Outpost Wars

 
Where American blood ran just as red as the blood of those who were wounded & killed in Korea during 1950 and 1951.

Table of Contents:

• Posters & Introduction
• Grid Coordinates of Familiar Outposts
• Battles Remembered - Outpost Harry
• Outpost Harry 15th Inf. Command Report
• The Hook - D.M. Butler's Report
• The 2nd Battalion - the Royal Australian Regiment
• Old Baldy - 1952

Posters & Introduction

Our friend Curley Knepp, who lived in Korea and worked as an accountant at Osan Air Base, attended a 50th Anniversary Commemoration ceremony at Camp Casey in September of 2001. Camp Casey is the home of the 2nd Infantry Division. The ceremony was sponsored by the United States Forces Korea 50th Anniversary Commemoration Committee in conjunction with the ROK 50th Anniversary Commemoration Committee. During the ceremony, the anniversary committee distributed flyers which had excellent graphics of the nations and the units/divisions who participated in the outpost wars in Korea during 1952/53. Below are two of the flyer graphics. To view a sharper, larger image of either of them, just place your cursor on the image and click. Likewise, most photographs on this and other pages of The Korean War Educator can be viewed as larger images by clicking on them. The introductory remarks which appear below these posters are entirely the work of the commemoration committee, not the text editors of this website.

The term "Battles of the Outposts" encompasses the fighting that took place in the final two years of the Korean War. In the first year of the war sweeping movement up and down the peninsula characterized the fighting. Combat raged from the 38th Parallel south to the Pusan Perimeter then, with the landing at Inchon and the Perimeter breakout, up to the Yalu, and finally a retreat south again in the face of the massive Chinese intervention.

After the United Nations resumed the offensive in January 1951 and stopped the subsequent Communist counter-attacks cold, the front stabilized north of Seoul. With the start of armistice negotiations in July 1951, the ground war settled into a static phase with action characterized by limited regimental or battalion attacks to seize or recover key tactical terrain, aggressive patrolling, and increasingly heavy artillery barrages by both sides. With the exception of the flare-up in the fall of 1951 during a hiatus in truce negotiations, this characterized the war until the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953.

If the grand maneuvers ceased, the fighting did not. In fact, nearly half of the war's 140,000 United States military casualties occurred during the "static" phase. Early in the truce negotiations both sides agreed that combat would continue until they concluded the final agreement. The armistice line would be the line of contact at the time the truce became effective.

Since both sides intended to create a demilitarized zone by pulling the opposing forces back two kilometers from the line of contact, their respective strategies focused on the seizure and maintenance of a fine of strong outposts to ensure that friendly forces held defensible terrain when the armistice came into effect.
From the standpoint of the men engaged, the relatively small scale battles that engulfed these outposts as the opposing forces engaged in bloody struggles to hold or retake the hills that dominated the main line of resistance were every bit as intense and demanding as any in history. This phase of the war became the small unit commander's fight.

Most actions took place at battalion, company, and platoon level, but the intensity and duration of the artillery and mortar barrages from both sides eclipsed those of the trench warfare of World War I.

In the bitter combat in and around the Punchbowl, Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, the Nevada Cities complex, Hill 717, the Hook, and others in a long, long list, America had asked its young men to endure some of the fiercest combat in its history. The awareness of the continuing truce talks at Panmunjom made it even more difficult for the soldier to deal with the unremitting danger and hardships.

At this time, every soldier knew that they fought over tiny pieces of nearly vertical real estate while an armistice could be signed at any time. No one wanted to make the list as the last casualty of the war.

This presented an obvious challenge to leadership at every level as they sought to minimize casualties while accomplishing the mission. The endurance of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the United Nations forces who saw it through day after day of mortal combat against an implacable foe, when international politics denied them a traditional battlefield victory, testified to their valor and fidelity.

Americans have appropriately called the Korean War "The Forgotten War." The "static" phase has been the forgotten part of the forgotten war. It is fitting that we take this opportunity to commemorate the heroism and sacrifice of the "Battles of the Outposts."

Grid Coordinates of Familiar Outposts

Map coordinates supplied to the Third Infantry Division Society by Martin Markley of California resulted in the longitude and latitude identification of hills in Korea. These hills were the sites of some of the Korean War's fiercest battles to take and/or hold ground. On them, thousands of Americans, as well as veterans of other allied nations, were mortally or seriously wounded. We are grateful to Martin for sharing his research results on this page of the Korean War Educator website.

Geodetic References for the Hills on Which the Outpost Battles Raged

Battles Remembered - Outpost Harry

[KWE Note: Information submitted by Martin Markley of California, a survivor of Outpost Harry.]

15th Infantry Regiment Command Report, July 12, 1953.

During the period 16 May to 5 June, the 15th Infantry had been relieved of its responsibility for the Outpost Harry sector. When reports from various higher staff sections had been correlated and evaluated, and the higher commanders were assured beyond any reasonable doubt that Outpost HARRY was to be attacked by numerically superior Chinese force, it was ordered that the 15th Infantry Regiment, a more experienced and battle tried unit, be made responsible for the Outpost HARRY sector no later than the 6th of June. This was accomplished by relieving the 2nd Battalion 65th Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry. The regiment prepared to meet the onslaught of the Chinese.

Following is a physical description of Outpost HARRY, for most of the action from 10-18 June centered around this hill. Outpost HARRY is situated some 425 yards northeast of the friendly MLR which is on a general southeast-northwest line from the Chorwon Valley to the Kumwha Valley. The hill is approximately 1280 feet high and is locate about 320 yards south, and part of a larger hill mass occupied by the enemy, referred to as Star Hill. The outpost commands a good view of the enemy terrain and his avenues of approach to the MLR position. Since the elevation of the outpost is greater than that of any friendly -held terrain within an area of a mile, the position affords early warning of enemy approach to the main battle line.

The road approach to the outpost from the MLR runs north along an intermittent stream to the rear of the outpost, where the supply point is located. From here, movements to the position must be accomplished dismounted.

The position itself contains a communications trench which runs from the supply point forward some 315 yards to the forward observer bunker on the northernmost slope. Here the trench joins another trench which makes a complete circle around the forward position of the outpost; this position of the outpost is refered to as The Loop. Approximately 80 yards to the rear of The Loop, along a finger of the ridge running to the right side of the outpost, an additional trench extends approximately 110 yards. This finger is mutually supporting with The Loop position and helps protect the probable avenues of approach into position. The left side of the outpost is steep enough to afford a natural barrier to the attacking enemy force.

Aerial reconnaissance from 1 June to 8 June showed much increased enemy activity. This activity included construction of new ant-aircraft artillery positions, self-propelled gun revetments. artillery positions, supply bunkers, personnel bunkers, a new bridge and road improvements along the enemy main supply routes. An enemy offensive was obvious.

During the same period prior to the attack of 10 June, increased personnel sightings were reported during daylight hours. During the period of darkness, an increasing number of vehicle lights were reported, generally in the rear areas moving south and southwest toward the enemy's main battle positions. Prior to the attack CCF artillery battalions positioned to fire into the 3rd Infantry sector disclosed the enemy to be employing 102mm rocket for the first time in this area.

Also evident during this period was increased enemy counter battery fire on friendly artillery positions. Incoming artillery and mortar rounds reported in the regimental sector increased from an average of 275 per day to 670 per day, during the 4 to 5 days prior to the initial attack on the outpost. During the attacks on Harry, a tremendous volume of rounds fell in all of the regimental sector, including service units and regimental headquarters.

The enemy disposition at this time were not pinpointed; however, it was well known that there were in contact two unidentified battalions of the 22nd Regiment, 74th Division, in the left sector and two unidentified battalions of the 221st Regiment, 74th Division, in the right portion of the 15th regimental sector. The 221st Regiment, 74th Division was located in the sector immediately opposite outpost HARRY. Reserves capable of intervention in the outpost HARRY action were the two reserve battalions of regiments in contact with the 15th Infantry in the left sector, as well as three battalions of the 220th Regiment, unlocated which were in the 74th Division reserve.

Then began the concentrated enemy drive which was to last for a week and was to cost the Chinese dearly for every engaged minute. At 1950 hours on the night of 10 June the first CCF sightings were reported, and each sighting was engaged by mortar and artillery fire. At 2130 hours an ambush patrol west of OP Dick in the sector of the Greek Battalion reported Chinese numbering approximately 250 coming of Jackson Heights (in front of OP Tom). Mortar and artillery began falling on the 15th MLR as well as outposts Dick and Harry. After a short but intense fire fight in the vicinity of Outpost DICK, including 2000 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire, the enemy withdrew. This was recognized as a possible enemy feint, and all units were alerted. At 2245, while attention was still focused on Outpost Dick, word came that the CCF were in the trenches on Outpost Harry, Bitter hand to hand combat was engaged in by members of Company "K", 15th Infantry and the Chinese were killed or driven from the trenches. The Chinese reinforced their attack four more times during the early morning hours, and as late as 0430 hours 11 June, were in the trench on the northern side of the outpost. In addition to a composite reserve local reserve committed by the 3rd battalion commander, Companies "E" and "C" 15th Infantry were committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were committed to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force. This tank-infantry team proved to be of great value in channelizing the enemy attack.

About 0530 the morning of the 11th, a daylight CCF attack in battalion strength was repulsed by elements of the outpost. An hour later, evacuation of dead and wounded began. This continued through the daylight hours. Colonel Russell F. Akers Jr., Regimental commander, reorganized placing Company "B", 15th Infantry, on the outpost, and placing responsibility for defense of this section on the 1st Battalion. The day continued with intermittent shelling of the outpost.

On 12 June at 0005 hours the Chinese moving through their own and friendly artillery gained the trenches in the rear of the outpost: hand to hand fighting followed. At 0032 hours the CCF gained the trench on the northern slope of the outpost while friendly forces held the southern trench. Bitter fighting ensued and the CCF made numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. Company "B", 5th Regimental Combat Team, was used to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were committed to the valley east of Outpost HARRY. as a diversionary force and again this force was highly successful in channelizing the enemy attack

At daybreak, about 0545 hours, the enemy withdrew and all action ceased. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and Colonel Akers took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "A" 5th Regimental Combat Team on the outpost.

On the night of 12 June at 2200 hours, enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF attack on the outpost which was broken up by friendly defensive fires. CCF were in the trench for a short time but were forced to withdraw. Fighting ceased at 2247. However, at 0208 the CCF attacked from the north, northeast, and northwest of the outpost. Bitter hand to hand fighting ensued as the enemy gained the trench on the northern slope of the outpost. Company "L", 15th infantry, reinforced and by 0450 hours the enemy was driven from the trenches and forced to withdraw. A platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion plus one platoon of infantry were dispatched to the valley east of outpost Harry and operated successfully as a diversionary force. All action ceased with the exception of friendly counter battery and counter mortar fire. Evacuation pf wounded and dead was begun, and the regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "C", 15th Infantry, on the outpost.

Daylight hours were utilized to clean the trenches and refurbish weapons' positions in anticipation of another attack during the hours of darkness. On the night of 13-14 June, ant approximately 0255, enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF screening action against the outpost from the east and west for the purpose of protecting recovery of their dead. This screening force was broken up by friendly defensive fires. Action became sporadic, with light enemy artillery and mortar fire falling on the outpost and MLR. By 0440 the enemy withdrew and all action ceased. The regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "G", 15th infantry on the outpost.

During the night of 14-15 June, at about 0125 the Chinese moving through friendly artillery and defensive fires, gained the trenches on the rear of the outpost, and intense hand to hand fighting followed. At 0222 hours, friendly forces held the outpost with the enemy reinforcing in the bitter hand to hand action. Company "E", 15th Infantry was committed to reinforce. One platoon from Heavy Tank Company and one platoon of infantry were again dispatched as diversionary force. At 0345 the enemy withdrew and action ceased; the regimental commander again reorganizing for new attacks, placed Company "A", 15th Infantry on the outpost.

The night of 15-16 June was a quiet night on the outpost, and the following morning the regimental commander placed the GEF Battalion in the area of the outpost Harry sector in order that his US battalions, all of which had suffered heavy causalities, could refit and reorganize. During the night of 16-17 June there was no significant action, permitting much needed engineer work on the outpost to be accomplished by Company "P", GEF Battalion and elements of Company "B", 10th Engineer (C) Battalion.

On the night of 17-18 June, the Chinese returned at about 0052 hours, moving through their own and friendly artillery and mortar fire to attack Outpost HARRY from the northeast and northwest. The enemy was repelled and forced to withdraw but stayed in the area. At 0240 the enemy attacked from the north under intense artillery and mortar fire. The CCF gained the trenches of the outpost on the northern slope at 0313. Bitter hand to hand fighting ensued with the enemy making numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. Company "N", GEF Battalion was committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry Regiment, and one platoon of Greek Infantry were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force. By 0402 hours the enemy was forced out of the trenches on the outpost, and all action ceased with the enemy withdrawing, having fired 22,000 rounds in support of this attack.

The enemy forces employed against Outpost Harry during the period 10-18 June were tabulated by Intelligence Sections to be substantially as shown below:

• 10-11 June A reinforced CCF regiment (Approx. 3,600 CCF)
• 11-12 June A CCF regiment (approx. 2,850 CCF)
• 12-13 June A reinforced CCF regiment
• 13-14 June An estimated 100 CCF
• 14-15 June An estimated 120 CCF
• 15-16 June Negative
• 16-17 June Negative
• 17-18 June A CCF regiment.

During this period the entire 74th CCF Division was utilized against this position and at the end of the engagement was considered combat ineffective. Enemy rounds fired in support of their attack during the period 10-18 June amounted to 88,810 rounds over 81 mm size: friendly mortar and artillery units in conjunction with friendly tank fires were 368185 rounds over 81mm size."

Outpost Harry 15th Infantry Command Report

65th Infantry Regiment - 3RD Infantry Division - 3rd Division Command Report for May 1953 for 65th Infantry Regiment.

On May 12 training was suspended and the Regiment alerted for movement to an assigned sector of Line Missouri. The heavy mortar company relieved and assumed sectors on Line Missouri from missions of heavy mortar companies of the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 15th Infantry Regiment in Vicinity of CT 513378 on the night of 13-14 May. One platoon of heavy mortar company, 65th Infantry came under operational control of the 7th Infantry Regiment.

On the night of May 14th, elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions moved into assembly areas in rear of Line Missouri. Assembly areas were in the sectors soon to be occupied by these units in a relief of the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion 5th Regimental Combat Team.

Company "G" of the 2nd Battalion, 65th Infantry Regiment relieved elements of the 2nd Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment on Outpost Harry during daylight hours May 15th.

On the night of May 15-16 Company "G" attached to the 2nd Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment, and occupying Outpost Harry, defended the outpost and defeated an intended three (3) pronged attack by an estimated battalion size enemy force.

Fourteen (14) Bronze Stars were awarded to four (4) officers and ten (10) enlisted men of Company "G" as a result of their outstanding performance in the action.

On the night of May 29-30 Company "C" conduced a raid ("Operation Surprise") against the enemy with the objective being "Monks Hood", CT 526424. Its mission was to close with the enemy to destroy, kill, or capture, enemy personnel located on the objective. The operation was not successful.

From May 15th through May 31st this unit had thirty-eight (38) ambush patrols, one raid, and four (4) miscellaneous combat patrols. Seventeen (17) members of the Regiment were KIA.

3rd Division Command Report for 65th Infantry Regiment June 1953:

On June 1st 1953 the 65th Infantry Regiment occupied the sector of Line Missouri from CT498421 to CT 543415 with the 2nd Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right. The 1st Battalion was located at CT 536395 as a regimental reserve and in addition was charged with the reconstruction of Line Wyoming from CT 539377 to CT 558384.

During the period 1-30 June constant and vigorous command action was taken at all levels to insure continued improvement of defensive works in the assigned sector of Line Missouri. This work was personally supervised by commanders at all echelons. At the end of the period noticeable improvement was made in the deepening of trench works and installation of machine gun and rifle bunkers.

At 050800 June 1953 the relief of the 2nd Battalion was begun by the 3rd battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment. Relief proceeded without incident until 060140 at which time responsibility for the sector passed to the control of the CO, 3rd Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment. The transfer of responsibility of this sector CT 498421 to CT 516408 from the CO, 65th Infantry Regiment to CO, 15th Infantry Regiment was made at that time.

Concurrently at 052045 June the 1st Battalion began effecting relief of the left company sector of the 1st Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment. This relief was completed at 060025, with the Commanding Officer 65th Infantry Regiment assuming responsibility for the new sector at this time. At the same time, the Commanding Officer 1st Battalion assumed responsibility for the right Company Sector of the 3rd Battalion. As of 06 June 1953 the Regiment was deployed on Line Missouri from CT 516408 to CT 551420 with the 3rd Battalion on the left and the 1st on the right.

On 10 June 1953 Company "F" supported by a section of tanks, conducted a raid on Hill 412 (CT 518420). The tanks moved to a position in the valley west of Hill 412 from which to support the attack of Company "F" by fire. Company "F" crossed the LD at 1200 and by 1315 was engaging an unknown number of enemy in a small arms and hand grenade firelight. At 1457 the Objective was secured, and the company was engaged in searching the area. At 1505 an estimated fifty (50) enemy countered-attacked. This counterattack was repelled with small arms and artillery. Company "F" withdrew on order to the MLR at 1535 after completion of its mission. Friendly casualties were: Three (3) KIA and thirty-three (33) WIA. Enemy causalities were: fifty-three (53) counted KIA: Twenty-five (25) estimated KIA, and twenty-five (25) estimated WIA. The raid was very successful. (This was the raid that Company "F" received the Presidential Unit Citation for. See Citation below)

On 10 June 1953 at about 0300 hours Company "B" of the 1st Battalion was attacked by an estimated enemy company, preceded by a barrage of approximately five hundred fifty (550) rounds ao mixed artillery and mortar fire. Shortly thereafter the enemy engaged the center platoon of Company "B" in a small arms and hand grenade firefight and succeeded in entering the trenches. Hand to hand combat continued for forty-five (45) minutes when the friendly forces counter-attacked and ejected the enemy. Action continued sporadically until 0430 at which time the enemy withdrew.

At 0530 search patrols were sent out from Company "B" which recovered pile caps, and machine gun magazines, propaganda leaflets and traces of where dead or wounded had been removed. Friendly casualties were: One (1) KIA and Fourteen (14) WIA. Enemy casualties were: Thirty (30) KIA

On the night of 13-14 June 1953 Company "G" conducted a raid on Hill 412. Leaving the MLR at about 2215 hours the lead elements had reached the assault position by 0015 hours. For close support and diversion of enemy fires one (1) platoon of tanks were attached, one of which mounted a search light. The search light tank was stationed so as to light the valley to the east of the Objective.

The first assault was launched at 0039 hours and was repelled by enemy hand grenades and mortar fire, just short of the reverse slope of the trench line. At this time the tanks began receiving 82mm mortar fire and at 0104 hours the remainder of Company "G" reported receiving mixed mortar and small arms fire.

At 0245 the assault continued, but this attack was also driven back by heavy artillery fire. A withdrawal then took place in order to regroup. It is evident that the enemy was stronger than had been anticipated in both the center and right portion of the Objective.

The third assault started at 0358 hours and swept around the left flank of the high point of Hill 412. The assaulting unit cleared the top and pressed the attack along the reverse slope for seventy-five (75) yards before being stopped by overwhelming enemy fire.

At 0419 hours on order of the Regimental Commander, Company "G" returned to the MLR. During the return, the enemy continued to deliver a heavy volume of mortar fire on the safe lane used at the beginning of the raid. Because of this another safe lane was found and Company "G" closed the MLR at 0515 hours. Friendly casualties were: One (1) KIA and Thirty-three (33) WIA. Enemy casualties were: Ten (10) counted KIA, fifteen (15) estimated KIA and fifteen (15) WIA.

Company "E" also raided Hill 412 on 14 June 1953. The Company moved into an assembly area south of Company "I" at 1800. At this time the assembly area and the MLR positions of Company "I" were subjected to heavy shelling. Regardless Company "E" crossed the LD at 1900 and at 1950 commenced the assault. A platoon of tanks moved into the valley and supported the assault.

Throughout the period the enemy had delivered heavy artillery and mortar fire on the approaches to Hill 412 and Hill 412 itself. The assault was initially successful and at 2025 the Company was engaged in mopping up the first enemy positions. At this time the enemy placed an unprecedented barrage of mortar, artillery, and rockets on the Objective and the approaches to the Objective. Due to this heavy fire the order was given to withdraw and the Company closed the MLR at 2315. During this action an estimated 10,000 rounds of hostile artillery, mortar and 132mm rockets were received. Friendly casualties for this action were: Nine (9) KIA and fifty-seven (57) WIA and four (4) MIA. Enemy casualties were: thirty (30) counted KIA, ten (10) estimated KIA, and ten (10) estimated WIA.

During the period 10through 15 June 1953 Outpost Harry, held by elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment, was attacked by large enemy forces. Throughout this period elements of the 3 Battalion 65th Infantry Regiment and its attachments rendered all available fire support to the beleaguered Outpost. This support was considered instrumental in the successful defense of the position.

The following awards were made:

• Silver Star Medal - 10 Officers and 4 enlisted men.
• Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device - 3 Officers and 20 enlisted men.
• Bronze Star Medal - 12 Officers and 10 enlisted men.
• Purple Heart Metal - 8 Officers and 59 enlisted men.

3rd Division Command Report for 65th Infantry Regiment July 1953:

On July 1953 the 65th Infantry Regiment occupied a sector of Line Missouri from CT516408 to CT594429. The 1st Battalion was on the left extending from CT 516408 to CT 5514220; the 2nd Battalion in the center from CT 551420 to CT573416 and the 3rd Battalion (3rd Recon Company attached) on the right from CT 537416 to CT 537416 to CT 594429. The mission of all battalions was to defend and improve the MLR positions and extensively patrol within their assigned sectors of responsibility.

During the period of July 1-31, constant command action was taken at all levels to ensure continued improvement of defensive positions in assigned sector. At the end of this period, noticeable improvement had been made on trench work and automatic weapons positions within the sectors of responsibility.

On the 6th of July 1953, Company "K" conducted a raid on enemy held Hill 250, CT592446. At 0020 hours the support platoon departed the MLR, followed 15 minutes later by the assault platoon. After passing through the support position the assault element reached the attack position at 0222 hours and was ordered to move out. With 2 squads abreast, the assault element moved over the first objective at 0233 hours and along the northern ridge without incident. Upon approaching the second objective at 0237 hours, they were met by fire from an unknown number of enemy. At this time the assault element began receiving artillery, mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire from the high ground, known as "Green Knob", to the northeast of Hill 250. When this firefight intensified at 0251 hours, the support element was committed.

The support platoon approached the objective and swept the southwest ridge. At 0302 hours, as they became heavily engaged, the alert platoon was also committed, having already moved to the old support platoon position. They swept the objective at 0320 hours for all remaining friendly and enemy causalities and at 0335 hours all elements began a withdrawal to the MLB over the prearranged return route. The enemy continued to blanket the objective with fire and, as the friendly elements withdrew, continued to roll this fire after them. Upon reaching the MLR with this fire, the enemy continued to fire on the MLR positions for some time.

The first elements of the raiding party reached the MLR at 0434 hours, the friendly casualty report being, 3 KIA 10 MIA and 20 WIA.

At 10:55 hours a Searching patrol was dispatched to the area of contact to try to locate missing persons. They could observe two (2) bodies but could not make any positive identification.

The final report on casualties was as follows: Friendly: 3 KIA, 10 MIA and 20 WIA. Enemy: 8 counted KIA 20 estimated KIA and 20 estimated WIA.

The raid was considered extremely well executed and successful.

On the night of July 13-14, 1953 the 65th Infantry Regiment was relieved by elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment. At 1200 hours on the 13th, the 3rd Battalion was placed under the operational control of the 7th Infantry Regiment. At 2400 hours the 1st Battalion reported that their relief by elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment had begun and by 0500 hours on the following morning, both the 1st and 2nd Battalions had been relieved and were on their way to the new Regimental reserve area at Chipori. The Regimental Command Post left its location at CT 527384 and opened a new location at CT 477118.

At 0700 July 14th the Regiment was placed on alert status and the Regimental Commanding Officer made a recon of the area behind the penetration by CCF forces, of the Capitol ROK Division sector. At 1200 hours the order was given, by the Regimental CO, to move from assembly areas near Chipori and occupy battle positions on Line Wyoming from CT 701383 to CT 734400, thus blocking any further advance by enemy forces in the CAP ROK sector.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions cleared their assembly areas at 1545 hours, reaching their new positions by 1800 hours. At the same time the Regimental Advanced Command Post opened in the vicinity of CT725377. By 2040 hours the 2nd Battalion had occupied positions on the forward slopes of the ridgeline and the 1st Battalion was in position to block any breakthrough, behind the foreword elements. The 3rd Battalion (3rd Recon Company attached) was released from the 7th Infantry Regiment on 0400 hours the following morning and, with Regimental Tank Company closed their new assembly areas at 1005 hours. The 3rd Battalion, at this time, was under Division control as a reserve Battalion. By 1200 hours, liaison had been established with both the 29th ROK Regiment on the left and the 15th US Infantry Regiment on the right flank. Heavy Mortar Company was located at CT669383 in general support of the 9th ROK Division. The situation was considered secure at the time.

On July 17th, 1953, elements of the Regimental Tank Company moved in front of the MLR to the vicinity of CT 712404 to support, by fire, a patrol from Company "C", establishing an outpost on Hill 326. One tank received minor damage and friendly casualties were: 2 KIA and 8 WIA. The outpost was established to be manned during the hours of darkness.

On July 24th, the 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion on the MLR. The relief began at 1600 hours and was completed at 2120 hours when the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion assumed responsibility for the sector from CT 709396 to CT 729408. The 2nd Battalion took up the roll as Division Reserve Battalion in the vicinity of CT 718360. The relief was conducted with a minimum amount of confusion and no unusual incidents were reported.

Upon receiving word, the 26th of July, that the truce agreement would be signed on the following day, plans were made within the regiment for the forthcoming relief and withdrawal from the proposed demilitarized zone.

The last aggressive tactical operation carried out by the 65th Infantry Regiment during the hostilities was a recon petrol of eighteen (18) men, led by 2nd Lt George W. Baird, of Company "B" commanded by 1st Lt Raymond W. Johnson, on the night of July 26th, 1953. The petrol left the MLR at 2050 hours, reaching the furthest point, CT 719414, by 0030 hours. At 0042 hours, they observed 15 CCF at CT 721413 and notified artillery. Fire was directed on the enemy and they were effectively disbursed. The patrol returned to the MLR at 0340 having made no contact.

On July 27, 1953, the 65 Infantry Regiment was officially notified that the truce had been signed at 1000 hours, and that the cease fire would go into effect at 2200 hours on July 27.

During the period from 1500 hours to 2145 hours on this day, the enemy continued to shell the entire regimental sector, including the Regimental Command Post area. Numerous casualties were inflicted by the artillery shelling on this last day of hostilities. At 2145 hours all firing ceased within the regimental sector and the 2nd Battalion proceeded to relieve elements of the 26th ROK Regiment. This relief was completed at 0130 hours on the 28th and at 0500 hours, elements of the 1st Battalion proceeded to relieve elements of the 29th ROK Regiment on the left flank. This relief was completed at 10000 hours, thus enlarging the regimental sector to include the area from CT 688384 to CT 740415.

During the period from July 28, 1200 hours to July 30th 0001 hours emphasis was placed on policing the assigned sectors and moving all ammunition and equipment south of the demilitarized zone line. During July 30th, the regiment moved back to positions behind the demilitarized zone line and began their survey of defensive positions to be manned and improved. By July 31, 1800 hours all personnel of the 65th Infantry Regiment were south of the demilitarized zone, and a certificate had been sent to Division, so stating.

Friendly casualties were: six (6) KIA, twenty-seven (27) WIA and six (6) MIA.

Enemy casualties were nine (9) counted KIA, one (1) WIA. Five (5) prisoner of war were taken.

Morale continued to be excellent, no personnel took R&R to Japan, and showers were readily available to all personnel.

Presidential Unit Citation for Action on June 10th reads as follows:

Company F, 65th Infantry Regiment, 3d Division, is cited for outstanding performances of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy in the vicinity of Kumwha, Korea (hill 412 across from Outpost Harry), on 10 June 1953. This unit, a member of a combined attacking team, was assigned the mission of assaulting a heavily fortified enemy hill for the purpose of diverting the concentration of communist strength at a nearby strategic point. As the company moved into a forward position it encountered heavy enemy fire from the crest of the hill. While two friendly tanks departed for a point to the left of the objective, a 10-man assault team approached the crest under the support of tank, artillery, and small arms fire. The assault platoon twice placed machine guns on the eastern slope of the hill to cover the advance but these were quickly destroyed by enemy fire. As the assault group engaged the hostile defenders in close combat, the platoon leader was wounded. His men moved back 10 yards, regrouped, and again charged the cave position, killing and critically wounding its occupants with hand grenades. As the assault platoon moved along the southern slope of the ridge in an effort to pinpoint the enemy fire, they were met by intense resistance from a well-entrenched enemy on the reverse slope. Sending word for two support squads to move up, the Company Commander led his unit in a repeated attempt to rush the crest of the hill. Again encountering concentrated enemy fire, the group managed to deploy to the right and left of the eastern end of the ridge to prevent an enemy envelopment. While the platoon made ready a further attempt to capture the reverse slope position, strengthened by the support squads, a squad-leader of the first platoon moved to the forward side of the hill and discovered the location of the enemy emplacements. With this information, the assault elements again moved forward, crossed the ridge, and routed the enemy with hand grenades and small arms fire. The hard-fought positions immediately were occupied and reorganized in time to stem enemy efforts to regain them. The heroism and courage exhibited by members of this unit reflect great credit on themselves, their organization, and the military service of the United States. (General Orders 620, Headquarters Eighth United States Army, 16 September 1954.)

The Hook - D.M. Butler's Report

*Text submitted to the KWE by Charles H. Owens, M/Sgt. USMC Ret. with permission from Bob Downey.  Written by Major General D M Butler AO, DSO (Retd)

When Peter Cook first asked me to write something on Bob Downey's article, I was already conscious of what a great service Bob had done by putting the story of 2RAR on the Hook into context. Somehow the battle has never been talked about much, probably because it culminated in the Truce and was overtaken by that remarkable event. Nonetheless it was a tremendous battle and we have to wonder why it has taken so long for the story to be told.

Many who really know 2RAR would not be surprised. 2RAR from its inception has always been a quiet, professional, and no fuss battalion. Formed from the units of the Ninth Division, it would be easy to assume it would always carry the glamour, which that division seemed to attract. But the leaders within the unit at foundation were of the tough, dedicated Arch Denness, Ron Garland style who made sure the job came first and were never side tracked by the illusion of easy reputation. That character persisted within the unit and carried it through those awful years which were endured in Puckapunyal on return from BCOF in 1948.

Bob Downey correctly identifies that period in his article as a story to be told and properly alludes to the resultant difficulties which the unit had to fix as it came to readiness for service in Korea. Sensibly he did not dwell on the government and bureaucratic incompetence and neglect which placed the battalion in such an appalling situation for so long. Even allowance for the vast backlog of work, which had to be undertaken in the nation in those post war years, does not excuse the lack of energy and imagination at most levels. Some would say the war had exhausted the country; certainly there was little vitality in many of the levels of leadership. It was as if people were content to concentrate on rebuilding their own lives and families after the years of absence on war service.

Long after that time, I served with one of the players of those years who told me of an incredible experience he endured in the transition of the battalion from BCOF to Puckapunyal. The outline of his story may help to explain the state of things at that time. Paddy Brennan, that most marvellous of soldiers, was a young sergeant who had either enlisted in the Australian Army in UK, or from a British unit in Japan, I can't remember which. I believe he had gone direct from the British Army to 2RAR, or 66 Aust Inf Bn as it then was, without going to Australia. When the ship carrying the unit home from Japan docked in Australia the bulk of those returning marched straight out from the dock to discharge or leave. Paddy was in charge of the small party, not entitled to leave, who were to move direct to Puckapunyal as the advance party. Every one waved goodbye and the young sergeant made his way to the RTO, only to discover that nobody knew anything about his party. They had no money and not even an authority to get from the docks to the railway station. It was hardly a pleasant introduction to Australia for that young sergeant. You would have to say it is hard to imagine such muck up when measured against the standards of today. Small comfort for the young man, totally new to Australia, absolutely on his own and very aware of his responsibility for the men. Somehow Paddy got to the station and managed to convince the authorities to move his team to Victoria. They arrived unannounced at Seymour in a weekend, scrounged transport to Pucka, only to be left to their own devices in empty and unprepared lines. Evidently there was no one in authority to be found. With no money, no rations and no equipment they were stranded, at least until the following Monday. To say the least, the party was absolutely frustrated and very hungry. All they could find was an axe in an adjoining woodheap with which they killed a sheep, butchered and barbecued it. Could you imagine skinning a sheep with a blunt axe?

Obviously things had to get better, but it was not the time to be in a regular infantry battalion in Australia. The unit became pretty much a depot battalion once the Korean War started, with a constant turnover of people. All the while the battalion endured barracks which should have been condemned years before. Just across the road the National Service battalions enjoyed high standard accommodation in barracks specially refurbished for them. Political correctness is not a modern day phenomenon; it was blatant in 1952. 2RAR faced experiences which would have challenged any organisation to its very foundation. A handful of devoted senior officers and NCO's struggled to maintain stability and identity and deserve enormous credit. For example, Bob describes how the RSM, Lionel McCombe, during some of the worst time, persevered with training his personally selected cadre of young NCO's. Every morning, without fail, they would do an hour on the square before morning parade. At other times he would take them for weapon training for which he was famed. Incidentally he was the photographic model used in a rewrite of the Owen Gun pamphlet just after the war. Largely through his determination, example and encouragement the battalion developed a complement of outstanding junior leaders, ideally suited for the savage patrolling war they would eventually encounter in Korea. Furthermore, he set standards of the management of soldiers for those young men, which enabled them to absorb, without fuss, the large number of men the battalion took over from 1RAR in Korea. Lionel McCombe was a soldier.

Bob has told the story of the Hook well. From his description the reader can form a good gauge of the enormity of the battle. Even so it must be very hard to grasp the horror which was there for all to see when the war suddenly stopped as the Truce came into effect. There were over 3000 Chinese dead lying in front of the battalion. Many of the dead were laying two or three deep in rows, the whole scene was so utterly tragic. While the unit watched, it took the Chinese stretcher parties five days to take the bodies away. The scene so overwhelmed belief as to leave one to wonder what was going on in the Chinese lines. With so many fatal casualties there must have been at least 10000 wounded men. Our brigade commander, Brigadier John Wilton, echoed everyone's sentiment when he is quoted in the Official History as saying, " it was a horrible sight, which I will never forget".

In the face of events like these one has to ponder why that last Hook battle has never attracted the prominence of the early Korean battles, Kapyong and Maryang San. In terms of the numbers of troops engaged, ammunition expended and the challenge faced, the scale of the battle was enormous. For a considerable period of the battle there were at least nine Chinese battalions operating on 2RAR's front. There is no doubt had the enemy achieved his intention along the axis of Pt 121 he would have turned the line and visited a severe defeat on the UN forces. Because of its location near a bend on the Samichon River the Hook sector was always a hot spot. There were two particularly furious battles, which come to mind one against the Black Watch in 1952 and the other against the Duke of Wellington's Regiment in 1953. On both occasions the position was just held in the most desperate of circumstances. Each time the Chinese, with over whelming force and very heavy artillery support, penetrated the Hook company itself but could not hold under the weight and accuracy of the artillery storm the Commonwealth Divisional artillery developed against them. In July 1953, 2RAR, newly arrived on the position, had only just gained ascendancy in the patrol battle and wrested a precarious control of its front, so gaining observation of the approaches to it before the Chinese attacked. This initiative enabled the artillery to do its work well forward of the position with control and accuracy. Furthermore, in that short period after taking over the position before the Chinese attacked again, the battalion had not spared itself and worked without respite, night and day, to reestablish the defensive position. Fortunately all the effort paid off. The work was completed and it was a fully prepared and quietly determined battalion, which stood to and faced the commencement of the Chinese onslaught. At no time thereafter was the enemy able to effectively penetrate the battalion area. It was a classic defensive battle.

2RAR took over the Hook from the Kings Regiment, who had replaced the Duke of Wellington's after their gallant defence against the odds. The Kings were only there for a week, so a lot remained for 2RAR to complete. For starters the Chinese were on the wire. Quite literally they were camped there. Shortly after the hour appointed for the Truce a reinforced Chinese platoon suddenly appeared. They were dug in on the northern (reverse) slope of the Green Finger, 30 to 40 yards from the forward pits of the Hook Company. Their orders had been to fight to the last man. It was no wonder the patrol battle for 2RAR had been so fierce. Every night for ten days or so there had been intense, savage patrol battles to force the Chinese off the wire. At those close ranges it was difficult to even get out of the trench without contest with the enemy. It was a deadly race at dusk every day for those brave men. The cost had been heavy, but the battalion endured and was successful. The Chinese were slowly forced back. That Chinese platoon on first contact with our soldiers after the Truce, before the hierarchy arrived, made it quite clear they had not expected to withstand the aggressive Australian patrols for much longer. They were at the end of their tether. How vital it proved, when the main battle commenced, that 2RAR standing patrols were forward of the main line of trenches and able to direct heavy fire on to the first sign of enemy approach.

What is not generally appreciated from the accounts of the battle is that that standing patrol on the Green Finger was manned and remained in position throughout each night of the battle despite the presence of enemy in overwhelming strength. Furthermore, a Vickers machine gun section, located with the US Marine right forward company, about 500 yards west of the 2RAR position, sited so as to fire in enfilade across the battalion front, held its position when the US company was over run and continued to support the battalion. The section commander took as many men as could be spared from the guns and formed a defensive position, which gallantly and effectively halted successive Chinese attacks. Immediately east of those intrepid machine gunners was the Contact Bunker. It was so named because it was the link on the divisional boundary, sitting to cover the reentrant leading up to the 121 feature. The position, manned by a rifle section, was right on the axis of the Chinese thrust. Not only did they endure the maelstrom of artillery fire the enemy directed against their area but also continued to call for the devastating friendly fire, at times onto their own position, which so grievously thwarted the Chinese thrust. It is not enough to talk generally about the patrol battle. People must be aware of the absolute necessity of capitalizing on the advantages so hard won in that patrol battle. Those two cool young corporals at the Green Finger standing patrol and the Contact Bunker, together with the machine gun sergeant, each with their gallant sections, played such an important part in the successful defense and the final victory and provide a classic example of what should be done. Incidentally, the three gallant NCO's were each awarded the Military Medal for their outstanding feats of arms. I have often wondered whether, at other times, in other units, in other armies, or, in other wars, they may have been differently rewarded.

As already explained, on this occasion the Chinese had moved the main axis of their attack further west against the high ground represented by the 121 feature rather than at the Hook company itself, where they had paid so dearly in the past. Had they succeeded, because of the nature of the ground, they would have been much harder to shift and would have, no doubt, rendered the battalion position untenable. Their major thrust was against the right forward battalion of the US Marine Division on the left of the Commonwealth Division. Here they did over run the right forward company and were threatening more. Since they had been unable to penetrate anywhere along the 2RAR line there was a base for the Commonwealth Division to stabilize and contain the Chinese penetration along the left divisional boundary. As if aware of this, the ferocity with which the Chinese attacked was awesome. They subjected 2RAR to an absolute artillery firestorm in an attempt to neutralize them. The weight of fire directed against the rifle companies, particularly those on 121 and the Hook, was sustained and incredibly heavy. I have seen in other publications the rate likened to that endured at Pozieres, which has always been regarded as the heaviest shellfire to which Australian divisions were subjected in World War 1. The stoicism and bravery with which the men in the companies endured that most severe and prolonged of trials was inspirational and deserving of the highest praise.

In reply to this onslaught, the fire support the Commonwealth Division developed along the 2RAR front to engage the enemy movement was absolutely overwhelming. In addition to the planned artillery concentrations and the harassing and interdiction tasks of any battle, the divisional artillery fired in excess of 20 divisional targets at the maximum rate using Variable Time fuses against the massive Chinese concentrations as they approached dangerously close to the 2RAR positions. This meant 80 field guns were engaged. (At the time a US battery was available to allow the regiments to rest a battery at a time, as long as the resting battery remained with its guns in range for any emergency. The artillery otherwise got little respite during the long periods the division spent in the line.) The maximum rate was, as best I can recall, was 5 rounds per gun per minute. The VT fuses burst at a predetermined height above the ground and inflicted great damage to troops in the open. The effect of 400 of these special shells falling every minute in a confined area against closely massed troops is just too terrible to contemplate. Medium and heavy artillery units, mortars, tanks, and medium machine guns supplemented the field artillery. The direction and coordination of fire, through the Commander Royal Artillery and the artillery staffs, was well practiced and absolutely superb. It was an outstanding defensive battle and the defensive fire produced the devastating results already mentioned. This artillery battle was so much different to the solitary struggles without much support earlier in the war and at Kapyong. The brilliant attack at Maryang San showed the success, which could be gained using all arms when complete army formations are employed. The Hook in July 1953 represented the absolute culmination of those experiences.

While it is easy to see the Hook battle of July 1953 as a great artillery victory, built on the impregnable defence of 2RAR; old soldiers will know it does not tell the whole story. 2RAR was a good patrolling battalion; we are already aware of the quality of the junior leadership and of some of the reasons why there were such fine young men able to move so positively on the battlefield. The battalion's first tour in the line on the 159 feature in May/June 1953 was a tough introduction. The patrolling contests, particularly around the Mound, were testing for all ranks. Importantly, the battalion settled down and became very professional in the planning and conduct of its patrolling programs. Leaders at every level became familiar and were practiced with the precision and immediacy of the methods of employing and controlling fire then in use within the Commonwealth Division. Detailed target information and pre-registration of every feature on the battlefield, together with excellent and reliable communications, gave every patrol commander the ability to call for the divisional artillery if required, and, for that matter, every other weapon within range. That is to say the tank, machine gun and mortar targets were as carefully registered as the artillery and the whole was coordinated. Furthermore, the patrol commander would expect an immediate response. Remember too, by the time the battalion took over the Hook, most of the young platoon commanders and sergeants had completed 20 or 30 patrols, were competent and did not frighten easily. So it was; all of those difficult years, the handicaps of poor equipment and little training and a myriad of other things were redeemed on the battlefield. The soldiers rose to the occasion and made everyone look good. We all know that is what usually happens; we all hope battalions will be given a much more even opportunity if ever they have to go to war again.

Having said all that, it is only right to say that under George Larkin 2RAR was a very happy battalion. He was a nice man who genuinely cared for his soldiers. Without pretence in his associations, his easy way with them appealed, they liked him. No matter how hard things had been for him in the Command Post the night before; first light would find him out and around the companies in the trenches. All this was backed by considerable experience of war, a good tactical sense and unflappability, which was contagious. The team around him was an experienced one so the battalion was well led and administered; it was accustomed for all the things around it to be well done. Nor did the battalion suffer the discontinuity and erosion of individual relief. In short the battalion was tidy, lived well and had plenty of spirit.

As has already been mentioned, the battalion also knew how to work hard. The amount of the work to be done will not be clear to every reader .The state of the Hook defenses when the battalion took over could not have been worse. The Chinese artillery during the Duke of Wellington's battle had almost totally destroyed the defensive positions. In some places communication trenches, which had been 8 to 10 feet deep, were now ankle deep. Many of the fighting bunkers no longer served their purpose. The whole of the elaborate fixed line communication system had been destroyed and the position was functioning on a most fragile arrangement using assault cable. The defensive wire had alarming gaps and had to be replaced. The whole scene was desolate, boggy and smelly; everything was grey and covered with dust, just like those awful photographs of France 1914/18. The Kings, in the short time they were there, could do little more than reestablish the defensive perimeter. 2RAR virtually had to start again while under the threat of the ominous presence of the Chinese and at the height of the intensely humid Korean summer. Nothing could be left to chance. Even the defensive fire tasks were found to have lapsed into inaccuracy over the years, every task had to be re-registered. In two weeks of nonstop effort, day and night, virtually the whole defended position was rebuilt; trenches, bunkers, minefields and communications, everything. As one example, over 200 miles of signal cable were laid by hand. All the while the patrol battle raged and the shelling was a daily feature of life. It was truly a Herculean effort, completed just before the Chinese attacked again. The fact is that the fierce, sustained Chinese shelling flattened everything again on the first night of the battle, leaving the battalion to scramble through the next day to meet a repeat Chinese performance on night 2. Somehow the battalion rose to the challenge again, although it was a very tired battalion, which welcomed the Truce. It is hard to escape the conclusion that had the Chinese been able to follow their attack on the Duke's just a little quicker the result may have been different.

While talking about the spirit of the battalion I would be remiss if I did not make mention of the great delight everyone in 2RAR got from the band. No doubt many readers will find it at least passing strange for such a comment to appear in an article about a battalion which had been engaged in an obviously Homeric struggle. I know bands were taken away from battalions over 30 years ago as an essential economy, which the bureaucrats were able to impose with such delight and at no cost to themselves. All I can say is that the 2RAR band, under the energetic Bandmaster Fletcher, brought great joy and delight to all ranks in times of severe trial. A rendition of the favorite "Oopsie Do" was sufficient to have everyone smiling. Some things you just cannot measure or cost. 2RAR was a better battalion because of the band. It was a positively uplifting presence around the battalion.

We owe Bob Downey a debt of gratitude for reminding us of one of the Regiment's great battles. For once the outcome did not depend almost solely on the bravery and tenacity of a handful of ragged riflemen. This time the full armoury of a powerful and accomplished formation was deployed. On the tenacious defense of 2RAR the total power of the division was employed against an exposed, massed enemy. The combined power and precision of the divisional artillery absolutely and completely destroyed the enemy. Despite the enormity and horror of the enemy dead left on the field, we cannot claim it as a total victory because the Truce dramatically stopped everything in mid battle. It is hard to imagine what the Chinese would have done next. They would not have been able to go forward without adding to the slaughter; however, could they have just left the bodies there without attracting the opprobrium of the world? In any case they must have been totally exhausted. We will never know how they would have reacted. We still don't even know what they had hoped to achieve in their flurry on the eve of the Truce.

I share Bob's concern there is no specific regimental battle honor for the Hook; currently the generic, The Samichon, is judged to cover the battle. The battle in which 2RAR played such a significant part produced the only clear-cut victory achieved by either side in any of those torrid Hook battles. Since the two British regiments engaged in the earlier battles, The Black Watch and The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, each were awarded the singular battle honor, The Hook, it seems only proper The Royal Australian Regiment should be also rewarded for 2RAR's battle. Ironically the Samichon is not even emblazoned on the Regimental Color.

The 2nd Battalion - the Royal Australian Regiment

By H R (Bob) Downey on behalf of the 2RAR Association Inc.
 
This Paper is not meant to replace any history contained in Volume II of Robert O’Neill’s Official History of Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, other than to rectify a map and flesh out some of the actions of a Battalion in action in Korea in the closing stages of the hot war.

The Royal Australian Regiment, from September 1950 to August 1953 performed magnificently in climatic conditions no Australian soldier had previously experienced. There were four significant actions during this period, the advance, attacks and fighting withdrawals in the early stages of the war in 1950 which have never really been properly recognized; the Battle of Kapyong in April 1951- a brilliant defense and night withdrawal; the Battle of Maryang San in October 1951- a brilliant attack, and the Battle of the HOOK in July 1953- a brilliant defense. All four stages of the land war for Australians in Korea, were a credit to the soldiers who fought those battles. Some were conceived and brilliantly led, others were undertaken at Company and platoon level, and many of the heaviest actions of the war were commanded by sergeants and corporals. Interspersed between the major battles was the continuum of patrol actions always designed to force back the enemy from, or at least into, his defended localities. That, in itself, is a story of physical and mental courage and great determination to get to grips with the enemy. This Paper attempts to bring the actions of 2RAR into focus, for it was this fine Battalion that conquered the might of a Chinese Division, ordered to fight to the last man, on the nights of 24/25th and 25/26th July 1953, and which left the enemy barely hanging on. At 1000 hours on the following day the Truce was declared.

It is thought that the enemy bombardments leading up to their attacks and throughout the nights in question were so heavy, so accurate and so concentrated that they had not been experienced by Australian troops since Pozieres in 1916. No vehicular traffic could escape the accurate enemy artillery along the camouflaged ring-road at the HOOK. The accuracy and strength of the Commonwealth Division artillery answered any call for defensive, harassing or counter battery fire with such accuracy and effect that the task of the Battalion was made far simpler. Nothing can, however, take away from the steadfast courage and raw aggression of 2RAR’s soldiers in their triumph of arms against a very, very competent enemy!

Training in Australia

The Battalion had long been the training base for the infantry entry into the Australian Army from its return to Australia from Japan in late 1948. Stationed at Puckapunyal in Victoria it also served as the focal point for Victorian official occasions, Vice-Regal guards of honor and the like, and as a holding depot for the Army’s misfits, a repository for the halt and lame, those unfit for service, those awaiting Courts Martial and the generally disenchanted. This complement was ever present, in the way, and unemployable.

With the entry of Australian ground forces to the Korean War, its focus was on the retraining of former servicemen (K Force) who had enlisted from the Southern States to reinforce 3RAR, and many hundreds of such soldiers served in 2RAR for shorter or longer periods depending on their skill levels. Additionally, some Regular members of 2RAR volunteered for service in Korea with 3RAR. This situation continued till about mid 1952. By this stage LTCOL RL Hughes was commanding 2RAR with MAJ D Dimsey the 2ic and CAPT L Eyles as the Adjutant.

For the other officers, there was a constant stream in, and out as reinforcements. Some example of this can be seen from the marching out of officers in May and June of 1952. The one constant was that the Warrant Officers and senior NCOs stuck, and provided the continuity so vital in any unit. In a photograph taken in May 1952, eighteen of the 37 officers shown had left the Battalion by June. (1) Among the outstanding trainers in the Battalion since March 1951 was the RSM, WO1 Lionel McCombe, who had selected so many bright young regular soldiers and given them extra tuition before first parade every morning. These young soldiers were the backbone of the Sergeants’ Mess from that point onwards.

The Battalion was accommodated in what must have been the worst quarters built by man. The galvanized iron huts were a barrack room for a platoon. There were no beds and paillasses were provided. Hopper type windows of galvanized iron allowed ventilation. They may have been erected in 1914! This is a far cry from the single room with ensuite, and air-conditioning for today’s soldiers. Sawyer stoves provided hot water for washing of mess kits at Company kitchens, and hot showers were dreamed of.

LTCOL Hughes succeeded LTCOL Hassett as CO 3RAR in July 1952, and command of 2RAR passed to LTCOL M Austin who took over command of 1RAR in October 1952. LTCOL G F Larkin assumed command of 2RAR on 22nd September 1952. At this stage 2RAR was a fairly raw Battalion and it is to George Larkin’s great credit that what was left of the Battalion proceeded with training in skills and physical endurance. Some of the training was outside the scope of what training should have been devised for the war in Korea, but the specialist training had proceeded apace through August and September 1952, with the School of Infantry providing training for instructors for the MMG and Mortar platoon. There was the constant lack of equipment, particularly items such as signal wire, and wireless sets which would later be used in Korea. I'm sure the Anti-tank Platoon never or rarely, exercised with, nor fired, the 17pr Anti-tank gun. Strength of Rifle Companies was about 80 at this time, with concentration on building fitness and in working at night over long periods.

By the end 1952, the Battalion was ready to proceed to Korea, but further training was required in the early part of 1953, to round out about four months of training to Company level. With a departure date the Battalion completed its pre-embarkation leave and marched through Melbourne to a rousing reception. On 5th March the Battalion embarked on the MV New Australia berthed at Sydney. The number of Battalion members embarking was 603. Battalion Headquarters comprised 76, A Company numbered 67; B Company 58; C Company 55; D Company 61, Support Company 171, and HQ Company 115. (2)

An advance party of MAJ L I Hopton (2ic), CAPT D M Butler (Signals Officer), LT J Connell (Transport Officer), LT J Morahan (QM), LT K H Kirkland (2ic Mortar Platoon) and WO2 A Humphris (RQMS) had already arrived in Korea in late February 1953 for the take-over of stores and equipment from 1RAR which was then out of the line. A listing of the officers, warrant officers and senior NCO who embarked is shown as an endnote. (3)

The Battalion sailed in the evening of 5th March 1953, and arrived in Pusan, Korea, on 17th March 1953, disembarking and being trucked to Camp Seaforth, some ten kilometers from the city. Here the Battalion was issued with Cold/Wet weather uniforms and spent several days acclimatizing while another advance party traveled north to join 1RAR and 3RAR at Camp Casey for a parade of the three Battalions for the first time.

The Battalion entrained on 21st March and after a stop/start journey interspersed with the odd guerrilla unit firing at the train, arrived the next day at Tongduc'on-ni, the railhead for Camp Casey where the Commonwealth Division had wintered. It was early morning and still freezing cold as the Battalion sorted itself out and occupied the tented accommodation previously occupied by 1RAR. 1RAR entrained as we detrained.

As well as being the railhead for the Commonwealth Division, the area was well equipped with support facilities such as a mobile laundry and bath unit, and medical facilities.

On 23rd March 1953, fourteen officers and 268 other ranks from 1RAR marched into 2RAR from those with time to make up for their twelve month's tour. (4) Most of the Other Ranks were allotted to the Rifle Companies. In addition there was a requirement for more reinforcements from the Reinforcement Holding Unit in Japan. The strength of the Commanding Officer is seen here in being able to direct this combined force of tried and as yet untried soldiers into a cohesive unit, capable of taking its place in the line of battle.

The remainder of March and April were taken up with intensive training for the role ahead. Much of the training was in the high range of hills on the west of the Main Supply Route, and it was an opportunity to work with other units of the Commonwealth Division. Some time was taken by the officers and Senior NCOs to familiarize themselves with the country of the Jamestown Line from observation points just short of the Main Line of Resistance.

Preparatory to moving in to the line, the Battalion transited to Area 3 taking over the site then occupied by the French Battalion. Meanwhile the two British battalions of 28th Brigade (a Brigade of two Australian and two British Battalions commanded by an Australian), the 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry and the 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers had occupied Hill 355 and Hill 159 respectively.

Initiation to War

By the end of April 1953, officers and senior NCOs of the Battalion had reconnoitered the forward positions, and the Platoon Sergeants and section 2ics had been in-situ since 29th April to again familiarize themselves with the area of operations and to guide in the main body.

It was during the familiarization period that the Battalion had its first battle casualty. The NCOs were encouraged to join the Royal Fusilier patrols, and on the night of 30th April one such patrol became involved in a fire-fight, suffering casualties. Corporal Alan George Smith of 2RAR was killed in action in that fight.

On the night of 5th May 1953, the Battalion main body entered the line and assumed command of Hill 159 with C Company taking over the left forward knoll and spurs and B Company taking over the right forward knoll and spurs of the elongated feature. Two days later 3RAR relieved the 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry on Hill 355.

By this stage the weather was warming, and there were severe rain storms which made life in the trenches difficult. Nevertheless this did not prevent the policy of active patrolling in the valley, known locally as the ’Bowling Alley’ between the allied and enemy lines. These enemy lines, as far as 2RAR was concerned embraced four main features directly opposite Hill 159. They were somewhat higher rising in the ridgeline from our left to right and culminating in Hill 227. Locally they were named ‘Matthew, Mark, Luke and John’. The crest of these feature was some 1,000 meters from the defensive wire of the 2RAR positions. The valley floor ranged from about 250 meters to 800 meters across at the widest point, and it was in this area that patrol action by 2RAR concentrated.

Truly aggressive patrolling was entered into to wrest control of No-Mans-Land from the enemy. The US forces who had taken over during the deep winter months had failed to keep the enemy in check, and the enemy moved with some impunity up to the allied defensive wire.

From 5th May to 16th June 1953 each Platoon, conducted some thirty six patrols on the nearer spurs of our own positions, on the spurs of the enemy positions and in the valley. The majority of these were fighting/ambush patrols, although individuals conducted lie-up patrols to gain vital intelligence, or sniping, and there were usually reconnaissance patrols moving with the fighting patrols. At each mine-wire gap each platoon had to provide a standing patrol of usually an NCO and four to give warning of any enemy activity or provide covering fire for any patrol withdrawing under enemy pressure.

Other patrols included stand-by patrols to come to the assistance of any other patrol in trouble, and escort patrols for Engineers checking and maintaining the mine-wire. The patrol program was considerably exhausting, but it generally achieved very pleasing results in forcing the enemy back to his own defensive positions.
Throughout May and early June the main contacts with the enemy were on the left flank of the 2RAR position, on West Spur, London Ridge, Durham Ridge, and on a small knoll, Kigong-ni, known as the Mound, some 400 meters from the mine-wire gap Dingo. This particular knoll was about half-way between the enemy and the allied Main Line of Resistance, and it was thought important to be in possession of that knoll to secure tactical advantage of the situation applying to the left forward Company. A number of major clashes occurred in these areas, while active patrolling to the east along the Bowling Alley was relatively quieter. The main brunt of this ceaseless night fighting was borne by C Company and D Company who shared the patrolling on the left flank. It was those young soldiers trained by Lionel McCombe who were to take command in many very difficult situations.

At the end of May 1953, D Company relieved C Company as the left forward company, and A Company relieved B Company on the right flank. The reserve Companies were located on Hill 159 Rear and Hill 210 respectively. Patrolling from these Reserve Companies continued. As there was little for the 17pr guns of the Anti-tank Platoon to do they began transforming to a large rifle platoon and took up position between 2RAR’s right flank and the left flank of the unit on Hill 355, and they conducted patrolling in the east of the valley.

Situated within the Battalion area was a troop of Centurion tanks of 1st Royal Tank Regiment, one located on the crest line of Hill 210, another on the crest line Hill 159, and one in reserve. This is shown below.

While these provided some reassurance in attacking any new digging activity or movement on the enemy’s Forward Defended Locality, they also caused some inconvenience in that they always drew enemy artillery and mortar fire when they themselves fired, and troops in the vicinity soon came to respect the enemy’s accuracy with mortars and with artillery. To counter some of this enemy activity, Royal Navy aircraft often conducted bombing raids, and possibly caused some consternation among the enemy. Of course, the effect of these raids was unknown, but later evidence indicated that the Chinese had a most impressive underground defense system, tunneling through from the rear slope to effect embrasures on the forward slope.

The photograph, above, shows just such a raid on the enemy’s left flank facing Hill 355. This photograph was taken from the crest of Hill 159 Rear. On 28th May 3RAR was relieved by the Durham Light Infantry, and went into reserve, and in turn 3RAR relieved 2RAR on 16th June 1953. The results of active patrolling might have been significant, but there was the cost in killed and wounded. 2RAR lost 10 killed, and 57 were wounded and 3 members were missing. One of these PTE Fred Speed was eventually returned from prisoner of war camps, on the signing of the Truce. The others PTE E G Bourke and PTE Son Joong Ok, a KATCOM, were presumed dead.

The Awards and Decorations for this period in the line were as follows:

• The award of the Order of the British Empire was made to LTCOL George Frederick Larkin, MAJ Kevin Britten Thomas MC, MAJ Thomas Harry Wilson, and MAJ John Frederick Rance Woodhouse.
• The award of Member of the Order of the British Empire was made to CAPT John Brydon Wells, and Warrant Officer Class II Arthur Humphris.
• The Military Medal was awarded to SGT William James Joseph Bruce, and to Lance Corporal Robert Richardson, and Mentioned in Dispatches to SGT John ACOL, LCPL Edmund George Bourke (Posthumous), and to PTE Harold William Smith.

(For the Citations for these and later Awards see 2RAR Association publication: Honours and Awards Presented to Members Serving with 2nd Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment 1945-1995 available from the Association)

The time spent in Reserve was not entirely restful, and from the lessons learnt during the six or so weeks in the line, much was achieved in retraining. A scare on Hill 355 held by the Durham Light Infantry had B Company moving to reinforce that Battalion. It is interesting that during this stage a type of ‘fatigue creep’ developed, probably as a result of lack of sleep, and small groups from each platoon spent 24 hours at B Echelon to try to recreate sleep patterns.

Return to Action

The 28th Brigade was now given responsibility for the positions on the left flank of the Commonwealth Division. To the left was the 1st US Marine Division and in particular, the 7th Regiment of that Division.

The Brigade’s area consisted of a ridge line with the highest feature as Hill 146, and the whole shaped in the fashion of a ’hook’ lying on its side. The most important part of this feature was what was called THE HOOK; this jutted out towards the enemy held ridge line which, in general, overlooked all the surrounding features. The HOOK had been hard-fought over in 1951 and in 1952 when occupied by the Black Watch, In May of 1953 the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment fought a bloody battle for control of the left forward feature. They had been assisted by the King’s Regiment, who eventually relieved the Duke of Wellington’s.

In the relief of the King’s Regiment, Brigadier Wilton, Commander, 28 Brigade, decided to allocate the left forward positions to 2RAR, and the right flank bordering the Samichon River to 3RAR. LTCOL Larkin’s plans were that B Company would hold the main feature on the left forward position on the ridge, A Company would be placed on its right flank, and C Company would form the barb of the ‘hook’. The Anti-tank Platoon was to be under command of B Company as an additional, albeit reinforced Rifle Platoon. It must be remembered that the Chinese Forward Defended Locality was nowhere further than 200 meters from the front bunkers of B Company, and at times the standing patrols, usually of an NCO and six were at times mere meters from similar enemy standing patrols.

Prior to the move platoon commanders spent a 24 hour period in the line with the King’s platoon commanders as part of the familiarization process, and accompanying one of their standing patrols, in the case of B Company, to Green Finger and Ronson, two very close relationship positions with the enemy. One of the lessons learnt on these missions was to keep off the radio net unless something was urgent. The carry of radio static and voice on a still night carried well into enemy territory. No fighting/ambush patrols were to be sent out.

The preparation for the move meant that only essentials were to be carried, as the full complement of equipment including ammunition was to be man-carried in from the debussing point, a distance of about 2 kilometers, certainly for those occupying the forward positions. The move of the Brigade was to be over two nights, the 9th July for 2RAR and 10th July for 3RAR.

The movement of the Battalion from Area 6 was anything but smooth, and the convoy of trucks jammed with other traffic throughout the short transfer. Military Police were seemingly unable to un-jam the blockage and rather than the forward companies, B Company and C Company taking over the HOOK positions at first light, it was about 1000 hours before all the troops were in position and the King’s companies withdrawn. By contrast, and from later intelligence, the Chinese Division who initiated the attack on the HOOK later in July, moved on foot some 60 kilometers in just over 24 hours to take over their position.

A very rapid familiarization began in each platoon area and those tasked with the night standing patrols given a briefing of routes out and in. The sniper section of SGT Hansen, PTE Tupper and PTE Ray were stationed at the furthest point forward of the forward platoon.

The defenses were still in a very rundown state after the bombardments of May 1953 and to us there seemed to have been little done to rectify the situation. Digging during the day was not possible and this was perforce a night operation, when a platoon or more of the Reserve Company would be marched forward to undertake digging and revetting work. There gradually took shape a well-constructed bunker system, designed and supervised by a first-class Assault Pioneer platoon. By the time of the Truce a well-constructed cut and cover trench system was nearing completion. Part of this on the HOOK is shown below.

In the meantime, where trenches had collapsed through enemy shell and mortar attack, one kept fairly low to the ground. The bombardments in July virtually reduced the well-developed trench system to a shallow gutter, so heavy was the enemy artillery concentration. The same section of trench system is shown after the bombardment.

The left flank of the Battalion was secured by C Company, and on the saddle connecting their position to the right flank of the 1st US Marine Division, a Contact Bunker was established and manned by a Corporal and six men. Further into the 2nd Platoon, Company H of 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment was a 2RAR medium machine gun section. This was in the Main Line of Resistance and tasked to fire across the front of 2RAR, as was another section of medium machine guns located within A Company of 3RAR as shown on the altered map from the Official History, below.

Some very strong enemy pressure had been applied to the infantry and the MMG section on Hill 111 on two early occasions before the main Hook battle. While the objective was not actually Hill 111, but rather Berlin, East Berlin and Boulder City, those on Hill 111 took a battering on 8/9th July and again of 19/20th July, and on both occasions the 2RAR MMG section played a major role in assisting in the defense of Hill 111.

Shelling and mortaring on all positions of the Battalion were a constant and accounted for nearly all the Battalion’s casualties. The nightly standing patrols were seldom missing a firefight with the enemy. It was afterwards revealed that enemy tunneling had occurred underneath the spur line to Green Finger, and it is thought that the enemy laid up here during the day and were very quick to come into action at last light. As with all patrolling at this particular time in the war, the dash to make position first was important. The loser in the race usually suffered the most casualties.

Normal patrolling and stand–to during darkness continued through July and the tempo of operations added to ‘fatigue creep’. The constancy of the work of digging during the night, the constant bombardment by the enemy and the lack of sleep probably had some effect on all ranks in the Battalion. On 22nd July there was a changeover of B and D Companies, with B Company going into Reserve.

A Special Intelligence Report has come to light about the following several days and is included here:

The Actions Southwest of the Hook 24/25, 25/26 July 1953.

By 1200 hrs on 24 July 1953 a very heavy bid-up of wireless nets opposite 1st Commonwealth Division was evident. In a matter of hours the number of extra out-stations had in fact increased to an extent where an attack of some considerable size was indicated.

The main additions to the already building net were mortar and artillery out-stations, including one of a known 122mm artillery battery. Additional Infantry was also noted.

Early on the evening of the 24th a report from special sources indicated that at least a Company was to be employed North and Northwest of the Hook and that other forces had been warned for duty to the West.  It was clear that the above forces were to create a diversion and draw fire in fact to split the defensive fire support.
The battle had barely started when the enemy ordered more troops to move forward towards the Hook area. This move started but was stopped by heavy machine-gun fire causing many casualties. Meanwhile small groups of the enemy were being moved to the Southeast from rear of Warsaw and Long Finger. These troops were told to observe carefully and report the location of any fire positions.

At the same time to the West the enemy was forming up two Companies on the reverse slopes of Betty Grable and phasing two other companies up. In addition, at least two forward observation groups were edging slowly along the valley South of line Seattle/Ronson towards a point between Hill 111 and 121. This latter group was about 5-8 strong and was flanked by two groups of about 10-15 each. The task of these flanking groups was to make a fire corridor for the forward observation groups moving westward in order to allow them to get into position between Hill 111 and 121.

The movement of the southernmost forward observation group was successful; it got through although its flank guards were badly shot up. Soon after it was giving fire directions onto friendly mortar positions from a sheltered spot just west of the junction of Hills 111 and 121. The other group ran into more difficulties and was not heard of again.

As the enemy proceeded to form up in area Betty Grable, he was heavily shelled, but his control ordered a move forward by two companies and called on a further two companies to be ready for battle. One of the companies in the first wave was involved on Hill 111; of the others the majority were caught in the open west of Betty Grable and suffered very heavy casualties. Eventually the two rear companies behind Betty Grable were caught by VT fire and also suffered severely. Confusion reigned for over thirty minutes while dead and wounded were collected.

The troops moving against Hills 111 and 121 were urged to press on and were told that things to their right were going well. However their casualties continued to mount steadily from tank and machine-gun fire from Hill 121 area. This fire, the enemy admitted, was very fierce as indeed was the artillery attack which had devastating effect.

To sum up, a study of the intelligence items from special sources indicates the following:

Breakdown of troops employed:

• North and Northwest of Hook-2 Companies
• West of Hill 121 and 111- one battle group of four companies
• MLR of two right companies of 1st US Marine Division- Two Battalions
• Boulder City - One Regiment (three Battalions)
• West of Boulder City - One Battalion

Tasks

• Battalion North of Hook-diversion to split artillery support
• Battalion group West of Hills 111 and 121- to take 111 and 121 and pass through to Southeast
• Two right companies of 1st US Marine Division-One battalion to take company areas and swing South Boulder City -take and secure it as a firm base for further attacks and particularly to provide a firm right shoulder for development of operations to the Southeast.
• West of Boulder City - diversions.

The enemy repeated these actions on the night 25/26 July. Intelligence coverage on this occasion, while not as good, still gave indications that a further effort was to be made. Forming-up-places the same as on the previous night and a possible Start Line - track west of Hills 111 and 121-was identified and forward observation groups were heard working very close to the Main Line of Resistance. All these were taken on by our artillery with heavy losses to the enemy.

These last attacks were not so well controlled. They were urged to proceed, so it seemed, in the hope of success against the recognized and rapidly mounting odds represented by United Nations artillery, machine-guns and tank fire. They were doomed to failure and petered out because of tremendous losses.
It appears that the attack on Boulder City was intended, if it succeeded, to provide a firm base and a firm right shoulder for development of the effort with particular weight being added against the area along the inter-divisional boundary between the 1st US Marine Division and the 1st Commonwealth Division. There is no doubt that the enemy fully appreciated the possibilities related to a thrust in this direction.

They were first, the river was attractively close and a breakthrough in force might reach it. Secondly, the Hook which had proved so costly in attacks from the North could be turned. Finally, once the enemy broke through the Hills 111 and 121, the Main Line of Resistance to the West could be left under pressure, and a swing to the West simultaneously with a dash to the South and East for the river, would roll up the 1st Marine Division’s right flank. If any of these had occurred then the diversionary effect against the Hook from the North may well have strengthened into a pressure attack to keep 1st Commonwealth Division’s attention to the front.
Continual emphasis was placed throughout the battle on keeping up the diversionary attacks until the main effort was well under way. Once a firm base on Boulder City had been established and with threats being maintained further to the West, there is every indication that the enemy had intended to hurl the battalion group of four companies in a double axis thrust against Hills 111 and 121 and at least two battalions on to the right-hand company of the Marines. The first objectives were these four positions. The second and follow-up wave was to pass through, swinging South. It is probable that both efforts would have been strengthened as they gained momentum. Certainly there were sufficient additional forces to the North and West of the Paris/Betty Grable features to do just this. There is no doubt on one point-had it not been for a few stalwart infantrymen on Hill 121 and two tanks in the blocking position between Hills 111 and 121 and for the speed and flexibility and weight of the 1st Commonwealth Division artillery, the enemy would have broken through. The consequences of such a catastrophe would have been far reaching and frightful, but easy to imagine.

The night of 24/25th July was hectic! From about 2030 hours incoming artillery and mortars were generally at the rate of 30 a minute over most of the two forward companies and Hill 111 with fairly intensive shelling of the Reserve company area, Battalion Headquarters, and the Mortar base plate positions. The actions by individual soldiers, NCO and private soldiers alike, was inspirational. SGT Cooper’s section on Hill 111 was, for much of that night, alone, as the Marine battalion withdrew, although eventually retaking the feature. The composure of young NCO’s in calling in artillery fire onto their own position was courageous, as was the literally toe-to-toe personal fights around the positions on Hill 111 and the Contact Bunker. The standing patrols on Green Finger and Ronson on that same night were severely attacked and on Ronson, withdrawn after calling in defensive fire tasks. (6) The standing patrol on Green finger led by CPL Len Hayden remained and returned again on the night of 25th/26th July. Throughout these two nights night almost turned to day with the use of the Battalion’s illuminating flares and those continually dropped by an aircraft flying backwards and forwards across the battle zone.

The accuracy and speed with which the Divisional artillery performed in defensive fire task was extraordinary. It is assessed that some 25,000 mixed rounds of shells and mortars were fired against the enemy. The only US shelling was right on target in the C Company, 2RAR jeep-head, all 75 rounds. By this stage of 1953 the Commonwealth Division was a formidable formation.

By first light on 25th July there were scene of great damage, both human and material. The enemy attacked again during the night of 25/26th July 1953, but with less enthusiasm and the attack petered out by early morning.

It is estimated that the enemy dead numbered some 3,000, and for 2RAR’s period on the HOOK, the casualties were 15 killed and 72 wounded. The last two nights before the Truce was signed on 27th July cost the Battalion 5 killed and 24 wounded.

The cease-fire took effect at 2200 hours on 27th July 1953, and one of the conditions was to be clear of the agreed Demarcation Zone (DMZ) within a week. This involved each Company dividing itself into three elements, one element to establish a camp for the Battalion, one element to remove and recover as much as possible of the engineer’s stores and equipment from the line, them demolish what couldn’t be removed, and a third element to scour the whole area between the Forward Defended Localities, for missing soldiers’ remains, weapons and other recoverable material.

The soldiers of the Battalion had performed with steadfast bravery against a full-on enemy attack under the most appalling conditions. Great advances were made to have a foolproof signals line system in operation, but the bombardment saw this blown to pieces. Normal radio traffic became unusable and there was the reliance on CW bands with Morse Code. Torrential rain clogged drainage of the trench system and at times troops were standing waist deep in water. Throughout the period 9th-27th July 1953 the soldiers of 2RAR were indefatigable! Like Australian soldiers wherever they have served they made the most of every situation with initiative, humor and aggression towards the enemy. It was a great Battalion!

Awards for the period 1st to 27th July 1953, and immediate awards, were made as follows:

• Member of the British Empire to LT John William Martin Connell and WO II Leslie Ernest Moore.
• The Military Cross was awarded to LT Patrick Oliver Giles Forbes; the Military Medal to SGT Brian Charles Cooper, LCPL Kenneth Number Crockford, PTE George Edward Kent, CPL Thomas William Maguire, PTE James Michael McAuliffe; and Mentioned in Dispatches to LT Colin Andrew Collingwood Wilson, CPL Colestin Herbert Chauvier, CPL Kevin George Condon, CPL Kevin Joseph Cooper (Posthumous), CPL Leonard Hayden, CPL Joseph Brian Slater, PTE Keith Weeding and PTE Donald Albert Youngman. (5)

By early August the longest serving of the transferees from 1RAR had completed their tour of duty and left the Battalion for home or for posting to Japan, and the first group of Battalion members went on Rest and Recreation leave of five days to Japan. From August onwards the pattern of the Battalion was dictated by the need to establish in detail the new Kansas Line position as a fixed defensive position. This was not a pleasant task as with the onset of winter, digging became extremely hard with the freezing of the ground.

Sporting fixtures were arranged between and among units in the Division and the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment won the Rugby competition with 2RAR as runner-up. 2RAR won the Divisional Volleyball competition against a Canadian unit.

On 17th April 1954, the Battalion arrived back in Australia in the same vessel, it having carried 1RAR to replace 2RAR, a reverse of the previous years situation. By May 1954 the Battalion had begun re-forming at its new base at Enoggera , Queensland, but with a series of re-postings only seven original officers remained with the Battalion and about the same number of the original senior NCOs. About one Company of soldiers returned to the Battalion, and these were formed into one company, A Company.

LTCOL Larkin left the Battalion in late August 1954 to be replaced By LTCOL J Ochiltree who had been a Defense Attaché in Washington DC. Life for the Battalion revolved around some fitness training, a succession of military funerals for former senior officers, and the special training for these consumed large amounts of time and energy, and the usual chores associated with being only a tram ride away from a Command Headquarters. All these tasks were accomplished with very few soldiers.

By early 1955 a steady stream of recruits flowed into the Battalion and a number of young officers form RMC, Duntroon and from OCS, Portsea. Training for jungle warfare commenced in early 1955 at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra (now the Land Warfare Centre), with each Company rotating through the tough course. The Battalion had been warned for service in the Malayan Emergency and the tempo of training proceeded at an increased rate. By mid 1955 only two original officers remained to take part in the forthcoming operations.

On 28th September 1955 the Governor-General, Field Marshal The Viscount Slim KG, GCB, GCMG, GBE, DSO, MC presented the Queen’s and Regimental Colors to the Battalion in an impressive ceremony at Victoria Park, Brisbane to be followed by a march through the City. These were the first Queen’s and Regimental Colors to be presented to a Battalion of the Regiment.

The Battalion embarked in the MV Georgic for Malaya in October 1955.

Endnotes:

1. LTCOL RL Hughes, MAJ FL Skinner, CAPT K Hatfield, CAPT L Eyles,  LT J Hooper, LT FC Smith, LT AL Limburg, LT E Boyd, LT JH Skipper, LT J Black, LT McMasters, LT RDF Lloyd, LT J Burns, LT CN Khan

2. Embarkation Nominal Roll. 2RAR War Diary AWM 85 (313)

3. Bn HQ: LTCOL GF Larkin (CO), CAPT JB Wells (Adjt), CAPT H Gayst (RMO), CAPT JJ Campbell (OPD Padre), LT RVP Feehan (IO), WO1 PG Steer (RSM),, WO2 Fletcher (Bandmaster), SGT RG Hansen, SGT AS Fitzsimmons, SGT PN Ellem, SGT TR Kelly, SGT RE Bell, SSGT LM Johnson, SGT R Levitt,

A Coy: CAPT Gardner, LT CA Wilson, WO2 MAR Jury, SSGT JP Sheddick, SGT NH Hollingdrake, SGT GM Black,

B Coy: MAJ Passlow MC, CAPT AC Gordon, LT BR Adams, LT HR Downey, WO2 PC Smeaton, SGT R Tarr, SGT RW Grebby, SGT HD Clively, SGT LH Ewington,

C Coy: MAJ Woodhouse, CAPT JH Lewis, LT D Allen, SGT DN Candow, SSGT AJ Burgess, WO2 LEM Moore, SGT KJ Hamilton, SGT WJJ Bruce,

D Coy: MAJ K B Thomas MC, CAPT IM McKenzie, LT FX Crowe, SGT K Jones, SGT RM Askew, WO2 WV Lawlor, SGT K Foran, SSGT K Crichton,

Sp Coy: MAJ TH Wilson, LT POG Forbes, CAPT CS Walsh, LT MT Frost, SGT N Whitecross, SSGT KC Berry, SGT AW Bailey, SGT DA Jordan, SGT RF Smith, SGT BR Maxwell, SGT WB Carpenter, SGT FA Nicholls, SGT LD Currie, WO2 LT Foale, SGT CW Curtis, Sgt EC Sutton, SGT BC Cooper,

HQ Coy: MAJ IE Kerr, WO2 VAAN Fox, SGT DJ Hansen, SGT J Acol, SGT F Myles, SGT ES Waterworth, WO2 JG Gerrans, SGT V McEllister, SGT JE Summers, SGT AF Wilson, SSGT J Lloyd, SGT AE Deacey, SGT GT Layton, SGT A Wells

4. Nominal Roll of 2nd Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment, Korea, 1953-1954. 2RAR Association Inc Publication, July 1999. (Available from the 2RAR Association, PO Box 1097 Toombul 4012 Price $7.50)

5. The publication containing the Citations is available from the 2RAR Association. Price $15.00. PO Box 1097 Toombul 4012.

6. Notes on the Defensive Fire and Harassing Fire tasks of the Battalion’s MMG and Mortar platoons.

On Hill 159 between 5th May and 16th June 1953 there was one section of MMGs on the left forward feature and two sections and platoon HQ low down on the spur behind the Anti-tank platoon with the task of firing almost due west along the Bowling Alley.

The location of the MMGs on the HOOK was as related and as shown on the map on page 4. Nearly all shooting was done "off the map" using dial sights. This was quite accurate although there was the usual problem with map enlargements causing map distortion in the process as did moisture. Using an eight figure map reference was quite useless to the rifle companies who had to rely on 1:50,000 maps. An example of a 1:25,000 map of the Hill 159 position illustrates this, below.

The Machine-guns used Mk VIIIZ ammunition with alleged maximum range of 4,500 yards, but were rarely fired over 3,500 yards. The ammunition proved good, but the barrels stripped their rifling after a few thousand rounds and had to be replaced. The factory loaded belts were poor with loose rounds causing many stoppages.

The one mortar base plate position on Hill 159 was at the rear of the at about the grid reference 150175 (see above). On the HOOK there were two base plate positions, not too far from where they are shown on the page 4 map. Mortar Fire controllers were located on Hill 121 with C Company, on the HOOK with B and later D Company, and the two 3RAR Mortar Platoon fire controllers were situated in their forward platoons.

The 2RAR Mortar platoon had six Defensive fire tasks and thirteen counter mortar tasks.

The MMG platoon had twelve defensive fire tasks and the 3RAR defensive fire tasks were four. The Durham Light Infantry, one of the Reserve Battalions, was also tasked with MMG and Mortar defensive fire tasks.

When not engaged the 2RAR MMG sections were laid on Warsaw and Seattle. Calls for MMG fire could only be sanctioned by Company commanders, and for mortar support through the mortar fire controllers to the Officer Commanding Support Company.

Old Baldy - 1952

Dear Ed:
The best description of the action "On top of Old Baldy" is contained in the book "Movin On" but even that was from people who not really there but rather they were observing from a distance. Anyway, I am sending you two emails because the email letters I received contain too much data for one. Note that I gathered the casualty list from the Korean War Database. I do not have the database for the wounded or missing; only those who died on 3-4 July 1952.

Date: Sun, 01 Aug 1999 23:04:31 -0400
From: Ray Hilgart <[Please enable JavaScript.]>
To: Bob Fowler <[Please enable JavaScript.]>
Subject: Old Baldy on 3/4 July 1952

Dear Bob:

Thanks for your response to my queries on my friend, Don Shaw. I have received quite a bit of mail from those who were in or close to the action of that night, including the Company L commander, Captain Jack Rose.

Much of the information included below are extracts taken from a book entitled "Movin On, the 279th Infantry Regiment 1950-54"

In late June 1952, the 45th Infantry Division was deployed on the MLR (Main-Line of Resistance) in the area along LINE JAMESTOWN and just south of the line of 12 outposts which were wrested from the Chinese and established by the three regiments of the 45th during the Apr-Jun 1952 time period. It should be noted that these 12 outposts were all north of the MLR and were generally manned by a platoon on a rotating basis.

Included in these 12 outposts were:

• Outpost 08 (Eerie, Hill 191) Outpost 10 (Pork Chop Hill 234)
• Outpost 11 (Old Baldy Hill 266)
• Outpost 12 (Pokkae Ridge)

In late June, along the MLR, Line Jamestown, the 279th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) occupied the right flank sector of the division and the 179th RCT the left flank sector, the sector in which Old Baldy was located. The 180th RCT was in Corps reserve.

At 2100 hours on 1 July 52, the 180th RCT assumed operational control of the right flank of the division sector and the 279th RCT moved into reserve. The relief had been planned for the hours of darkness but rainy and foggy conditions delayed the operation until daylight of the 2nd of July.

Notes on the Composition of an Infantry Regiment (1952):

An Infantry Regiment generally contained:

• 3 Infantry Battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd)
• 1 Tank Company
• 1 Medical Company
• 1 Headquarters Company
• 1 Service Company
• 1 Heavy Mortar Company

Notes on the Composition of an Infantry Battalion (1952):

1st Battalions included:

• 3 rifle companies (A,B,C)
• 1 weapons company (D)
• 1 Headquarters Company
• 2nd Battalions included:
• 3 rifle companies (E,F,G)
• 1 weapons company (H)
• 1 Headquarters Company
• 3rd Battalions included:
• 3 rifle companies (I,K,L)
• 1 weapons company (M)
• 1 Headquarters Company

On 30th June, the 3rd Battalion of the 279th RCT (3/279) was located not far behind the MLR. Captain Jack Rose, Company L commander, was called to the 3/279 command post (CP) about midnight and was informed that his company was going back on the MLR in the 179th RCT sector under operational control (OPCON) of the 179th RCT. Chinese pressure was increasing in that area and the additional troops were needed to relieve the 179th RCT's A/C Company. This combined unit had been formed out of both Companys A and C because each had been so badly mauled that neither by itself was an effective combat unit. A/C Company of the 1/179 occupied the same general position that Company L of the 3/279 had occupied earlier in 1952.

On July 1, 1952, Capt Rose ordered his Company L men to man their old positions on the MLR inasmuch as they could identify them. These positions were not on Old Baldy itself but rather south of Old Baldy along the MLR. On 2 July 1952, the day after Company L took their positions on the MLR, the remainder of the 3/279 occupied positions of the MLR also.

Company K occupied the MLR to the left flank of Company L.

Lieutenant Dennis J. Harrison, commander of Company I, had the Company I CP positioned on Hill 226 which was north of the MLR about 300-400 meters. The outpost on Old Baldy (Hill 266) was about 300 meters northwest of Hill 226 and personnel from Company I took up defensive positions there although in what strength has not been determined. I suspect that at least two platoons with supporting fire elements occupied the Old Baldy outpost.

Elements of the 3/279 Weapons Company M and Regimental Medical Company were attached to the three rifle companies, I, J, and K.

Captain Rose recalled: "Throughout the day of the 3rd of July, the enemy fired artillery into the area. It was apparently registration fire because they would fire a few rounds in one area and then shift to another. The targets seemed to be the Company L front and the routes leading out of the MLR to Old Baldy and Company I."

By late afternoon of 3 July, Chinese fire intensified greatly, especially pounding Company I fortifications on Old Baldy. Company L was raked by heavy artillery fire and subjected to enemy probes just after dark. Several were wounded and Duane Helms' assistant machine gunner was killed.

Captain Rose continues: "At about 2215 hours on the night of 3 July, all Company L platoon leaders were in the CP and a long, rumbling, continuous noise like a large freight train was heard. This was the opening of the attack on Company I on Old Baldy. This was the closest I heard to a TOT (Time on Target) barrage while I was in Korea. All platoon leaders returned to their respective platoons and prepared for further orders."

About 2230 hours, the intensity of the enemy artillery barrage increased on Old Baldy. Captain Rose continues: "Our artillery was firing constantly and so was the Division Artillery. We also had priority of fire from Corps and Army also. In short order, the Air Force was dropping flares that lit up the whole area. Company L was firing in support of Company I and fired about 2-million rounds of small arms and 1000 or more 60mm mortar. The cooks had to come up to keep water poured on the mortars to prevent short rounds caused by premature cook-offs. They also carried ammunition."

At 2255 a reinforced enemy battalion attacking from the northeast stormed the Company I force manning Old Baldy. From their positions, the men of Company L provided maximum support to the besieged defenders of Old Baldy. In the light of flares from a distance, the attacking Chinese looked like swarms of ants crawling up Old Baldy.

Tremendously outnumbered by the Chinese, a number of positions manned by the Company I defenders were overrun. In fierce hand-to-hand combat, the outnumbered Thunderbirds drove the attackers back about twenty minutes after midnight of the 4th of July.

A second wave of Chinese attacking from the same direction hit Company I again about thirty minutes later in a massive assault that lasted about 20 minutes. Capt Rose, who viewed the Chinese onslaught from a distance by the light of the air force flares believed that Company I was in desperate straits. They were running low on ammunition and were in danger of being over-run.

At 2200, Captain Rose ordered Lieutenant Kenneth G. Herring to take his 2nd platoon and reinforce Company I. To reach Old Baldy, Lt Herring and his platoon had to follow a ridge leading to Hill 226 where the Company I CP was located, then continue on the ridge to Old Baldy (Hill 266).

Upon reaching the Company I CP on Hill 226, Lt Herring found the area lightly defended because what few of Company I had remained at the CP had been ordered by the Company I commander, Lt. Harrison, on up to Old Baldy to help stem the Chinese onslaught.

By 0100 hours on 4 July, the Chinese pressure was such that Lt Harrison ordered Lt Herring to move forward to Old Baldy. The enemy fire targeting the ridge leading from the Company I CP to Old Baldy was devastating. Herring, analyzing the pattern of the enemy barrages delayed his departure until the enemy artillery shifted concentrations.  This enabled Herring to lead his men to the besieged Old Baldy during somewhat of a lull in the enemy fire and in doing so, minimized casualties. His platoon arrived on Old Baldy in time to assist in repulsing the second attack.

At 0210 a third and final wave of enemy troops from the west fought their way to the Thunderbird positions on Old Baldy.

They maintained fierce pressure on the perimeter defense until 0235 hours. Then the remainder of Company L arrived to reinforce the decimated Company I.

Cpl Corbin Beach, a medic assigned to Company L, moved to Old Baldy as soon as the shelling subsided to care for and evacuate the wounded.  Forty years later remembered that only 71 of the 172 men of Company I were able to walk down off the hill on the morning of 4th of July 1952.

Company L took over the defense of Old Baldy for three more days after the 4th of July. The Chinese never made another attack. They had been soundly beaten and they had had enough.

Company I Thunderbirds earned three silver stars and a Bronze Star for Heroism that night of 3/4 July.

• Pfc Jim Foley (posthumously) BAR man
  Sgt John J. Kerby (Posthumously) Rifle squad leader
• Sgt Robert Braaten (medic)
• Cpl William House (Bronze Star f/Heroism) (Rifleman)

My friend, Donald D. Shaw, was killed that night, reportedly in hand-to-hand combat when a group of enemy overwhelmed his defensive position on top of Old Baldy.

Following are those KIA that night of 3/4 July 1952, almost all from Company I.

• Brown, John L. 11223865
• Chong, Marchmont T. 50004120
• Collett, Walter 45042039
• Crawford, George C. 53100199
• Davis, Jerry 19415653
• Foley, James J 51002309 Silver Star
• Gardner, Merritt H. 51092690
• Gorton, Wesley H. 21913932
• Hill, Daniel G. 51037762
• Hogarth, Raymond H. 55041693
• Hook, Russell L. 56092034
• Hutchison, Robert W. 55179280
• Kerby, Joh J 55028473 Silver Star
• Knorr, Jerome W. 55046793
• L'Hommedieu, Raymond 55026423
• Madden, William H. 12271724
• Queen, Ruff G. 53100179
• Schwemer, Harold G. 55046583
• Shaw, Donald D. 16384724
• Stone, Charles A. Jr. 51016383
• Tobio, Anthony F. 51002296
• Weeks, Homer G. 56061168
• Wrather, Paul D. 14385275

Received: (from [Please enable JavaScript.])
To: [Please enable JavaScript.]
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1999 19:03:57 -0600
Subject: 4 JULY 52

I saw your question reference the fighting on 4 July 52.

This letter was in 1996 and I suppose by now you have received the information you wanted. If not, let me know and I will give you what I have.

The action would have been on "Baldy" and your friend would probably have been in Company I. At that time I was th CO of Company L.

Jack W. Rose, Texas