ any operations were feasible, and once Changjin was cleared it might then be feasible to revise the X Corps Eighth Army boundary and direct X Corps to attack the northwest to cut the Manpojin/Kanggye road."
So, once again, we're back to square one, with Changjin as the pivotal point of the new plan. But as stated and verified, "Smith deliberately stalled on the advance." Here not only had he "stalled" his orders from Almond and X Corps staff planners, but the staff planners of JSPOG were also ignored, as their plan was the one being acted upon, (Draft 1) turning left at Changjin. "After that point is reached" what date that would be could not be worked into the plan, it being the unknown factor. At that time, the advance was not "stalled" by any enemy action, but by one division commander "dragging his feet." "Thus it was that with virtually no enemy opposition, the Marines advanced at an average rate of only a mile a day between 10 and 23 November." (10).
Yet General Smith took issue against his "one main effort" border assignment being changed. Now at last, disregarding Smith latest objection, General Almond had been busy with his own planning as well. On 14 November, the date the Marines occupied Hagaru-ri, Almond sent a letter to General Wright, "which in effect, was quite in line with the order to plan for a westward move, after clearing the town of Changjin." He assumed that the town of Changjin would be the next Marine objective seized. General Almond, in his own support of Draft One, told General Wright in part:
"With the containment by Eighth Army offensive in that area, coupled with the unchanged overall mission, it now appears to me to be inadvisable, at this stage of Eighth Army and X Corps operations, for X Corps forces to operate in any strength to the west."
He stated the reasons for his opposition to such a move from his position below the Chosin Reservoir as follows:
"The principal reason for this conclusion is that the only two feasible vehicular routes to the westward in X Corps zone, short of Chosin Reservoir are Yong-Hung-Taepyong-ni and Wonsan-Yandok roads. Since both of these routes enter Eighth Army zone in the rear of General Walker's present front lines, any advance in strength to the westward over them would appear a fruitless operation.... in view of the foregoing, I am convinced that X Corps can best support Eighth Army's effort by continuing its advance to the north, prepare to move westward if desirable when X Corps elements are well north of Chosin Reservoir, and they will be prepared to trap and destroy any enemy forces engaging Eighth Army which depends upon a line of communication through Manpojin. North of Chosin Reservoir suitable lateral routes to the west appear to exist but those routes would have to be verified when that area is reached." [11]
Note of importance: While Almond was blamed outright for the attack out of Yudam-ni, he was in reality opposed to launching any attack "short of Chosin Reservoir" as above: "the only two feasible vehicular routes to the westward in X Corps zone, short of Chosin Reservoir" and "Since both of these routes enter Eighth Army zone in the rear of General Walker's present front lines, any advance in strength to the westward over them would appear a fruitless operation....
This became Almond’s Plan 8: Draft One.
So what is expected here? At least a reconnaissance in force unit from the Marines in their zone to check and verify these routes for vehicular traffic and enemy troop movement westward from Changjin, and for this vital information to be fed back into X Corps G-2 for any enemy force analysis. At that time, the border mission was not changed--nor would it be--as Almond continued his letter to General Wright.
"Thus, X Corps Operation Order No. 6, 11 November 1950, directing advance in zone to the north border of Korea is in accordance with Part II, CX 67291, and is I believe, at present the most important contribution we can make to the overall operation in Korea. The success of the advance will result in the destruction of Chinese and North Korean forces in the reservoir area, which might other wise be employed on the Eighth Army front.... I trust that my analysis of present X Corps capabilities explain our views here and hope that energetic execution of my Operation No. 6 will place assistance to the Eighth Army before the cold weather now upon us is much more severe."
Had Almond been anticipating full cooperation from his inland forces, the Marines, in "that energetic execution of Operation No.6," his anticipation would not have become a reality. From November 17th through the 26th, the Marines had stalled at Sinhu-ni east of the reservoir.
Since the JSPOG were the movers and shakers of the new Plan 8, it is inconceivable that they would not be a part of or be directly involved in its planning and direction, as the input of this unified command, the Navy, Army and Air Force were all contributing factors. Supplies brought in by ships required the Air Force to fly or drop those supplies inland to ground Army forces to utilize those supplies. So Plan 8, Draft One required a force at Changjin to execute it from there on November 24 at 0800 hours (being launched at once to coincide with Eighth Army advance.) But something interfered with this Draft One execution. No force was at Changjin nor would one ever be. However, a force was already at Yudam-ni to execute it from there. On the same date and hour, the 7th Marines could well execute Draft 2 of that same plan since that force was already in place--or so it seemed. Yet, things are not always as they seem. Such was the reality in this case. [12]
Again, it would seem a reality that both forces were to lead off from their respective forward positions regardless of who was doing the planning, whether X Corps, GHQ, or the JSPOG in Tokyo. Since the new plan would still not place forces on the left flank of the 7th Division, not only would that flank be fully open from the west side of the X Corps boundary line to Singalpajin, its flank was already wide open above and across the new boundary line all the way to the Yalu in the Eighth Army zone on to the Chinese border. It always was, as the enemy was never required to observe the boundary line anyway. But that was no big concern--again, so it would seem.
Yet, one fact stands alone. Had the JSPOG plan been followed "using forces already in place" rather than in motion leapfrogging forward or backward as the case would be...had no force moved one mile or not on November 27th...it is an indisputable and undeniable fact that those forces in place would have fared far better than they did. Lines of communications would have remained in place and stabilized as established. The position of each and every unit supplied would have been fully known to ground and air support units, which meant that a drop line could be established. Ammo supply dumps, their contents and locations would have been known and their amounts of ammo recorded. And of major importance, a reconnaissance patrol could have been sent forward and been monitored. These things were surely considered and recorded, but not put into practice. Thus the resulting outcome and disaster to the 7th Division task forces.
It would seem we have a consensus between the JSPOG staff and Almond's staff in one vital respect: "concentration of forces for a coordinated attack would not be necessary... The attack could be launched at once using the forces already in place." Both agreed that "X Corps must eliminate enemy forces in the reservoir area ... once Changjin was cleared it might then be feasible to revise the X Corps Eighth Army boundary and attack northwest to cut the Manpojin-Kanggye road."
So what is known? Both planning groups--X Corps and JSPOG--were of one mind as reported. These forces in place are those from the 1st Marine Division. Almond wrote, "North of Chosin Reservoir suitable lateral routes to the west appear to exist but those routes would have to be verified when that area is reached." The variable in the plan concerns that, "Then" with the JSPOG staff, and "when" with Almond's staff. Both concerned reaching Changjin. Both depended on Draft One to be activated if reconnaissance information feed back warranted any forces crossing into Eighth Army territory.
But enemy forces at Changjin town were never fully monitored nor eliminated, so the variable in this plan is now a known reality. Changjin was not going to be cleared. Forces were 25 miles from that point, and furthermore, no 7th Marine force was at Yudam-ni on November 22. But "pressure" was applied to move a force there, in place by November 24. That force was the 7th Marine Regiment located at Hagaru-ri on the 23rd. So we finally have a force at Yudam-ni to lead off from there on November 24. Whether it was the one General Smith wanted at Yudam-ni is not a relevant point. He moved them into position there. They were a force "already in place," and the hour was late. They were at Yudam-ni under their own G-3 division order. Their commander's assumption--and the myth--that some unknown quantity of Army forces would relieve the 5th Marines within some unknown time schedule was not carved in stone, as no order was issued at that time to move any Army forces into the Chosin arena. The alert order to move Lt. Col. Faith into that area "as far as possible" could indicate the 5th Marine force there within that time frame was still under orders and advancing toward Changjin.
Supporting this logic, the 5th Marines could be required to still move forward with Faith’s battalion as an Army rear guard behind them, considering the fact that "A" Company of the 1st Marine Engineering Battalion remained behind at the sawmill near Sasu-ri just below Hudong-ni, and was gathering timber to repair the blown bridge over the Paegamni-gang, by-passed for the time being. Another Marine unit held an outpost on Hill 1203 south of Sasu overlooking Hagaru to their rear. Both of these units were still there in the new Army zone on 29 November. Only on 30 November would General Smith order them back to Hagaru, this being the same date that the rear 31st CP and our tank command were ordered back to Hagaru as well. This also related to author Clay Blair’s suggestion that the 5th Marines should proceed forward, with the 7th Division catching up in due time. These facts indicate MacArthur, the JSPOG, and Almond were now on the same wave length for X Corps to operate west of their established boundary line east of Eighth Army boundary line. Plan 8 and its several drafts verify these facts.
On 26 July 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 became effective, reaffirming the status of the Marine Corps as a separate military service within the Department of the Navy. The Act provided for Fleet Marine Forces, and confirmed the Corps' mission of seizing and defending advanced bases, as well as land operations incident to naval campaigns. So the Marine Corps was now an entirely separate service, but still under the Department of the Navy. General Smith seemed to be testing the waters and length of his chain concerning his new authority. This is the first real test of the new National Security Act of 1947. It created the independent Department of the Air Force, but it left unanswered questions as to battlefield "joint command problems."
The first six months in Korea--the act's first test--were a total disaster. The many recorded statements of Smith’s protests and delays and his opposition to his orders as a divisional commander are highly publicized and defended. This was the first United Nations action where an American general was rated and praised for his rebellion against his assigned corps commander. If the Navy would not react to these new problems within their own command, surely there was nothing General Almond could do over and above his recorded compromises to reduce the mission at the expense of the 3rd and 7th Division. That is, with the exception of one option--remove the Marines from the mission entirely and place them in reserve at Chosin. OPN O 7 (Plan 8, Draft 3) would seem like an all Army operation at Chosin via their own documented orders that the 7th Infantry Division would have the entire responsibility to execute the order to seize Mupyong-ni, as well as Changjin, without delay. The mystery is, why would the Army records be removed as being there, instead of the Marine records?
What was not known was the commitment of the many Army officers to MacArthur’s plans, O- 7. For whatever their commitment or opposition, MacArthur’s plan and his authority superseded their opposition to any change in direction. In short, "pressure" of higher command always prevailed. There were no votes taken at any Army division level to choose the division commanders' best choice among orders. It would not be far fetched to guess that the Naval officers might not have been fully supportive of these plans in any true fashion:
1) It was a land operation, therefore they could not supply naval gun fire support.
2) It was an Army plan.
3) They were responsible for the inland forces--the Marines.
4) the Marines were not directly under the Pacific Fleet Commander or operating in "land operations incident to naval campaigns."
5) If the plan failed, the fall-out over publicity would take years to repair. In that event, it would embarrass all concerned.
Yet MacArthur, as always, had the final say. But why was General Smith operating outside of JSPOG, GHQ, and X Corps orders? "Smith's views on the combat scene are further illustrated by a personal letter to General Cates, the Marine Corps Commandant, on 15 November. He frankly admitted that he felt Almond's orders were wrong and that he, as Marine commander in Korea, was not going to press his own troops forward rashly to possible destruction." [13]
So Smith made his position crystal clear against any advance. The ball was now thrown into Almond’s court and he--finally--had to react. He had already used the 7th Division at the Pujon (Fusen} Reservoir and the 3rd Division at Sach’ang-ni to appease Smith. He then had to use the 7th Division to replace the Marines within the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. Now Smith was left with a complete regiment in reserve, and no real place to put them. His choice was to locate them in a joint command at Yudam-ni to justify his protest over realigning them there in the first place. That proved to be a fateful, costly decision on his part, but damage control would spin this move as a life-saving event for his forces at Yudam-ni. That political spin completely ignored the fate of Task Force Drysdale and Task Force Faith.
Was it a lawful mission? My position is that it was, although it surely was not the best planned. But that, too, was never known due to the massive changes made and the interservice in-fighting that required massive troop shuffle of forces. Had that precious time been used to reconnoiter the positions as ordered instead of a dragging gait style, more might have been uncovered about the enemy already completely surrounding the area of operations. Who really benefited? We are led by reports to believe that the Marine command was saved by Smith’s delay. Surely that cannot be disputed, for had the 7th Infantry Division remained in their own zone, they would have reduced their own casualty listings. Yet the Army force involved became victims of circumstance, suffering the most Killed in Action within that same twelve mile radius. The explanation for that was the Marines were saved--not by their numbers-- but by their training. Even over their reported disclaimer, they were out of their element, but reality records that they were a reinforced Marine group at Chosin. The 11th Marines, were there as well. They provided that reinforced heavy artillery. Heavy Pershing 90,000-pound tanks, were part of the Marine Division arsenal as well. They were well-equipped with inland heavy weapons. And above all else, they had their own air to ground support.
But little was recorded about the 11th Marines or those tanks being within the reservoir area. Why highlight their own stronger force? But the further question is, what to do with an Army force east of Chosin? These numbers increase the amount of friendly forces by over 4,000 as well, reducing the burden on the Marine forces. The answer is--for damage control, remove them from the area by reference that they were "somewhere" east of the reservoir, but don't be too exact on how far removed they were from the Chosin Reservoir. Why give more information than required?
This question is the biggest mystery of all, since the Army dominated the entire campaign inland under Almond--supported by MacArthur. So again, why would our Army records be the ones removed from military history? That question posed, and a response by my son that "the Army just doesn't seem to know," sparked my composition of this research. Yet Almond was in command at Chosin, and it is well-documented that MacArthur favored X Corps. General Walton Walker referred to "MacArthur's pets." That boundary line maintained between the two commands clearly favored Almond to remain in command of his own corps. The fact that Operational Order 25 was not released and remained buried until 1979--the same year General Almond was buried--is a coincidental event of itself. Isn't it interesting that one would surface as one was buried. Almond being gone from the scene could now save face, even though the records were released, he being no longer available to be questioned about those orders if his plans failed. Makes one wonder what would have happened to those records if the plan had worked? Would those records have been sealed?
Since the objective itself did not change and it was a fact of life that certainly time itself would not change or slow its progress, the mission had to change within a set time frame around that inland force. All consideration has to be given here. That reserve force must be reorganized some way to fit the new mission--that mission inclusive now of Mupyong-ni for the 7th Division. That is the only part, in my opinion, that would ever require Operational Order 25 to be marked "secret" in the first place. Had that reference to Mup’yong-ni been omitted by MacLean, this entire event could have been up front. But something indicates a problem with the Army being assigned Mupyong-ni to seize that area. Still the Marines claim those same efforts to activate that like mission as well. And that is the mystery. Why is that? The new and latest plan was for the 7th Division--not the Marines--to seize Mupyong-ni. That plan was recorded on MacLean's last order 25. But what if the plan failed--as it did?
Who was responsible to repair the damage caused? Certainly not the Department of the Navy. In their view, the Marine Corps was "on loan" to the Army. The Marine Commandant had a letter from his inland force commander denouncing the original Plan 6 and General Smith’s intent to delay it, notwithstanding the other one of Plan 8, with its two changeable positions and order of battle. [14] So the foul-up had to be placed elsewhere outside of the Department of the Navy. While those Army records for our task force on the east side of Chosin were removed, the Marine Corps' over-abundance of discredit and innuendos against Army forces--Task Force Faith--created a point of convergence of facts being called down upon their own forces. This seriously disrupted and disputed any Marine damage control feature. Again I make my redundant statement that our task force "made no claim to any fame." But also, sadly, our Army officers made no large effort to correct any of those innuendos and untrue statements concerning our own honor to our own dead and our commitment on that side of the reservoir. I am a survivor of the Army campaign east of the Chosin. Hopefully, my personal attempt to clarify some facts may rectify this delay.
Since the Army itself will survive any crisis due to its size, and the only naval involvement was their one Marine Division inland in Korea, the easiest Army damage control solution seems to have been to remove the Army from the Marine area of operations as much as possible. There is only one problem with this solution, and it is a major general one. The major general Marine commander was highly vocal over the events at the time. Those vocal remarks locked in a pattern of many accurate and inaccurate statements over his own personal behavior verifying the whole. Coupled with the Marine history of speculation, Marine damage control can be examined for what it is. The Marine statement of blame on others reveals several facts.
Self praise (an excessive amount coming from within the corps itself) and an over-abundance of medals awarded, failed to silence or satisfy or justify the Marine Corps' overall fear of rejection. As time passed, the respect awarded to the Army forces irritated some in the Marine Corps, particularly those who disputed the few Marines who challenged the historians' past remarks about the Army units. The late, late award of the PUC also set into motion new innuendos. Again, that seems strange in light of the fact that the Army units made no claim to any fame on the east side of the reservoir. The Army only asked that it be included in that PUC in the early 1950s. In fact, as stated, those Army officers were quizzed on their own conduct over why they failed as they did. But there an old maxim, that says, "Turn about is fair play." Why didn’t the Marine officers follow their own orders as were issued and verified by General Smith?
Why did the Marines remain at Yudam-ni after being ordered by General Smith to clear that road back to Hagaru on 28 November by General Smith? Why did they also remain there one additional day longer after receiving the second order from General Smith based on Almond’s order late on the 29th to return to Hagaru-ri? Their latter recorded answer is that they needed that extra day--each time--to realign their forces. These and many more discrepancies are fair game to question.
As recorded by Shelby L. Stanton, "On November 21, Almond selected the second draft of Operation Plan Number 8. The push toward Mupyong-ni would be made directly west from Hagaru-ri, where the Marines were already located." [15] This was to be the new Marine "one main objective." Since time was a factor and pressure was applied and in order, the Marines located at Hagaru were the 7th Marines and not the 5th Marines, it would seem logical that they (7th Marines) were already in place for the lead off from Yudam-ni. This indicates that the implied relief of the 5th Marines between 24-27 November would have to wait an additional planning stage of three days with the 7th Division personnel added, but under a different draft number.
This one number was so vital and so important beyond the second draft that it required General MacArthur's personal approval. Only within that mythical draft number three were the 5th Marines ordered to move from east of Chosin. General Smith himself verified and commented on this, saying, "Apparently pressure was put on General MacArthur .... He devised a new plan that rushed some troops from the 31st and 32nd Regiment east of the reservoir to relieve the 5th Marines. The 5th would then move over to Yudam-ni." But he did not state that they were ordered in front of the 7th Marines, and that was an extremely difficult order to locate on any order from X Corps.
What could not be explained factually could therefore be fabricated. What was fabricated without fact can therefore be challenged. To "relieve the 5th Marines" or "replace them" is a matter of pure semantics. Also their "presently" or "previously" assigned mission, Changjin. In this case, the mission of the 5th Marines changed to the west side when what is known of the CCF clash with 1/A/7 Marines on the evening of the 26th and loss of one 1st Lt. Mitchell caused "A" Company to withdraw and signaled a direct involvement of enemy forces. That should have posed only two options for 1/5 and 3/5 Marine Battalions still on the east side of Chosin. Receive new orders from their own G-3 staff, supplemented by their G-2 staff, to either (1) remain in place or, (2) pull into Hagaru early morning of the 27th. As recorded, two-thirds of the 5th Marines did not arrive at Yudam-ni until after the 2/5 Battalion was allegedly stopped by a CCF "massive force" per General Smith’s interview. [16] In Marine history, the maps show the 5th Marines fully ahead of the 7th Marines on the west side. But they never were in that position at the start or until Smith ordered the 7th Marines to open the road back to Hagaru. Thus, in reality that order realigned the 7th Marines behind the other two battalions of the 5th by passing through their lines to the rear--almost as if they had to be rearranged for the historical record.
General Smith was noted for keeping meticulous notes of events. Much of Marine history of the Chosin Campaign is based on Smith’s chronicles. He appears honest and truthful in many of his notes. In fact, these provide much insight of his negating his own regimental commanders' accounts. However, while never doubting his regimental commanders' reports, he does not verify them with his official endorsement.
There is one important point to note about the aborting of the Yudam-ni attack westward. He also disputed and failed to verify General Ridgway’s version that his two regimental commanders were the ones calling off the attack. "It was then that Murray and Litzenberg decided on their own, without consulting Smith, to call off the attack and go on the defensive, disregarding Almond's orders, as they figured the show was hopeless." [17] This action was his alone, based on those two regimental commanders' reports of the CCF in front of them. "Murray made as I said, about 2.000 yards, and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that he was up against a massive force out there." Here his decision was made on Murray’s report as Smith was not there at Yudam-ni on the 27th.
However, that earlier advance westward on the 27th merely appeared as a battalion size recon in force, opposed to one of a smaller 1/A/7 Marine company size force the evening of the 26th. Both forces met resistance and aborted their contact to receive divisional guidance. But Marguerite Higgins' accounting returns to haunt their history about a "joint command." She remarked that the Marines were working "for the first time without division guidance." While Smith did order Colonel Litzenberg to clear the road back to Hagaru, he did not order that to be done at "all cost" to Task Force Drysdale. The necessity, however, went without any order, as that MSR was the only solution to a withdrawal. So the question is posed, why the delay to head back to Hagaru-ri as ordered?
While this interservice "joint command authority" rivalry continued to escalate within the Korean War, it was not truly solved until 1986. (However, the running controversy over the PUC and exclusion of Task Force Faith continued for another 13 years.) It took the Goldwater-Nichols Act to amend past arrogance of commanders. With the strong support of Senator Sam Nunn, it still needs work. Senator Barry Goldwater also ran interference with the Republican President Ronald Reagan. The Act defined who carries the authority of a single command. To its credit was the one commander of the Gulf War, General Norman Schwartzkopf. Hopefully, the release of all secret documents from the Korean and Vietnam Wars also had some input into the Goldwater-Nichols Act. What this act did was establish the CINC operational control over all forces assigned to his command without the bickering and whining that was done between the timeline of Korea and Vietnam. Had this act been in effect in Korea, the cost of casualties might have been far, far less. But again, that could have been--but it was not. The scandal and disgrace at Chosin Reservoir was the disregard for orders issued by the commander in charge regardless of who that would be. General Smith also held to his past delays with General Ridgway as well, which indicated the man being in charge over him was what irritated him, not the mission assigned as such.
Draft One, Ebb & Flow. It was approved and ordered by MacArthur to Almond (per) 40 Lt., Gen Almond to Gen Wright, 15 Nov 50; Rad, CX 69009, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 15 Nov 50. (Draft one, Nine days to date of activation, 24 November.) Discarded on 21 November in favor of Draft Two.
Statement, page 266: Policy and Direction: "Changjin and Mup'yong-ni were too widely separated to be assigned to a single division. General Almond also directed that the planners take into consideration that extreme winter temperatures of 30 to 40 degrees below zero Fahrenheit would severely restrict both friendly and enemy operations."
Fact in contradiction - OPN O 25, Intel Summary: (B) plus body of Operation Order 25. Both objectives: Changjin and Mup'yong-ni, although considered as "too widely separated to be assigned to a single division." The end reality: These two areas were both assigned per OPN O 25 to a single division--the 7th Infantry Division. What changed?
Policy and Direction, page 266: "On 23 November, Colonel Chiles, X Corps operations officer, took this plan to Tokyo where he discussed it with General MacArthur. On 24 November, General MacArthur directed that the plan be carried out with ‘one modification,’ a shift of the proposed boundary between the X Corps and Eighth Army farther west and south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division. General Almond was told to designate his own D-day. [18] The details of the corps plan were passed on to General Walker and the Eighth Army staff by visiting GHQ officers on 24 November." [19]
Here that "one modification," cited by all authors and historians--"a shift of the proposed boundary between the X Corps and Eighth Army farther west and south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division." This was verified as the only change. Consider this. The plan was ordered by GHQ. The necessity for Colonel Chiles' personal presentation to MacArthur seems overrated by the reciprocal visit of GHQ officers to Korea the next day. "The details of the corps plan were passed on to General Walker and the Eighth Army staff by visiting GHQ officers on 24 November." However, per footnote [fn 29], both commanders had already been informed on the 23rd by MacArthur, via Rad, CX 69661, 23 Nov. 50--this prior to Colonel Chiles' return to Korea as well. Thus, Almond activated Lieutenant Colonel Faith for his fateful mission early morning of 24 November.
Personal visits from GHQ officers to explain this "one modification" as a mere "shift of the proposed boundary between the X Corps and Eighth Army" also seems overrated. The details of only one modification must have had a real impact on Eighth Army operations already under way. Surely there was more information of importance as to why Almond was delaying his mission to assist General Walker’s offensive by cutting off the CCF enemy rear flank by three additional days. But recall that General Walker issued only one order that date (the 25th) lowering his boundary line below Mupyong-ni.
Page 266, Policy and Direction, notes that "General Almond ordered his troops to advance at 0800, 27 November. The final assignment of tasks directed the 1st Marine Division to seize Mup'yong-ni and advance to the Yalu, the 7th Division to attack from the Changjin Reservoir and advance to the Yalu, and the ROK I Corps to advance from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin areas to destroy the enemy." [20]
Fact(s) in direct contradiction: "The 7th Division will extend its zone westward, through that zone previously assigned to the Marines" [21] Plus, Opn O 25, Part 1b, "7th Inf Div atks 270800 Nov. seizes Mupyong-ni, adv to Yalu Riv. Destroys en in Z Secures the Pugsan area." This was the 7th ID's new mission, together with that of the 31st RCT: seizing the town of Changjin, via the east side of the reservoir. [22]
We have several other conflicts of statements:
1) Hammel, Chosin, page 211-212: Order to attack west received after the one to withdraw to Hagaru-ri (would be after 292029 November
2) Mossman, Ebb & Flow, page 48. No mission designation for the 1st Marines as a major unit.
3) MG Smith: One regiment, to open attack, but he had only one battalion of the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni on opening hour of attack.
4) 27 November opening attack from Yudam-ni, called to a halt after six daylight hours. Apparent sighting of a "massive" enemy force (2 to 1 ratio). However, night of 26th, clash with the enemy reason of award for MOH for a Marine officer, either downplayed or ignored.
5) Almond: No reported reaction to the aborted mission westward, even though he was there in the Yudam-ni area for two additional hours after the mission was aborted. His only notebook comment was that "drivers were not practicing convoy road discipline." [23]
6) If previous zone assigned to the Marines was meant to imply that same zone assigned through Plan 6, there being no other 7th Division flank support, it cannot be supplied directly to the Marines. Granted they were no longer within the Eighth Army zone. However, it was not defined as any other than "the previous zone assigned to the Marines." We have no real clarification of the Plan 8 other than through OPN O 25, as far as Changjin.
7) After MacLean arrived east of Chosin, the tank company was withdrawn 30 November from rear support. Dispute over who ordered same.
8) 1 December, withdrawal dispute. Was it ordered from higher command or not?
9) Per MG Smith to MG Barr: Air priority was to be granted from 1st MAW. It never arrived until after a five-hour delay, arriving around 1300hrs on east side of Chosin. However, it was providing cover for air drops of ammo and strafing the enemy on the west side of Chosin on 1 December as early as 0800 hrs.
10) Task Force Faith received neither of these until 1300 hrs, after that five-hour delay on the east side.
11) Support from Hagaru-ri: 105mm Howitzers were well within range to cover Hill 1221, as TF Faith before or as our forces reached that point. No forces would have to leave Hagaru-ri--only howitzer shells, monitored by overhead liaison plane already over area.
12) Air to ground priority was stated as granted to TF Faith. However, night fighters were not part of that priority, as in (#9) above. Night fighters (hecklers) were also provided for west side of reservoir, as part of their ‘priority’.
13) MG Smith was not in charge of 1st MAW. MG Field Harris was. What MG Smith promised MG Barr did not obligate MG Harris. As Appleman records in Escaping the Trap, page 216, breakout from Yudam-ni would have "maximum air cover, including carrier planes from Task Force 77." (Badoeng Strait's mission changed with the start of the Korean War in late June 1950. Early in the following month, she embarked Marine Corps aircraft for transportation to the war zone. She operated some of these Marine planes for combat operations through a tour that lasted until January 1951, including participation in September and December 1950. USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116, later AKV-16), US Navy History
[1] Another report that only two Air Force officers were included. See Policy And Direction, page 260. In the face of the enemy strength evident in General Almond's area and in the Eighth Army's zone, General Wright's JSPOG staff closely examined the original plan developed for X Corps operations. The Eighth Army attack was to be the main U.N. effort. Wright's staff looked at the X Corps' plans from the standpoint of "How can X Corps best assist Eighth Army?" The JSPOG planners had either not consulted or did not believe intelligence estimates forwarded to Washington by Willoughby, since their planning assumptions credited the Chinese with less strength than shown in Willoughby's reports of the same date. According to JSPOG assumptions on 12 November, the Eighth Army faced 18,000 Chinese troops, and the X Corps, 7,500. These troops were in addition to 50,000 North Koreans fronting the X Corps' path of advance. The Chinese were credited with the ability to reinforce at the rate of 24,000 men per day (fn 12).
[2] Walker issued a single order on the 25th, one that shortened the final objective line of the ROK II Corps to conform with the 27 November attack by General Almond's forces. Otherwise, he intended that the Eighth Army would continue its advance on the 26th as originally conceived. Ebb & Flow, 66 [fn14] 14 Eighth Army G1 SS Rpt, 25 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30007 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 25 Nov 50.
[3] General Omar Bradley, "A Soldier’s Story", page 138.
[4] Message precedes Colonel Chiles return to Korea. Compare to footnote #5 below, these are two different orders.
[5] Mossman, page 48, (footnote 42, X Corps WD Sum. Nov 50; Opn O 7, 25 Nov 50.)
[6] OPN O 24, Issued by Colonel MacLean, 31st RCT, 242400 Nov. ‘50 (Declassified-09/91)
[7] Indicating that the Naval officers now have second thoughts in use of the 1st Marine Division for this mission. Without their recorded opposition (to use the 7th Division instead of the Marine division), their silence will be taken as full approval of their agreement to this attack westward.
[8] (P&D-261)
[9] Staff Study, X Corps Assistance to Eighth Army, 12 Nov. 50, JSPOG Files. (Policy And Direction, page 261)
[10] South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, page 773
[11] Policy & Direction: The First Year, page 263
[12] Here all historians insert their own spin on why this Draft 1 was aborted.
[13] Policy and Direction, page 261 [GPO]. Recall Ralph Smith’s defense over his own relief at the Island of Saipan. Quotations are almost identical.
[14] Still he takes issue with Almond over Draft 1, here you are telling us to be prepared for an attack to the west...We’ve got one Main effort... (Under Plan 6)
[15] Ten Corps in Korea, (194)
[16] RED FLAG. "I halted the attack, because it was manifest that he was up against a massive force out there." Frank interview 1969.
[17] Ridgway; "As these two regiments moved out, they were rapped hard by the long-concealed Chinese. It was then that Murray and Litzenberg decided on their own, without consulting Smith, to call off the attack and go on the defensive, disregarding Almond's orders, as they figured the show was hopeless."
[18] [fn,28] Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 24 Nov. 50
[19] [fn,29] Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps and CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov. 50 [20] [fn, 30] X Corps Opns Order No. 7, 25 Nov. 50. Colonel MacLean is in motion moving his forces to the railroad station at Pukchong at 250800 November.
[21] Ebb & Flow, page 48, Opn O, 7, 25 Nov 50 [fn 42]
[22] National Archives, Declassified 1/9/79
[23] Appleman, Escaping the Trap, page 55
"Was it not ironic that Task Force Faith came to its final stop just short of the site of Drake's 31st Tank Company bivouac and the 31st Infantry Rear CP? Thirty hours earlier there had been 16 operable tanks and 325 soldiers in a perimeter within a stone's throw of where the convoy died--they had been there since the evening of November 27. Then on November 30 an order came for them to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. Who ordered that withdrawal to Hagaru-ri?...And why was the order issued?"
- Appleman, East of Chosin, p.322
In the 1950's, there was a popular song titled, "What a Difference a Day Makes." This chapter covers several days and an important difference relating to each one of them--the 7th Division's relocation to East of the Chosin Reservoir.
Final Night of Lt. Colonel Faith's task force battle: total destruction of our column of wounded and the final demise of the task force.
Click on each link below to find a map which shows the tank command location between Hudong-ni and Hagaru-ri.
http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map7_full.jpg
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/maps/map8_full.jpg
No friendly force remained between Task Force Faith and Hagaru-ri for a total of eight miles. That eight mile enemy trap, already partially in place, was reinforced and consolidated by a reaction over the X Corps OPCON transfer order to the sole command of General Oliver P. Smith, USMC--a transfer of command over the Army task force and all others Army forces within the Chosin Reservoir. Effective as of 292027 November, those 7th Division forces were exclusively under the sole command and responsibility of the 1st Marine Division. [1] However, prior to that transfer event, one should clarify what division (Army or Marine) was previously in charge of that area of operations.
For that information we must consider the Marine recorded history, a history which is directly in conflict and contradiction to Operation Order #25 (1.b). The 7th Infantry Division was to seize Mupyong-ni, as written by Colonel Allan D. MacLean in his own regimental instructions concerning his five objectives labeled "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", to be seized without delay toward the town of Changjin. Both sets of objectives were previously assigned to the Marines, but then changed under the latest order of 0 7, 25 November issued by MacArthur. It was an order that therefore superseded all Marine objectives in the Hagaru-ri area.
The Marine Corps' own history and its own public relations campaign distorts these facts, retaining and locking in their sole objective as Mupyong-ni. [2] We have a conflict of orders. Until that OPCON timeline change, the Marine G-3 had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do concerning that new X Corps order issued directly to and binding on all Army forces. The point is that MacLean's 31st RCT mission east of Chosin, inclusive of Lt. Colonel Faith's 1/32nd Infantry, was firmly locked within a 7th Division, 31st Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT) Order #25. That order had absolutely no connection to the Marine G-3 section between OPN 0 7 25 November and prior to 292027 November 1950. Colonel MacLean's mission prior to that timeline belonged exclusively to the 7th Infantry Division as given by the authority of X Corps and its commanding officer. Its later removal from all records, namely OPN O 25, totally and completely removed MacLean's RCT from all active Army history on this side of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. Those men involved within its mission were classified "secret," and listed as merely missing in action. Recall Smith's earlier PUC remarks on excluding this Army force as making no contribution whatsoever to the withdrawal of his remaining forces from Hagaru-ri back to the coast of Hungnam. Where did the 7th Division force come from and where did they go via this timeline? They were completely vanished, erased, vaporized, and suddenly gone, along with their records and credentials--a phantom force lost to history. They no longer legally existed within this area on Army maps or official Army records.
However, a few of those records were securely transferred and guarded under a classified label within the National Archives just outside Washington D.C. There they remained until they were declassified and OPN O 25 was copied on 9 January, 1979. This now creates an enormous problem between the Army and Navy, indicting that General Almond turned over the full responsibility of a non-existent Army force to the Department of the Navy, via its Marine Corps. How can and should this situation and fiasco be handled? For over five decades, history failed to explain this farce. But it now seems that military history has come full circle in re-establishing those lost or misplaced credentials, now public knowledge through OPN O 25. It would also seem evident that General Almond has his personal revenge at last. The Navy and Marine Corps now have the problem of explaining, correcting, and recording military history within this area. How do they do that? How do they make their records coincide with those of X Corps? There were no credentials or records for this Army forces (until now--the purpose of this research) east of the reservoir. However, the Department of the Navy become fully aware and involved over these facts in this controversy within the upcoming years by extending their own opposition in denying the PUC award to forces east of Chosin for forty-nine years (1950-1999), while at the same time issuing it to the 1st Marine Division. The Department of the Army is on record via a Ninth Endorsement (1952) to included all forces east of Chosin in that PUC Award (see chapter endnote).
The real story and facts may show the Marines Corps in a bad light. Let the chips fall where they may by reviewing a direct report of Marine G-3 records. What did they do with their (classified) copy of OPN Order 25, sent to the Marine SP's per MacLean's order listed as: "(4. b.) C1 V 1st Mar Div SP, Opns Overlay, Annex 1"? This information (1.b) also verifies that it was the 7th Infantry Division's zone of operations, plus this road overlay was to provide prior priority road clearance for all MacLean's forces moving from Pukchong through the Marine road network between Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, and northward to Hagaru-ri. Any research should include those X Corps orders within their independent Marine Division, as those records of the X Corps Army history should include all X Corps orders to the Marine Division within that same time frame. It should also be inclusive of that Marine order to replace the 7th Marines by the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni. That move alone left no forces on the east of the reservoir (see General Ridgway's map and Navy maps 17 & 18). The last two Navy maps verify the full 7th Division was well east of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir. Yet, in all fairness, the Navy doesn't really seem to have access to these orders. "A search of the 1st Marine Division G-3 Journal, November 30, 1950, fails to disclose an entry concerning an order of any kind to the 31st Rear CP and the Tank Company at Hudong-ni. Yet that command would be the one authorized to issue it." [3]
The removal of Task Force MacLean (not Faith) made all Changjin history as recorded unreliable. The death of Colonel MacLean prior to the X Corps transfer of his command to the Marine command opens the door to his entire command being referenced as Faith's command from start to finish. Lt. Colonel Faith interacted directly with the Marines; however, it is an existing fact that Colonel MacLean never did. Still, Faith had no individual credentials of his own except through reference within OPN O 25 as well. But Faith commanded his own 1/32nd Battalion at the start, and the two extra battalions at the finish--the 3/31st Infantry and 57th FA.Bn--were remnants of MacLean's larger force of men.
Yet, Colonel MacLean's standing orders left instructions to his tank commander, Captain Robert Drake, to move his tanks forward. Under the changing circumstances, Colonel MacLean's orders remained in effect until rescinded by someone in authority. Faith could not do that. He was never in command of that tank command unit. Plus, they remained blocked four miles south of his perimeter. However, the Marine commander's new OPCON order then superseded any prior Army order. The Marine history, while fully verifying this OPCON transfer, still is highly vague on the issue of those tanks returning into Hagaru-ri. Without dispute, they withdrew well during that timeline under Marine operational control.
One should place this in light of those earlier forces that the Marine commander assumed command over-- those (1/B/31) 7th Division forces who were "attached" to Task Force Drysdale earlier (28 Nov) and totally outside of Smith's authority at Koto-ri. They had their own orders under their own commander and were never "attached" to the Marines--however, they were linked to MacLean's orders. Drysdale's British force had an "attached" United Nations status directly to the 1st Marine Division. [4] This latter is of no big issue except to verify my point of the chain of command. The commander in charge (in charge being the key issue) has every right to appoint any commander over another unit. At Changjin, the Marine commander (Colonel Puller) delegated and appointed the British UN commander of a small unit (250 men) to be attached to the Marines, as the leader of his own titled force to break through from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri. There is no disputing that or the fact that the British commander's newly assigned authority should supersede any ranking Marine commander placed under him, and those Army units as well--again, assuming that the Marine officer placing that Army force in that unit had the legal authority to assign that force to that task. In this case, Colonel Puller did not. General Smith PUC version disputes Colonel Puller's authority to attach that Army unit, supported by Smith's individual disclaimer that the Army force simply "attached themselves" to that column.
But while that may be another moot issue, as that Army force had to move forward towards Colonel MacLean anyway, the Marine command reaction over our tank force behind us is an entirely different issue. Our rear tank and CP command was transferred and "officially attached" to the Marine commander prior to its withdrawal. MacLean's records were "lost," but not those of the units behind him. The rear tank force was placed under command of the Marine commander, and their records of its movements under that Marine G-3 section should fully document the orders given by them. That seems to be lacking, or highly vague. The distance between MacLean's two units was only four miles, and another four miles back to Hagaru-ri. Moving that tank force added those additional four miles to the journey of Task Force Faith. That move severely jeopardized the task force and sealed its fate. "What commander in his right mind could order such a move in the circumstances without deliberately running the risk of sacrificing the task force, and how could he be willing to take that risk?" Appleman, East of Chosin, p.323.
My attempt to unravel this mystery is to lock in on the mission east of Chosin after the Marine commander (MG Smith) was placed in charge. That timeline from 292028 hours Nov. ‘50 was one minute past the Marine recorded time frame of the change of operational control and full command to them. "At 2027 that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir area, including the three Army battalions, were placed under the operational control of the Marine commander by X Corps." [5] Here at long last the Marine commander had total and exclusive control--not only of his own Marine division--but the additional command over all Army units within his immediate area. This brings to mind General Bradley's remarks: "This is no time for fancy Dans who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals."
Here, at long last, General Smith was calling the signals. Almond's commands to him were then merely suggestions and options of what to do. In the end, it would be Smith's call alone to decide what course of action to take--or in this case, to totally ignore. No matter what transpired beyond that timeline (292028 November), the Marine commander and his designated officers were in full and complete charge of all Army forces. This indicates that those Marine officers, delegated to various responsibility within the 1st Marine Division, then had whatever new authority over Army forces as Smith assigned to them. For example, the Marine tank commander, when given authority over the Army tank command, had independent authority of operational control over that force and could place them where he wanted them. He could allow them to remain in place as rear guard support for Task Force Faith, or he could order them back to Hagaru-ri and place them in any defensive position of his choice. Unfortunately, at the expense of Task Force Faith, he picked the second option. As to the question of who ordered our rear tanks withdrawn, that answer has just been given.
Per National Archive reports on the Army CP command: "On the night of 29 Nov the rear CP received orders to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and that we would now be under the control of the 1st Marine Division." [6] It is unclear who issued that order or what later hour of that night it was issued. But we do know that this order was not activated until the afternoon of the next day (the 30th). Therefore, another question is posed. Why the delay? In the U.S. Army, "An order calls for instant compliance, a view sometimes difficult for the American soldier to understand.... Once an order was published it could not be changed except by the issuing authority." [7]
As it happened, the 7th Division Commander General David Barr arrived that same morning for a scheduled afternoon meeting at Hagaru with CG Almond, MG Smith, and 7th ADC BG Hodes. While some other authors may imply that General Barr ordered Captain Drake to relocate his command at Hagaru-ri, MG Barr was no longer the one responsible as he had lost full operational control over these forces in the Chosin arena. All MG Barr was authorized to do was to explain that prior night's order (in reference footnote 6 above). It was and still remained a fully lawful order by the new issuing authority. He did not have to detail what Captain Drake was to do next. That action was obvious. Case closed. Legally, that tank command, plus the medical holding team, artillery service battery, and the rear CP forces belonged at Hagaru-ri, as ordered. However, were they really needed there? [8] But new credentials and separation from MacLean's command-for the Army tank command, medical detachment, artillery service battery, and the rear CP forces were established there as part of a new provisional force then fully and physically attached to the 1st Marine Division. The overwhelming fact here was the connection to Task Force Drysdale and the need for more tanks to defend Hagaru-ri. That condition created an emergency for the 1st Marine Regimental commander to rush more forces and equipment to Hagaru from wherever he can get them.
"The reinforcements ordered up from Koto-ri had a difficult time of it on the road. Only a part had managed to get through, and the night of 30 November brought further heavy attacks at Hagaru and against the Army battalions." [9] This indicates that the entire Task Force Drysdale from Koto-ri was needed at Hagaru. To compensate for the difference of only one-third of Drysdale's force getting through to Hagaru, it would seem logical that the 31st Tank Armor would also be required to fill that void. That would be further indicated by its withdrawal order issued on the night of 29th November that they were needed to "reinforce Hagaru! (see Marine Map 20). RED FLAG: But why not state that up front? This verified Smith's important error in not placing that free battalion of the 5th Marines at Hagaru-ri. Had MG Smith pulled them in there, neither would Colonel Drysdale's force ever have been needed at Hagaru, or would it have been necessary to sacrifice Task Force Faith due to that tank withdrawal from Hudong-ni.
The major-point here is not that a withdrawal order was ever issued to the tank unit in the first place. The point is, why did it not coincide with the same timeline withdrawal notice to Task Force Faith on the night of 29 November? Why the time delay? It was no big secret that the Chinese forces--exclusive of those CCF forces at Yudam-ni--always attacked after dark to avoid close-in air strafing and bombardment of their forces. Any withdrawal would have to be during daylight hours for our use of those planes. To prepare for that breakout, those orders would have to have been issued the prior night. These also should have been issued with the tank withdrawal order. Task Force Faith had much-needed M19 40mm shells erroneously dropped at Hudong-ni. An order to Faith to withdraw first (and only then to the tank company), and then for them both to withdraw to Hagaru should have been the order of the day.
The 29th and the 30th slid into history without Task Force Faith being issued those orders. Why? While Appleman disputes that there was ever a withdrawal order issued by General Smith to Colonel Faith until Faith and his forces were well on the road back towards Hagaru-ri, the Army history within Ebb & Flow records as follows:
"Smith sent withdrawal instructions to Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1st. By that time Smith had dropped all plans for sending a rescue force to Faith, whose forces had taken strong assaults around their lakeshore perimeter during the night of 30th. Although they had defeated these attacks, it was doubtful they could withstand more. Hence, Smith judged, waiting to dispatch reinforcements to Faith until the Yudam-ni troops returned to Hagaru-ri would be too late." (Mossman, p. 132)
Any intelligent rationalism should conclude that a withdrawal of any friendly force four miles above one's own defensive area would remove that much flank protection above--provided, of course, that one had any plans whatsoever at that time to retrieve that road after reclaiming those four miles surrendered to the enemy. That reason is out of sync with military logic because it would leave the forward unit stranded and deserted, as well as giving the enemy a free staging area a full eight miles between that unit while simultaneously blocking Faith's withdrawal path. This became a reality and tragic end result for Task Force Faith. However, that task force continued to "contribute" to the security of Hagaru-ri, in spite of Smith's (PUC) claim to the contrary. The companion question arises, "Why did Smith not issue an early withdrawal to Fox Company of the 7th Marines in the rear of Yudam-ni defense? Instead, he ordered his forward greater units of three regiments (5th, 11th, and 7th) to fall back and collect Fox Seven on the withdrawal.
One of many unreliable factors within this drama is the lack of records by the Marine G-3. Entirely too many are connected to "Smith's Chronicles" & "Notes." Maybe that explains why he is separated from the Marines so many times within this drama to his own personal exclusive connection. (Always Smith did this or Smith failed to do that.) While it is understood that orders can be verbally given, their execution can relate to a timeline of events and movements. The 1st Marine tank commander may not have known exactly who issued that tank withdrawal order, but he knew full well when those tanks arrived at Hagaru-ri and were attached to his personal command. Per Army archives, Captain Drake's report stated: "Company arrived Hagaru-ri 301750, was attached to the 1st Marine Division, and immediately placed in the perimeter defense of Hagaru area...." [10] It was still not too late to inform Faith to "prepare to break out" ASAP. Such a message could have been air dropped with a parachute flare into our area of entrapment, since the reports were that all radio communications to Faith were out--a claim I totally dispute. [11] Better late than never. So why still delay that vital order some additional 17 hours after the tank force was reassigned within Hagaru (6 hours of the 30th and 11 hours of the 1st)? The answer may well be found within Eric Hammel's reference that "O.P. Smith was not a demonstrative leader.... he rarely gave an order, but always pointed in the direction he thought things ought to be heading." [12]
That quote may have additional credence within Mossman's accounting in the Army history, Ebb & Flow. It stated, "On 1 December,... General Smith now commanding all forces in the reservoir area, had given the two regiments at Yudam-ni their withdrawal order the previous evening following his afternoon conference with Almond." [RED FLAG] Smith placed neither Colonel Litzenberg nor Colonel Murray in charge, but merely directed both to "expedite.... movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal south. Destroy any supplies which must be abandoned during this withdrawal." [13]
Female correspondent Marguerite Higgins stated as well, "The 7th and 5th Regiments were now operating for the first time under joint orders and without benefit of division guidance." [14] Adding to all this command confusion, the Marine assistant division commander was not in Korea at that time. Still, one vital fact remains. Those Marine forces had received orders twice before 1 December to withdraw from Yudam-ni back to Hagaru-ri. They needed one extra day added to each individual order (28th and 29th) to realign their forces for either withdrawal, and they were engaged within that final withdrawal at 010800 December. (Three additional days to close at Hagaru-ri, on 4 November.) Also, an air drop of supplies and close air to ground support was already in operation on the west side of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. Point of importance: Faith still had three hours to wait for his official withdrawal authorization, plus another two hours for a total of five hours for any air to ground support. Of more importance is the fact that there were no air drops or other supplies dropped prior to our moving out.
Again, why would Faith be overlooked this same date and hour? What seems so contradictory in all of this is the praise attributed to General Smith by others. In Appleman's East Of Chosin, he rated him highly, saying, "...Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith was a model of coolness, caution, and tactical and planning abilities." [15] And as I have stated, General Ridgway--in spite of his own later problems with delays by Smith--seemed impressed by him. Why those discrepancies exist mystifies me. Appleman seems to me to fault Smith's judgment at times (see quotes within this chapter). Ridgway praised him in spite of the thing he himself detested--failure to move "together, together." Yet all those things were after thoughts of reports by others. Maybe I'm missing something here. I have previously stated, "A general's persona is complex." It seems that everyone but General Almond admired General Smith, yet all others were outside of the arena where the critical action and the main performance was being played out in a real life drama. And only within that real arena can it be fairly and accurately judged for history.
On this same fateful afternoon at Hagaru (30 November), generally speaking the "stars" were out in force. Per Marine history: "On the afternoon of the 30th a command conference was held at Hagaru in the Division CP. Generals Almond, Smith, Barr and Hodes were informed at the briefing session that a disaster threatened the three Army battalions..." [16] RED FLAG - As outlined below, those three Army battalions no longer included the entire 31st RCT, the new, renamed Task Force Faith having been reduced to three Battalion Combat Team (BCT) strength only. What is so significant about this? The Hudong-ni force four miles to the rear was already in the process of returning to Hagaru under prior withdrawal orders while this meeting was being conducted. [17] "Blowing the ammo and ration dump"--and no one from the Marine command informed General Almond of that fact. Nor is it recorded that General Almond was informed that Hagaru had just been reinforced by those remnants of Task Force Drysdale, an increase of tanks by 17 heavy Pershing tanks from Drysdale's force, added to those assigned to the 5th & 7th Marine Regiments, tank platoons of at least four tanks each (17 + 8 = 25 + Drake's 16 = 41 tanks at Hagaru-ri). The timeline for that meeting started at 1410hrs (2:10 p.m.). It ended after 1 hour and 20 minutes, or 1530 hours. [RED FLAG] Two hours later at 1730 hrs, all Hudong-ni 31st Army units had closed on Hagaru. There were then some forty-plus tanks at Hagaru. However, none of these were ever ordered back to assist a breakout by Task Force Faith the next afternoon, thereby severing that rear guard connection to Task Force Faith and making this following statement totally irrelevant.
"Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. These two generals agreed, however, "that not much could be done until the Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru," and the conference ended on an inconclusive note."
This last part adds a continuous connection within this meeting, but in reality the decision between the two generals occurred after Almond had left the meeting. [18]"Almond directing General Barr and Smith to draw up a plan for extricating the cutoff units...have the plan ready for him by six o'clock (1800hrs) that evening.." Considering that Almond left at 1530 hours, also that the cut-off units included the tank command, however, two hours later at 1730hrs, the rear CP and Tanks from Hudong-ni were secure at Hagaru, and Faith was totally cut-off. (RED FLAG] Thirty minutes (1800) later was the deadline for the plan to be submitted to Almond for the total withdrawal. As this day ended, so did any decision about assisting Task Force Faith. Conclusion: "Not much could be done." Translation: Nothing was done.
Solution: So what could have been done that wasn't? (1) Assure that the Marine air controller located at Hagaru insure the next day's (1 December) scheduled priority air drop of ammunition be delivered prior to the breakout of Task Force Faith instead of being re-routed to the Marines west of Chosin. Task Force Faith was out of 40mm and extremely low on .50 caliber ammo for the quad 50's, both essential self-propelled weapons. These were reduced to using two barrels (instead of four) on the night of 30 November. All men were scrounging for all types of much-needed ammo. After all else, it was reported MG Smith assured MG Barr that LTC Faith would have "air priority," but this is a claim that cannot be fully authenticated.
(2) A second alternative: Hagaru forces merely use our tanks and turn their guns, which were under full Marine operational control, towards Hill 1221. That hill was within extreme range of those 76mm tank guns or our two 31st tanks that had 105mm mounted cannons. The latter two 105mm weapons were definitely within range. An artillery air observer plane was overhead for observation and should have been used for coordination and accuracy of rounds.
(3) Consider, too, the Marines were using their six tubes of 105mm howitzers from H/11 at Hagaru for fire missions at extreme range to cover 7th Regiment Fox Company at Toktong Pass, providing shells to defend them during nighttime hours. That extreme range was seven miles. The distance to Hill 1221 was only four miles--well within a ‘comfortable range' of all those 105mm weapons. The average destruction of artillery by a long range weapon was listed as 60 percent of all enemy casualties in all wars. It was criminal negligence on MG Smith's command not to use them as support of Task Force Faith on his withdrawal to Hagaru. [19] Using only two of the six tubes from Hagaru would not have deprived "F" company (reorientation) of coverage they could and should have gotten from their other 11th Artillery Regiment batteries at Yudam-ni. There were 48 total pieces there, minus those six-105mm tubes at Hagaru. Some units were self-propelled 155mm. We know there were eight tractor-pulled 155mm with a 10 mile range abandoned at Toktong Pass. MG Smith should have required H/11, FDC to connect to the frequency of that forward artillery liaison plane over Task Force Faith and that ground observer at Hagaru, gaining contact with Faith at 1500 hours afternoon of 1 December--that one operator received the message to withdraw.
Click on the link below to view the breakout route of Task Force Faith 1 December 1950. Again, note the location of Hudong-ni, as well as the fact that the final break up of our task force was also at Hudong-ni: http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map11_full.jpg
It meets and beats all requirement that NO force of any kind was required to leave Hagaru except howitzer shells. It meets and beats criticism that no forces were available for any attack from Hagaru to assist us--this without depriving Fox Company of four howitzers standing by to cover them. Those two howitzers added to the two tank units would have equalized four tubes each for Fox Company awaiting link-up from 1/7 Marines already outside their perimeter. Fire missions were suspended that night anyway, for fear of dropping shells on Lt. Colonel Davis' nighttime rescue operation. Here was a partial solution to Almond's orders: merely reorient those two weapons during daylight hours--a plan which could have been in operation within 24 full hours of planning, well before needed. No one suggested this plan of assistance. Rather, they simply write it off as waiting for the Marines to return from Yudam-ni. [20] Any assistance would have saved our own ammo. Ironically, those eight 155mm howitzers with their prime movers later at Toktong Pass, ran out of diesel fuel, and were abandoned on the withdrawal from that point 4 December, and later destroyed via air strikes.
Indeed, those units--and in fact the worth of the Marine 11th Regiment artillery--was called into question by the Marine priority system used west of the reservoir by some Marines themselves. The 3/5 battalion commander took issue over the neglect of the 11th Regiment artillery to cover and supply cover support to his 3/5 battalion. "Every time he called for artillery the priority was elsewhere." [21] This indicated that artillery was oriented someplace else. If one eliminates support for F/7 and 3/5, it just adds more confusion over that so-called Joint Command at Yudam-ni. Lt. Col. Carl Youngdale, equal in rank to Murray, indicated that the 7th Marines had "priority status". Very little notoriety is given to the 11th Marine Regiment. There was a failure to acknowledge that there were three regiments instead of only the two infantry ones.
Furthermore, it is not pointed out that three regimental commanders were maneuvering for leadership and no one commander had exclusive authority over the other one. That asinine "senior officer" status in Marineland was not an issue in the Army ranks. The man assigned command was in command ‘period.' Colonel MacLean commanded the entire 31st RCT with attached units of the 32nd. Yet MG Smith failed to act in this case to appoint either one of those three commanders as top dog in command at Yudam-ni. To hell with the concept of "senior status." It didn't work for Drysdale's command authority, and Colonel Litzenberg had scrapped that concept with his acceptance of that "joint command." He was the senior officer--the only full colonel on the scene.
The only artillery unit out of the brawl was How Battery at Hagaru, directly supporting Fox Company. Since all artillery 11th Marine units were in position to cover Fox Company as well from Yudam-ni, why weren't those guns used? This question would be entirely none of my business if the Marines on the west side had not been so critical of our operations on the east side.
Mission change for Lieutenant Colonel Faith--Order to Withdraw
The strange part of this entire campaign was the attempt to praise ALL officers with credit over disobedience of their orders. This was not only an excepted practice, most officers were involved and all others were invited to join the club. Ironically, this extended to Task Force Faith--the insistence that he left his assigned area without proper authorization. The strange part is that the charges were by some of those very Army officers within his own command.
A) Ebb & Flow, page 132: Smith sent withdrawal instructions to Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1st. By that time Smith had dropped all plans for sending a rescue force to Faith, whose forces had taken strong assaults around their lakeshore perimeter during the night of the 30th. Although they had defeated these attacks, it was doubtful they could withstand more.
The Navy history verifies this as well, as "On the morning of 1 December, therefore, the Army troops were ordered to break out to the southward at the earliest possible time, and were advised that while no troop assistance could be given, owing to the situation at Hagaru, maximum air support would be provided." (Chapter 9, Part 2)
B) Fact in contradiction: Appleman's book, East of Chosin (p.196) and Escaping the Trap, (p.134) via those officers named as present on morning at 011100, December 1950. Lt. Col. Faith stated that he was ordering the withdrawal on his own intuitive. The source for the confusion of Lt. Col. Faith over his order to withdraw on his own is based in Marine history via a footnote on page 243 of Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign. [RED FLAG] Based on the research by K. Jack Baur, PhD, the footnote 20 reads as follows: "The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, unless otherwise noted, are: Statement by Capt. Edward P. Stamford , n. d, 2-15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, n.d;" (Captain Stamford reported at that meeting 12/1/50 Faith's decision to break out.)
C) Fact in contradiction - Rebuttal: No order reached Faith until 011500 December when the force was in the clear on the way back to Hudong-ni. All communications, other than through Captain Stamford who was the Marine TACP controller, were out to any and all sources between Faith and Hagaru. However, there were communications to Faith through that TACP link shortly before Faith announced his decision. This dispute proves one vital fact: There were relay communication links to Faith.
D) Fact in contradiction to rebuttal - 14 Apr 1953 Eleventh endorsement on MajGen O.P. Smith's letter, serial number 9532 of 3 Mar 1952 Section 6: "b. On 30 November Task Force Faith was advised by the 1st Marine Division that it was now attached to the 1st Marine Division, that it should make every effort to improve its situation by working toward Hagaru-ri,.... Shortly after acknowledgment of this order radio communication went out."
We have many more conflict of statements. Remaining with this issue, there was a related withdrawal order to Faith--although disputed by some Army officers within Faith's own command--that our withdrawal order was on Faith's own initiative. My opinion is that he would never do that, but he would have been justified if he had done it. While Marine History does not record any communication to Faith from the 1st Marine Division, there is one recorded that happened in the afternoon on 011500 December while "in the clear." But memory of past events fade with time. As exaggerated in the old joke about how far one's parents had to walk to school in the snow, the mileage and depth increases as the years pass from that timeline. Likewise, to forget details under pressure in any event is easy without some direct fixation connecting that event. Non-events are discounted. Faith is not here to tell his side of the story, so all he may have said is hearsay. To state that this was his direct decision would not have been necessary, especially in light of those same officers around him urging him to do it. It implies wishful influence on one's own suggestion and input. Plugging in the information that MG Smith stated was issued on the 30th, makes "by working toward Hagaru-ri" a standing order. But we do have three reports of communication links to Faith's command--the one on 30 November, and two other radio links between 010900-011300 December. It is recorded that the one sent on the 30th was "acknowledged" as well.
To state that all communications links were totally cut off is not an accurate statement. The TACP connection was an active two way channel between nine o'clock and shortly before dark when our controller destroyed his radio link to the supporting overhead planes. The 1st Marine Division had an air-to-ground control station dispatcher at Hagaru. That dispatcher could easily monitor the open channel at anytime to communicate or relay with our forward controller. As stated and never denied, the Hagaru dispatcher knew what Marine radio equipment our forward air-to-ground controller had, and therefore knew his frequency as well as his call sign. What was also never denied is the oddity that our TACP controller did not ask for or request that dispatcher's frequency. That was his one single function above all others--his main field of expertise.
There was the prime importance and advantage of having that TACP controller from the Marine Corps rather than one from the 5th Air Force TACP group. One from this latter group was assigned to the 3/31st Infantry, but he had become a KIA casualty earlier. However, this does not seem to be the link we had to work with on the breakout date. That morning had heavy cloud cover and fog overcast. The air-to-ground connection was not to the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW), which was already heavily engaged in covering the Marine withdrawal that very same morning starting on the west side of Chosin. Those Marine pilots were not monitoring Stamford's frequency. They were locked in on the activity at Yudam-ni.
The evidence suggests that the Marine dispatcher assigned our air to ground cover to the aircraft carrier group Task Force 77. That Marine dispatcher at Hagaru-ri had to also divert whatever air drops of supplies that were destined for us. Our supplies were diverted hours earlier to the Marine side of the reservoir. Those supplies were dropped early morning with sorties over Yudam-ni commencing at 010800 December. The air-to-ground defense at Yudam-ni also was under way at this time. [22]
E) Fact in contradiction as to Marine air priority: As outlined in Appleman's Escaping the Trap [23], General Smith had promised General Barr that full air support would be provided. Because the danger to the 3/5 Marine Battalion was so great to protect the realignment of forces, it required air support early morning of 1 December at Yudam-ni. That same morning, eight Corsairs supported "F" Company to Rocky Ridge, while C-119 Flying Boxcars dropped supplies in that Fox Company area. Task Force Faith received NO air drops. My point in stating this is that Marine Fox Company remained stationary while Faith was on his move to a breakout. Also at 020200 December, the Marine forward air controller requested two night fighters around "F" Company. Three additional ones were provided, making a total of five. [24] It appears that none of those night fighters had been requested by our TACP controller. A significant point can be found in this latter action with regards to the CCF timeline (020200) within their mopping up mode of operations, thereby completing the Task Force Faith total convoy disaster on the east side of the reservoir.
Our air connection was switched to the aircraft carrier group from the Sea of Japan, whereas the air-to-ground support for the Marines originated from Yonpo air strip and the Badoeng Strait. It is a logical concept that a shift of our air-to-ground units to the Navy also shifted the burden of control to the Naval TACP dispatcher aboard ships. However, those flights were "weathered out" and the Marine Air Wing was required to supply that action anyway, after the loss of five hours and any needed air supplies packaged for Faith and his forces. Those ammo supplies directed towards Faith were consequently diverted during the time delay from Task Force Faith to the Marine side of the reservoir.
But this point, recorded by Appleman, cannot be overlooked. Air-to-ground support for the west side of the reservoir at Yudam-ni had already commenced and been in continuous operation since eight o'clock for all Marine forces on their side of the reservoir. Why and where was that so-called "priority" air-to-ground support that is recorded to have been provided for us? Between eight and one o'clock, a full five hours of vital daylight time was lost, and during that timeline there was no air drop of precious supplies and ammo because they were being dropped elsewhere across the reservoir. Who diverted those exclusive flights to that side of the reservoir? As reported, our controller had contact with an overhead naval carrier air pilot at nine o'clock. His channel was open and could well be monitored by any one of those planes from MAW. But as recorded, they apparently were not on line to Captain Stamford's frequency, our coverage being transferred to the Navy carrier squadrons.
There is a connecting link. Appleman reports in East of Chosin and Escaping the Trap that on 1 December, a lone plane from the USS Leyte made contact with Captain Stamford and said that he would return with a flight of planes to cover ground defensive cover if the weather cleared. [25] This Task Force 77 was restricted at the time by Fifth Air Force to reconnaissance and interdiction missions only. The problem within this version is verified via Navy recorded history as follows:
Mission Change - Land to Sea History of United States Naval Operations: Korea by James A. Field, Jr.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
Chapter 9: Retreat to the South
[Part 1:] On 1 December the weather over eastern Korea was very bad. Morning flights from the carriers met a solid overcast over the plateau and were diverted to the EUSAK area, where three missions totaling 23 aircraft found satisfactory control, successfully attacked large concentrations of enemy troops and abandoned friendly equipment, and blew an ammunition dump at Sinanju. But the weather which had altered their employment also prevented their return to base, for the task force had been obliged to cease flight operations late in the morning. Unable to get home, the aircraft landed at Wonsan, were kicked out again owing to rumors of a deteriorating ground situation in the neighborhood, and finally spent the night at Kimpo.
[Part 2:] "On the 30th, following General Harris' first request for carrier air, Task Force 77 had sent 39 sorties to the reservoir, of which 14 struck at Chinese troops surrounding the isolated Army units while 25 attacked the enemy in the hills about Hagaru. By bad luck, however, [RED FLAG] the next day brought bad weather both at the reservoir and in the Sea of Japan. Although aircraft from Badoeng Strait and Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy, the early flights from Task Force 77 were weathered out of the reservoir, and in late morning the force was obliged to cancel operations. At midday, the Army troops began their southward movement with 20 fighters overhead, but in the course of the afternoon a combination of heavy attacks and enemy roadblocks fragmented the column, most officers and key NCOs became casualties, and as darkness fell the force dissolved. It had almost made it in: the disintegration took place only four and a half miles from Hagaru; but although a number of stragglers were brought in across the frozen reservoir, total casualties reached almost 75 percent."
Note the phrase, "Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy." No soldier of Task Force Faith needs any renewed remainder of our own fateful napalm event. One part of a friendly mission misdirected. It was an honest error, but nevertheless the napalm was dropped short on the leading force of our task force. It is a friendly fire mistake that is burned into the memory of each surviving task force member for the rest of our lives. However, that error was not by the Navy fighters. Its timeline placed the Marine air cover at 011300 hours. Again, a central mystery. Why did we have to wait for MAW cover?
As mentioned above, the fear of the weather staying overcast denied us the benefit of any air drops of much-needed food, medical, and ammo supplies--not only for what we expended during the night just ending, but for the road trip which remained directly ahead. That air-to-ground cover eventually had to be supplied anyway from the MAW. But those ammo supply planes had already dropped their supplies and left the area. That ammo was our life saving ingredient to fight our way back to Hagaru-ri. Without it, any breakout plan--whether there was one or not--would justly be criticized for what it really was--an effort in futility. It was a disaster waiting to happen from Day One. Planning on day eight--our fourth day of entrapment--could not possibly correct all of the roadblocks and obstacles put in place by Marine friendly forces eight miles behind us. In reality, due to that Marine delay in air cover, we traded daylight for moonlight. That was not a fair or beneficial exchange for Task Force Faith. The moonlight only highlighted our positions. We were silhouettes in the moonlight, walking in the snowy white backdrop of the Chosin Reservoir.
Statement: "Close support requests beyond the capabilities of the 1st Marine Air Wing were to be reported to the Fifth Air Force." [26] On 28 November, the forces available to General Harris consisted of MAG 12 with two fighter and one night fighter squadrons at Wonsan, MAG 33 with one fighter and one night fighter squadron at Yonpo, and a fighter squadron in Badoeng Strait. [27] FAFIK on 1 December cut existing red tape, gave General Harris autonomy in the conduct of air operations in support of X Corps, and instructed him to proceed without reference to Fifth Air Force except when reinforcements were needed. The first days of December saw a steady shift of the fast carrier effort toward complete concentration in the X Corps zone. (That exception rule was not followed. Instead, it was passed on directly to the Navy, thus bypassing that Fifth Air Force notification order.)
Fact in contradiction: 1st MAW failed to inform Fifth Air Force it needed help, as required. Up on the plateau, following the attacks of the 27th and 28th, comparative quiet reigned. But the enemy controlled the roads. Marine and Army units had been separated into a series of isolated perimeters. In this situation, Marine air commander General Harris had strongly recommended to ComNavFE a sustained effort by the fast carriers in the X Corps zone, and had stated that Fifth Air Force concurred in this proposal. But an evening dispatch from FAFIK on the 29th indicated that such concurrence applied only to that day's operations. In view of the "critical condition" in the EUSAK area, it asked for a divided effort for the next few days. [28]
"During the time that the 7th Marines was heavily engaged in combat with the CCF 124th Division, a controversy between General Almond and General Partridge over the control of the 1st Marine Air Wing came to a head. Under existing procedure, the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center at Seoul controlled the assignment of missions to the 1st Marine Air Wing. General Almond felt that during a period of active ground combat when the local ground tactical situation could change drastically within an hour or two, he, the local commander, should have complete command over the air units supporting the ground troops. On 4 November, General Partridge flew to Wonsan to hold a conference with General Almond on the subject. General Almond won his point. The Fifth Air Force ordered the 1st Marine Air Wing to assume direct responsibility for close support of X Corps without reference to the Joint Operations Center. Close support requests beyond the capabilities of the 1st Marine Air Wing were to be reported to the Fifth Air Force." [29] Without reference to the Joint Operations Center would place any close support under the Marine air operations center at Hagaru. By not intervening in the Marine monopoly here, Almond had placed more faith in the Marine Corps (to equate air support) than General Smith ever had in him. That was a huge mistake on Almond's part, and his Army forces paid with their blood in that time lost.
While highest praise was given to the 1st MAW, the confusion caused by MG Harris' involvement doomed the MAW's independent actions. On 1 January 1951, the Fifth Air Force reclaimed their original operational control over the 1st MAW. Whether the Marine Corps liked it or not (and understandably, they did not), their air-to-ground control was returned to the authorization of the Fifth Air Force. The Department of the Air Force's "priority" authority was abused and misused, therefore it was recalled. General Smith tried in vain to recover at least one squadron in South Korea. When he appealed to General Ridgway, he learned Lesson 101 in the military chain of command. General Ridgway merely replied, "Sorry...I don't command Fifth Air Force." Case closed. Like Smith, he never commanded the MAW.
What was Smith's "new" plan for compliance with Almond's order to assist Task Force Faith on his withdrawal? Was it (as all evidence suggests) redundantly delayed or simply ignored? That question remains without a firm answer. Yudam-ni Marines did not return to Hagaru until 3-4 December. The General Barr reference, "both general's agree..," has no place in this. Barr was either in a Joint Command with Smith, or he was merely an observer at Almond's conference involving his own concern, over his remaining authority?
If General Barr was in Joint Command, then he could have delegated his authority to his ADC Hodes and nothing would had changed, except it would have countermanded Almond's total operational control to Smith. MG Barr merely recalled BG Hodes from Chosin to avoid any conflict of interest between Hodes and Smith. So we have another Catch 22 (irrational decision) here. If MG Barr is blamed for the withdrawal of the tank command, he had to share joint command with MG Smith to do that. Each man was equal in rank because of different chain of commands. Again, this is a moot point. No indication was given to Barr regarding that "Joint Command" authority. Without it, Smith did not need Barr's agreement--or disagreement--one way or the other.
One of the strange and unsolved mysteries in all of this is whether or not General Smith accepted General Almond's directive that he was in full charge of all forces in the frozen Chosin area. The reality seems to be that he did not accept full command of all three battalions east of the reservoir, since there are no clear (only controversial) records to support that he issued any orders directly concerning our force there. [30] Nor have any reports connected directly to the Army units benefiting or "contributing" to his own Marine divisions security directly or indirectly--totally disregarding the use of our tank connection. Indeed, much to the contrary, MG Smith disputed this over the PUC Award for the remainder of his life. [31]
While reports seem to be manipulated to imply that Smith issued a "withdrawal order" to Task Force Faith, and granted a "priority order" to use "his own" air cover, these two things are lacking in any detail within Marine Corps recorded history. But that acceptance or non-acceptance of a Marine commitment for this Marine commander to command an Army force directly overlapped and bound the Department of the Navy--the Mama & Papa of the Marine Corps--in my opinion just as surely as if those Army forces were aboard any Navy ship at sea. However, the controversy over MG Smith's apparent withdrawal order to Faith is of importance here to lock in that question, added to his constant interference between the Department of the Navy and the Navy's own acquiescence to Smith's position after his death (1977). Merely to now continuously maintain their own 22-year denial of the PUC award is a relevant issue.
Below are the numbers (per day) recorded in history over the "commitment" Task Force Faith made to the Changjin (Chosin) Campaign. It is for each reader to judge for him or herself whether that commitment we made on the east side of the reservoir was or is worth any honorable mention of any kind to Task Force MacLean-Faith or those men being eligible to qualify for any type of an award. As the Marine public relations officer stated with regards to Lt. Colonel Don Faith receiving the Medal of Honor, Faith received it for simply "doing his duty, and not very well at that." [32] Thus, you the reader of this research may calculate the situation from these new facts and decide for yourself whether or not there is justification for these men to receive recognition for their role in the Chosin Reservoir campaign. I hold fast to the personal knowledge that we did the best we could with what we had to work with.
In closing this research, let me restate one thing that I have repeated several times within these pages. The group listed in the Days One through Nine made no claim to any fame at Chosin. Nor did we receive any for being there. That may be unjust, but that is nevertheless the reality. But that reality stretched farther than it should have. For example, why the innuendos and degradation over our task force integrity? Where did it originate from and why is it included within such a tragic and fateful event of defeat?
It certainly did not come from the CCF enemy, for they honor our captured regimental standard in their capital museum as a military trophy. If not from the enemy and not from the Army survivors of the Chosin campaign, the answer must originate from the Marines. Then one must consider what was their purpose in shifting blame to someone else. I view it as their own guilt trip, not ours. We Army veterans do not need to justify the demise of our truck convoy of wounded due to our tank removal ‘contribution" to the Marine withdrawal. Instead, the Marine Corps should step forward and justify why those tanks were truly needed at Hagaru-ri and admit who truly bears the larger part of the responsibility, particularly considering the circumstances created by General Smith in his own failure to locate his replaced 5th Marine Regiment at Hagaru-ri instead of at Yudam-ni. Why did he fail to relocate this loose regiment at his weakest point at Chosin?
Also, I pose two other speculative questions to consider, given the years of established publicity on the Marine Division being the sole force at Chosin. Consider these scenarios. (1) What if the 7th Division had delayed their relocation by 24 hours? (2) What if the 5th Marines had not been replaced by that delay? The Marine code is that they take care of their own. What a difference a day would make in additional air support to them on the east side of the reservoir.
For another reference to a "Phantom Force," see: http://31rct.tripod.com/phantomforce.html. There is a list of 844 Army KIAs casualties by date. The list is from the American National Battle Monument Commission. (The Marine total is 556 KIAs, per Navy History.) See the internet source below:
Navy History www.history.navy.mil/books/field/ch9a.htm#top (Review Chapters 8 & 9.)
Total = 844 KIAs (See KIA East of Chosin page located on the index of links in this research paper.)
*Of special note above regarding those KIAs or MIAs on December 3-6, 1950: Of these 119 men, 111 of them were exclusively from the 57th Field Artillery Battalion. The dates were chosen only for some closure. It can be justifiably assumed that those men were casualties at that final roadblock at Hudong-ni on December 1 and 2. The 57th Field Artillery (my outfit) was officially disbanded, pending a reorganization, after that date. Of this group, 98% percent were from Task Force MacLean-Faith's forces. The rest were located around Hagaru-ri.
The force east of Chosin paid a tremendous price in lives lost for being there. Therefore, we will not yield that page in military history to anyone who wishes to capitalize upon our action or continuously seek to claim it as their own. I believe in a quote attributed to Five Star Admiral William "Bull" Halsey which said, "There are no extraordinary men...just extraordinary circumstances that ordinary men are forced to deal with." Lieutenant Colonel Faith was forced to deal with his own extraordinary circumstances east of Chosin, and he played out the hand that fate had dealt to him as best he could. In the end, he gave his own life in that endeavor. What more could the Marine public relations officer who degraded Faith's Medal of Honor expect of him?
Remember also that the lowest ranking line soldier or Marine had no idea whatsoever what his immediate higher command authority was doing behind the front lines. Hopefully, this research may shed some light on the action behind that higher echelon activity and that it may bring some small sense of closure over this forgotten Army battle east of Chosin, especially to those related to thee men who lost their lives there. That tragic event cannot be undone. The dead cannot be restored--only their remains can be reclaimed. History must be revisited with this in mind and a fresh look at past written history to finally unravel those mysteries that remain. Remember, too, I did not create all the reported discrepancies in past histories. I have merely highlighted them in my research.
To all those men assembled at Chosin, regardless of their service branch, I salute you for your personal service, sacrifice, and hardship in that Frozen Chosin campaign.
[1] Appleman, East of Chosin & Escaping the Trap, stated this order was not effect until 0800, next morning.
[2] See Hammel, Chosin pages, 211-212. Here there is a report that this mission for Mupyong-ni was reinstated by (suggestion) of X Corps to the 1st Marine Division.
[3] Appleman, East of Chosin, p. 322.
[4] See Ebb & Flow, page 29, Chart 2 - Organization of UNC Ground Forces in Korea 23 November 1950, (www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/ebb/ch2.htm )
[5] X Corps 01 19, 29 Nov 50, page 238, Marine G-3
[6] Captain George A. Rasula, Assistant S-3, 3/31st Battalion, source, enclosure, National Archives interview.
[7] General Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story, page 138
[8] Per Marine history, on the evening of the 30th at Hagaru-ri, "The enemy had shot his bolt." There were no more threatening attacks against Hagari-ri after this night.
[9] History of United States Naval Operations: Korea by James A. Field, Jr., Chapter 9, Part 2
[10] Captain Robert Drake, Enclosure 8, National Archives
[11] An artillery battalion was rich in communications equipment and expertise, in both radio & wire maintenance.
[12] Chosin, Eric Hammel, page 143
[13] Note 8, page 131, Msg, CG 1st Marine Div to COs 5th and 7th Marines, 1920, 30 Nov 50
[14] War in Korea, 1951, p.188
[15] East of Chosin, page 340
[16] Marine History, page 238
[17] Nov 30 - "During the afternoon we started our withdrawal, blowing the ammunition dump and burning the ration dump." Archives, Capt. Rasula
[18] See Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p.358
[19] The report that the withdrawal order from Smith was received 011500 Dec. via a forward observer's jeep indicates that the means was there to call in accurate fire mission from that observer. Artillery liaison planes were flying over head as well. Col. Anderson, archive report
[20] Other authors' interpret Almond's order to "gain contact" with Task Force Faith by one regiment withdrawing from Yudam-ni for that purpose. However, Smith's order in that withdrawal from Yudam-ni was for those two regiments to "Expedite... movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal south." (See footnote 12.) But our task force was northeast. Thus, Smith had no intention of sending any force eastward at the time he issued this order.
[21] Russ, Breakout, p.306. LTC Taplett, commander of 3rd Battalion 5th Marines.
[22] This is covered in detail in Appleman's book, Escaping the Trap.
[23] Appleman, Escaping the Trap, pages 217, 223, and 232. First, we needed that ammo. Our breakout was delayed from 1100 to 1300 hours for air to ground support on our side of the reservoir. Action on the west side was already under way. This disputes the "priority status" promised by General Smith for Task Force Faith.
[24] See Appleman, Escaping the Trap, p.223
[25] USS Leyte (CV 32) facts, history, Leyte. After two weeks of preparation, departed 6 September 1950 to join TF 77 in the Far East to support United Nations Forces in Korea. Leyte arrived Sasebo, Japan, 8 October 1950 and made final preparations for combat operations. From 9 October through 19 January 1951, the ship and her aircraft spent 92 days at sea and flew 3,933 sorties against the North Korean aggressors.
[26] Appleman: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, page 744, June-November 1950
[27] US Navy History, Chapter 9, Part 2
[28] Ibid, US Navy History
[29] Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, page 744
[30] He did, however, supersede his authority by "attaching" B/31 to Drysdale's Task Force, a point he denied in the PUC Award by rejecting them, saying that they "attached themselves to this force."
[31] See libraryautomation.com/nymas/changjinjournal.html#CHANGJIN%20JOURNAL%2004.15.00
[32] Captain Capraro's statement per Martin Russ, Breakout, page 334, on another Marine officer being more worthy of that award.
I have reviewed the recently published book, The Gentle Warrior: Oliver P. Smith, USMC, by Clifton La Bree. I wrote to him about my views on his subject, and we had an exchange of opinions. I enclosed a comment on the declassified Operational Order #25 that states that Mupyong-ni was reassigned to the 7th Division. He replied that it was "beyond the scope of his research." Like other authors before him, he writes the one continual, redundant thread throughout all the books on Chosin: that MG Smith "delayed" his orders. Only one author, Clay Blair, ever stated that Smith "refused" to move forward on the east side of Chosin prior to 24 November.
This latest book by La Bree goes even further, including a quote that states that General Smith "disobeyed orders." I am amazed that this author would include that statement as a supportive defense of the career assessment of an elevated four-star general's career, calling Smith a "gentle warrior" rather than a controversial one. On February 21, 2002, I received this comment from Clifton La Bree: "Your defense of Almond and criticism of General Smith defies logic and is contrary to opinions taken by most historians familiar with the subject."
Yet opinion is often contrary to reality. No historians as of this writing, including La Bree, have ever admitted any knowledge of Opn O 25 in their reports. [1] That information is a vital piece of the Chosin puzzle. Most historians do agree that Smith was dragging his feet, however no historian has ever stated that he was the only division commander in the Chosin Reservoir campaign to do that, or that it was an honorable thing for him to do. On page 219 of La Bree’s book, it states that "...it is not generally known that one reason that the division could be saved was that General Smith disobeyed orders." [2] If this was true, he could well have been charged with a court martial offense. Any defensive statement would have to be weighed within a trial for his dereliction of duty. However, no such charges were ever filed. Therefore, no record exists of MG Smith disobeying any order. Instead, there is implied praise by most historians because he did so. To what end? It is difficult to understand whether this quote was intended to praise or degrade General Smith over that disobedience. Does that defy logic? So one should search for a reason and some supportive fact behind this statement.
I am not a noted author, nor do I pretend to be. However, I believe that there are some mistakes that need to be pointed out about LaBree’s book. Early in his book, he stated on pages 165-166 that:
"During the forty-five years since Smith wrote his Korean narrative, more information has become available regarding the performance and fate of the RCT 31...The loss of all records and most of the officers and noncoms had contributed to a lack of appreciation for the contribution that the unit made...certain facts should be pointed out, because they directly relate to O.P. Smith's performance as commanding general...."
"When Smith assembled what he called his 'aide-memoire,' he was not aware of the significant role played by the army units east of Chosin. As a matter of a fact, he was probably influenced by Colonel Beall, who had been responsible for the rescue of hundreds of survivors from RCT 31. Ironically, in 1953 Colonel Beall submitted a scathing report against the army in the Chosin campaign, which calls to question his powers of observation and his integrity.... It is now clear that RCT 31's actions spared the 1st Marine Division the heavy casualties that the Chinese would have inflicted if the army units had not delayed their attack. It is possible that RCT 31 saved the division from destruction."
How does the observation that it was "possible that RCT 31 saved the division from destruction," tie into the total destruction of the RCT 31 via the La Bree statement, "because they directly relate to O.P. Smith's performance as commanding general...."
The reality is that the reassignment of the original Marine mission to the 31 RCT and its ultimate destruction did "directly relate to O.P. Smith's performance as commanding general....," as did his utter failure to reinforce Hagaru-ri on 26 November with his 5th Marine Regiment--now freed of their mission and replaced by the 7th Division orders. This reality, in fact, unraveled on 270800 November 50, which was the scheduled hour of the stated Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Did General Smith disobey an order to send his forces forward in defiance of any X Corps order on that date? Supportive evidence by Marine history and most historians is that he did not. In fact, their records indicate Smith over-reacted in a near state of panic to realign his 5th Marine Regiment as his lead forces at Yudam-ni to conform to that order.
"In planning the advance, Smith had assumed the full relief of the 5th Marines east of the reservoir by noon of the 26th. He apparently expected the entire 7th Division combat team to arrive by that hour, but General Barr had called for the relief of the Marines by a minimum of one infantry battalion, an order satisfied by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry. In any event, the remainder of Colonel MacLean’s forces did not reach the new zone by noon on the 26th or by 0800 on the 27th, the scheduled hour of the Marine advance. The full 5th Marines consequently did not reach Yudam-ni on the 26th, and the plan had to be changed since Colonel Murray was with his forces east of the reservoir. Colonel Litzenberg, commanding the 7th Marines, took charge of the opening effort." (Mossman, Ebb & Flow, pages 89-90, per Marine history)
Smith is credited with an urgency in moving his forces toward Mupyong-ni westward at Yudam-ni, contradicting any claim that he disobeyed or delayed any order. MG Smith’s forces were where his command (not Almond's) had placed them when the enemy hit at Yudam-ni. The effort to establish as fact that "Smith saved his command by disobeying orders," at Chosin falls short of reality. That action cannot be proven. (Call to mind the General Billy Mitchell case supportive evidence: "conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline." He was charged and found guilty.)
Reality must therefore point to some earlier event at Chosin--Smith's delay in moving his forces on schedule. It is common, publicized knowledge that earlier than 24 November, General Smith delayed, stalled, refused, or dragged his feet. The opinion that MG Smith used delaying tactics has been put forth by most historians of the Chosin Reservoir campaign. This can be proven via schedules. But, again they were refuted and invalidated by Almond’s reassigning those delayed missions to the 7th Infantry Division. General Smith was never charged with any misconduct. Nor were any charges of "dereliction of duty" ever filed against him. Therefore, no official record of his disobedience exists. Instead there is only implied praise that he did so by most historians. Again, to what end? One must search for reason and fact behind this statement as well.
It is a fact that since ancient times silence has been viewed as approval over any event when ignored by others involved. Reality: [RED FLAG] CG Almond did respond to Smith's various delays at Seoul, the Fusen Reservoir, at the relocation of the 3rd Infantry Division to Sach’ang-ni, and at the Chosin Reservoir by removing MG Smith’s zone of responsibility and transferring those zones to the 7th Division. That is the reason Lt. Col. Faith was at Fusen and was the closest unit to relocate to Chosin. [3] Smith's delays were never condoned by Almond's silence. He was merely reassigned. While most historians have collectively established a legend for General Smith, it is a legend that has no supportive evidence. Again, to what end did they create the legend? It was their way of giving credit where they felt that credit was due--that MG Smith saved his division by "disobeying orders" [4] and not having forces further into enemy territory.
But the reality was that all UN forces were already deep within enemy territory. The 7th Division was already 45 miles north of Smith's forces. There was enemy ahead, behind, and right and left of us. We were no more venerable to attack than our pursuit of the North Korean enemy within their own territory. This offsets opinions that state that attacking the enemy earlier would have saved all commands by upsetting the enemy timetable to engage us. MacArthur’s stated opinion (similar to President Lincoln’s opinion in the Civil War) was, "By delay the enemy will gain on you." Different opinions on the same issue. What was the most rational approach?
Similar charges have also been leveled by most historians against General Almond of X Corps in Korea. They state that he had "total disregard for his forces," yet no charges of "conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline" were ever officially filed against him. Still, Almond's so-called cavalier attitude with regards to the safety of the troops is a common legend publicized by most historians of that day, as well as by some of the subordinate Army commanders who carried out his orders. In spite of his purported reputation for having disregard for troop safety, Almond continued in command (silent acceptance of his authority) under General Ridgway, even after Ridgway replaced General MacArthur in April 1951. CG Almond gave MG Smith a Distinguished Service Cross for his service at Chosin. Those historians who defend the validity of that medal, must surely, although perhaps unwittingly, defend the X Corps Commanding General's established right, authority, and integrity to issue that medal. Whether outside of military regulations stating the criterion to qualify for it, is another matter. [5] They cannot support both views without contradiction.
I have my own opinion and version of what happened at Chosin concerning the forces I served with. My version may deeply offend others, as other versions offend me. The right to have differing opinions is a protected freedom in this country. Silence over Smith’s alleged delays does not rule out the rationality of other military options left open to Almond. He, with MacArthur's permission, could remove the 1st Marine Division from its mission, place them in reserve status, and go around them. Implying that events and delays caused MG Smith to dominate the Chosin Reservoir Campaign over CG Almond is beyond the reality of the urgent situation of set timetables for that combined offensive to go forward on 0800 November 24th. The many excuses supplied in support of MG Smith's actions or inactions will not withstand extensive scrutiny. Having been relieved of the attack westward from Yudam-ni, why did he fail to fully relocate his 5th Marine Regiment into Hagaru-ri, instead ordering them an additional 14 miles beyond Hagaru into Yudam-ni (in front of, rather than behind) the 7th Marine Regiment already there?.
If we are ever to obtain closure for the Korean War, events must be placed in perceptive. Legendary opinions must be replaced by the reality of that day. Established documents must come forward to place forces where they were and a reasonable explanation must be given to explain why those forces were there. Let the chips fall where they may, regardless of who may be offended by reality. If legendary figures must fall, so be it. Reality will never completely erase the shadow those legendary figures have cast over the years, but full light will allow history to flourish and spread, nourished by that light. Where is that "one historian" explaining the reason why the 7th Division was at Chosin in the first place? The statement, "because General Almond wanted them involved," is a little inadequate. Anyone who believes that Almond (who was known to have an aggressive nature) would fail to react, is missing the truth about the great drama that took place at Chosin.
The reality is that Almond inserted Task Force MacLean into the mix, and Lt. Colonel Faith was officially attached on 29 November to the 1st Marine Division. Thus, any benefit Smith derived from these forces and Task Force Dog cannot be overlooked in Army forces involved in "the saving of his division." Almond had his own delayed plans for history about Chosin, via the 7th Infantry Division, 31st Infantry Regiment, OPN O 25, classified and secured in the National Archives. Regretfully, someone uncovered it in 1979, but placed no value on that information. I obtained a copy of it in 1991. Its contents peaked a unique interest for me because, as an Army survivor of the drama that took place east of the Chosin Reservoir, I understood its value to Frozen Chosin history. - Ray Vallowe
[1] This document was copied on 1-9-79, indicating that someone had it from the National Archives and in the public domain after that date. Why it was not commented on by "most historians" is unknown to me.
[2] Smith’s biography, The Gentle Warrior, page 219.
[3] Col. Faith some 45 air miles south of his parent regiment, located near Samsu, near the Yalu River.
[4] The Gentle Warrior, page 219. Source: The New York Times editorial for Thursday, 1 September 1955.
[5] 3-7. Distinguished Service Cross: a. The Distinguished Service Cross, section 3742, title 10, United States Code (10 USC 3742), was established by Act of Congress 9 July 1918 (amended by act of 25 July 1963). The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades. Since Smith stated that he never got the citation that was required and that stated why he was awarded that medal, its legality is in doubt. Nevertheless, it is listed to his credit. That criterion required to receive it is lacking. When did he "involve risk of life so extraordinary" as to set him apart?
Voice Your Opinion. Ray Vallowe has an outspoken opinion about the Army's role at the Chosin Reservoir. Even before his research made its public appearance on the Korean War Educator, he knew that his opinions on the subject clashed with existing written accounts of what happened to Army troops during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Furthermore, he knew that his opinions would likely clash with Marine opinions. Consequently, he requested that this page be established within his research to allow public rebuttals from other historians and veterans of the Korean War. Ray Vallowe is fully aware that his research might draw comments, both positive and negative, from KWE readers. If you wish to comment on his research, he invites you to do so. The KWE is more than willing to provide the opportunity for any and all to express their opinions on this controversial subject. However, rebuttals that are personal attacks on Mr. Vallowe for having the opinion that he has will not be posted.
[KWE Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by Ray Vallowe and those who disagree with him are not necessarily the opinions of the Korean War Educator.]
"For the past couple of days I have been going over Ray Vallowe’s analysis of the history of the Korean War. I am impressed with his detailed account of now unclassified writings of some Army generals and historians. Mr. Vallowe has apparently spent a lot of time and effort to "even the score" with the Marines, including General O. P. Smith. I will not try to dispute his writings and his conclusions since he is using a lot of the histories written by others.
But let me say this in answer to his "long" analysis. In my recollection of my Korean War experiences, I have stayed away from being critical of other United Nations forces, including the U.S. Army. I feel they all had a tough job to do in Korea and most did the best they could under the circumstances of their previous training or lack thereof. When we lost one person due to combat, it did not matter what service he was in, it was felt by all of us who were there. But in defense of my beloved Marine Corps, I must take exception to his comments against our Division Commander General Smith. I am sure that through it all, General Smith did what he thought was the right thing to do. It was his duty to object when he had objections; it was his duty to look out for the safety of his men; it was his duty to fight the battles among the generals--all to make sure that he did not put Marines under his command in preventable bad situations.
I note that Mr. Vallowe apparently served in mostly Field Artillery units, and I don’t know if he serviced with any infantry units. These are normally units that play a different role in combat situations, but in the case of Korea and the Chosin, they would be intermingled and would face the same dangers. I searched hard to find any complimentary language towards Marines, but I could not find any. I must admit I have not read his complete account, and maybe I overlooked any compliments he may have made.
I would say to Mr. Vallowe, you are entitled to have your opinions about the Marines' participation in combat in Korea. Further, I will mention again that you have access to histories that have been written. But I know that history can be shaped the way a writer wants it to be. On behalf of General O. P. Smith, our division commander, and Cols. Raymond L. Murray, Homer Litzenburg, Chesty Puller, and our infantry regimental commanders (I must point out they were all World War II combat veterans), along with the many officers and enlisted men of the First Marine Division, I take offense at your comments about the Korean War history.
I will stick with my opinions as one who served in Korea for the first year of the war, and I will give praise to the men of the Army, Marines, Air Force, and Navy for each in their own way contributing to the freedom of South Korea. I am proud to be an American and a Retired Marine and am proud to have served with the men from all the services. They did what they were ordered to do and made us all thankful to each one of them. I only hope that I don’t ever discount what they did in Korea." -
[KWE Note: Gene Dixon's memoir about his service in Korea can be found on the KWE.]
"I sincerely admire and commend Gene Dixon for the following: "I have stayed away from being critical of other United Nations forces, including the U.S. Army. I feel they all had a tough job to do in Korea and most did the best they could under the circumstances of their previous training or lack thereof." Well stated. He is therefore personally exempt from any such direct criticism and should not be offended by it. I salute him for his personal service and sacrifice, months after my own service ended in Korea.
However, I have an opposing view on Gene Dixon's statement: "General Smith did what he thought was the right thing to do. It was his duty to object when he had objections... it was his duty to fight the battles among the generals--all to make sure that he did not put Marines under his command in preventable bad situations." Here is my difference of opinion. The battles were not between American generals as in our past Civil War. A general in charge of combat troops has an obligation to pursue and engage an enemy as his orders require. Indeed, that concept extended all the way down through the lowly Army private in the ranks--at least it did in the 1950s. The division general's personal opinion of the merits of the final order are of no concern. Nor is any officer's high opinion required in regard to his appointed superior as a prerequisite for his command.
This rule of military obedience was highlighted in the relief of General MacArthur by President Truman in early 1951. General MacArthur was removed because he was continually in conflict with orders from the President, his commander in chief. MacArthur's problem was not that he was not trying to win this war. It was in his failure to understand the new concept of a "limited war." Much has been stated about his responsibilities to carry out orders as given:
"It was MacArthur's privilege, and his duty, to give his views as to the rightness of a contemplated course, and to offer his own recommendations before the decision was rendered. It was neither his privilege nor his duty to take issue with the President's decision after it had been made known to him." (Gen. Ridgway 153)
"The concept of duty, in military service, has been elevated to extreme importance, and obedience to properly constituted authority is primal. No man in uniform, be he private or five-star general, may decide for himself whether an order is consonant with his personal views. While the loyalty he owes his superiors is reciprocated with equal force in the loyalty owed him from above, the authority of his superiors is not open to question." (Gen. Ridgway 234)
General Marshall (JCS) could not condone MacArthur's conduct during senate the hearings in 1951. "You preach loyalty all the time. You are dealing with an organization where a man receives an order from even a captain which leads to his death or wound, and he has to obey that order... [T]hat has to be instinctive. Now, if the example at the top is contrary to that, then you have got a very serious situation."
General Smith of the Marine Corps was continually in conflict with General Almond, his superior. MacArthur was fired. Smith ended his career with four stars instead of two. What was Smith’s magic? He was continually being saved by reactions of inter-service rivalry from World War II. No one would dare relieve a commander from another branch of the service.
Gene Dixon said, “I note that Mr. Vallowe apparently served in mostly Field Artillery units, and I don’t know if he serviced with any infantry units. These are normally units that play a different role in combat situations, but in the case of Korea and the Chosin, they would be intermingled and would face the same dangers.”
Perhaps this official Army record will update my credentials in this matter:
HQ Battery, 7th ID 57th FAB, at Chosin
Vallowe, Raymond C., E-4 Cpl
MOS-4812, Heavy Weapons Infantryman
In the United States Army, members of an infantry combat unit are designated by the color stripe insignia for any PFC and above. The stripes are on a blue background with gold stripes. All other support units from other technical support from outside that division had the reverse of blue stripes on a gold background. It is my understanding that the Marine Corps maintains that “ALL” Marines are combatants, and no designation separates one from the other. - Thank you for your comments. - Ray Vallowe
I won’t turn this into a running battle of opinions. This will be my last comment on this and I will let others voice their agreements or disagreements. I, as a Marine, am satisfied with General Smith and his actions. Also as a Marine I am more than familiar with "good order and discipline", wherein orders from superiors are obeyed. It was General MacArthur that requested the Marines, and he must have had "good" reason to do so. One of the Marine Corps' main missions is that of amphibious landings, which they have shown their expertise during World War II and the Inchon landing. Marines by their very nature are offensive oriented. At the Chosin, the Marines were put in an "out of ordinary" situation for them. Long supply lines over very narrow roadways, and I am not sure that they received the support from the Army command that the situation demanded. I am sure that this was a "big concern" of General Smith. I end by saying again, "Thanks" to all of those that played a role in making South Korea to be what it is today. And this, of course, includes all of the brave United Nations forces, including the U.S. Army. We would do well to let them and the world know that we appreciate their sacrifices which sometime included giving their lives. My opinions are my own and based only on my own participation in the "Not-Forgotten War" in Korea. - Gene Dixon
