In God We Trust
It was a rectangular area approximately 100 by 50 miles in the southeast corner of Korea. Western boundary = Naktong River; northern boundary = a line through the mountains from Naktong-ni to Yongdok on the east coast; eastern boundary = East Sea (Sea of Japan); southern boundary = Tsushima Strait.
Part of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division (airlifted from Japan on the morning of July 1, 1950)
Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith
Capt. Leroy Osburn - Co. A had about 140 men and officers at the time.
Brig. Gen. George B. Barth
This is a controversial subject that has not yet been resolved by the KWE.
Pvt. Kenneth Shadrick of Skin Fork, Wyoming County, West Virginia, became the first reported casualty of the Korean War when he died around 4 or 5 p.m. on July 5, 1950 near Sojong, Korea, from a bullet wound to his chest. His Serial Number was RA15273308, and his MOS was 04745. He was born in 1931. A member of a bazooka squad, he was killed as a photographer took his picture after he had fired his weapon at a Soviet-made tank. When he stood up to see if his ammunition had penetrated the tank, the enemy struck him down. The remaining members of the bazooka team carried his body out. Shadrick's death was reported by reporter Maggie Higgins, who erroneously stated that he was the first American GI killed in Korea. Higgins was not only among the first reporters in Korea, she was also the first female reporter in Korea.
Those who were in Korea those first days of the war know positively that Kenneth Shadrick was not the first American G.I. killed in Korea. The battle of Osan on July 5 started around 7:30 a.m. According to George Weidensall of Beckley, West Virginia, a number of soldiers were killed before Shadrick, who died in the late afternoon. The KIA's were all members of the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division. The name of the very first G.I. killed in Korea is not known other than the fact that he was a machinegunner in the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. Some say he was in B Company. Others say he was in Headquarters Company of the 21st.
The 19th, 21st, and 34th Infantry Regiments of the 24th Division stationed in Japan were brought over to defend South Korea when hostilities broke out. Because men from several companies were hastily mixed together in the first shipment of American troops to form a still-under-strength battalion, Weidensall explained that no one was familiar with all of the members of the regiments fighting on July 5th. Hence, the names of the first casualties have not been confirmed for the Korean War Educator. Weidensall said that Kenny Shadrick was in the 34th Infantry Regiment, which was several miles behind the 21st Infantry Regiment on July 5th.
A reference and footnote in Roy Applemann's book South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pointed out by KWE visitor Lisa Sholl, state the following, indicating that the first GI killed in Korea was with Headquarters Company:
The two damaged tanks pulled off to the side of the road, clearing the way for those following. One of the two caught fire and burned. Two men emerged from its turret with their hands up. A third jumped out with a burp gun in his hands and fired directly into a machine gun position, killing the assistant gunner. This unidentified machine gunner probably was the first American ground soldier killed in action in Korea. [29] American fire killed the three North Koreans. The six rounds of HEAT ammunition at the forward gun were soon expended, leaving only the HE shells which ricocheted off the tanks. The third tank through the pass knocked out the forward gun and wounded one of its crew members.
[29] Interv, author with 1st Lt Lawrence C. Powers, 2 Aug 51. Powers was Headquarters Company Communications Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, at Osan, 5 July. He said he saw this action.
First U.S. Army unit to enter combat in Korea. Consisted of half of the battalion headquarters company, half of the communications platoon, rifle companies B & C (understrength), a medical platoon from the 21st Regimental Medical Company; and two 4.2 mortars from the 21st Infantry's heavy mortar company. The mission of Task Force Smith was to provide an "arrogant display of strength" as a delaying tactic until other allied forces could arrive in Korea to help.
This task force was the combined Army/Marine force that launched the first Allied counterattack of the war on 7 August 1950.
A combined force of the 25th Division, 5th Regimental Combat Team, and the 1st Marine Brigade (35th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division; 5th RTC; and the 5th Marine Regiment). This was the first major offensive of the 8th Army. It stopped the KPA's southward push to Pusan. Task force dates: 9-12 August 1950.
This task force included the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division and elements of the U.S. Army's 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division. This task force followed the NKP troops that were withdrawing from the Korean peninsula on 23 September 1950.
In April of 1950, a group of young Marines from the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton were selected to form a provisional platoon and to serve aboard the USS Juneau when it joined a fleet of other ships in a peacetime mission to the Far East. The following Marines were serving onboard the USS Juneau when the Korean War broke out. The ship was in Korean waters the day after the war began and began firing missions from its five inch guns in support of the South Korean and U.S. Army units that had been attacked by the North Koreans. In the first week of the war, the Juneau, along with other allied ships, was attacked by six North Korean PT boats and general quarters were sounded. Five of those boats were sunk and one got away. The Marines, firing their quad forty mm guns, sank one of the boats.
1st Squad | 2nd Squad | Third Squad |
| SqdLdr Sgt. - W.S. Gerighten | Sgt. R.H. Arnie | SqdLdr - - Col. E.B. Carney Jr. |
| FtLdr - Cpl. A.R. Lewis | Cpl. Jim O'Connor | Gunner - Pfc. W.H. Gunter |
| BAR - Pfc. D.E. Armstrong | Pfc. V.D. Hack | AGunner - Pfc. W.J. Ghrist |
| ABAR - Pfc. V.A. Akers | Pfc. R.A. Hamilton | AmmoCar - Pfc. F.R. Brown |
| R - Pfc. R.S. Deja | Pfc. C.E. Puckett | AmmoCar - Pfc. N.K. Amstutz |
| AmmoCar - Pfc. L.L. Pederson | ||
| AmmoCar - Pfc. P. Meier | ||
| FtLdr - Pfc. C.L. Moore | Pfc. J.G. Kelly | AmmoCar - Pfc. W.H. Popp |
| BAR - Pfc. J.L. Pope | Pfc. F.L. Orrell | |
| ABAR - Pfc. R.C. Stachulak | Pfc. F.J. Palgua | AdminSgt. - R. Cash |
| R - Pfc. W.H. Middendorf | PFC M.A. Skinner | Supply - Col. R. Olson |
| FtLdr - Pfc. R.E. Dugan | Pfc. R.G. Olague | |
| BAR - Pfc. J.B. Walker | Pfc. J.E. Weber Jr. | |
| ABAR - Pfc. W.K. Crider | Pfc. To Moody Jr. | |
| R - Pfc. F.A. Rowinsky | Pfc. J. McGill |
Note: Popp came down with polio in the middle of the firing on Korea in July. He was the cook. He was evacuated from the ship Juneau to the Helena. Later he was flown to Japan. He survived the polio. Pederson was replaced by Tom King of Texas because Pederson had tuberculosis.
At about 1930, the following named officers and men comprising a demolition team of four (4) bluejackets, a security element of four (4) marines, a demolition officer, and a demolition patrol commander, departed from the USS Juneau (CLAA 119) for the USS Mansfield (DD728) by motor whale boat:
This patrol was assigned the mission of mining a railroad tunnel in the vicinity of Sangchon, Korea. We carried with us the below items of equipment:
The patrol arrived aboard the USS Mansfield at 1945 and completed plans for Naval Gunfire support on call. At 001, 12 July 1950, the USS Mansfield went to General Quarters and made for its station some 3,000 yards from the beach. At approximately 0105, the whale boat, containing the demolition patrol and its equipment, left for the beach. The boat crew was supplied by the USS Mansfield. Through radio communication from the USS Mansfield and radar facilities aboard, we were kept on course until about 500 yards from the beach. The Commander navigating, we continued to the beach. At an estimated 200 yards, we could see the beach, however, all estimates at night were difficult to make. The surf did not seem too great. Several large rocks were observed in the water from one foot to 25 feet high. When it appeared that we were about 30 yards from shore, we dropped our stern anchor and paid out nearly 45 fathoms of line. Soundings were attempted with paddles, but the bottom, at this point, could not be located. More line was bent on to the anchor line, because we still had an estimated 20 yards to go to the beach.
At this point, a locomotive appeared, at what seemed to be directly over our heads. It was found later to be actually about 150 feet up and 500 yards inland. All hands laid low in the boat until the train passed. We had not heard the train coming, it just suddenly appeared (we surmised it must have come out of the tunnel) continued on for about 300 yards and disappeared in another tunnel. We were confident we were on the right part of the beach.
During the above locomotive episode, the boat drifted seaward a bit and when the engine in the boat was started again, the anchor line had become fouled with the propeller. The Chief Boatswain Mate, acting as boat officer, went over the side and, with difficulty, cut the line loose. We could not retrieve the anchor without wasting valuable time. Still some 10 yards from the beach, the sailor acting as bow hook and the Marines disembarked and pulled the boat closer to shore. The Marines then made a perimeter of defense while we unloaded the boat. The boat was going to have to lay off shore until we returned because the rocks near and on shore were hazardous. The surf was not a problem. Two Marines were left on the beach and the rest of the patrol proceeded inland toward the railroad track.
The beach was covered with loose rock and walking was hazardous, especially with the loads of explosive we were carrying. We estimated the track to be 150 feet to 200 feet above us, up a very steep slope. I decided to climb to the high ground to look for the track. Everyone fell on the rocks at one time or another. After 30 minutes, we reached the high ground, but still could not see the tracks. I sent scouts out 100 yards in each direction until the track was found. We had been standing on top of the tunnel. We slid down the steep grade as cautiously as possible until reaching the tracks. Once on the tracks, our machinery was set to work. Into the tunnel, guards were posted and two demolition men, each digging in their explosives with the aid of another man. The Commander, who had been in constant communication with the USS Mansfield, kept them advised of our activities. Three charges were laid, two of about 25 pounds each three feet apart and 80 feet away, another single charge of 40 pounds. All three charges were connected with two lines of primacord, one on the inboard side of each track. The two 25-pound charges were put within 50 yards from the tunnel entrance. The 40-pound charge was dug in about 100 yards from the other tunnel entrance. The ties and track were laid on a charcoal and cinder base. Since digging with shovels made too much noise, the men dug with their hands. After the charges were placed in their holes and completely covered, I inspected each position. I cleared the tunnel of all but one and taped the primacord with blasting caps onto the tracks. Two pieces of primacord, one on each track, had three non-electric blasting caps taped on, and the primacord was then taped to the track. The entire operation in the tunnel took about 45 minutes.
We left the tunnel and made a quick trip over a much easier route back to the boat. We joined the two Marines who were left on the beach, loaded the unused equipment, and waded out to the boat. All personnel accounted for, we made for the USS Mansfield, arriving there about 0330. Mission accomplished. - R. M. Johnson, Second Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps.
After serving about six months on the Juneau, the Marines were transferred ashore in Korea, and most rejoined the units that they had formerly served in while stationed at Camp Pendleton. These Marines, commanded by Capt. (now Major) Curtis F. Hamlin USMC Ret., are now all retired and live all over the USA. Two of them were later killed in action. Others have died. Each year, some of them attend a reunion of the USS Juneau.
[KWE Note: The following story was reprinted on the Korean War Educator with the permission of Major Pennino's son. It was published in Real magazine around October or November 1952. The major (a Bostonian) died several years ago. He served in four big campaigns in Europe, was twice decorated for heroism, once wounded. As MacArthur's News Chief in Tokyo, Pennino wrote the widely published eyewitness account of the Tojo hanging. On a special mission touring the Pusan Perimeter in the grim days from August to October, 1950, he ran into the story of Task Force Smith. He later became the commander of the Army Home Town News Center in Kansas City.]
This is the epic story, told here for the first time, of the first handful of American ground troops ordered into combat in Korea. They were only 406 men, dug in on a hill near Osan, but they blasted hell out of 20,000 onrushing Communist troops spearheaded by 33 Russian-made T-34 tanks.
With their seven-hour gory stand on Heartbreak Highway, Task Force Smith--consisting of only two understrength American rifle companies--forced the Reds to slow down their headlong assault, deploy their forces and thus lose the impetus that would have carried them to the docks of Pusan just a few days after the outbreak of war. In what may have been the seven most crucial hours of that war, Task Force Smith changed the pattern of the whole conflict and perhaps the course of history. Of the 406 grim and ill-equipped Americans who manned that hill near Osan, only 250 came out alive...
Lt. Col. Charles Bradford Smith, scrappy 34-year-old commander of the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, was asleep when the phone call came through: "Brad, the lid has blown off. Get your fighting clothes and report to the C.P." The routine seemed familiar. Smith, a West Pointer, had been routed out of bed at Pearl Harbor to rush his 120 infantrymen to defend an eight-mile stretch of Hawaiian beach. Now it was Korea.
This was on June 30th, four days after the Reds started their invasion of South Korea. The 24th Division was stationed at Kyushu, southernmost island of Japan. Less than 12 hours after orders left Washington authorizing the use of U.S. troops, C-54's began landing Smith's battalion on a rain-soaked runway 13 miles out of Pusan, Korea. On the wall of a barracks, one of Smith's men found time to scribble this classic little jingle: "Clap your hands and jump for you. You were here before Kilroy!"
There was little joy among this meager, jittery vanguard of the great army that was to halt the Reds. The men were wet, tired, bewildered. Swept from a quiet spot in peaceful Japan, they were being tossed to an enemy they knew nothing about, in a sickening country, in a confusing, mysterious war. And yet this understrength battalion and its 19 jeeps represented the hope of 53 United Nations countries to hold the Red forces plunging toward Pusan.
Only about one in seven of the men were combat veterans; the rest were green. The bulk of the riflemen, machine gunners and mortar men were 20 years old or less. But the battalion had reached its peak of training; in Army parlance, 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, was "red hot."
Supporting the riflemen were four heavy machineguns, two 75mm recoilless rifles, six bazookas, two mortars, and a promise and a prayer that a battery of artillery would join them soon.
Major General William F. Dean, commander of the 24th (later captured by the Reds), had said to Smith: "When you get to Pusan, commandeer trucks, trains, anything else you can get your hands on. Head for Taejon. We've got to block the main Seoul-Pusan road as far north as possible."
There was no other information; no estimate of the enemy situation; no indication of what would be on the battalion's flanks; and no idea of when it could expect any reinforcements.
At Taejon, Smith met Brig. Gen. John Church, MacArthur's advance commander in Korea. "Well, Smith, we have a little action up here," said Church, pointing on a map to a strip of main highway south of Seoul. "All we need is an outfit up there that won't run when they see tanks."
Smith decided to look over the land he was to defend. Taking a handful of his battalion officers, he drove to a spot north of Osan and surveyed the high ground commanding the two avenues of approach into the town. Jutting out of the rich Uijongbu valley was a large hill, flanked on the east side by a railroad and on the west by the main highway.
"If we had to fight in this vicinity, here is the spot we could best defend," Smith told his officers. Then he mapped out supporting fires and final protective lines, dovetailed plans for company and platoon defensive positions and covering fires.
This was to be the first planned American battle line since the end of World War II.
Shortly after midnight, July 5, 1950, all of Task Force Smith moved out to Osan. By this time, the communists had made a clean breakthrough and there was nothing between Smith and the Red spearhead even to begin to slow the enemy down. Task Force Smith was the only organized resistance remaining on the bloody highway between Seoul and Pusan.
Smith's men moved into their positions rapidly. Foxholes were dug, communication wire was laid, ammo and rations were unloaded and distributed. At the first light, the men scanned their fields of fire. In spite of the rain they had about 10,000 yards' visibility right down the main highway and railroad bed. Meanwhile, word had come through that the promised artillery had showed up--Battery "A" of the 52nd Field Artillery was digging in 1500 yards to the rear of Smith's position and was ready to start shooting. By 7:30 a.m., Task Force Smith was trimming up its positions. It had test-fired its guns and rifles, and the artillery had fired several registrations on likely target areas in front of the riflemen's positions.
"B" Company with supporting elements was responsible for the highway, one 75mm recoilless rifle was assigned to cover it. "C" Company was to cover the railroad. The second 75 recoilless rifle was trained down the railroad tracks.
M/Sgt. Harvey Vann, a Texan, had bought a new car in Japan just before the battalion was flown to Korea. Now standing on the hill north of Osan, he offered it for sale. "It's a good buy, men," he assured his dug-in comrades, "And I'm willing to sell it at a loss." He had no takers.
Daylight brought more rain--and the enemy. The weather doused any hope of air support for the defense.
At 7:30 a.m., July 5th, the Communists struck. A column of thirty-three Russian-made T-34 tanks came rumbling out of Suwon down the highway toward the Americans on the hill.
Task Force Smith trained all its guns on the enemy. The artillery opened up at Colonel Smith's call, but the infantry held its fire, waiting for the order to shoot. The initial enemy fire attack came when the tanks were at about 1500 yards. They approached without caution, apparently not expecting to run into a force that would stand and fight.
"They couldn't have been surprised that we were on the hill," Smith recounted. "After all, we made plenty of noise when we test-fired and registered our guns at daybreak. They must have heard us."
The American artillery continued to fire as the T-34's paused on the winding highway to pour shells into the U.S. positions. Smith ordered the fire of the 75mm recoilless rifles held until 700 yards range because of the shortage of ammunition. For the rest of the infantrymen, the order was, "Don't shoot till you see the slant of their eyes!" The tanks came on.
Sergeant Pugh was in command of the 75 rifle responsible for the highway. When the back blast of his gun immediately disclosed his position to the oncoming tanks, the Communists blasted his position, killing one soldier and wounding another. The sergeant and his remaining men moved the gun about 100 feet and resumed firing, continuing until their ammunition was exhausted. Because the bulk of their ammunition was the wrong type (probably high explosive and not armor piercing) no visible damage was done by their fire. The tanks were slowed down, but they weren't stopped. For an hour, they inched forward toward the American positions.
The tragedy of the defense was the failure of the anti-tank rockets to knock off the lead tank. Moving under the direction of Lt. Janson Cox, a Missourian who has since been reported missing in action, the bazooka teams edged down to the road to engage the tanks. "It was heart breaking," reported Capt. Doody of "B" Company, "to watch those men firing pointblank and doing little damage. Rockets hit the tanks in the tracks, turrets and bogies, and still couldn't stop them!"
Lieutenant Ollie Conner, standing behind a knocked-out vehicle, fired 22 rockets from about 15 feet into the tanks as they went by. He stood upright in the smoke and the rain, defying the enemy tankers, and cursing as his shots, all excellent hits by World War II standards, failed to cripple the tankers. Yet before his ammo was gone, Conner managed to knock out two of the tanks, a feat for which he later was awarded the Silver Star.
There were no live demolitions or mines to hinder the enemy. The tanks moved right through the hail of fire coming down on them from the hill.
"If one anti-tank crew had been able to pick off the lead and rear tank, the others would have been sitting ducks," reported Lt. Col. Miller Perry, the artillery commander, as he recounted the action. "Four or five tanks, all medium, just sat near our positions with their hatches battened down, blasting away at our line. The infantry took a terrific pounding as the other tanks came down the road. The tanks swung their turrets on our artillery positions, letting us have it. In a direct fire duel at 100 yards range, we struck back with our 105's and stopped four of them."
Colonel Smith moved from company to company to make sure his men held their positions in the tank attack. It wasn't easy for some men. When Smith passed the gun emplacement of a young Iowan, Pfc. John Crespo, a 60mm mortarman, Crespo held up the bipod. It had been shattered by shell fragments. "What do I do now?" he asked. Crespo fought on as a rifleman, but following that engagement was reported missing in action.
Not far from Crespo, Brad Smith could see the rest of the 60mm mortar team, blasted by tank fire. Sgt. Calvin Patterson of Oregon had been struck in the neck with shell fragments, but refused evacuation to the aid station. "We won't get out anyway," he explained. He stayed with the small mortars until out of ammunition and then directed his platoon, including Crespo, as riflemen.
The hour-long tank battle had been costly. About 20 Americans had been killed and wounded holding their positions as the tanks went through and past them, leaving six burning hulls on the road. Task Force Smith had been ordered to hold. General Church had said, "All we need is an outfit up there that won't run when they see tanks." Task Force Smith did not run.
But the main attack had not yet been launched. On the road south from Suwon, 10,000 yards away, the Americans could see countless trucks loaded with troops. Why they did not dismount and fight with the tanks is a mystery to Smith. Had they fought as a tank infantry team, Task Force Smith would have been slaughtered in the first assault.
Forty-five minutes after the tanks had passed through Task Force Smith's position, the trucks started up. They rolled along the highway much as the tanks had. None of the troops got out ahead to scout the ground.
A column of enemy five miles long came out in the open, and when the leading elements were within 1000 yards, Task Force Smith "threw the book at them." The column was raked with machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. Trucks went up in flames. Enemy dead and wounded cluttered the road. Others fled in panic into adjacent rice paddies. This was not the war the Reds had been used to during the past several days.
The enemy's approach was slowed down, which gave Task Force Smith a chance to consolidate its positions and move up more ammunition. They discovered then that the tanks had shot up many of the 19 jeeps which had been pooled in the rear.
The tanks continued to speed down the main highway toward Pyongtaek while Task Force Smith engaged the infantrymen to the front. As the T-34's rolled by, they tore up the communications lines to the artillery battery. This destroyed the last communications Smith had, other than messengers. Most of his jeeps were gone, his radios were inoperative from the constant rain, and now the tanks had chewed up his wire.
The artillery was 100 yards off the road in position when the tanks went by. They suffered only a few casualties, including Col. Perry, the artillery commander, who received a shell fragment in the knee.
Once the tanks cleared, Task Force Smith never saw or heard them again. What the advance guard of Americans did not know was that by this time the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, commanded by Lt. Col. "Red" Ayers, was approaching a new line near Pyongtaek to fight the first in a planned series of long delaying actions. The T-34's were rolling head on into this force as the Red infantrymen, several miles behind the tanks, were collecting their wits. The initial shock against Task Force Smith had been severe for them. Losses were great.
"It seemed that we mowed down hundreds, but it was hard to tell," Smith said. By 10:45 a.m. the Reds resumed the offensive, this time dismounted. Artillery and mortar fire began to fall on the U.S. position. From under this cover, swarms of Communist soldiers 1000 yards from Task Force Smith fanned out in a wide enveloping movement, sweeping in from the east and west up the far slopes of the hill. Task Force Smith held tenaciously, fighting off wave after wave.
Smith decided that the only way to prolong survival was to bring his forces together on one side of the road and fight in a perimeter defense, Indian fashion, as long as he could. But getting his men across the road was difficult. The highway was covered by a screen of enemy fire, and the enemy had already set up machine guns on the slopes immediately below the American positions.
Dug in on the slopes overlooking the Reds was quiet, determined Pfc. Florentine Gonzales. He was a machine gunner who had always said he would never leave his machine gun. He had all but hand-carried the weapon from Japan to that hill, and now as the enemy came in his sights he splattered them with a fury of fire. As his buddies tried to close into the defense perimeter, Gonzales covered them, yelling encouragement as he traversed his gun across the ranks of the attacking Communists. By the time the last American dashed across the road under Gonzales' covering fire, they noticed that he was bleeding from head to chest. But his gun was still pouring out a volley of death. He clung to his gun, half-blind with blood and rage. All the strength he had left in his body was on the handgrip of his machine gun as the communists swarmed his position. (He was later reported as a captive by the enemy.)
The perimeter was established but by 2:30 in the afternoon, with one quarter of its force wounded or killed, very little ammunition left, no communications and no transportation, Task Force Smith was virtually surrounded. The only area from which it was not getting a heavy volume of fire was to the right rear.
There was no air support, not even a liaison cub plane to guide Task Force Smith out of this hell. There was no hope of any ground support punching its way through to them, not while 37 Russian tanks were on the highway between Osan and Pyongtaek. The road was under fire, preventing any opportunity to open wire communications to the artillery.
Sergeant First Class Loran Chambers of Mt. Sterling, Ill. was a rough-tough soldier. In World War II he had collected five Purple Hearts, and this was the day for his sixth combat wound. He was a platoon guide in "C" Company, directing all available fire on the attacking North Koreans. A gruff, profane, but colorful sergeant, Chambers called back over the sound-power telephone for some 60mm mortar support. The answer came back. "Won't reach that far." "How about some 81's?" Chambers shouted. "We don't have any." "Well, for C____ sake, throw in some 4.2's." "We're out of that, too," came the plaintive response from the mortar platoon. Then Chambers asked, "How about the artillery?" "No communications." "How about the Air Force?" "We don't know where they are." "Then, dammit, call the Navy!" Chambers demanded. "They can't reach this far."
Chambers was exasperated but not undone. "Send me a camera," he yelled over the phone. "I want to take a picture of this." A few minutes later Chambers was struck by mortar fragments, for his sixth Purple Heart. He went on to earn five more Purple Hearts and a commission, and was rotated home before his luck ran out.
At 2:30 Colonel Smith issued orders to his companies to fight their way through the light spray of fire to the right rear. "B" Company would cover the withdrawal as "C" Company with attachments, the medics, the walking wounded and Battalion Headquarters fought their way southward toward a smaller hill to the rear. From here "C" Company would in turn support the withdrawal of "B" Company.
The positions were littered with American dead. There were many critically wounded men lying on litters, on the ground and in the air station. Use of the few remaining jeeps for evacuation purposes was impossible, as the enemy controlled the road, and the rice paddies were rich with mud and fertilizer. Litter bearers carrying wounded through hip-deep mud in rice paddies would have progressed so slowly that the bearers themselves would certainly have become casualties.
"That's the worst part of a deal like that," Smith said, "to leave wounded and dying men yelling for you to help them, and there was no way to help them. We had a lot of casualties getting out of that position, how many I don't know."
One of Smith's lieutenants, hurt badly, was dragging himself to the rear. There were six men lying on the ground, unable to walk. "Lieutenant, what is going to happen to us?" one of them cried out. The lieutenant passed him a hand grenade. "This is the best I can do for you."
The withdrawal was made more difficult by an enemy machine gun nest 40 yards away from the route. It sprayed the hillside and rice paddies every time one of the infantrymen tried to move.
This murderous gun wasn't silenced until Lt. Raymond E. "Bodie" Adams of Baltimore, Maryland, star pitcher and captain of the regimental baseball team, tossed a grenade 40 yards directly into the gun next and destroyed the position. Bodie Adams, who had to take considerable risk and fully expose himself, got the Silver Star for this action.
There was no indication of where the tanks had gone and Smith did not know how large a force he was fighting. Actually it was two divisions, led by the tank spearhead that hit him seven hours earlier. Now these two divisions--about 20,000 men--had already suffered thousands of casualties and were fully deployed along the strategic Seoul-Pusan highway.
"In an obviously hopeless situation with many casualties, no communications, no transportation, ammo gone and the enemy tanks now well behind me, I was faced with a decision: what the hell to do? To stand and die or try to get the remains of my task force out of there. I could last, at best, only another hour and then lose everything I had. I chose to try to get out in hopes that we would live to fight again another day," Smith said.
Smith gave orders to his men to try and find their way to friendly positions. Certainly other U.S. units were set up by now. He told his men to assemble in company groups. The situation on the distant flanks and rear was unknown. It seemed reasonable to expect that other enemy units were advancing down parallel roads. The ammunition was exhausted, and Smith felt that small groups of five or six unarmed men would have better chances of survival than company-size groups of unarmed men. "Meet me at Chonan, 20 miles south of here. Keep off the main roads. Good luck."
Some men walked 60 miles, wading through muddy and malodorous rice paddies and over mountains to get to that position, but they made it. Others never made it. Lt. Col. Smith with four or five volunteers sloshed through open rice paddies in hip-deep mud to notify the artillery battery that the infantry was pulling out. Because of lack of communications, there was no other way to notify the artillerymen who were still in good shape and had lost no equipment. This seemed a miracle, since Task Force Smith had observed the tanks firing at 100-yard range into the battery position.
For several days men of the battalion filtered back to the rear. Perhaps the most unusual odyssey of escape was the story of Sgt. William F. Smith. Hiding out behind enemy lines, he worked his way with the aid of friendly South Koreans to the west coast, where fishermen took him south by boat. Abut two weeks later, he regained friendly lines where he was hospitalized with a case of pneumonia.
Captain William "Chief" Wyrick, a good infantryman with some Indian blood in him, took a small group south across the railroad tracks. Wyrick moved east with his group, which included the chaplain. They ran into a group of about ten Koreans. Not knowing whether they were South or North Koreans, they forced the natives to join them. They struck out for Ansong and from there south to Chonan. The further they went the more disorderly the march became. However, they managed to take care of the wounded, feeding them rice balls which were provided by the Koreans, who turned out to be friendly, and eventually made their way to Chonan.
The artillery battery moved out in its trucks, leaving in their wake destroyed equipment. En route over open country and back roads the trucks picked up all the infantrymen they could locate. On July 6 about 185 men from Task Force Smith had reassembled as instructed at Chonan, ready for what might come.
Task Force Smith still wasn't out of trouble. As the men straggled into Chonan, they were directed to a schoolhouse where they hoped to rest and get cleaned up a bit. Just as Smith had gotten out of his dirty fatigues, he received word that the town was now "No-man's land"--in other words, in front of the front lines!
Smith hurriedly dressed and together with some of his men dashed into the town, hoping to scrounge some trucks. There he saw his "C" Company Commander, Capt. Richard W. Dashner, of Waco, Texas, with a group of 65 men who had just arrived. This brought the survival total to 250 exhausted men. Smith told them to stand fast right where they were while he continued on in search of trucks. Going to the railroad station, Smith and his group were fortunate in securing four trucks from the South Koreans and were also able to borrow six more trucks from the Service Company of the 35th Infantry, which was in the process of moving supplies to the south.
Task Force Smith - now 250 strong - got on the trucks and on General Barth's order proceeded to Taejon for rest and equipment. About 155 men were killed, wounded or missing in the seven-hour fight at Osan.
But the enemy tanks, which sped down the main highway through Smith's positions while Task Force Smith held its ground, were in far worse trouble. For one thing they had taken serious losses for the first time since they launched their aggression. Six tanks were a lot of casualties of the 33 tanks in the short fight. They did not know how large or small a force they had hit.
Moreover, the Red tankers did not know what was holding up their infantrymen to the rear and therefore, did not dare attack without infantry the positions at Pyongtaek held by the 34th Infantry Regiment.
The 34th got a break then, in that it was able to move back to a position just south of Chonan with little trouble and there set up a better position for delay. This time it was with a greater force, including "A" Company and the reminder of "D", the companies Smith had left behind in Japan.
Task Force Smith--what remained of it--was soon reunited with the other units of the 1st Battalion, and lost forever its identity as Task Force Smith. It became once again the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division. Its valiant men went right back into battle no longer green kids but bitter and hardened combat veterans. They now knew what kind of an enemy they were facing in the swarming hordes of fanatical Communists who were determined to drive them from Korea.
It was a long time before any of the men of Task Force Smith realized what they had accomplished. When they had time to reflect, or when someone who knew "the big picture" explained it to them, they could realize the magnitude of their success. With 406 men they had forced two North Korean tank-led divisions to slow down a drive that would have easily brought them to Pusan, for on July 5 no firm defense was set up anywhere behind Task Force Smith to stop the Reds.
Two days later, when General MacArthur announced in Tokyo, "The enemy have lost their opportunity for victory in Korea by deploying too soon," he was thinking about Task Force Smith. He was thinking about the momentous decision which had sent a handful of men against 20,000 well-trained, well-equipped Communists. He was thinking about Brad Smith's decision to stand at Osan.
It was the seven-hour fight of Task Force Smith at Osan that gave the free world the margin of time it needed to get more troops to the Korean peninsula and stop the Reds.
In response the Pennino's article in Real magazine, readers responded with the following Letters to the Editor that were posted under the title "The Lesson of Korea":
James Beilstein's Research Report...James B. decided that he didn't like having to go to the bottom of a page of reading to find the footnotes on a particular subject, so he inserted the footnotes between each line of text. His report is available for viewing in your choice of PDF File or MS Word 2000 document:
*KWE Note: Beilstein's research is his own, and it is up to the visitors of the KWE to determine the validity of his facts. KWE has received comments about the accuracy of some of Beilstein's sources. As always, reader comments are welcome.
An excellent source of information about 1/5 Marines involved in the Pusan Perimeter is a Special Action Report that appears on the Pusan Perimeter page of the Korean War Educator.
Following is a roster of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced for August and September 1950 while in action in Korea. It was compiled by Robert J. Speights, Austin, Texas, who thought it should be done.
This roster of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Korea 1950 is a list of men who raised the title Marine to a new level. During the months of August and September the pressure on the Pusan Perimeter was relieved to the degree that in three operations better than three North Korean divisions were rendered ineffective. History is not within the scope of this work, but these are the men who made the legends. Semper Fi, R.J. Speights
by Lynn Montross, Historical Division, Headquarters, USMC. Reprinted from June 1951 issue of The Marine Corps Gazette with permission.
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The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade lost no time at going into action in Korea. On 14 July 1950, when the ground troops sailed from San Diego, their destination was Japan for a brief training period. During the next 10 days, however, the military situation deteriorated so rapidly that Gen. Douglas MacArthur ordered the Brigade to proceed directly to Korea.
On 2 August, as the men landed at Pusan, the enemy was about 40 miles from that seaport. The next morning the main body of the Brigade moved east by rail to a bivouac near Masan in Eighth U.S. Army reserve. And on 7 August, the eighth anniversary of the Guadalcanal landing, the Marines launched the first of three counter-attacks which would restore Eighth Army lines.
Not much encouragement could be derived at that date from the political and strategic background. As early as 10 May the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea had warned the United Nations Commission that North Korean forces were moving toward the 38th Parallel. He estimated their total strength at 183,000 men and 173 tanks, including 25,000 veterans of Chinese Communist campaigns. The ROK army, hastily built up from a national constabulary, numbered about 100,000 men. Most of the units had received little training, but there was a general lack of such arms as tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons.
On 25 June 1950, when the first NK columns crossed the 38th Parallel, it could not be doubted that the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea was carrying out Soviet policies. Nor was it any secret that the invading army had been trained by Soviet instructors and armed with Soviet weapons.
The United Nations and President Truman met the challenge with dramatic promptness. Military sanctions were ordered against the aggressors on 28 June, and four days later the first U.S. Army troops landed in Korea.
On 2 July the Chief of Naval Operations, with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, granted Gen. MacArthur’s request for a Marine RCT with its own air. This was the inception of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, made up of the 5th Marine Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines, and MAG-33—a total of 6,534 men, including supporting troops.
BrigGen Edward A. Craig commanded this air-ground team composed largely of troops stationed in California. On 13 July, as Marine embarkation began, LtGen Walton W. Walker assumed command of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), numbering 43,146 men in Korea and Japan.
Gen MacArthur had already warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 July to expect a major conflict against a well-trained and equipped enemy. His prediction was confirmed during the next three weeks as U.S. and ROK troops fell back before materially superior invaders. Taejon had to be evacuated on 21 July when the line of the river Kum could not be held. The out-weighed UN forces, their left flank dangling, were unable to prevent the enemy from making an end run in the direction of Pusan.
Nonsan, Namwon, and Hadong fell in dismaying succession to invaders sweeping around to the UN rear, opposed only by militarized ROK police. Gen Walker met the threat on 25 July by shifting the 24th Division (less the 21st Infantry) to the Chinju area with a blocking mission. The North Koreans continued to make daily gains, however, with an estimated two to three regiments of the 6th Division. On the last day of the month they drove southward and eastward to the occupation of Chinju, about 50 miles west of Pusan. On the central front other enemy forces reached the river Naktong, and on the east coast a NK column pushed southward to capture Youngdok from ROK defenders.
EUSAK spokesmen described the situation as "fluid," but the Pusan perimeter was already taking shape. Taegu, the hub of the rail net, was about 50 miles from Pusan, which meant that EUSAK had a larger perimeter than its scanty forces could defend except at key points. The intermittent "line" of defense positions stretched from the secondary port of Pohang on the east coast to the Naktong, then dipped to the south coast in the vicinity of Masan, only 35 miles from Pusan.
This irregular semicircle, about 120 miles in length, or a smaller one, had to be held at the peril of a new Dunkirk. The defenders had only seven under-strength divisions on 1 August. EUSAK consisted of the 24th Division and most of the elements of the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions—42,199 men in all, including supporting troops. Air Force units added 3,527 to the total. Alongside these U.S. divisions were four battered ROK divisions, in action since 25 June.
Eleven enemy divisions had been identified by this date. The seven which launched the invasion were those numbered from the 1st to 6th, including a large proportion of veterans of Chinese Communist campaigns, and the 15th. Four more divisions, hastily raised from border constabulary units, were thrown into action before the end of July.
At the outset Gen MacArthur had necessarily to draw upon occupation forces in Japan, including many recent recruits not ready for combat. The first contingents, making contact with the enemy on 5 July, found themselves plunged into a melancholy land of bleak mountains and fetid rice paddies. Friend could not readily be distinguished from foe in a swarming Oriental population, and too often a group of supposed South Korean civilians proved to be disguised enemy soldiers.
Throughout July an atmosphere of failure and confusion oppressed the men at the front and communicated itself to the public at home. Pearl Harbor had been a shock that energized and united Americans in a day. Korea, in contrast, was only enough of a disillusionment to arouse grumbling. It was hard for soldiers and civilians alike to realize that an Asiatic peninsula might become the Spain of a third World War.
August threatened to be a critical month for Pusan, caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Thus the arrival of the Marines was timely, following the debarkation of the 2nd Infantry Division and Army 5th RCT at Pusan the day before.
Reinforcements were sorely needed at a time when five of the seven UN divisions had neared exhaustion. Since the perimeter could not be held in strength everywhere, EUSAK orders of 2 August called for counterattacks against penetrations to disorganize enemy columns, keep them off balance, and prevent them from launching a coordinated effort. At this turning point the Marine air-ground team constituted a welcome unit to be shifted from one sector to another as a mobile, self-contained reserve.
On 4 August the Plans Section of EUSAK completed a study of plans, later approved, for a counterattack along the Masan-Chinju-Hadong axis. Two days later Task Force Kean—named after MajGen William B. Kean, CG of the 25th Division—was organized with a mission of driving west toward Chinju to secure Masan, a secondary port, from future enemy attempts. The primary object was to prevent NK forces n the Chinju area from cutting the Eighth Army off from its Pusan base. This peril was considered imminent in view of reported large hostile troop movements toward the southern front. Later intelligence led to the conclusion that the main enemy effort would be made farther north in the Yongsan sector of the central front. But the plans were not changed, as it was hoped that the Chinju operation would relieve NK pressure on the threatened central front.
Task Force Kean had as its components the 25th Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (plus an ROK police company), and the Army 5th RCT. The main body of the Marine ground forces, after proceeding by rail on 3 August from Pusan to the Changwon bivouac near Masan, spent three days in EUSAK reserve. Routine patrols were sent out while the Brigade occupied tactical dispositions astride the Masan-Changwon corridor in preparation for further operations. Nervous bursts of night firing occurred in all battalion areas, but no casualties resulted.
These patrols were believed to have provided the occasion for the first air-drops of rations and water by helicopter as well as evacuation of heat casualties. The presence of an enemy patrol was confirmed only once, but no contact could be made with North Korean soldiers who abandoned their observation post and escaped.
The three days in EUSAK reserve were valuable as an orientation and training period. Despite its hasty buildup, the Brigade could be considered an outfit of combat-ready troops. The 1st Battalion, commanded by LtCol George R. Newton, was fairly typical. About 300 of the men had been training at Camp Pendleton when the Brigade was activated. Most of the remaining 400 troops of the battalion had thereafter joined from posts and stations on the West Coast. The latter had received no training with the battalion on field problems, but all were basically well grounded. An experienced and able group of officers and NCOs provided a high order of leadership. During the trans-Pacific voyage they conducted shipboard instruction at the squad and platoon level.
The Brigade moved into an assembly area at Chindong-ni (Map, page 30) on 6 August after being attached to the 25th Division. Relief of a battalion of the 27th Infantry was accomplished by 3/5, under control of CO 27th Infantry for this action. Gen Craig resumed full Brigade control after his other two battalions moved into attack positions that night.
A new chapter of Marine Corps history had begun, and it was fitting that a rifle platoon should draw first blood. Shortly after dark, while the Brigade was still under Army control, CO 27th Infantry directed that a platoon of 3/5 proceed several miles forward to protect the flank of a company reporting heavy pressure. The 1st Platoon of George Company and a MG section were sent by CO 3/5 with a mission of seizing a ridge line. During the advance the first Marine battle casualties of Korea occurred about 0500 on 7 august when enemy artillery shells wounded tow men. Two hours later Lt John H.J. Cahill led 39 men up a slope swept by NK automatic fire. He took his objective at 0900, after making contact with the 27th’s infantry company, and held for 24 hours under sporadic mortar and automatic fire until being relieved the next morning by Dog Company of 2/5. Six men of the detachment were killed and 12 wounded, in addition to heat casualties.
The story of the war in Korea might have been written in terms of such rifle platoon actions. Although he American public had been conditioned by irresponsible concepts of push-button warfare, the actual showdown called for the timeworn fundamentals of sound infantry training.
The attack plan of 7 August provided for the Army 5th RCT to jump off at 030 from positions just beyond Chindong-ni after a brief air-artillery preparation. These assault troops had orders to pass through and relieve the 27tn Infantry before advancing to clear the road junction west of Chindong-ni . When that mission had been accomplished, the Marine Brigade was to jump off from the road junction and initiate its attack along the route toward Kosong. Meanwhile the 5th RCT would continue to advance along the northern fork of the road toward Chinju.
This plan remained in effect until the Army 5th RCT was held up by opposition northwest of Chindong-ni. CG 25th Division then directed that a battalion of Marines relieve the 2d Battalion, Army 5th RCT, so that the attack could proceed. This mission fell to 2/4 of the Marines, and at 1100 the battalion moved out from Sangnyong-ni. Enemy automatic and mortar fire held up the advance, but the extreme heat did as much to delay troops making an exhausting climb. At dusk the Marine shad not been able to complete the relief, and an early morning attack was necessary to fight through and relieve the Army battalion. Eight men were killed and 28 wounded in the Marine battalion.
Such stubborn enemy resistance had developed in this area that three days and nights of slugging would ensure before the road junction had been fully cleared. This task absorbed the efforts of the Marine Brigade as well as elements of the Army 5th and 27th Regiments. At 1120 on 7 august Gen Craig was directed by CG 25th Division to assume command of all Army as well as Marine units in the area—a responsibility which he held until relieved by oral instructions late in the afternoon of 9 august after the road junction was cleared.
Where possible the Marine Brigade operated in a column of battalions passing through and relieving one another at successive objectives. Not only was the rugged terrain a factor, but the battalions still had only two rifle companies. [At Camp Pendleton, as part of the transition from a peace to war footing, third platoons were activated on 5 July. Third companies did not join the Brigade, however, until after operations ended in the Pusan Perimeter.] The great frontages typical of the Korean operations required battalions to commit two companies abreast, leaving no reserve echelon.
Slow progress in clearing the road junction was made during the daylight hours of 8 August by the Brigade and Army troops against enemy units identified as the 82rd Motorized and the 13th and 15th Infantry of the 6th Division. The Marines learned to respect a hardy enemy for his skill at camouflage, ambush, infiltration and use of cover. They learned that supporting air and artillery fires often had limited effect on a foe making clever use of reverse slope defenses to offset Marine concentrations. Thus a ridge might protect and conceal an enemy strong point until attackers were too close for supporting fires. At that stage the affairs turned into a fire fight with small arms in which the North Koreans were at no disadvantage despite their handicap in air and artillery.
Rear areas and supply routes were seldom safe from infiltration. A noteworthy example was supplied on the night of 8 August when the enemy threw a road block across the Masan-Chindong-ni MSR behind 2/5, delaying the relief of that Marine battalion by a battalion of the 24th Infantry. CG Brigade ordered 3/5 to the rescue form positions in the vicinity, with two battalions of the 24th Infantry in support. Slow progress was made in staggering heat on the morning of 9 August. Artillery fires and napalm strikes were delivered to enable How Company to seize the high ground commanding the road block. Not until late that afternoon was the weary 2d Battalion relieved.
Meanwhile 1/5 had been ordered on 8 August to advance from defense positions at 2300 in conjunction with an Army 5th RCT effort to complete its mission of clearing the road junction. Although the Leathernecks had to cross a mile-long rice paddy to relieve an Army's 5th RCT battalion, not a shot was fired at the single-file column. At 0600, after completing relief, the Marines attacked to seize Objective 1, the high ground to the immediate front. Again the lack of resistance was bewildering, and orders were received to continue to advance along the road toward Paedun-ni. About a third of the distance had been covered without opposition when the battalion set up defense positions for the night.
The late afternoon of 9 August dated a turning point. Army 5th RCT reported that the road junction had at last been cleared, permitting forward movement along the northern route toward Chinju. Three days of hard and often confused fighting had dislodged the enemy and forced him into full retreat along both roads in the direction of Kosong and Chinju. These results had been accomplished during a decisive first phase in which Gen Craig held overall command in the forward area. Then, on 10 August, Army elements of the 5th and 27th Regiments reverted from Brigade command to 25th Division control.
The fleeing enemy offered little opposition to the advance of the 10 August. After occupying Paedun-ni at dawn, the Marines advanced 10 miles along the road without any serious action except an attempted enemy ambush defeated by Lt Col Harold S. Roise’s 2d Battalion with air and tank support.
Fatigue and heat continued on 11 August to be the main foes of troops who had known little sleep or rest in four days and nights. As the Brigade moved toward Kosong against light opposition, the 35th RCT had covered most of the distance to Chinju along the northern axis. Pockets of resistance were encountered, but the enemy was withdrawing everywhere and even abandoning equipment. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines hastened this process by shelling Kosong. Enemy transport led a disorderly flight from the town, and Marine air had a turkey shoot at the expense of a column estimated at 40 vehicles. About half were destroyed and the rest damaged in repeated attacks by the Corsairs.
Although the UN forces were criticized for being road bound, this episode hinted that the enemy had fewer difficulties because he had fewer vehicles. Only human transport could traverse the rice paddies and hilltops; but the North Koreans were driven to that expedient by UN planes which controlled the roads in daylight hours.
The enemy, according to EUSAK estimates, began the invasion with 122 planes of all types, most of which were destroyed by the middle of July. Only infrequent flights by single aircraft were reported afterwards, and Marine fliers met no resistance in their element. Despite the enemy’s lack of air reconnaissance, his artillery was surprisingly effective at times. As an example, a 122mmprojectile knocked out one of our 105mm howitzers with a direct hit on 7 August, killing two men and wounding eight of B Battery, 11th Marines. Enemy intelligence commanded respect, and his intermittent firing practices permitted well camouflaged gun positions to be long concealed form air observation.
The evacuation of Kosong occurred just as LtCol Robert D. Taplett’s 3/5 passed through the other two battalions. Beyond the town the fast-moving advance troops bore down on the NK 83rd Motorized in the confusion of escape, and infantry combined with air to leave the road strewn with enemy dead and wrecked transport. Some of the Soviet-made vehicles were captured intact and put to good use by Marines slowed by transport shortages and limitations. [Many vehicles were left on the dock at San Diego because of shipping shortages. But the Brigade discovered that even the full allowance of equipment would not have been sufficient.]
At dusk on 11 August, after reaching high ground 2,400 yards west of Kosong, the Brigade halted with orders to attack toward Sachon in the morning. The 1st Battalion leapfrogged the 3rd at daybreak and advanced for seven hours against negligible opposition to a ridge within sight of Sachon. It could hardly have been imagined at this moment that a beaten enemy was coiled to strike his two boldest blows of the campaign.
The first developed when 24th Infantry elements were surprised by enemy infiltrating 25 miles to the rear and overrunning artillery positions on the MSR west of Chindong-ni. At noon on 12 August, CO 5th Marines, carrying out 25th Division instructions, ordered 3/5 to the new road block by motor lift. Arriving at 1600, G and H companies attacked to secure their first objectives before dusk. Several hot fire fights took place the next day before How Company advanced with supporting air, artillery, and 4.2 mortar fires to clear the MSR.
Meanwhile, as the other two Marine battalions continued the advance toward Sachon, the enemy demonstrated that ambush as well as infiltration was an ever-present threat of North Korean tactics. At 1400 on 12 August the 1st Battalion, with a reconnaissance company detachment leading, entered a U-shaped defile east of the town.
This was the beginning of the affair known as the Sachon Ambush. As a test of Marine and enemy techniques, it is perhaps the most instructive fire fight of the operation.
The reconnaissance detachment, acting as the point, promptly unmasked enemy intentions by spotting four NK soldiers hurrying toward their machine gun emplacements (Point C). Fire was immediately opened when return fire revealed additional positions (Points A). Baker Company deployed on the left side of the road and Able on the right.
A platoon of tanks, attached to the battalion, soon got into the fight. Maneuver was prevented by rice paddies lying between the road and high ground. But tank fires were directed by platoon leaders using such SCR 536s as had not been put out of commission by mud and water. CO Baker Company, after orienting himself, further briefed the tanks on his SCR 300. After rogering for this orientation, the tanks put down the fire requested by platoon leaders.
Tanks covered the laborious advance of the 3rd Platoon of Baker Company across an ankle-deep rice paddy to seize a hill on the left flank. Covered by these supporting fires, the 3rd Platoon reached the crest of Hill 202 but was driven back by superior enemy numbers counter-attacking from the reverse slope. Artillery was called into action to get the platoon off the hill. The Corsairs strafed the indicated area with repeated runs, and artillery laid down about 30 minutes of fire.
Nearly every supporting arm had figured in a combat which might otherwise have cost Baker Company far more than the actual three dead and 13 wounded. At 1745 the battalion advanced again to occupy the high ground to defend for the night. This advance caught the enemy withdrawing and killed 38 at no cost to the Marines in casualties.
Word came just before midnight that the Brigade had 25th Division orders to move to a new front. In the 1st Battalion area the two rifle companies were separated by a gap of 800 yards covered by 4.2 mortars and artillery. At 0450, with the withdrawal beginning, a flare revealed artillery as well as 4.2 and 81 mortar fire laid down almost in the laps of the infantry. As a final touch, three .5 rocket launchers were credited with knocking out two machine guns and killing the crews.
By daybreak Baker Company had reorganized for a counterattack, but Battalion ordered the withdrawal to continue as supporting fires escorted the covering 2nd Platoon safely down the slope. This last fight cost the company 12 killed, 16 wounded, and nine missing, presumed dead.
The Leathernecks were reluctant to turn their backs on Sachon with the final objective within grasp. It doubtless seemed to them that the six-day operation had accomplished nothing, since Army units advancing on Chinju were also pulled back from their objective. But events were to prove that the enemy had been stopped cold after penetrating within 35 miles of Pusan—the high tide of the North Korean advance. Never again would the invaders be able to mount a serious threat on this sensitive southern front. In this operation Brigade estimates placed the casualties of the three NK regiments at about 1,900.
CG 25th Division ordered the Marines to withdraw from the vicinity of Sachon by motor and LST to the Chindong-ni area, and the 3rd Battalion (with its road clearing mission completed) reverted to Brigade control. The men proceeded from Chindong-ni by motor lift to the railhead at Masan, where they had their first hot meal since landing in Korea nearly two weeks before. Unhappily, the train pulled in before half of them had eaten. The Brigade reached its assembly area at Miryang on 14 August. There it passed by EUSAK orders to operational control of the 24th Division.
The Marines had scarcely time to clean their weapons at Miryang before being sent back into action again. Enemy pressure in the Naktong Bulge of the central front had created a menace even before the Sachon-Chinju operation ended. This situation resulted in 24th division orders for the Brigade to move by Army and organic motor lift on 16 August to previously reconnoitered positions in the Yongsan area.
See these memoirs on the Korean War Educator:
See these memoirs on the Korean War Educator:
As the Eighth Army continued to reel under the withering blows of the NKPA, General Walker received a visit from General MacArthur, who promised, "Help is on the way." Walker would be reinforced by the 2nd Infantry Division, the 5th Marines and the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). There were to be no more withdrawals. Walker had to hold for six weeks while a reserve force of two divisions was built up and landed behind enemy lines at the port of Inchon on the Yellow Sea. This would cut off supplies to the NKPA in the south and assure their defeat. Without question, the Eighth Army must hold. Walker issued to his troop commanders what the press dubbed as his "stand or die" order. There would be no more retreating. "We are going to hold this line. We are going to win."
The U.N. forces dug in along their meager toehold in southeastern Korea, which became known as the Pusan Perimeter. The western edge, manned by U.S. troops, ran from the Korea Strait north along the Naktong River for about 85 miles. Just north of Taegu, the line turned east and ran for about 50 miles to Pohang on the Sea of Japan. ROK troops defended in this mountainous sector. They had performed better than expected and inflicted severe casualties on the attackers. They had naval gunfire support from U.S. and British ships. Once retreating down the coast, the 3rd ROK Division was surrounded. The Navy took them off and landed them farther south.
Kim Il Sung ordered his North Korean troops to take Pusan by August 15 (Korean time), regardless of casualties. It was the anniversary of the Japanese surrender. Astrological reckoning, timing, and dates are important in the Orient. The fighting was furious. The NKPA suffered the casualties, but they did not take Pusan. It was a moment to be proud of American arms.
Undaunted by these losses, the North Koreans poured more troops into the area to continue the struggle. Time was against them. They must prevail now before the U.N. forces were built up to a level which would preclude a NKPA victory. Astonishingly, they were able to maintain a high morale and keep their troops supplied, in spite of the U.N. control of the air, by moving men and material at night. ROK Colonel Min Ki Sik had formed a scratch force of regimental size (Task Force Min), delayed their advance through the southwest, and added to their ration problem by confiscating much of the rice in the area and shipping it to Pusan. The NKPA was expected to live off the land.
The Pusan Perimeter was not a series of two-man foxholes every few yards—there were too few troops for this—but rather an offensive-defense. Observation posts were strung along the front and when the enemy movement was detected, troops located in strong points well to the rear would come forward to attack and push the NKPA back across the Naktong River. They were greatly aided by the Air Force and Navy performing observation and close ground support. Forty-four percent of these tactical missions were flown by the Navy and Marines from carrier decks stationed off shore. The Air Force operated at considerable disadvantage at this time, however, for there were only two strips in Korea suitable for use by F-51 and C-47 type of aircraft—K-2 at Taegu and K-3 at Yonil on the east coast. Both were dirt strips. Most of the tactical planes flew from Japan.
The fighting was fierce. U.N. forces were holding on by the skin of their teeth. New units arriving at Pusan were quickly thrown into the battle. Two battalions of the 29th Infantry from Okinawa were committed before they had cleaned all the cosmoline (packing grease) from their newly issued weapons.
The Wolfhounds, in Army reserve, were shifted here and there to the hot spots. Twice the First Marine Provisional Brigade was called to eject an enemy penetration at the Naktong Bulge. The Army troops of the 24th and 2nd Infantry Divisions had fought their hearts out for eleven days in this area and stopped the enemy advance, but were too weak to push the North Koreans back across the river.
Lt. William R. Ellis, who experienced combat in World War II, says the 9th Infantry Regiment fought magnificently. "The original group of officers was gallant and far under-ranked. Most of the company commanders were (only) first lieutenants, which was a disgrace itself. They were forty-year-old, gray-haired World War II veterans (reserves called up) and still lieutenants in combat in 1950. I knew them all and have regretted at times that I did not join them (in death) for they by-and-large died unknown and unrewarded for their bravery." E Company had all its officers wiped out on five occasions.
Enlisted man, Charles Payne of the 34th Infantry Regiment, remembers it this way: "Masses of gooks (enemies) poured over the hills and through the gaps like a flood. Our people were fighting like seasoned troopers, but were just being overpowered….Hour after hour we held the North Koreans off … time and time again gooks rushed us. Each time we would lose a man, they would lose many. The ground was covered with their dead. We stacked our dead around us for protection. The battle seemed to go on forever."
Few Americans today, or even then, know of the desperate struggle, the pain and suffering, the utmost heroic effort and valor displayed to stop the North Korean assaults. The U.S. suffered its highest casualties of the entire war during these six weeks. If and when the public does become conscious of this all-important battle, it will, no doubt, be ranked alongside Bunker Hill, the Alamo, Bataan, and Corregidor.
United Nations Commander General Douglas MacArthur planned an amphibious invasion of Korea as early as June 27, 1950. The plan envisioned landing an invasion force on the Western coast as early as July 20 consisting of the 1st Cavalry Division, an Army Amphibious brigade, an Army Regimental Combat Team, and a Marine Regiment. The goal was the capture of Inchon and Seoul in order to cut off the flow of supplies North Korean Peoples Army troops and supplies to the South. The plan was dubbed "Operation Bluehearts."
Soon, however, events in Korea on the ground forced General MacArthur to scrap the plan and instead send the 1st Cavalry Division to P'ohang-dong to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter. Although Bluehearts was scrapped, it served as the model for the successful "Operation Chromite" or "Inchon Landing" on September 15.
The landing at P'ohang-dong took place over a period of several days, July 17-19. It was an unopposed landing. The main enemy forces were installed to the North, but were taking a pounding from the air and sea. On July 17, a battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment landed near Yonil to secure the airfield there. Typhoon Helene prevented the remainder of the regiment and the 82d Field Artillery Battalion from landing until July 22.
The 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 8th Cavalry Regiment, organized into Regimental Combat Teams, including supporting division troops, arrived on July 18 and 19. Both RCTs quickly moved west by truck and rail toward the vicinity of Taejon, arriving on July 22. Their mission was to relieve embattled 24th Infantry Division troops in the vicinity and to secure the Taejon-Yongdong-Taegu highway corridor which led directly south to the airfield in Taegu and beyond to the ports on the Sea of Japan.
Close air support from Seventh Fleet; deep air support from FEAF; patrol aircraft from Task Group 96.2
[KWE Note: This chronological list of famous Korean War battle sites in South Korea was compiled by the Department of the Army.]
"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." - Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Task Force Smith, comprised of elements of the 24th Division's 21st Regiment, then based in Japan, was the first American unit to fight in Korea. The initial 406 members of Task Force Smith arrived at Pusan by air on 1 July 1950 and were rushed north by train and truck. On 4 July they were joined at Pyongtaek by 134 men of their division's 52d Field Artillery Battalion which had crossed from Japan on an LST.
A little after midnight on 5 July the infantry and artillery of the Task Force moved out of Pyongtaek. Their leader, LTC Charles B. Smith had to commandeer Korean trucks and miscellaneous vehicles to mount his men. The native Korean drivers deserted when they found that the vehicles were going north. American soldiers took over in the driver's seats. BG George B. Barth, Acting commanding General of the 24th Division Artillery, and Colonel Smith followed the task force northward. On the way, General Barth tried to halt the ROK demolition preparations by telling the engineer groups that he planned to use the bridges. At one bridge, after talk failed to influence the ROK engineers, Barth threw the boxes of dynamite into the river. It was only twelve miles to Osan, but it took two and a half hours to get there because ROK soldiers and civilians fleeing south filled the road and driving was under blackout conditions.
About 0300 on 5 July, the delaying force reached the position which Smith had previously selected. The infantry units started setting up weapons and digging in at the predesignated places. LTC Miller O. Perry, 52d FA Battalion commander, moved his guns into the positions behind the infantry that he had selected the previous afternoon. All units were in place, but not completely dug in, before daylight.
In seeking the most favorable place to pass through the ridge, the railroad bent eastward away from the highway until it was almost a mile distant. There the railroad split into two single-track lines and passed over low ground between hills of the ridge line. On his left flank Colonel Smith placed one platoon of B Company on the high knob immediately west of the highway; east of the road were B Company's other two rifle platoons. Beyond them eastward to the railroad tracks were two platoons of C Company. This company's third platoon occupied a finger ridge running south, forming a refused right flank along the west side of the railroad track. Just east of the highway B Company emplaced one 75-mm recoilless rifle; C Company emplaced the other 75-mm recoilless rifle just west of the railroad. Colonel Smith placed the 4.2-inch mortars on the reverse, or south slope, of the ridge about 400 yards behind the center of B Company's position. The infantry line formed a 1-mile front, not counting the refused right flank along the railroad track. The highway, likely to be the critical axis of enemy advance, passed through the shallow saddle at the infantry position and then zigzagged gently downgrade northward around several knoblike spurs to low ground a little more than a mile away. There it crossed to the east side of the railroad track and continued on over semi-level ground to Suwon.
Two thousand yards behind the infantry, Colonel Perry pulled four 105-mm howitzers 150 yards to the left (west) off the highway over a small trail that only jeeps could travel. Two jeeps in tandem pulled the guns into place. Near a cluster of houses with rice paddies in front and low hills back of them, the men arranged the guns in battery position. Perry emplaced the fifth howitzer as an antitank gun on the west side of the road about halfway between the main battery position and the infantry. From there it could place direct fire on the highway where it passed through the saddle and the infantry positions.
Volunteers from the artillery Headquarters and Service Batteries made up four .50-caliber machine gun and four 2.36-inch bazooka teams and joined the infantry in their position.
The infantry parked most of their miscellaneous trucks and jeeps along the road just south of the saddle. The artillerymen left their trucks concealed in yards and sheds and behind Korean houses along the road just north of Osan. There were about 1,200 rounds of artillery ammunition at the battery position and in two trucks parked inside a walled enclosure nearby. One or two truckloads more were in the vehicles parked among the houses just north of Osan. Nearly all this ammunition was high explosive (HE); only 6 rounds were high explosive antitank (HEAT), and all of it was taken to the forward gun. When the 52d Field Artillery was loading out at Sasebo, Japan, the battalion ammunition officer drew all the HEAT ammunition available there--only 18 rounds. He issued 6 rounds to A Battery, now on the point of engaging in the first battle between American artillery and the Russian-built T34 tanks.
At the Osan position as rainy 5 July dawned were 540 Americans: 389 enlisted men and 17 officers among the infantry and 125 enlisted men and 9 officers among the artillerymen. When first light came, the infantry test-fired their weapons and the artillerymen registered their guns. Then they ate their C ration breakfasts.
In spite of the rain Smith could see almost to Suwon. He first saw movement on the road in the distance near Suwon a little after 0700. In about half an hour a tank column, now easily discernible, approached the waiting Americans. In this first group there were eight tanks. About 0800 the men back in the artillery position received a call from the forward observer with the infantry for a fire mission.
At 0816 the first American artillery fire of the Korean War hurtled through the air toward the North Korean tanks. The number two howitzer fired the first two rounds, and the other pieces then joined in the firing. The artillery took the tanks under fire at a range of approximately 4,000 yards, about 2,000 yards in front of the American infantry. The forward observer quickly adjusted the fire and shells began landing among the tanks. But the watching infantrymen saw the tanks keep on coming, undeterred by the exploding artillery shells.
To conserve ammunition Colonel Smith issued orders that the 75-mm recoilless rifle covering the highway should withhold fire until the tanks closed to 700 yards. The tanks stayed in column, displayed little caution, and did not leave the road. The commander of the enemy tank column may have thought he had encountered only another minor ROK delaying position.
General Barth had gone back to the artillery just before the enemy came into view and did not know when he arrived there that an enemy force was approaching. After receiving reports from the forward observer that the artillery fire was ineffective against the tanks, he started back to alert the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry, whose arrival he expected at Pyongtaek during the night, against a probably breakthrough of the enemy tanks.
When the enemy tank column approached within 700 yards of the infantry position, the two recoilless rifles took it under fire. They scored direct hits, but apparently did not damage the tanks which, firing their 85-mm cannon and 7.62-mm machine guns, rumbled on up the incline toward the saddle. When they were almost abreast of the infantry position, the lead tanks came under 2.36-inch bazooka fire. Operating a rocket launcher from the ditch along the east side of the road, 2d Lt. Ollie D. Connor, fired 22 rockets at approximately 15 yards' range against the rear of the tanks where their armor was weakest. Whether they were effective is doubtful. The two lead tanks, however, were stopped just through the pass when they came under direct fire of the single 105-mm howitzer using HEAT ammunition. Very likely these artillery shells stopped the two tanks, although the barrage of close-range bazooka rockets may have damaged their tracks.
The two damaged tanks pulled off to the side of the road, clearing the way for those following. One of the two caught fire and burned. Two men emerged from its turret with their hands up. A third jumped out with a burp gun in his hands and fired directly into a machine gun position, killing the assistant gunner. This unidentified machine gunner (survivors of Task Force Smith believe he was PFC Kenneth Shadrock, killed in action at about 0830, 5 July 1950) probably was the first American ground soldier killed in action in Korea. American fire killed the three North Koreans. The six rounds of HEAT ammunition at the forward gun were soon expended, leaving only the HE shells which ricocheted off the tanks. The third tank through the pass knocked out the forward gun and wounded one of its crew members.
The tanks did not stop to engage the infantry; they merely fired on them as they came through. Following the first group of 8 tanks came others at short intervals, usually in groups of 4. These, too, went unhesitatingly through the infantry position and on down the road toward the artillery position. In all, there were 33 tanks in the column. The last passed through the infantry position at 0900, about an hour after the lead tanks had reached the saddle. In this hour, tank fire had killed or wounded approximately 20 men in Smith's position.
as to what would happen if tanks came through the infantry to the artillery position. Someone in the artillery had raised this point to be answered by the infantry, "Don't worry, they will never get back to you." One of the artillerymen later expressed the prevailing opinion by saying, "Everyone thought the enemy would turn around and go back when they found out who was fighting." Word now came to the artillerymen from the forward observer that tanks were through the infantry and to be ready for them.
The first tanks cut up the telephone wire strung along the road from the artillery to the infantry and destroyed this communication. The radios were wet and functioning badly; now only the jeep radio worked. Communication with the infantry after 0900 was spotty at best, and, about 1100, it ceased altogether.
The tanks came on toward the artillery pieces, which kept them under fire but could not stop them. About 500 yards from the battery, the tanks stopped behind a little hill seeking protection from direct fire. Then, one at a time, they came down the road with a rush, hatches closed, making a run to get past the battery position. Some fired their 85-mm cannon, others only their machine guns. Their aim was haphazard in most cases for the enemy tankers had not located the gun positions. Some of the tank guns even pointed toward the opposite side of the road. Only one tank stopped momentarily at the little trail where the howitzers had pulled off the main road as though it meant to try to overrun the battery which its crew evidently had located. Fortunately, however, it did not leave the road but instead, after a moment, continued on toward Osan. The 105-mm howitzers fired at ranges of 150-300 yards as the tanks went by, but the shells only jarred the tanks and bounced off. Altogether, the tanks did not average more than one round each in return fire.
Three bazooka teams from the artillery has posted themselves near the road before the tanks appeared. When word came that the tanks were through the infantry, two more bazooka teams, one led by Colonel Perry and the other by Sgt. Edwin A. Eversole, started to move into position. The first tank caught both Perry and Eversole in the rice paddy between the howitzers and the highway. When Evresole's first bazooka round bounced off the turret of the tank, he said that tank suddenly looked to him "as big as a battleship." This tank fired its 85-mm cannon, cutting down a telephone pole which fell harmlessly over Eversole who had flung himself down into a paddy drainage ditch. A 105-mm shell hit the tracks of the third tank and stopped it. The other tanks in this group went on through. The four American howitzers remained undamaged.
After these tanks had passed out of sight, Colonel Perry took an interpreter and worked his way up close to the immobilized enemy tank. Through the interpreter, he called on the crew to come out and surrender. There was no response. Perry then ordered the howitzers to destroy the tank. After three rounds had hit the tank, two men jumped out of it and took cover in a culvert. Perry sent a squad forward and it killed the two North Koreans.
Earlier in the morning it was supposed to have been no more than an academic question During this little action, small arms fire hit Colonel Perry in the right leg. Refusing to be evacuated, he hobbled around or sat against the base of a tree giving orders and instructions in preparation for the appearance of more tanks.
In about ten minutes the second wave of tanks followed the last of the first group. This time there were more--"a string of them," as one man expressed it. They came in ones, twos, and threes, close together with no apparent interval or organization.
When the second wave of tanks came into view, some of the howitzer crew members started to "take off." As one present said, the men were "shy about helping." The officers had to drag the ammunition up and load the pieces themselves. The senior noncommissioned officers fired the pieces. The momentary panic soon passed and, with the good example and strong leadership of Colonel Perry and 1st Lt. Dwain L. Scott before them, the men returned to their positions. Many of the second group of tanks did not fire on the artillery at all. Again, the 105-mm howitzers did, however, hit another in its tracks, disabling it in front of the artillery position. Some of the tanks had one or two infantrymen on their decks. Artillery fire blew off or killed most of them; some lay limply dead as the tanks went by; others slowly jolted off onto the road. Enemy tank fire caused a building to burn near the battery position and a nearby dump of about 300 rounds of artillery shells began to explode. The last of the tanks passed the artillery position by 1015. These tanks were from the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, in support of the North Korean 4th Division.
Colonel Perry estimates that his four howitzers fired an average of 4 to 6 rounds at each of the tanks, and that they averaged perhaps 1 round each in return. After the last tank was out of sight, rumbling on toward Osan, the score stood as follows: the forward 105-mm howitzer and 2.36-inch bazookas fired from the infantry position, had knocked out and left burning 1 tank and damaged another so that it could not move; the artillery had stopped 2 more in front of the battery position, while three others though damaged had managed to limp out of range toward Osan. This made 4 tanks destroyed or immobilized and 3 others slightly damaged but serviceable out of a total of 33.
For their part, the tanks had destroyed the forward 105-mm howitzer and wounded one of its crew members, had killed or wounded an estimated 20 infantrymen, and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the infantry position. At the main battery position the tanks had slightly damaged one of the four guns by a near miss. Only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded at the battery position.
Task Force Smith was not able to use any antitank mines--one of the most effective methods of defense against tanks--as there were none in Korea at the time. Colonel Perry was of the opinion that a few well-placed antitank mines would have stopped the entire armored column in the road.
After the last of the tank column had passed through the infantry position and the artillery and tank fire back toward Osan had subsided, the American position became quiet again. There was no movement of any kind discernible on the road ahead toward Suwon. But Smith knew that he must expect enemy infantry soon. In the steady rain that continued throughout the morning, the men deepened their foxholes and otherwise improved their positions.
Perhaps an hour after the enemy tank column had moved through, Colonel Smith, from his observation post, saw movement on the road far away, near Suwon. This slowly became discernible as a long column of trucks and foot soldiers. Smith estimated the column to be about six miles long. It took an hour for the head of the column to reach a point 1,000 yards in front of the American infantry. There were three tanks in front, followed by a long line of trucks, and, behind these, several miles of marching infantry. There could be no about about it, this was a major force of the North Korean Army pushing south--the 16th and 18th Regiments of the NK 4th Division, as learned later.
Whether the enemy column knew that American ground troops had arrived in Korea and were present in the battle area is unknown. Later, Sr. Col. Lee Hak Ku, in early July operations officer of the NK II Corps, said he had no idea that the United States would intervene in the war, that nothing had been said about possible US intervention, and that he believed it came as a surprise to North Korean authorities.
With battle against a greatly superior number of enemy troops only a matter of minutes away, the apprehensions of the American infantry watching the approaching procession can well be imagined. General MacArthur later referred to his commitment of a handful of American ground troops as "that arrogant display of strength" which he hoped would fool the enemy into thinking that a much larger force was at hand.
When the convoy of enemy trucks was about 1,000 yards away, Colonel Smith, to use his own words, "threw the book at them." Mortar shells landed among the trucks and .50-caliber machine gun bullets swept the column. Trucks burst into flames. Men were blown into the air; others sprang from their vehicles and jumped into ditches alongside the road. The three tanks moved to within 200-300 yards of the American positions and began raking the ridge line with cannon and machine gun fire. Behind the burning vehicles an estimated 1,000 enemy infantry detrucked and started to deploy. Behind them other truckloads of infantry stopped and waited. It was now about 1145.
The enemy infantry began moving up the finger ridge along the east side of the road. There, some of them set up a base of fire while others fanned out to either side in a double enveloping movement. The American fire broke up all efforts of the enemy infantry to advance frontally. Strange though it was, the North Koreans made no strong effort to attack the flanks; they seemed bent on getting around rather than closing on them. Within an hour, about 1230, the enemy appeared in force on the high hill to the west of the highway overlooking and dominating the knob on that side held by a platoon of B Company. Smith, observing this, withdrew the platoon to the east side of the road. Maj. Floyd Martin, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, meanwhile supervised the carrying of available ammunition stocks to a central and protected area back of the battalion command post. The 4.2-inch mortars were moved up closer, and otherwise the men achieved a tighter defense perimeter on the highest ground east of the road. In the exchange of fire that went on an increasing amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the American position. Enemy machine guns on hills overlooking the right flank now also began firing on Smith's men.
Earlier, Colonel Perry had twice sent wire parties to repair the communications wire between the artillery and the infantry, but both had returned saying they had been fired upon. At 1300 Perry sent a third group led by his Assistant S-3. This time he ordered the men to put in a new line across the paddies east of the road and to avoid the area where the earlier parties said they had received fire.
About 1430, Colonel Smith decided that if any of his command was to get out, the time to move was at hand. Large numbers of the enemy were now on both flanks and moving toward his rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of him along the road stretching back toward Suwon; and his small arms ammunition was nearly gone. A large enemy tank force was already in his rear. He had no communications, not even with Colonel Perry's artillery a mile behind him, and he could hope for no reinforcements. Perry's artillery had fired on the enemy infantry as long as the fire direction communication functioned properly, but this too had failed soon after the infantry fight began. The weather prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene. Had it been present it could have worked havoc with the enemy-clogged road.
Smith planned to withdraw his men by leapfrogging units off the ridge, each jump of the withdrawal covered by protecting fire of the next unit ahead. The selected route of withdrawal was toward Osan down the finger ridge on the right flank, just west of the railroad track. First off the hill was C Company, followed by the medics, then battalion headquarters, and, finally, B Company, except its 2d Platoon which never received the withdrawal order. A platoon messenger returned from the company command post and reported to 2d Lt. Carl F. Bernard that there was no one at the command post and that the platoon was the only group left in position. After confirming this report Bernard tried to withdraw his men. At the time of the withdrawal the men carried only small arms and each averaged two or three clips of ammunition. They abandoned all crew-served weapons--recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns. They had no alternative but to leave behind all the dead and about 25 to 30 wounded litter cases. A medical sergeant, whose name unfortunately has not been determined, voluntarily remained with the latter. The slightly wounded moved out with the main units, but when enemy fire dispersed some of the groups many of the wounded dropped behind and were seen no more.
Task Force Smith suffered its heaviest casualties in the withdrawal. Some of the enemy machine gun fire was at close quarters. The captain and pitcher of the regimental baseball team, 1st Lt. Raymond "Bodie" Adams, used his pitching arm to win the greatest victory of his career when he threw a grenade forty yards into an enemy machine gun position, destroying the gun and killing the crew. This particular gun had caused heavy casualties.
About the time B Company, the initial covering unit, was ready to withdraw, Colonel Smith left the hill, slanted off to the railroad track and followed it south to a point opposite the artillery position. From there he struck off west through the rice paddies to find Colonel Perry and tell him the infantry was leaving. While crossing the rice paddies Smith met Perry's wire party and together they hurried to Perry's artillery battery. Smith had assumed that the enemy tanks had destroyed all the artillery pieces and had made casualties of most of the men. His surprise was complete when he found that all the guns at this battery position were operable and that only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded. Enemy infantry had not yet appeared at the artillery position.
Upon receiving Smith's order to withdraw, the artillerymen immediately made ready to go. They removed the sights and breech locks from the guns and carried them and the aiming circles to their vehicles. Smith, Perry, and the artillerymen walked back to the outskirts of Osan where they found the artillery trucks as they had left them, only a few being slightly damaged by tank and machine gun fire.
Perry and Smith planned to take a road at the south edge of Osan to Ansong, assuming that the enemy tanks had gone down the main road toward Pyongtaek. Rounding a bend in the road near the southern edge of the town, but short of the Ansong road, Smith and Perry in the lead vehicle came suddenly upon three enemy tanks halted just ahead of them. Some or all of the tank crew members were standing about smoking cigarettes. The little column of vehicles turned around quickly, and, without a shot being fired, drove back to the north edge of Osan. There they turned into a small dirt road that led eastward, hoping that it would get them to Ansong.
The column soon came upon groups of infantry from Smith's battalion struggling over the hills and through the rice paddies. Some of the men had taken off their shoes in the rice paddies, others were without head covering of any kind, while some had their shirts off. The trucks stopped and waited while several of these groups came up and climbed on them. About 100 infantrymen joined them in this way. Then, the vehicles continued on unmolested, arriving at Ansong after dark.
There was no pursuit. The North Korean infantry occupied the vacated positions, and busied themselves in gathering trophies, apparently content to have driven off the enemy force.
The next morning, 6 July, Colonel Smith and his party went on to Chonan. Upon arrival there a count revealed that he had 185 men. Subsequently, Capt. Richard Dashmer, C company commander, came in with 65 men, increasing the total to 250. There were about 150 men killed, wounded, or missing from Colonel Smith's infantry force when he took a second count later in the day. The greatest loss was in B Company. Survivors straggled in to American lines at Pyongtaek, Chonan, Taejon, and other points in southern Korea during the next several days. Lieutenant Bernard and 12 men of the reserve platoon of B Company rescued Chonan two days after the Osan fight. Five times he and his men had encountered North Korean roadblocks. They arrived at Chonan only half an hour ahead of the enemy. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast.
None of the five officers and 10 enlisted men of the artillery forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came back. On 7 July five officers and 26 enlisted men from the artillery were still missing.
The N.K. 4th Division and attached units apparently lost approximately 42 killed and 85 wounded at Osan on 5 July. A diary taken from a dead North Korean soldier some days later carried this entry about Osan: "5 Jul 50...we saw vehicles and American PWs. We also saw some American dead. We found four of our destroyed tanks. Near Osan there was a great battle."
For their valiant holding action which delayed the enemy advance for six precious hours, representatives of Task Force Smith, including LTC (Later BG) Charles B. Smith, a 34-year-old West Pointer from New Jersey, were later honored by President Truman at a special ceremony held in Washington, D.C.
Today, on a tree-covered hilltop at Chukmi-Ryung, near Osan, stands an obelisk commemorating the battle at Osan. The monument was erected in 1954 by the 24th Infantry Division, then based in Korea. The bi-lingual inscription on the plaque commemorates the spot where the first American ground unit--the vanguard of the UNC--did battle in Korea against the Communists.
After Task Force Smith had fought its way out of impending encirclement near Osan, the 24th Division fought successive holding actions at Chonan, Chonui and Chochiwon and south across the Kum River to the important town of Taejon. It was a natural location for a determined stand by US troops since it is an important communications center and is at the head of a highway and double-tracked railroad which twists through the mountains to Pusan, 125 miles to the southeast. To protect Taejon, the thinning ranks of the 24th Division were deployed between the town and the Kum River. Engineers blew the bridge crossing the Kum but, unfortunately, the waters of the river subsided and the enemy was able to ford the river at several places. On 13 July, before the battle of Taejon began, LTG Walton H. Walker, CG of the Eighth Army, had assumed command of all ground forces in Korea. He wanted to hold Taejon, but once the Communists forded the shallow Kum, the fate of the city was decided. Nevertheless, the battle for Taejon was bitter. There were neither weapons nor troops enough to hold the Communists. In the west, probing attacks were launched by the enemy up and down the Kum and the established footholds across the river at Samgyo-ri and Kongju.
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Field, Korea
9 September 1950
This report is submitted in accordance with a directive received from the Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and paragraph 11401.2, Marine Corps Manual. The purpose of the actions in which this unit participated during the period of 7 July to 6 September 1950. Missions assigned this Battalion, were as issued by the next higher echelon, the 5th Marines.
Battalion Landing Team: 1st Battalion, 5th Marines - 33 Officers 637 Enlisted
At various times elements of the following units were attached, depending on whether the battalion was in assault or reserves.
This schedule, as set forth by higher headquarters, required this battalion to be ready in all respects to embark aboard ship at San Diego on 13 July 1950. All organizational equipment was prepared and packed for an amphibious operation. A preferred plan was formulated for an amphibious landing. An alternate plan was drawn up in the eventuality the battalion would be airlifted to its destination. The enemy situation in Korea was confused and very little concrete information was available at battalion level. No Military maps of Korea were available prior to reaching our destination. The battalion carried sufficient water, rations and ammunition in its supply train to last for one days operations.
Prior to embarking aboard ship on 13 July, the battalion conducted three days dry net training and amphibious lectures at the debarkation mock-ups at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton. Approximately one half of the battalion had participated in Demon III on 12 May 1950 at Aliso Beach, near Camp Pendleton. Lectures were held on troop life and training aboard ship. On 17 and 18 July, while APA-45 was at NSD Oakland for repairs, units held instructions in weapons, first aid and tactics and participated in calisthenics ashore. During the period 19 July to 2 August, shipboard training was conducted continuously to include weapons instruction, tactics lectures, calisthenics, amphibious doctrine and debarkation drill. While in bivouac near Changwan, night patrolling was practiced.
Upon receipt of the order to be embarked by 13 July, all equipment and supplies of BLT 1/5 were packed for an amphibious operation. Transportation of supplies to San Diego and ship loading continued on a 24 hour schedule until completed. On 13 July, BLT 1/5 entrucked at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton and proceeded to San Diego. Embarkation was completed by 1600, 13 July.
The APA 45 sailed from San Diego at 0800, 13 July. On the afternoon of 13 July, in the vicinity of San Clemente Island, the ship developed turbine trouble and turned toward San Francisco, arriving at NSD Oakland on the afternoon of 16 July. Repairs were completed by the afternoon of the 18th. The ship rejoined the convey on the morning of 2 August and arrived at Pusan, Korea at 1800 on 2 August. Personnel debarked at 0500, 3 August, entrucked at 0600 and proceeded to Chiangwan, where the battalion covered the advance of the Brigade and remained in bivouac for three days.
BLT 1/5 became a part of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on 7 July 1950. From 7 July 1950 to 13 July 1950 this unit was packing, training and preparing to board ship.
On 13 July 1950 at approximately 0800, BLT 1/5 commenced entrucking at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California and proceeded to the U. S. Naval Station, San Diego, California, going directly aboard the USS Henrico APA 45. BLT 1/5 was completely loaded at 16oo on 13 July 1950.
On 14 July 1950 at approximately 0900, the APA 45 put to sea and proceeded to the vicinity of San Clemente Island when engine trouble, which developed at approximately 1430, caused the APA 45 to leave the convey and proceed independently to Oakland, California.
The APA 45 put in at Oakland, California at approximately 1900 on Sunday, July 16, 1950. On 17 and 18 July, small unit training was conducted ashore at NSD Oakland while the APA 45 was undergoing repairs.
The ship departed Oakland, California at approximately 1800, 18 July, and while underway, the battalion conducted indoctrination, intelligence lectures on Korea and general and specialized infantry training.
APA 45 joined up with the convey of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, in the early morning of August 2, 1950, and proceeded to Pusan, Korea, arriving at Pusan, Korea at 1800, August 2, 1950.
BLT 1/5 disembarked at Pusan, Korea at approximately 0500 on 3 August, 1950, entrucked at 0600 and proceeded to Ch’angwen, Korea. The battalion disembarked at approximately 1400 on 3 August and took up defense positions approximately one mile west of Ch’angwon astride the Masar-Pusan road with the mission of protecting the movement of the Brigade into the Ch’wangwon area. Later, BLT 3/5 arrived, tied in on the left flank and relieved elements of 1/5 on left of road, and took up defense positions on left front, while this battalion extended their defense to the right front. Two casualties were suffered in "A" Company, BLT 1/5, one by accidental discharge, and the other during challenging procedure.
4 August 1950 - The battalion remained in position at Ch’angwon. Continuous patrols were sent out by "A", "B", and H & S Companies to the front and right flank. No enemy were encountered and patrols continued on 24 hour basis.
5 August 1950 - The battalion remained in position and continued patrol action. At approximately 2130, "B" Company reported enemy activity to their front and at 2145, "B" Company’s patrol was fired upon and withdrew to friendly front lines. A short fire fight followed without any casualties suffered by "B" Company, and the enemy withdrew at approximately 2200.
6 August 1950 - Continuous patrol action by BLT 1/5. No enemy encountered.
7 August 1950 - BLT 1/5 entrucked at approximately 1000 and proceeded to the vicinity of ChinDong-ni, arriving at approximately 1230 on the same day. This battalion relieved "G" Company, BLT 3/5. The relief of "G" Company on front lines was completed at approximately 1700. Enemy activity was observed to the battalion front. One casualty suffered in "A" Company due to friendly short artillery round. Friendly supporting fires were placed on enemy to the battalion front. No enemy action was encountered during the night.
8 August 1950 - BLT 1/5 departed from ChinDong-ni at approximately 0600 and moved in route column southwest along road towards Chinju, Sachon-Paeden-ni with the mission of following in rear of elements of the 5th RCT, ( U. S. Army), to crossroads at Chinju and Sachon junction and to take the left fork in the road, proceed to high ground to the immediate front and relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT ( U. S. Army ) on position. Upon arrival at the crossroads, this battalion found that the 5th RCT (U.S. Army) had not cleared that point and acting upon Regimental orders moved back approximately one mile and went into defense positions with orders to move out again at 2300. The rear CP was established at approximately 1700. At 2300, BLT 1/5 departed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT ( U. S. Army ) on position. The night march included the crossing of approximately 1 mile of rice paddies and a climb to positions on the high ground where the battalion set up defense positions at approximately 0400, 9 August. No opposition was encountered. At 0430 this battalion received an order to attach and seize the high ground to the immediate front as Regimental Objective #1.
At 0600 BLT 1/5 moved out to seize Regimental Objective #1 and advance to the west along ridge line and set up defense positions on Regimental front lines at approximately 0900; no resistance was encountered. At 1200, orders were received to move to road and continue advance toward Paedun-ni. No opposition was encountered and defense positions for the night were set up approximately 1800 with the battalion CP.
10 August 1950 - At 0100 the last of the column of BLT 2/5 passed through 1/5., becoming the Brigade Advance Guard. At 0630 the battalion moved out behind the 2nd Battalion with orders to seize the high ground east of Paedun-ni. This battalion was in position at 0900. At 1500, the battalion was ordered to continue the advance toward Paedun-ni, Korea behind the 2nd Battalion. At 1700 our column arrived at Paedun-ni. At 2000, the battalion passed through BLT 2/5 and went into defense positions.
11 August 1950 - At 0300, the advance was continued westward towards Kosong, Korea with this battalion following BLT 3/5, with orders to patrol the high ground to the southwest of Kosong. At approximately 1200, BLT 1/5 arrived in Kosong, Korea, patrolled the area assigned with negative results. The column was reformed and departed from Kosong, at approximately 1500, advancing west ward behind BLT 3/5.
12 August 1950 - At 0630, BLT 1/5 passed through BLT 3/5 and moved northwest in advance guard formation along the road to Sach’on, Korea, with a detachment of fifteen men commanded by Capt. Kenneth J. Houghton of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Reconnaissance Company as the point and "B" Company, BLT 1/5, commanded by Captain John L. Tobin, as the advance party. No resistance had been encountered up to this time. 50 enemy abandoned motorcycles with side cars, twenty Russian built Ford jeeps, and numerous quantities of small arms were passed, burned or camouflaged beside the road, all having been abandoned by the enemy as a result of air strikes and rapid movement of the Brigade.
The 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of seizing the town of Sach’on, passing through, and seizing the high ground to the north and west of Sach’on. Units attached to the 1st Battalion at that time were a detachment of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Reconnaissance Company, 1st Platoon of "A" Company 1st Tank Battalion and detachment of "A" Company.1st Engineer Battalion. The point and 1st platoon of "B" Company was supported by two M-26 tanks, with three tanks of the same type following "B" Company. At approximately 1300 the point and "B" Company were in a valley in the vicinity of the small village of Changeh’an, with high ground to the front, to the left flank, and to the right flank. The point had just entered the village when it observed two enemy taking cover; they were fired upon by the point, whose fire was resultant in precipitating the premature disclosure of enemy positions. The enemy obviously had planned a rear guard action of an ambush type to such an extent that the entire column would be allowed to come within their fields of fire before they commenced firing. The point was immediately fired upon by an enemy machine gun on the high ground to the right flank. "B" Company immediately came under intense automatic weapons fire from the high ground to the front and both flanks.
The point requested the 1st platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt Hugh C. Schryver, Jr. to move forward and assist them in the fire fight. The company commander "B" company, immediately dispatched the 1st platoon to their aid by fire and maneuver, engaging the enemy from positions in the ditch beside the road. The 1st platoon suffered 3 casualties while moving forward to this position.
While the 1st platoon was moving forward to the aid of the point, the company commander "B" company ordered the 2nd platoon, commanded by 1st Lt David S. Taylor, to move forward on the three tanks from the rear of the Company’s column.
This platoon moved forward to the rear of the 1st platoon, deployed on both sides of the road and engaged the enemy from positions in the road ditches with small arms fire.
By this time company headquarters and the 3rd platoon were receiving intense fire from enemy machine guns and other automatic weapons from the high ground to the right flank. The battalion commander directed the forward air controller, 1st Lt James W. Smith, to call down air strike on enemy personnel observed on the right flank. The company commander, "B" company ordered the 3rd platoon, commanded by 2nd Lt David R. Cowling, to cross the rice paddies and seize the high ground to the right flank, as soon as the air strike lifted. The battalion commander experienced difficulty in getting immediate supporting fire due to the fact that the units were in column and had to get into firing positions. The Regimental Commander had been previously notified by the Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, that artillery fire was not available.
While the 3rd platoon was crossing the rice paddies, one rifle platoon and one machine gun section from "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reported to the Company Commander, "B" Company, for orders. This unit had moved forward upon order of the Battalion Commander. The Battalion Commander was at that time informed by the forward air controller of two planes with five minutes remaining on station prior to returning to the base. The Battalion Commander directed they search for targets forward of friendly troops. This flight immediately located enemy vehicles and personnel in the strike area and used their remaining ordinance and returned to base.
The Company Commander, "B" Company ordered the two squads and the machine gun section from "A" Company to take up positions on the high ground to the right and to the rear of the enemy positions from which "B" company was receiving automatic fire, and the one remaining squad to move to the high ground to the left flank and place flanking fire on the enemy occupying positions on the high ground on the left flank. The two squads and the machine gun section from "A" company succeeded in knocking out the enemy position.
While the 3rd platoon was moving forward to carry out their assignment, intense machine guns and automatic fire was being delivered on the company from the high ground to the left flank. The tanks and personnel on the left side of the road took these positions under fire, the tanks utilizing machine gun and 90mm fire.
When the 3rd platoon of "B" company was near the crest of the high ground, it received exceptionally heavy fire from machine gun positioned to deliver interlacing bands of fire from such well concealed positions that the 3rd platoon was forced to fall back a short distance down the slopes of the high ground. Enemy strength in that area was estimated at approximately 60 in number. In this action one man was killed and 4 were wounded, one of the wounded being Lieutenant Cowling, the platoon leader. The battalion commander directed the company commander of "A" Company, Captain John R. Stevens to seize the high ground to the battalion right flank, thereby protecting the brigade’s flank. The battalion commander, also at that time, ordered Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, commanded by Major John W. Russell to place 81mm mortar fire on the high ground to the left flank.
The 3rd platoon "B" company was ordered to fall back to the high ground where the two squads and the machine gun section from "A" company were in position, and "B" company mortars were ordered to fire on the enemy automatic weapons which the 3rd platoon had been assaulting. A total of 113 rounds, 60mm HE, was delivered on these positions.
The battalion commander, 1st battalion, ordered an air strike on the automatic weapons positions on the high ground to the right flank immediately following "B" company’s mortar fire. The air strike destroyed those positions. While the air strike on the right flank was being delivered, the Battalion Commander, 1st battalion ordered artillery, one battery of which had gone into position, to fire on the enemy positions on the high ground to the left flank. At about 1700 all of the enemy positions had been silenced with the exception of the machine gun positions on the left flank from which "B" company had been receiving fire. An air strike was called which silenced this position.
At about 1730 "B" company was ordered to take up positions on the high ground to the left flank and dig in for the night. "A" company was ordered to occupy the high ground to the right flank and dig in for the night. While "B" company was preparing to move out the battalion commander ordered an air strike on enemy positions while the enemy had once again placed an automatic weapon which was firing on "B" company. "B" company moved out with the 1st platoon in lead, followed by the 2nd platoon, then the remainder of the company. Progress was very slow due to the crossing of rice paddies and sporadic small arms fire.
When "B" company reached the far side of the rice paddies they located approximately fifty empty well prepared and well concealed infantry positions.
The battalion commander received a report from friendly aircraft, of an enemy concentration in the area. He ordered an air strike on the concentration.
Upon reaching the crest of the high ground, the 2nd platoon engaged the enemy of approximately one company strength, and in about 10 minutes secured the high ground in their sector. During this engagement the platoon leader, 1st Lt David S. Taylor observed some of the enemy withdrawing down a ravine on the reverse slope of the high ground. He ordered one squad to proceed down another ravine in an attempt to cut off the enemy’s retreat. This squad succeeded in doing so and in the ensuing action a total of 38 enemy was killed and one wounded enemy officer captured, without any casualties to the squad. Despite all effort to get the enemy officer to Regimental Headquarters for interrogation, he died upon arrival.
"B" company completed its movement onto the high ground and sat up a perimeter of defense. The company had to complete its perimeter of defense under cover of darkness. The 3rd platoon less one squad and with one machine gun section attached were placed on hill 202; 1st platoon with one machine gun section attached, extended down from hill 202 to within 75 yards of the second platoon, which, plus 1 squad from the 3rd platoon and one machine gun section, were placed on the ridge on the company’s right flank.
Total casualties for the day were 13 wounded in action, 3 killed in action, and 2 missing in action.
The battalion commander received orders at approximately 2400 from the regimental commander to form the battalion on the road at 0630 and prepare to entruck for movement of the regiment to another sector to reinforce U. S. Army units. All companies were notified.
At approximately 0400 the following morning, all company commanders alerted their companies and every man was awakened. (As previously directed by the battalion commander). At 0430 "B" company started receiving intense automatic weapons and small arms fire from the right front. "B" Company’s 60mm mortars fired six (6) illuminating shells to the immediate front. The enemy was observed near the right front and was engaged with fire at approximately 0500; enemy strength in that sector was estimated at 60 in number.
At that time 3 flares (2 green and 1 red) went up to "B" Company’s front and the company was immediately attacked on the left flank. The enemy attacking the left flank all appeared to be armed with automatic weapons and attacked from close, well-concealed positions, to which they had moved during the hours of darkness.
They succeeded in over-running the left flank, killing all but one man in the machine gun section and inflicting heavy casualties in the 3rd platoon.
Due to lack of communications and darkness, (the 1st and 3rd platoon’s 536 radios had become inoperative due to mud and water from crossing rice paddies, (and the telephone wires were believed to have been out), it was practically impossible to determine the condition of the 3rd platoon’s position. Two runners were dispatched from the company CP to the 3rd platoon to obtain information, but both were killed before they could get to the platoon. The enemy, upon over-running the machine gun section attached to the 3rd platoon, turned the captured machine guns on the remainder of "B": Company.
The company commander ordered messengers to instruct the remainder of the 3rd platoon, 1st platoon and company headquarters to fall back to the 2nd platoon’s position with the 1st platoon covering the movement by fire.
The company commander requested the battalion commander to place all available 81mm mortar, artillery and 4.2" mortar fire on hill 202 to cover the movement to the 2nd platoon’s position.
The fire support was excellent. The 81mm mortar fire from the 1st battalion, 5th Marines delivered immediate support, with 4.2" mortar and artillery fire getting on shortly the 81mm fire.
It was daylight when the movement to the 2nd platoon’s positions was completed and at that time captured machine gun positions were observed. "B" Company Commander ordered the 3.5" rocket section to fire on them; both guns and enemy crews were destroyed.
By this time the entire company had the enemy under fire and with the assistance of supporting fires were driving the enemy back over hill 202. During the attack the enemy placed intense and effective mortar fire on "B" company’s right flank and right rear.
It was practically impossible to move "B" Company off the high ground by 0630 since the counterattack was still very strong at that time so at approximately 0700 the battalion commander ordered "B" Company to leave the high ground and proceed to the road, ready for prior ordered movement. The company commander "B" company requested all available supporting fires be placed on the enemy prior to and during the movement. All wounded personnel were collected and the company moved in an orderly manner, carrying the wounded off the high ground under covering fire set up by the 1st and 3rd platoons and supporting arms.
The company executive officer, Capt Francis I. Fenton, Jr. directed the column and movement of wounded across the rice paddies while the company commander directed the covering fire for the movement from the rear. When all troops were clear an air strike was called on hill 202 by the regimental air controller.
Total casualties for both days action were, 15 killed in action, 33 wounded in action, and 8 missing in action. There was an estimated 250 enemy killed in both days action.
It is the consensus of opinion of persons involved in the action that the enemy in the area was of battalion strength. It is also apparent that the enemy in this area was the rear guard for the main body.
13 August 1950 - At 0900, "B" Company completed its withdrawal, from its position and all casualties were evacuated. At 1000, BLT 1/5 entrucked and proceed to Miryang, Korea in accordance with regimental movement plan. At 1330 BLT 1/5 arrived and disembarked from trucks and went into a tactical assembly area. At 2400 BLT 1/5 began a march to board the LST for further transfer to Masan.
14 August 1950 - At 0230, BLT 1/5 embarked aboard LST #24 to proceed to Masan, Korea. At 0600, LST #24 got under way for Masan. At 0930, LST #24 arrived at Masan and troops disembarked and went into an assembly area while awaiting rail transportation to Miryang, Korea. At 1400, BLT 1/5 entrained at Masan and commenced movement by rail to Miryang. At 1730 BLT 1/5 arrived at Miryang and entrucked at 1930 to proceed to bivouac area. The battalion arrived at bivouac area at 2000.
15 August 1950 - Remaining in bivouac all day, personnel drew clothing, washed clothes and units were all resupplied on equipment shortages.
16 August 1950 - At 1400, the order was received to move to the Naktong River area, west of Yongsan. The 24th Division (U. S. Army) plus the 1st and 2nd battalion of 9th RCT, 2nd Division (U. S. Army) were occupying defensive positions in this area. The Naktong River at this point made a large semi-circular band, at which point elements of the North Korean Army had penetrated to the east side of the river. In order to maintain the Naktong River defense line, it was necessary to drive the enemy from this peninsula on the east side of the river.
Due to the scarcity of transportation, the 5th Marines were shuttled to the front by battalion, the 1st Battalion being the last to leave the Miryang area. The 1st Battalion entrucked at 0515 on 17 August, making the 24 mile trip in shortly over 2 hours and detrucked west of Yongsan at 0730. It than proceeded west in route march with "A" Company as the point followed by "B" Company, command group, Weapons Company, H&S Company, and the supply train.
At 0700, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, had jumped off in the attack to take Brigade objective #1 which consisted of Obong-ni Ridge and the low ground to the west. The attack had been preceded by an air strike and a heavy artillery concentration.
By 1100, the 1st Battalion was being held in reserve, 1000-1200 yards in rear of objective #2, with the battalion CP. At 1330, the order was received to pass through and relieve the 2nd Battalion and to continue the attack to secure objective #1. The Regimental Commander attached the 75mm Recoilless Gun Company and the 1st platoon of "A" Company, 1st Tank Battalion to the 1st Battalion. At this time the 2nd Battalion was in contact with the enemy at the bottom of the slope of Obong-ni Ridge, with "D" Company on the right and "E" Company on the left, extending approximately 1000 yards south of the road. Lt Col. Newton was in the CP with the 2nd Battalion Commander. The 1st Battalion staff moved into the 2nd Battalion CP to operate in conjunction with them until the relief was effected. "B" Company, 1st Battalion proceeded forward along the road to the right of the CP to relieve "D": Company, 2nd Battalion and "A" Company 1st Battalion went forward over OP hill to relieve "E" Company, 2nd Battalion on the left. Weapons Company set up 81mm mortar positions. The relief was completed by 1600 and the attack was continued to secure Obong-ni Ridge before nightfall.
"B" Company went into the attack with the 1st and 2nd platoons in assault, the 2nd on the left, 3rd platoon in support and machine gun platoon under company control delivering supporting fire from positions on the forward slope of OP hill and from the forward slope of the hill on the right of the road. "A" Company had the 1st and 2nd platoons in assault with the 2nd on the left, the 3rd platoon in support and set up on the forward and south slope of OP hill to provide supporting fire. The machine gun platoon was attached to the rifle platoon by sections.
The 1st platoon of "B" Company proceeded across the low ground forward of OP hill and attacked up the draw leading to hill 102. When it was within 100 yards of the top, it was pinned down by fire from hill 109 and then maneuvered to the right to take hill 102 along the spur leading up from the road. This maneuver was successful and hill 102 was secured by the 1st platoon at approximately 1710, although they were then receiving fire from the village on their right rear. Shortly thereafter, the 1st platoon of "A" Company gained the high ground (hill 117) on the right of the company’s zone of action by maneuvering up the draw between hill 117 and 109. However, upon reaching hill 117, they were pinned down by fire from the vicinity of hill 143. The 2nd platoon of "A" Company had proceeded up the draw between hill 117 and hill 143 to secure hill 143, but could not overrun the position due to heavy casualties, including the platoon leader, 2nd Lt. Thomas E. Johnston. The fire directed on the platoon had come from machine guns set up on hill 143 and in the saddle between hill 143 and 117.
By 1725, the 2nd platoon of "B" Company was on hill 109 and the nose running forward of it. They had attained their position by working up the draw between hill 109 and 117 and had assaulted hill 109 from the left (south) side. Their advance had been supported by the machine gun platoon firing over their head from the forward slope of OP hill. In the final assault of the high ground, Captain John L. Tobin, "B" Company Commander, was seriously wounded and Captain Francis I. Fenton, Jr. took command of the company. An all-around defense position was set up with the 1st platoon on the right, 2nd platoon bending around hill 109 on the left, the 3rd platoon in the rear, and the Company CP and 60mm mortars in the rear of hill 109. The machine gun platoon was called forward and attached to the platoons for the defense.
At approximately 1700, Captain John R. Stevens, "A" Company Commander passed his 3rd platoon through his 2nd platoon to continue the attack on hill 143. The 3rd platoon advanced up the draw between hills 117 and 143, but could not emerge into the saddle due to machine gun fire from flanking hillcrests and slopes. The 1st platoon had been forced to withdraw to the forward (east) slope of hill 117 due to heavy casualties and concentrated enemy fire. During the entire afternoon, supporting fire had been called down on hill 117 and 143 and the whole of Obong-ni Ridge. "A" Company continued the attack, but as darkness fell, was not on the high ground in force. The defensive positions set up on the ridge on the night of the 17th consisted of "B" Company extending from the nose on the right of hill 102 to the saddle on the left of hill 109 with "A" Company tying in there and extending along the east slope of hill 117 and on down the spur behind hill 117 to the low ground forward of OP hill.
At 2000, while the battalion was digging in for the night, "B" company sighted four North Korean tanks approaching along the road leading into the battalion position. The rocket section of the anti-tank assault platoon was called up from positions near the CP and went into position on the right of the road by the curve just forward of the CP. The 75mm Recoilless Gun Company was already in position on the spur leading down to the road from OP hill, where they had been supporting the advance of the battalion with direct fire on Obong-ni Ridge. Three M-26 tanks were also called to take positions at the curve in the road just forward of the CP. As the first tank approached point X, it was fired on by a 3.5" rocket from the AT assault platoon and was hit in the right track assembly but continued forward. As it reached point X, it was hit by fire from the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Company, where it was stopped, but continued to fire its guns at the OP. The 2nd tank was hit in the gas tank by a 3.5" rocket from the AT assault platoon as it approached point Y, and ran off the road. The tank commander then opened the turret to fire the top machine gun when a 2.36" white phosphorus rocket from the AT assault platoon ricocheted off of the turret cover and fell into the interior of the tank. As the 3rd tank approached point Y, it was hit by fire from the M-26 tanks and knocked out of action immediately. The M-26 tanks fired on all three enemy tanks until they were completely destroyed. The destruction of the 3 tanks from the time the first shot was fired, took ten minutes, only because the third tank was ten minutes behind the second tank. The fourth tank and accompanying troops never reached the position, being destroyed and dispersed by friendly aircraft well forward of "B" company’s positions. No enemy personnel escaped from the 3 tanks knocked out at point Y.
The plan of night defensive fires set up for the night of the 17th consisted of the 60mm mortars of "B" Company firing into the logical routes of approach forward of the Company. "A" Company’s 60mm mortar section was ineffective due to a direct hit on the section by tree white phosphorus shells. The 81mm mortars were firing into the draws leading into the battalion positions on the west slope of Obong-ni Ridge. 4.2" mortars were registered in the valley forward of Obong-ni Ridge. Artillery was registered in on the west slopes of Obong-ni Ridge, with the bulk of the registrations southwest of hills 113 and 147.
The enemy counterattacked the 1st Battalion positions at approximately 0230 on the morning of the 18th of August, coming down Obong-ni Ridge from the south, moving on both sides of hill 117, isolating the 3rd platoon of "A" Company on the spur running down behind hill 117, and penetrated through the 1st and 2nd platoons of "A" Company an on into "B" Company’s position around both sides of hill 109. Part of the 1st platoon of "A" Company pulled back along the left flank of "B" Company, leaving a gap between hill 109 and 117. "B" Company restored its lines after the initial penetration and was able to drive out or kill all the enemy in their position within 45 minutes, however they continued to receive heavy automatic weapons fire from hill 117 through the night. "A" Company was in such a position that the enemy was on the high ground immediately above them and was able to throw or roll grenades down into their positions. The enemy method of attack was to have one squad rise up and throw grenades and then advance a short distance, firing to their front and flank with automatic weapons. They would then hit the deck and another squad would repeat the same movements. These actions were observed in the light made by 81mm illumination shells. They would not halt their actions when illuminated. The enemy was armed with automatic weapons and had set up at least one 30 caliber US light machine gun. The 2nd machine gun section of "A" company, in firing on the attack, was subjected to heavy grenade and automatic weapons fire in return. One trick of the enemy was to work in close to our machine gun positions, drawing their fire. When our machine gun position was disclosed, it would be fired on by an automatic weapon set up at greater range. "A" Company mortar section, as previously mentioned, was down to 5 men and could not support the company due to lack of accurate information on troop positions. At 0330, one red and one green flare were fired by the enemy, the meaning of which was unknown. The intensity of the attack diminished toward daylight, leaving the enemy in possession of hill 117. "A Company reorganized and at 0700 resumed the attack to secure hill 117. Heavy supporting fire was laid down on hill 117 and 143 and the saddle in between. On squad of "A" Company which had remained with "B" Company throughout the night attacked down the ridge from hill 109 and the 3rd platoon and the remainder of the 1st and 2nd platoons proceeded up the draw between hill 109 and 117. "B" Company furnished supporting fire from their positions on hill 109. The enemy was entrenched in strength on hill 117 and only after a direct hit by a 500 lb. bomb on the east slope of hill 117, which knocked out 4 enemy machine guns, was the 3rd platoon of "A": Company able to reach the top of hill 117. The 3rd platoon then advanced south across the saddle toward hill 143 and was pinned down by fire from the crest. An air strike was called on hill 143 followed by 81mm and 4.2" mortar concentrations. The enemy then withdrew to the west at 0830. "A" Company had secured hills 117 and 143. Supporting fires were continued on hills 147 and 153, ending with an air strike.
Upon securing objective #1, it was apparent that the MLR had been penetrated and the enemy was in full retreat, without arms in numerous cases. They could be seen fleeing beyond brigade objective #2 in large numbers. LtCol. Newton requested the initiative and kept the enemy on the run.
At 1000, the battalion received the order to move south along Obong-ni Ridge and occupy hills 147 and 153. By 1230 this had been accomplished and the lines extended on the forward slope of Obong-ni Ridge from hill 109 to hill 153 and down the spur behind hill 153 to the low ground. The 81mm mortar platoon displaced to positions at the foot of the draw between hills 109 and 117.
By this time, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, had been passed around the right flank
of the 1st Battalion and had secured Brigade Objective No. 2, and was assaulting Brigade Objective No. 3. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, had passed around the right flank of the 1st Battalion and had taken up positions in the valley forward of Obong-ni Ridge. Weapons Company, 1st Battalion sent out patrols down the trail toward the village of Obang-ni and on south of hill 153. No enemy was encountered.
When objective No. 1 was secured, "B" Company had 2 Officers and 110 men effective and "A" Company had 4 Officers and 100 men effective. In going over the enemy position, the Battalion, in a very brief inspection counted 18 heavy machine guns, both American and Russian types; 25 light machine guns, 63 rifles and sub-machine guns, both American and Russian types, on 3.5" rocket launcher with 9 rounds, 8 AT rifles and large amounts of ammunition and hand-grenades. 150 enemy dead were found in the area. "A" Company found that the enemy buried many of their dead in the fox holes where they were killed. During the entire operation, all the personnel of H&S Company acted as litter bearers, doing an outstanding job of evacuating the wounded of both front line companies to the battalion aid station minutes after they were hit, carrying water, ammunition and defense materials forward.
"B" Company, in overrunning the enemy positions, found one SCR 300 Radio and one SCR 536 Radio, evidently captured previously by the enemy. The SCR 300 was in perfect working condition and was set on the frequency of the 1st Battalion, indicating that the enemy had been listening in on all conversations of the battalion throughout the attack on objective #1.
An all round defensive position was set up for the night of the 18th of August with "A" and "B" Companies in position as previously mentioned; Weapons Company extended across the low ground on the left flank of "A" Company and the AT assault platoon on the nose of OP hill leading down toward Obonk-ni. H&S Company continued around OP hill, tying in with Regimental H&S Company. The 1st Battalion CP was moved to the draw on the forward slope of OP hill. Protective fire was put out to the front of the rifle companies and trip flares and anti-personnel mines were installed down the valley to the left flank of "A" Company by engineer personnel, who had been sent up to remain with the 1st Battalion for the night. When the flares and anti-personnel mines were retrieved the next morning, 3 mines were found detonated, with pools of blood beside them. No bodies were found.
At daybreak on the 19th of August, "F" Company, 2nd Battalion. 9th RCT (U. S. Army) occupied hill 908 to the south of the 1st Battalion’s position and had sent out patrols to tie in with "A" Company’s left flank by 1000 of that day.
At 1100 on the 19th, the order was received to entruck and proceed to Yongsan and to go into bivouac. The battalion arrived at Yongsan at 1700.
During the engagement, 4 enemy were captured; 3 by "A" Company and 1 by "B" Company. Questioning disclosed that the 1st Battalion had been opposed by elements of the 19th Regiment of the 4th North Korean Division.
It is believed that Obong-ni Ridge was the enemy’s main line of resistance.
19 August 1950 - At 0845, BLT 1/5 entrucked and proceeded to the train station at Maryang and embarked on train at 0930 for rail transportation to Changwan, arriving at the debarkation point, 3 miles south west of Changwan at 1400. Troops disembarked at 1430 and went into bivouac.
22 August 1950 - Remaining in bivouac area all day, troops resting.
23 August 1950 - Remained in bivouac, troops resting, taking showers, and getting pictures taken in the bean patch.
24 August 1950 - Remaining in bivouac, troops resting, going swimming and taking showers.
25 August 1950 - From 0800 to 1130 BLT 1/5 conducted infantry tactics and weapons training from bivouac area. At 1300 to 1600 weapons instructions and inspections was conducted by all units of BLT 1/5.
26 August 1950 - BLT 1/5 remained in bivouac area conducting rifle platoon tactics, 81mm mortar instructions, anti-tank assault instructions from 0800 to 1130 on adjacent terrain. From 1300 to 1600 all units conducted care and cleaning of weapons.
27 August 1950 - BLT 1/5 observed holiday routine.
28 August 1950 - From 0800 to 1130, BLT 1/5 conducted company problems, 81mm mortar instructions, and anti-tank assault instructions. From 1300 to 16oo conducted weapons inspection, maintenance of equipment and shower details.
29 August 1950 - At 0754 a combat patrol consisting of one reinforced rifle platoon from "A" Company, BLT 1/5, was sent out approximately 5000 yards to the right front. The patrol returned at 1235; no enemy encountered. Remainder of BLT conducted platoon problems, with Weapons Company conducting anti-tank assault training and 81mm mortar night firing exercises. From 1400 to 1600, all units of BLT 1/5 conducted practiced marches.
30 August 1950 - Infantry training was conducted in an area adjacent to the bivouac area. A patrol of a reinforced platoon size, patrolled the area. No enemy were encountered; nor, was there any evidence of enemy having been in the area. The patrol returned to the bivouac area at 1120, maintenance of equipment and weapons inspection was conducted during the afternoon.
31 August 1950 - "A" and "B" Companies conducted training in squad and fire team tactics. Weapons Company trained 3.5" rocket teams in tracking targets and setting up road- blocks. The 81mm mortar platoon rehearsed delivering night defensive fire and conducted training for forward observers. H&S Company, other than those attached to "A’, "B" and Weapons Companies, conducted on the job training.
1 September 1950 - The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, received a warning order at 1000 to standby for immediate movement, on order, to the Hamall sector of the Maktong River sector to reinforce U. S. Army forces. At 1100 orders were received, directing the Battalion, to send out combat patrols to the southwest due to enemy penetration of friendly front lines. Before patrols could be dispatched an order was received, directing the 1st Battalion, to prepare for movement to Miryang to be used as 8th Army reserve for the Naktong River area. At 1630, all units of this command boarded a train in the vicinity of the bivouac area for transportation and proceed to Miryang. The 1st Battalion arrived in Miryang at 1710 and disembarked immediately. Sufficient transportation was not available to transport the 1st Battalion to the assigned assembly area, consequently, the shuttle system was used and all troops were in the bivouac area by 2400.
2 September 1950 - At 0230 a warning order was received which directed the 1st Battalion to prepare to move out, by truck, at 0800 and proceed to a forward assembly area and to be prepared for further movement on order. By 0810 the 1st Battalion was entrucked and started the movement to the forward assembly area at 0820. The 1st Battalion arrived at the forward assembly area at 0940, disembarked and moved into assigned areas. The battalion CP was established. At 1750, while in the assembly area, the 1st Battalion received a warning order, directing the battalion to standby for movement, prior to daylight, to the Yongsan area.
3 September 1950 - At 0030, the 1st Battalion received the order commence movement to the Yongsan area by truck to daylight and to be prepared to commence the attack southwest of Yongsan at 0200. At 0400 the 1st Battalion started the approach march following BLT 2/5 toward U. S. Army’s front line position southwest of Yongsan where BLT 1/5 and 2/5 were to pass through the Army’s defense positions and take up positions at the line of departure with BLT 2/5 on the right, in preparation to attack to the northwest at 0800.
While en-route to the line of departure BLT 2/5 was held up by enemy mortar and small arms fire, thereby, causing a delay of approximately 50 minutes in starting the attack. At 0800 the 1st Battalion was on line with BLT 2/5 on the right and commenced the attack at 0855 with the mission of seizing the high ground. The supporting weapons that were attached to the 1st Battalion at that time was the 2nd Platoon of the 75mm Recoilless Gun Company.
Immediately after the attack started "A" and "B" Companies moved out across the rice paddies, with "A" Company on the left, and immediately came under long range small arms fire from the high ground to their direct front, however, the enemy fire was not of sufficient intensity to halt the advance. The Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion directed, 81mm mortar, 4.2" mortar and artillery fire be placed on the battalion objective while the companies were moving across the rice paddies.
At 0925, while crossing the rice paddies, "B" Company started receiving intense automatic weapons fire, which pinned them down and halted the advance. The Battalion Commander directed the forward air controller to call down an air strike on the Battalion objective #1. Air support was immediate and succeeded in destroying the enemy positions from which "B" Company had been receiving fire.
The advance continued with "A" Company moving more slowly due to the mounting intensity of small arms fire coming from the high ground to their left front. The Battalion Commander directed an air strike using Napalm, be placed on the area from which "A" Company was receiving fire. As the air strike lifted the Battalion Commander directed "B" Company to shift its lines to the right to maintain contact with BLT 2/5, for "A" Company to move abreast of "B" Company and for the advance to continue as rapidly as possible.
At 0950 "A" and "B" Companies were tied in and contact had been made with BLT 2/5 and the attack continued. Progress was very slow due to the crossing of 800 yards of rice paddies and constant enemy small arms fire from the 1st Battalion Objective. At 1015 the 2nd Platoon, "A" Company started receiving heavy automatic weapons fire from the enemy positions to the left front where the air strike using Napalm had been conducted. The Battalion Commander directed the 81mm mortar forward observer to place mortar fire on those positions and directed the Platoon Leader of the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon to place white phosphorus fire on a small village in the direct front of "B" Company from which enemy small arms fire was being delivered on "B" Company’s left flank.
At 1050 enemy heavy machine guns started firing on "A" and "B" Companies from positions on the forward slope of the 1st Battalion Objective. The Battalion Commander directed the 4.2" mortar and the artillery liaison officers to place 4.2" mortar and artillery fire on these positions. At 1055 as the 4.2" mortar and artillery fires lifted the Company commander of "B" Company reported his company was in position to start the assault on the forward slope of the 1st Battalion Objective #1. At 1105, "A" Company was in position to start the assault and both "A" and "B" Companies commenced the assault on objective #1.
At 1110, "A" Company’s left flank was pinned down by enemy automatic weapons fire from the military crest of objective #1 in "A" Company’s zone of action. 81mm mortar fire was placed on the enemy positions and the assault continued. At 1115, "B" Company had succeeded in seizing the portion of objective #1 within their zone of action and was receiving enemy machine gun fire from the reverse slope of objective #1. The Battalion Commander directed 81mm mortar be placed on the reverse slope of the objective in "B": Company’s zone of action and that flame throwers be sent to the company commander of "B" company to be used on suitable enemy positions.
At 1205 "A" Company had completed seizing the portion of objective #1 within their zone of action. At 1215 both "A" and "B" Companies were receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from the next high ground to the 1st battalion’s direct front. The Battalion Commander directed the forward air controller to run an air strike on that high ground from which "A" and "B: Companies were receiving fire.
While the air strike was being conducted the company commander of "B": Company reported the enemy was leaving the reverse slope of objective #1 and running down the road to the next ridge line. The Battalion Commander directed artillery fire be placed on the enemy and excellent results were achieved. At 1220 both "A" and "B" Companies requested resupply of machine gun ammunition, grenades, 60mm mortar ammunition, water and additional stretchers to remove the wounded.
Groups of enemy continued to break and run from positions on the reverse slope of objective #1 and artillery fire was continually brought to bear upon them. At approximately 1350 both "A" and "B" Companies had received all necessary supplies and were ready to move out in the attack of 1st Battalion Objective #2. At 1415 the 1st Marine Brigade Reconnaissance Company was moved up to the extreme left flank of the 1st Battalion with orders to keep in visual contact with "A" Company’s left flank and to block any enemy movement from the left flank.
At 1445 the Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, directed the forward air controller to call a five minute air strike on the 1st Battalion’s Objective #2 and the artillery liaison officer to deliver a 5 minute artillery preparation immediately following the air strike. At 1510 "A" and "B’ Companies moved out in the attack of objective #2. There was light and scattered enemy resistance as the advance continued until 1545 when "A" Company started receiving enemy mortar fire on their front lines. An artillery observation plane spotted the enemy position and directed artillery fire which destroyed the position.
At 1605 the company commander of "B" Company reported a large group of enemy running from his zone of action toward the low ground in front of BLT 2/5. The Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion notified BLT 2/5 of the presence of the enemy in their zone of action.
By 1630 both "A" and "B" Companies had seized Battalion Objective #2 and were directed by the Battalion Commander to consolidate their positions and dig in for night defense. The Battalion CP displaced forward and set up. There was no enemy activity during the night and the 1st Battalion was prepared to continue the attack the following morning at 0800.
4 September 1950 - At 0800, "A" and "B" Companies moved out in the attack with the mission of seizing the portion of 5th Marines Objective #1 in the 1st Battalion’s zone of action. BLT 3/5 moved through and relieved BLT 2/5 on the right flank of BLT 1/5. At 0820 the Company Commander of "B" Company reported the capture of two Russian type T-34 tanks on his Company’s right flank, the tanks were unmanned and in excellent condition.
The advance continued very rapidly meeting no enemy resistance and many small groups of enemy were observed running in a disorganized manor away from the advance elements. In all cases artillery fire was called down which killed and wounded many of them, and a total of 12 prisoners were captured by 1240. By 1505, "A" and "B" Companies had completed the seizure of 5th Marines Objective #1. The Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, received orders from the Regimental Commander to halt the advance and to remain on Regimental Object #1 until further orders were received.
At 1515 the 1st Battalion was ordered to continue the attack and to seize the high ground. At 1600 the advance elements of the battalion CP moved forward and set up in position. At 1620 enemy activity was sighted on the high ground to "B" Company’s left front. The Battalion Commander directed 81mm mortar fire be placed on the area in which the enemy were observed. At 1630 the 1st Battalion continued the attack. As "B" Company was starting across the rice paddies they were fired upon by enemy automatic weapons from positions on the high ground to their right. "B" Company moved back out of the rice paddies to take cover from the automatic weapons fire, and the Battalion Commander directed an air strike on the enemy position.
At 1710 the Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, requested BLT 3/5 to place supporting fire on the high ground to their direct front, from which "B" Company was receiving enemy machine gun fire. At 1725 the advance continued and both "A" and "B" Companies completed the capture of the high ground, with further enemy resistance by 1800. There was no enemy activity to the front during the night. At 2400 heavy caliber enemy fire started falling on the 1st Battalion CP. Results of the mortar fire were one killed and two wounded.
5 September 1950 - At 0730 friendly P-51 type aircraft on a non-controlled mission strafed "B" Company’s front lines causing one casualty.
At 0820, "A’ and "B" Companies continued the attack with the mission of seizing the portion of the 5th Marines Objective "A" within the 1st Battalions zone of action. BLT 3/5 was directed to move across the rear of BLT 1/5 and to tie in on "A" Company’s left flank. BLT 1/5 was directed to maintain contact on the right with elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment (U. S. Army). The advance continued very rapidly and unopposed until approximately 0935 when enemy mortar and artillery fire commenced falling on the 1st Battalion front lines from enemy positions on Obong-ni Ridge. The Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, directed artillery and 81mm mortar fire be placed on the enemy positions. At 1025 the company commander of "B" Company reported the presence of one enemy artillery piece in the vicinity of Obong-ni Ridge and many enemy sighted on the ridge. The Battalion Commander directed 81mm mortar and artillery fire be placed on Obong-Ni Ridge. At 1105, "A" and "B" Company had reached the high ground when orders were received to halt the advance and remain in present position until U. S. Army units could tie in on the right flank and 3/5 could tie in on the left flank. At 1130 both "A" and "B" Companies were receiving enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire from Ogong-ni Ridge at frequent intervals during the halt. At 1420 the enemy launched a counter-attack against "B" Company with approximately 300 troops. The counter-attack was launched very rapidly from flanks and well concealed positions. The enemy used large quantities of small arms fire, automatic weapons fire, mortar fire, hand and rifle grenades. At the same time the counter-attack started the Company Commander of "B: Company reported three enemy tanks moving down the road toward "A" Company positions. The Battalion Commander directed 81mm mortar fire be placed to the immediate front of "B" Company’s positions and that the anti-tank assault platoon go forward and take up suitable positions for anti-tank defense. One 3.5" rocket team from "B" Company had expended all their ammunition prior to the arrival of the anti-tank assault platoon, scoring hits and stopping the 1st tank. Prior to the arrival of the anti-tank assault platoon, two Marine M-26 tanks moving up the road were knocked out by the enemy tanks. This all took place in the immediately rear of a U. S. Army tank which had previously been knocked out. Four other M-26 tanks withdrew to positions from which they could fire in the event the enemy tanks continued to move down the road.
The anti-tank assault platoon fired on the three enemy tanks exploding the 2nd and 3rd tanks and making the final kill on the 1st tank. The anti-tank assault platoon withdrew and tied in on "B" company’s left flank. While the tank action was going on "B" Company, with the aid of the 81mm mortar fire had succeeded in stopping the counter-attack. "B" Company’s casualties during the counter-attack were; 2 killed and 23 wounded.
By 1500, BLT 3/5 had relieved "A" Company and tied in with "B" Company’s left flank. "A" Company, less the 1st and 2nd platoons, one machine gun section and one mortar squad, moved into reserve positions approximately 400 yards to the rear. The remainder of "A" Company was placed on line to reinforce "B" Company. At 1530, U. S. Army units made contact and tied in with "B" Company’s right flank.
At 1600, the Battalion Commander directed the Battalion Executive Officer to assume control while he attended a, Battalion Commanders, conference at the Regimental CP. At 1725 orders were received to prepare to be relieved on position, under cover of darkness, by elements of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, U. S. Army. For a route march to the vicinity of Yongsan where the 1st Battalion in Regimental order, would be entrucked to Pusan, Korea.
Enemy activity was light throughout the evening until 1855 when "B" Company received machine gun fire from the vicinity of Obong-ni Ridge. 81mm mortar fire was directed on the enemy machine gun positions and immediately large caliber enemy counter mortar fire was being delivered on the 81mm mortar positions. Artillery fire was directed on the enemy mortar positions.
6 September 1950 - At 0030 elements of "K" Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment, U. S., Army, affected relief of the 1st Battalion on position. The 1st Battalion moved out in route march following BLT 3/5 where the Battalion CP displaced and joined the column at 0230. The route march continued toward Yongsan, arriving in the vicinity of Yongsan at 0430. The 1st Battalion halted on the road west of Yongsan to await transportation to Pusan.
At 0730 all Companies moved into adjacent assembly area and the Battalion CP was established. At 1430 the 1st serial of trucks departed and proceeded to Pusan, arriving and going into assembly area at the Port-of-Pusan at 1810. At 1830 the 2nd serial departed and proceeded to Pusan. Arriving and joining the remainder of the 1st Battalion in the assembly at the Port-of-Pusan at 2130.
The tactics used by the North Koreans in the action of 3, 4 and 5 September resembled that of a retreating enemy fighting a delaying action. Small units, such as companies, platoons and squads were well camouflaged and concealed themselves in strategic positions on commanding terrain.
In the defense the enemy dug in on ridge lines some 10 to 15 yards down the reverse slopes. Their foxholes and positions were well prepared, being 15 to 20 feet apart. In order to have concealment from air observation the enemy used scrub pines camouflage. The enemy constructed parapets around the mounds of the graves in the ridges and by placing 4 or 5 men in this revetment with automatic weapons, established fortified positions or strong points.
In the attack the enemy consistently tried to attain high commanding terrain. In frontal attacks the enemy tried to approach our lines as close as possible and employ hand grenades.
Some of the enemy tactics either in attack or defense tended to be fanatical, such as the Japanese. When enemy attacks were repelled and the enemy driven from his defense position, he would give ground, surrender, or retreat in a very disorganized manner.
The enemy was organized in groups of 50 to 150 men. These units would be grouped together in a small area at strategic points, and not tied in with adjacent units. In this group there would be 1 or 2, 50 caliber guns, sniper and automatic weapons. From POW reports it was learned that each group was lead by a professional soldier and contained several other professionals, but that the bulk was conscripts and draftees who were not well trained and wanted to surrender but that their seniors threatened them with death. Moral was very low and the POW’s stated that they were not properly fed. These POW’s stated that the enemy was well supplied in arms and ammunition.
Estimated total enemy strength opposing the 1st Battalion during this action was 1800 to 3000. Estimated enemy dead in 1st Battalion zone of action were from 500 to 600. POW’s taken by 1st Battalion 28.
The enemy was deployed on strategic ridge lines. They would occupy the forward slopes and positions on the flanks and in huts or small villages, if present, but when heavy fire was brought down on them they would withdraw either to their well prepared positions on the reverse slopes or on the military crest. When driven from their reverse slope positions the enemy would withdraw in disorganized manner using low ground to move to the rear of another ridge. The retreating enemy would not take position of the next ridge line or strong point. Their position would be occupied by fresh troops and the withdrawing enemy would proceed further to the rear. It was noted in their withdrawal that some enemy troops would take cover in rice patties and houses and revert to sniping activity.
(1) The enemy encountered on 12 August in a rear guard action at Sach’on were elements of the 83rd Motorized Regiment of the North Korean 6th Infantry Division. The strength of the enemy encountered by BLT 1/5 was estimated to be one battalion of 300 to 400 men. The enemy was deployed on the high ground overlooking the road and town of Changoh’on. The enemy used machine guns, small arms, small mortars and grenades.
(2) On 17 August the enemy encountered defending Obank-ni Ridge, was the 18th Regiment, Commanded by Chang Ky Dok, of the North Korean 4th Infantry Division. The estimated strength of the 18th Regiment was 1000 men. The enemy was deployed with three Battalions on line. All three Battalions were placed to repel the attack on Obong-ni Ridge. The enemy was well equipped with automatic weapons, plus rifles and anti-tank guns. They Also delivered sporadic artillery and mortar fire.
(3) Prisoners were captured from units of the 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division and the 16th Mechanized Brigade. The actual units which opposed the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were the 2nd Battalion of the Independent Regiment of the 16th Mechanized Brigade, the 4th Battalion of the 16th Regiment of the 4th Division and the 1st Batttalion of the 17th Regiment of the 9th Division.
The individual enemy soldier was equipped with automatic weapons, sniper rifles or a 57 caliber (clip of 5 gas operated or single shot bolt action) anti-tank rifle and hand grenades. The 1st Battalion captured 2-122mm howitzers, 4-120 mm mortars, 4-82mm mortars, 5-76mm howitzers and 5- 47mm anti-tank guns. One T34/85 tank was captured intact by the 1st Battalion. Three T34/85 tanks were destroyed by 1st Battalion.
Sach’on Area against enemies 83rd Motorized Regiment
This battalion was in contact with the enemy on 13 August 1950 when ordered to return to Chin Dong-ni. On the 12th the enemy had fought a rear guard action with a force of an estimated battalion strength, and had counter-attacked at dawn on the 13th without gaining their objective, which was to force the withdrawal of "B" Company from the high ground on the Brigade’s left flank. The enemy was attempting to delay the advance of the Brigade while their main body moved towards the Sacdh’on-Chinju area. The enemy suffered severe casualties in this action and it is estimated that over one-half of the rear guard was killed. The Brigade could have moved towards Sach’on without too much opposition, especially in view of the breaking off of the attack by the enemy at dawn.
It is believed that the operation resulted in the destruction of the mobility of the 83rd Motorized Regiment. The enemy was so badly cut up that it is believed that complete reorganization with replacements was necessary to make the 83rd Motorized Regiment an effective fighting unit.
Naktong River-Youngsan Sector
This battalion was in contact with the enemy on Obongi-ni Ridge on the 17th and 18 of August 1950. The 18th Regiment of the 4th Division was defeated and retired towards the Naktong River in confusion. Leaving behind the majority of his small arms, supporting arms and motor transport. The capture of Obong-ni Ridge resulted in the penetration of the main line of resistance and the eventual collapse of the enemy bridgehead on the Naktong River.
(1) The enemy has defended hills with concentrations up to regimental strength. The enemy has defended roads with anti-tank guns, but not with personnel in any great strength. Villages have been defended by a few automatic weapons, but no great number of personnel. Enemy mortar and artillery fire has been accurate, but of small intensity when compared to ours. Enemy mortars and artillery have been previously registered in on objectives both to the front and rear of their positions. On entering these areas, our forces find themselves in comparatively heavy and accurate mortar and artillery fire of relatively short duration. The enemy fights for a hill, but so far, nothing else. He attacks at night rather than in daylight.
(2) The enemy makes excellent use of camouflage. He uses cover to a maximum at times, and then again, takes no advantage of it.
(3) The enemy has attacked at night rather than in daylight, breaking off his attack as soon as daylight comes, and making maximum use of hand grenades and his short range automatic weapons. He is neither as tenacious nor fanatical as the Japanese, but does press home his advantages until separated from leaders. Attacks start suddenly and finish just as suddenly. He either does not like daylight close combat, or realizes the shortcomings of his poor marksmanship at ranges above 200 yards and his inadequate supporting arms. He obviously does not relish close support aircraft as used by the Marine Corps.
(1) The enemy, in the opinion of the Battalion Commander, has displayed poor coordination among higher commanders. Therefore, friendly unified attacks, once the enemy’s main line of resistance has broken, will result in many prisoners and the complete collapse of the enemy.
(2) Napalm bombs, 500 and 1000 lbs. bombs with instantaneous fuses, large numbers of hand and rifle grenades and flame throwers are weapons that can be effectively used against the enemy because of his apparent herd instincts. Overhead machine gun fire in the attack should be utilized to a maximum degree because of the suitability of the terrain. Engineer demolition detachments should be used to aid in the preparation of defense positions at night. Barbed wire of all types should be used in the night defense position.
(3) As yet, the exposed flanks of this Battalion have not been subjected to attack by day. The high ground held by the battalion has been attacked during the hours of darkness. The CP has been tied closely in with front line units during the night had has not suffered attacks as reported by Army units.
(4) 75mm Recoilless Rifles, 3.5" Rocket Launchers and M-26 Tanks have proven successful against the Russian built T-34 medium tanks. Each of the above weapons can immobilize a tank, but the 3.5" Rocket Launcher and the M-26 Tank can kill them, where the 75mm RR Gun is not quite as effective.
(5) The 75mm RR Gun has proven to be a good supporting weapon during the period when supporting fires are lifted and before friendly forces can gain the tops of ridges or hills.
(6) Tanks and 75mm RRs can be effectively employed in an approach march formation, and should be placed well forward in the advance party.
Due to the method of employment of BLT 1/5, the command post did not function in the ordinary manner. This can be attributed to the inaccurate maps, which necessitated conducting operations from the battalion observation post, where the terrain on which the action was taking placed and the troop movement could be directly observed. As a consequence, the Battalion Commander and the Liaison Officers, operating on the OP, conducted the majority of the operations with the remainder of the Staff assisting, where possible, from the command post. The communication system was therefore altered to afford direct communication from the battalion observation post to both higher and lower echelons, with monitoring units at the command post.
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