In God We Trust
Greece:
Born under the stress of battle, nurtured under a disrupted economy, and stabilized by its own efforts in building a base upon which it could assist and advise the Republic of Korea - the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea recently celebrated its second anniversary.
UNCACK… is perhaps one of the most unique organizations in the world today. While a military command, it is international in its scope with its personnel originating from 21 countries of the United Nations. Military and civilians are working under army direction in civilian pursuits. Nearly all of its personnel has been selected on the basis of individual specialties. Among its numbers are included doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, economists and specialists in all fields of government.
The lessons learned in international cooperation, by this United Nations group, point out that it is possible for foreign groups to plan together and work together if the objective is worthwhile.
UNCACK is a united effort of the United Nations which provides an outlet for those member nations to provide food, supplies and technical assistance to the Republic of Korea. It also provides an outlet for these nations of the world to furnish help in kind when it is impossible for them to give financial aid. The aid may be in the form of rice from Thailand or sugar from the Philippines. Those who can, give money; others give machinery, food, and other articles to help stabilize the economy of Korea. The main thing is that all give what they can and to the best of their ability as their own economy permits. In the final analysis, who can say who gives most?
UNCACK’s problems have been many. When North Korea made its unprovoked attacked on South Korea, the 25th of June 1950, all of South Korea was thrown into panic. A peaceful economy was disrupted, the country’s streets WERE filled with fleeing refugees and its industry stopped. Over 4 million people were made homeless by the war and became dependent upon the Republic of Korea for their very existence. Thousands of civilian non-combatants were in need of immediate medical assistance.
Into this breach, stepped the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command by sending a select group of 29 officers, 16 enlistee men and 18 civilians from his Public Health and Welfare Section in Tokyo. Their mission…. "to make an immediate survey to determine in what way the United Nations Command could help the Republic of Korea maintain stability in the face of their crisis." In October 1950 this responsibility was transferred to the Eight United States Army. An agency was established and designated the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment, with the mission of taking care of this responsibility that had been transferred to the Eighth Army. In December the organization was raised to the status of a major command of Eighth Army and renamed the United Nations Civil Assistance Command. In January 1951 its name became the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK).
The basic mission given UNCACK was: "the prevention of disease, starvation and unrest among the civilian population." This mission was to assure that front line action could go on without interruption by unrest in rear areas. UNCACK later assumed the functions of the Economic Cooperative Administration (ECA) in February 1951, which in turn created an immediate need for specialists in the fields of economics, agriculture, industry, commerce, natural resources, finance, information and education.
From a small organization of 63 persons, UNCACK has grown to a large command of over 700 people. Growth has been nominal, personnel being added only when the demand for specialists developed in new fields.
Central headquarters of UNCACK is established near the seat of the government at Pusan. In the field, operations are conducted by Provincial Teams, one in each province and two teams located on the islands of Koji-do and Cheju-do. Each team has specialists in public, welfare, safety, economics, education, civil information and civil supply. Working in close cooperation and coordination with provincial officials they receive, receipt for and make distribution of food, clothing, and supplies of every type which have been sent to Korea for civilian relief.
One of the greatest contributions made to Korea has been the public health program. When UNCACK started in Korea, more than 240,000 men, women and children had died of disease and deprivation. All of these were war-sufferers, many were refugees. UNCACK went to work on the problem immediately, fully realizing that the war at the front could well be lost if sickness and unrest raged in the rear area.
Medical men have a way of maintaining calmness in the face of insurmountable problems and this problem was no exception. Health, welfare and sanitation closed ranks to present a united front against the ravages of disease. It was a fight against disease unprecedented in world history and the operation began at once.
Army Medical Service, upon call from UNCACK, began to call forward huge amounts of vaccines and other supplies to meet the emergency. Programs for the future were firmed. Teams for immunizing the people were formed and the Republic of Korea entered the program whole-heartedly with their doctors, nurses and personnel.
An orderly attack was made on disease amidst trying conditions and among fleeing refugees. The attack was so orderly in its movement that the people’s fears were alleviated and they responded eagerly to what we were trying to do for them. This action on the part of the medical personnel helped stabilize the area immediately behind the front, making it easier for welfare workers to control refugees.
Statistics as such are apt to be boring except when they illustrate a dramatic event in history. As we look at this dramatic fight against disease in the first six months of 1952 we see clearly how well this operation has been. Smallpox was cut 98 percent over a like period of 1951. Typhoid was reduced more than 96 percent and the deaths from this disease were only three percent of what they were last year. Typhus showed a reduction of 77 percent while diphtheria went down 87 percent. Of an estimated 40,000 lepers in South Korea, more than 12,000 were being treated.
Every section of UNCACK can give a thrilling account of their attacks upon major problems, although they may not be as dramatic as Public Health. Welfare Section has stemmed the tide of starvation and unrest by clothing the poor and feeding the millions of war sufferers and by providing homes for the orphaned and the aged. Commerce and Industry Section has put many of the bombed-out industrial plants back into operation by the importation of supplies and machinery parts, thus putting back to work many unemployed. Agriculture Section has imported fertilizer to help bring forth greater crops, thereby increasing the food supply. And so goes the story of rehabilitation of a country at war. UNCACK helps the people to help themselves.
The accomplishment of UNCACK, in close cooperation and coordination with the Republic of Korea, would not have been possible had it not been for the assistance received from many agencies of the United Nations. The United Nations Korea Rehabilitation Agency (UNKRA) has worked hand in hand with UNCACK during the past year. In the coming year UNKRA is planning to spend more than 70 million dollars in permanent rehabilitation projects.
UNKRA has worked with UNCACK by lending to UNCACK 134 of their personnel for work at headquarters level as well as at team level. The successes of UNCACK are jointly shared with UNKRA.
Another agency organized recently is the Combined Economic Board (CEB), which is composed of members from the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea. Their duty is to allocate the vast amount of relief goods coming into Korea, strictly on the basis of need, to the Korean people. They also decide what relief articles will be brought into Korea for sale purposes.
With agencies in the rear, working in close coordination and cooperation with those at the front, there can be no doubt that we shall have ultimate victory over the communist forces. The United Nations Command, UNCACK and UNKRA and the Combined Economic Board working together are assuring success.
by PFC James De Rose, Special to Pacific Stars & Stripes (date unknown)
From PIO, HQ., KCAC
KCAC veteran Roger Bradley of New York submitted the following Stars & Stripes article to the Korean War Educator website.
Today in Korea, an American nurse is conducting a school for young Korean student nurses, preparing them for future service to their communities and their nation…a Briton on the island of Cheju is physician and adviser to a populace without adequate medical care…a U.S. Army major is demonstrating to Korean farmers better methods of cultivating crops and protecting livestock…a civilian forestry specialist from the U.S. is organizing 4-H clubs among the youth of the Republic of Korea…an economist advises a ROK minister…a home is being built…an industry is growing…an economy is becoming stable. A nation, unnaturally divided, its sap drained by an exhausting war, and only now beginning to realize some of her inherent economic potential, is steadily dressing the wounds of a conflict which all but stripped her naked.
To be sure, the rehabilitation of this country, which was the initial battleground in the struggle between Democracy and atheistic Communism, is the responsibility of the Koreans themselves; nor would they wish it to be other than that. None the less, many agencies of the U.N., both military and civilians, are actively aiding in this regeneration, contributing whatever they are able toward the common goal.
The instances cited above, however, represent the activities of one agency, one group, one body—the Korea Civil Assistance Command. Seemingly unrelated, save for purpose, these functions and many more are each day planned, coordinated and carried out under the sponsorship of KCAC, whose task it is to aid the people of the Republic of Korea to become self-sufficient and able to carry on their own development.
KCAC, with headquarters in Seoul, is a major military command of the Far East Command, charged with the responsibility for preventing disease, starvation and unrest in the ROK, and assisting in the rehabilitation of a nation which seeks economic stability in an atmosphere of post-war uncertainty.
Headed by Brig. Gen. F.K. Hayden, KCAC succeeds the U.N. Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK), whose wartime mission was to stabilize rear areas so that frontline military operations could proceed with the minimum of disturbance. In carrying out that mission, UNCACK performed fantastic feats in the field of health and social welfare in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
To cite an example of this success, UNCACK’s efforts in reducing diseases showed these results in 1952: Typhoid was reduced more than 96 percent from what it was at the outset of the war and deaths from this disease were only three percent of what they were the previous year. Typhus showed a reduction of 77 percent and diphtheria went down by 87 percent of what it was in 1951. Of an estimated 40,000 lepers in Korea, more than 12,000 were under treatment in 1952. Much the same story could be told by each of the specialized branches of KCAC operating then.
When reconstruction and rehabilitation in Korea became the major concern of the U.N., it was decided that KCAC be designated a major command and assume the added mission of rehabilitation in the ROK. This it has been doing since July 1953.
Actually, KCAC is best expressed in terms of its field teams, located throughout the provinces of Korea, whose job it is to furnish "grass roots" civil assistance in their areas. Comprised of an average of 20 persons, half of whom are civilian specialists, the team implements programs initiated at KCAC Headquarters.
Civil assistance team functions may be seen in the distribution of relief goods to end users, in furnishing technical advice to provincial, local and civic bodies, in maintaining sound health standards, by education—in any of a thousand ways—each designed to assist the Koreans in their task of reconstruction.
The teams’ members originate from many countries and many walks of life. Military administrators, supply specialists, public health personnel, doctors, nurses, veterinarians, economists, all lend their particular talents to the smooth functioning of a unit which, in most cases, is the only link between board "relief programs" and the people who benefit from them.
Often the team has been the first source of consolation in time of disaster. During the tragic Pusan blaze, KCAC lent every effort to ease the sufferings of the populace by providing food, blankets and temporary housing. But whether misfortunate strikes a large city, like Pusan or small one like Cheju City on the island of Cheju, the response from KCAC is the same—immediate assistance.
On a higher level, in KCAC Headquarters, civil assistance activities are coordinated with many other agencies who seek the economic reconstruction of Korea. Among these are the U.N. Korea Reconstruction Agency and the Office of the UNC Economic Coordinator. Many of KCAC’s personnel are active in both these organizations and maintain close liaison with KCAC Headquarters and ROK officials concerned with rehabilitation. Also, many of KCAC’s branches are so organized as to be counterparts of ministries in ROK government, advising and assisting them in expediting the many problems of economic recuperation. Every effort is made to prevent duplication of effort on the part of U.N. agencies, and in this regard much success has been achieved.
KCAC also lends support to a host of smaller, independent relief agencies. KCAC has an association with numerous long-range projects aimed at rebuilding the Korean economy. KCAC is providing for power rehabilitation programs, for farm resettlement, for the renovation of Korean transportation and communications systems, and for the social welfare of the population in general.
A comparatively small organization, boasting only some 6000 U.S.-U.N. personnel, KCAC quietly pursues its dedicated aim of restoring Korea to the economic and social dignity to which it has every right, by "helping Koreans help themselves." For, like the forces of the U.N. themselves, KCAC was born of a struggle that has never ended.
On April 6, 1954, President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea presented the Korea Civil Assistance Command the Presidential Unit Citation for distinguished humanitarian services and achievements in the prevention of disease, starvation and unrest among the civilian population of Korea during the period December 10, 1950 to September 30, 1953.
The citation reads in part: "… By importing food, clothing, medical aid goods, and large quantities of fertilizer to increase crop production the tide of suffering of over 4,000,000 people has been stemmed…Working effectively with Korean medical personnel KCAC has been highly successful in reducing the disease rate. In addition, the Command has aided in the support of over 90 hospitals, 500 medical aid stations and 355 orphanages, has provided refugee camps and has established and operated more than 60 feeding stations which furnished meals to approximately 55,000 persons daily."
The Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) was created a major command of the Far East Command on 1 July 1953, as a successor to the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK).
Having personnel originating from 21 countries of the free world and specialists in nearly a dozen fields, KCAC retains the same responsibilities of UNCACK—"the prevention of starvation, disease and unrest"—with the added function of "rehabilitation." It has grown from a war time, emergency effort to an organization dedicated to the relief and restoration of the Koreans—by helping Koreans help themselves.
Basically, KCAC is a military unit of the US Army. It is, moreover, a United Nations effort, providing an outlet for member nations to provide food, supplies and technical assistance to the Republic of Korea.
Initially, civil assistance took the form of a complement of 29 officers, 16 enlisted men and 18 civilians, organized as an emergency measure by the Commander-in-chief, UNC, "to make an immediate survey to determine in what way the UNC could help the ROK to maintain stability in the face of their crisis."
Later, in October 1950, an agency was created under the Army and designated the US Public Health and Welfare Detachment. In December, it was renamed the UN Civil Assistance Command, subsequently assuming its full name of UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK).
The mission of UNCACK was to assume that front line action could carry on uninterrupted by unrest in the rear areas. Headquarters was established near the seat of the ROK government in Pusan. In the field, operations were conducted by provincial teams: one in each province and one each on the islands of Cheju-do and Koje-do. (Since that time the Koje-do team has been dropped and a special team added for the city of Seoul.) Each team was so organized as to include specialists in the fields of public health, welfare, safety, economics, education, civil information and civil supply. Working in close cooperation with provincial officials, they received and made distribution of all types of relief goods.
From a small organization of 63 persons, UNCACK grew to a large command of over 700. Of great importance was the contribution made by the Public Health section. Faced with the fact that more than 240,000 men, women and children had lost their lives due to disease and deprivation, medical men went to work, and through UNCACK, began to call forward huge supplies of vaccines and other emergency supplies to meet the need. Typhoid was reduced more than 96 percent and deaths from this disease fell 97 percent in a period of a year. Typhus showed a reduction of 77 percent and diphtheria went down 87 percent in a year. Of an estimated 40,000 lepers in Korea, more than 12,000 are now under treatment.
But the accomplishments of UNCACK and KCAC would not have been possible had it not received the cooperation it did from many other agencies of the United Nations. The United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) has worked hand in hand with UNCACK and KCAC throughout their years in Korea.
The functions of the field teams of the Korea Civil Assistance Command are best expressed in terms of the functions of KCAC itself; for the teams are the operating and implementing arm of the command and the backbone of the civil assistance program. What KCAC is to the national government of Korea, so too is the field team to the provincial governments, and the success of the entire rehabilitation effort depends in no small measure upon the smooth functioning of the KCAC field teams.
Retaining some identity in internal make-up with the headquarters KCAC, the field teams utilize both military and civilian personnel to carry out their mission, and maintain advisory personnel to coordinate assistance projects with local officials. Although the size of each team may differ with locale, the typical team averages slightly over 20 persons plus Korean personnel. Each team has approximately five officers with the remainder evenly divided among civilian technicians and enlisted men.
With sections dealing in public health, welfare, housing, sanitation, and agriculture, specialists are utilized to assist the speedy and efficient expedition of the civil assistance program as it affects the individual province. In addition to giving on-the-spot relief to any area stricken by disaster, the teams offer a "grass roots" example of what cooperation can mean to the Korean people in their struggle to build a stable economy.
The primary mission of KCAC’s Agriculture Branch is to rehabilitate and increase the agricultural and forestry production of South Korea. More than 70 percent of the population derives the major portion of their incomes from this source. Therefore, it is essential that programs directed toward the rehabilitation of South Korea’s agricultural and forestry activities should receive prime consideration.
Production of sufficient food to maintain the ever-increasing population has become a greater problem each year. Erosion, caused as a result of the destruction of forests to produce fuel for cooking, heating and lumber for construction, has greatly decreased the amount of arable land in South Korea.
As the population increases, agricultural programs must aid to (1) increase production by all available means, (2) reclaim all previously unproductive land capable of producing food, (3) prevent further erosion, (4) prevent destruction and loss from plant diseases, insects, and other pests, (5) increase livestock and (6) prevent infectious diseases.
Programs for Korean agricultural rehabilitation have become the responsibility of United Nations organizations since the Korean economy is at such a low ebb. The ROK neither has the money nor the technical knowledge to undertake projects of this nature. It is hoped the Koreans will absorb the more advanced agricultural methods introduced by the UN agencies and will strive for maximum production from their land in the future.
The basic mission of the Communications Branch is to assist the ROK in rehabilitating its communication system. Combating problems created by wartime devastation and lack of technically trained Korean personnel, this branch is endeavoring to help lay the groundwork for more ambitious programs to come.
In addition to offering technical advice, this branch is aiding in planning the expenditures of FOA funds allocated to reconstruct the communications system in Korea. Under the FOA program for FY 54, $4.7 million has been programmed to provide the following communications facilities: (1) 20,000 lines of automatic telephone equipment for the city of Seoul, (2) a school to train communications specialists, (3) 3,000 line manual switchboard and distribution plant for Taejon, (4) l,000 line manual switchboard and distribution plant for Masan, (5) a distribution cable plant in Seoul, (6) equipment and vehicles for maintenance of telephone plant, (7) radio equipment for the domestic radio-telegraph system.
Future funds will be used for the restoration of other communication facilities, particularly toll centers and trunk circuits to link the communities together.
This branch will continue to base its operations upon the local requirements, economic status of the country and technical ability of the Koreans in an endeavor to restore the maximum amount of communications possible with the FOA funds made available for that purpose.
The basic mission of the Power Branch is the restoration of present power plants and transmission systems that have been damaged by combat action, lack of maintenance and age. The secondary mission, and increasingly more important, is the new development of necessary and adequate generating plants and transmission and distributing facilities to meet the needs of an expanded industry in the ROK.
The present power system is part of a system formerly extending to the Yalu River and was not designed for the isolated type of operation now existing. There are many deficiencies in the system resulting from this isolated operation, together with damages caused by war and depreciation.
For the past several years, about one-third of the power used in South Korea has been produced by US owned and operated barges located at Pusan and Masan, and costing the US taxpayer about $3,000,000 per year. A plan for future production has been prepared in conference with combined planning groups of FOA, UNKRA, KCAC and ROK, which will increase the present maximum generating capacity from 238,000 KW to 480,000 KW and provide 300,000 KW of dependable power as compared to an estimated minimum demand of 225,000 KW by 1960.
This plan includes further rehabilitation of existing power and transmission facilities. In addition, three new thermal and three new hydro plants are planned. Two of these latter are FOA projects and one is by the ROK.
The Public Works Branch has the mission of advising and assisting its counterpart in the Republic of Korea Government, other branches of KCAC Headquarters, when requested, on matters requiring technical guidance to promote and improve the efficiency in the field of public works.
Personnel of this branch work in close cooperation with Korean officials of various ministries on the design and preparation of plans and estimates of materials and labor necessary for the construction of hospitals, orphanages and other welfare institutions, waterworks and sanitation projects, highways and bridges, government buildings, city planning, and grain warehouses.
Since September 1951, when the first allocation of CRIK materials was made, there has been over 100,000,000 board feet of lumber allocated for various projects. Nails, roofing paper, cement and glass constitute the other major demands.
In the FOA program for 1954, $11 million has been set aside for public works. The major portion of these funds will be used to rehabilitate water plants and other public utilities, streets, roads and bridges, government buildings, and grain warehouses.
One of the problems facing South Korea is the definite shortage of graduate Korean engineers who possess the knowledge and experience required for this tremendous rebuilding task. Therefore, the necessity of the Public Works Branch, consisting of engineers who are experts in various fields, can readily be visualized.
The basic mission of the Public Health Branch is to prevent disease and unrest. Under KCAC supervision, acute communicable diseases have been reduced from epidemics to small local outbreaks, water systems have been made operational, professional and health education have been initiated, stimulated and expanded, and the chronic diseases have begun to receive major attention.
The branch is divided into five sections—Preventive Medicine, Medical Care, Nursing Affairs, Environmental Sanitation and Medical Supply.
Under the Preventive Medicine Section come the mass immunization programs aimed at reducing and preventing disease. These programs proved exceptionally successful in reducing the number of cases and the death rate from disease.
The Medical Care Section is concerned with improving medical institutions and raising the caliber of professional personnel operating these institutions.
Nursing Affairs Section renders consultant and advisory services to the national and provincial governments in addition to operational duties within the KCAC public health programs.
The Sanitation Section primarily assists and advises the ROK Ministry of Health on coordinated sanitation programs.
The Medical Supply Section is organized to advise and assist on matters pertaining to programming of medical and sanitation supplies for Korea.
The Social Affairs Branch is responsible for the relief and welfare aspects of the KCAC mission in Korea, part of which is the prevention of disease, starvation and unrest among the civilian population. The broad Social Affairs mission is to insure minimum relief to needy refugees, war sufferers and other indigent persons in the ROK; to promote return of refugees and other indigent persons to a productive status in the Korean economy; to assist the ROK in development and administration of public welfare programs and services suitable to the overall economy of the nation.
Basic policies governing the UNC relief and welfare programs dictate that all UN relief goods must be pooled for distribution against general relief needs; economically and effectively used to prevent starvation, disease and unrest; allocated on the basis of greatest need; and distributed through ROK channels in accordance with procedures jointly agreed to by KCAC and responsible ROK authorities and approved by the Combined Economic Board.
Voluntary relief agencies with established missions in Korea are authorized and encouraged to operate their programs and to import relief supplies in their direct support. The Branch furnishes technical advice and guidance to the ROK Ministry of Social Affairs on programs for needy refugees, war sufferers, and other categories of destitute persons; on programs to reduce the number of persons dependent upon relief; and helps develop effective plans for allocation and distribution of relief goods.
The primary mission of the Supply Division is to supervise the receipt, handling and accounting for all Civilian Aid Supplies shipped into Korea, regardless of whether they are furnished by member nations of the United Nations or by private relief organizations in the United States and other countries.
Basically, the Supply Division is divided into four branches; Civil Supply, Movements Control, Sales and Records.
The Civil Supply Branch acquires and develops information necessary for the proper handling and control of relief supplies. This branch maintains records of approved supply programs and forecasts, and schedules the arrival into port facilities of all supplies for Korea. A schedule of distribution throughout Korea is developed in conjunction with the forecasting and shipping.
Movements Control Branch prepares the movement plan for receipt, port clearance, transportation and "in transit" storage of supplies for which KCAC has responsibility. The major supply items received are grain, coal, POL, fertilizer, lumber and cement.
Sales Branch supervises the sale of CRIK materials and Army surplus and salvage items as are turned over to the command for distribution to Korean Employees Sale Stores. These facilities serve Korean employees of UN installations.
The Records Branch compiles and maintains the necessary records and reports to account for receipt of all civilian supplies for Korea.
The mission of the Transportation Branch of KCAC is to rehabilitate and develop the transportation system of the ROK with an eye toward increasing its capacity to expedite goods between the principal points of use. The development of the transportation system under Japanese occupation left a marked deficiency in the lines connecting the eastern and western coasts, and normal connection was available only North and South between the principal cities of ROK.
Since all forms of transportation are inter-dependent, the development of any one form depends in large measure upon the capacity for expansion of the others. In planning for the rehabilitation of the ROK’s transportation system the following factors were taken into consideration.
The transportation system of Korea is comprised of the Korean National Railway (KNR) having 1,683 miles of route; 10 major and 57 secondary ports; a merchant marine of 39 vessels, 14 of which are ocean going; a network of 9,540 miles of roads which is not paved save for Seoul and Pusan; a fleet of old trucks and buses; 2,000 small wooden vessels, and streetcar systems in Seoul and Pusan.
Taking all factors into consideration, lack of adequate transportation facilities is the greatest single factor hampering the economic recovery of Korea. The transportation program as drawn up is calculated to enable imports under the expanded aid program to be distributed properly and to promote the internal economy of the country.
[KWE Note: Bradley was a supply--then company clerk--with KCAC in 1953/54.]
KCAC was originally United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC) and changed to Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC). KCAC was a united effort of the United Nations to provide an outlet for those member nations to provide food, supplies and technical assistance to the Republic of Korea. I was assigned as a supply clerk and later as company clerk of Headquarters Company. We were officially, the 8201st Army Unit assigned to 8th Army.
When I was assigned to KCAC I had no idea what its responsibilities were. I learned after joining the outfit. When North Korea attacked South Korea, all of South Korea was thrown into panic. A peaceful economy was disrupted, the country’s streets were filled with fleeing refugees, and its industry stopped. Over four million people were made homeless by the war and became dependent upon the Republic of Korea for their very existence. Thousands were in need of immediate medical assistance.
I arrived in Korea in late March 1953. I had a quartermaster MOS and KCAC needed supply people. So, I ended up in headquarters unit supply room when I guess there was a need for a supply clerk. I was not qualified for this position but it was not hard to lean to issue supplies. When the 1st sergeant learned I could type, I was moved to the Headquarters Company Orderly Room and assigned Company Clerk. A supply clerk worked at company level and received and issued those items necessary for a unit to function. These items included items of clothing, soap, mops, buckets, bedding, including the cots, etc. A company clerk worked in the orderly room of a company and was, in effect, the secretary to the 1st sergeant and the company commander.
KCAC had its Headquarters located in Pusan and moved to Seoul in April of 1954. We had teams in each of the provinces and on the island of Cheju-do. Headquarters offices were located in a masonry building that once was a maritime college. This was a large building and looked like many older schools in the United States. It was a two-story building and the classrooms were converted to offices.
KCAC included approximately 700 officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel. We were tasked to the responsibilities of prevention of starvation, disease and unrest with the added function of rehabilitation dedicated to the relief and restoration of the Koreans by helping Koreans help themselves.
The programs were funded by the 21 countries. These countries assisted with funds and/or goods as their economies allowed. The supplies consisted of food, clothing, medical supplies, building supplies, etc. They were distributed by the teams in the various provinces. Everyone was needy. The member nations supplied personnel to the teams. The personnel consisted of doctors, nurses, and technical people in the fields of agriculture, communications, power, public works, public health, and social affairs. Also, supply, transportation, etc. These were the decision makers.
There was one KCAC team in each province. Each team consisted of about 20 personnel plus Korean personnel. There were nine provinces plus there was a special team in Seoul. The provincial teams were located in the capital of the province. Cheju-do was a province. Our living quarters were quonset huts located on the compound that included the headquarters building. The quonset was shared by about ten or twelve GIs as I recall. Other buildings included a large mess hall, officers club and an EM club. We had a firehouse, maintenance building, an Armed Forces Radio Station building, and probably others, but they do not come to mind.
I don’t know too much about the Seoul team. I believe it was established in Seoul to work directly with the national government. The quonsets were heated by kerosene space heaters—two large ones, one on each end. They were like a parlor heater and were flued through the roof. The floor of the hut was wood.
The AFRS maintained a radio station and broadcast news and music. It also picked up ball games etc. It functioned like a stateside radio station.
Our duty hours were like a normal work day. We rose to reveille and had a formation at 0630 hours. Breakfast and then off to work, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Entertainment was diversified. We had a hobby shop. The items made in the Hobby Shop were models of all kinds as well as jewelry, leather goods, etc. These items could be taken or sent home. Most sent the items rather than try to carry extra baggage home with them. We had sports, swimming in the bay. We had access to Armed Forces Educational correspondence courses. We had activities at the EM club—games, dances, etc. The games played in the club were board games, cards, shuffle board etc. We danced with Korean girls. The girls were allowed onto the compound for these dances. They came on at 7 p.m. and had to be off the post by 11 p.m. I did not take any R&R. The USO shows were devoted to the units in the front, and rightly so.
We did employ Korean nationals at the company level. They were used for maintenance, laundry, houseboys, etc. I did not make any personal friends; however, we all became attached to our houseboys. These were teenagers who performed housekeeping in the quarters for us. They did light laundry, shoe shining, etc. Our houseboy’s name was Kim. Other than the fact that he was a student, I have little info about him. He was a very nice kid, always neat and clean. He was on the compound for employment, paid by ourselves. We had one houseboy per hut. On one trip for a mail pickup, my driver, a Korean national, hit a pedestrian. It caused quite a commotion among the bystanders and we were being threatened. I drew my pistol, got out of the jeep, unloaded the mail bags, and instructed the driver to take the injured man to the hospital. I waited on the sidewalk for him to return. My decision defused the situation and I was able to wait without incident.
On the headquarters level there were many civilians from various countries assigned to the various sections. These people were specialists in the fields we were involved with. We were secure from the fighting, however, we armed ourselves when leaving the compound and we maintained a 24-hour sentinel detail. I never felt any personal danger. We did have to be fully armed when leaving the compound. We had automatic rifles, 45 cal. Pistols as well as shotguns.
I do remember the day the truce was signed. Rumors had prevailed for days. Naturally, there was much relief among us on July 27th. As I recall, we celebrated at the club. After the truce, KCAC personnel continued as before. The work of the teams became more intense as they were now able to move more freely and into more areas of the provinces. Again, this was done with alertness to the danger of hostile forces. My duties did not change significantly except for new responsibilities. Before we moved our HQ to Seoul, the first sergeant went with the advance party to set up the company area. I then assumed the duties of the 1st sergeant. Everything remained the same as before the truce.
A tour of duty in Korea was 16 months, so I knew for a long time as to when I would be leaving. I did not know the exact date. My orders were cut on July 8, 1954. I came home aboard the USS General Randall. It was a larger ship and faster than the Marine Lynx. I had no assignments aboard ship. The mood was a happy one. We were all anxious to get home. I was happy to leave Korea but felt sad to be leaving the friends that I had made. We landed in Seattle. There were very few people welcoming the arrival of the ship. Some of the soldiers had family waiting for them. I do remember this because we were told to remain in ranks and not to jump the barriers. This was ignored by those with family. They were anxious to see those waiting for them.
I think my experience in Korea gave me a better appreciation of the U.S. seeing how the Korean people lived in comparison to our way of life had to make an impression. Did Korea change me? Yes. I left an immature young man and came back with a more mature outlook."
The Korean War would probably have ended much sooner if it had not been for the stalemate over the prisoner of war issue. The Communists wanted all prisoners of war returned, whether they wanted to be repatriated or not. Allied forces wanted all prisoners of war to have a free choice in whether or not they wanted to be repatriated. In 1953, the United Nations Command Repatriation Group (UNCREG) was formed to perform the important task of supervising repatriation efforts. This page of the Korean War Educator is about those efforts, and is based on information and photographs supplied to the KWE by UNCREG veterans and their families.
Munsan-ni, Korea
1 September 1953 - 31 December 1953
[KWE Note: The following text for "The UNCREG Story" was provided by Paul Wolfgeher of Independence, MO. A pdf of the booklet can be viewed by Clicking HERE, courtesy of Joe Bush, nephew of Col. David Burman.]
We hope and pray that this is the last battle of the Korean conflict. If we can successfully establish the principle of non-forcible repatriation, it is our opinion that the enemy cannot afford to unleash another aggressive war in which he must depend upon the loyalty of slave soldiers to secure his aims. Consider the fact that of more than 20,000 Chinese prisoners of war, 15,000 have declared that they will forcibly resist repatriation. Three fourths of the so-called Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers have elected to remain on the side of the free world. We regard the choice of these prisoners as being indicative of the attitude of the entire Chinese people.
The essence of our endeavor will be to see that all of the men involved, on both sides, if they do reverse the stands they have taken, do so freely, with no duress, coercion, fear or intimidation. Our representatives will be alert to prevent any attempts on the part of the communist "explainers" to use unfair tactics, threats or reprisals on families, or any of the devices which are barred under the terms of the Armistice. Our own "explainers" representing the several UN nations involved in the Korean conflict have been instructed to conduct their explanations within the spirit and letter of the agreement.
In the event these prisoners remain loyal to the cause of the free world through the period of explanations by the communists, we feel that we will have won the psychological battle of our time. Such a victory for the free world would be an effective deterrent to the initiation of future aggressive wars by the communists.
The United Nations Command Repatriation Group was organized to perform one of the most vital tasks still left undone in implementing the Armistice Agreement. After completion of the exchange of those prisoners who desired repatriation, explanations to 22,951 non-repatriate prisoners was the major remaining task to be accomplished. There were no textbooks or precedents to guide the UNC in this task. - BG A.K. Hamblen
-----
On 24 September, the Custodian Forces, India, (CFI) completed taking custody of the non-repatriates when it received in its North Camp the 359 UNC non-repats from the Communist command. Two days earlier the United Nations Command completed its delivery of 7,890 North Korean and 14,702 Chinese prisoners to the South CFI camp. Meanwhile, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was preparing rules for the conduct of explanations at both camps in the Demilitarized Zone.
Although the NNRC assumed custody of the prisoners of war on 24 September, explanations were not initiated until 15 October. This unexpected delay in the start of explanations came as a result of a last-minute protest by the Communists that the explanation sites built by the UNC engineers at the South Camp were inadequate and did not meet their specifications.
The Communists insisted that these specifications be met before any explanations would be made by their side. After several changes in NNRC construction requirements, the 32 new explanation points were rushed to completion and ready for explanations by midnight, 13 October.
While the hurried construction was being completed, the CFI was encountering trouble from the supposedly docile prisoners in the South Camp. The PWs, uncertain as to their ultimate fate, still lacked confidence in their Indian custodians. Due to the presence of Communist observers in the South Camp, the Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates demonstrated. These demonstrations created a number of touchy and difficult situations for the CFI. On two occasions the Indian guards fired into groups of demonstrating prisoners.
Lieutenant General K.S. Thimayya, the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, held his first press conference on 6 October with press representatives from both the UNC and the Communist camps. Facing an imposing battery of cameras, microphones, movie and TV equipment and correspondents, General Thimayya conducted the crowded conference with competence, tact and assurance.
The truce talks at Panmunjom broke down in 1951 over the point of forced repatriation. The UN insisted that every prisoner be allowed to decide freely whether or not he was to return to his homeland.
After seemingly endless bickering and disappointment, on 27 July 1953, both sides finally agreed to a method of handling those prisoners who did not want to return to their homeland. The agreement was set forth in an annex to the Armistice Agreement called the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). In this agreement each PW was guaranteed the right to elect his final disposition: he may decide to return to his original side, or he shall be aided in reaching a nation of his own selection.
The Terms of Reference provided for a commission composed of the representatives of five nations to oversee the prisoners not being directly repatriated. The neutral nations chosen to form the commission were Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and India. The representative from India was to be chairman and executive agent for the NNRC. India was also to provide a brigade of troops to guard the prisoners while they were being held in compounds within the Demilitarized Zone near Panmunjom.
Because of the refusal of the Republic of Korea to permit the Indian custodian troops to set foot on South Korean soil, the UNC carried the entire brigade to the Demilitarized Zone in one of the largest helicopter operations in military history. The Indian Custodian Force camp was named "Hind Nagar" meaning "Indian City" and the camp which housed the NNRC delegation was named "Shanti Nagar" meaning "City of Peace."
As set forth in the Armistice Agreement, all prisoners who indicated that they wanted to return to their homeland were to be repatriated within sixty days after the effective date of the Armistice. All prisoners who refused repatriation were then to be handed over to the custody of the NNRC. There, the nations to which the PWs belonged would have freedom to send representatives to explain their rights to the prisoners.
The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), activated the United Nations Command Repatriation Group (UNCREG) on 1 September 1953 to deal specifically with the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The activation of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group freed the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) to deal specifically with the Armistice Agreement without dissipating its effort on the Terms of Reference.
Specifically, the mission of UNCREG was to insure that all PWs have the opportunity to exercise full freedom of choice, to insure that the efforts of the Communist explainers be not coercive, and to explain to the non-repatriate UNC prisoners their rights and their freedom of choice.
The Communists had already begun their tirade of unreasonable demands and accusations that were to continue throughout the entire operation. While the explanation sites were being constructed, they demanded that the 90-day explanation period be counted from the first day that the prisoners and the Communist explainers actually met in the tents at the explanation area. The UNC steadfastly opposed any extension of the explanation period beyond the termination date of 23 December as dictated by the Terms of Reference.
With three weeks already lost, time became an important factor for the Communists if they intended to persuade the thousands of anti-Communist prisoners to return to Communism. On the morning of 14 October, the Communist command requested that the NNRC deliver one thousand Chinese prisoners to the explanation sites for explanations on 15 October.
The prisoners, however, did not come out for explanations until they were assured by General Thimayya that they would not be segregated. Then 491 violent, rebellious prisoners received persuasion talks from the Communist explainers that first day. And more important, only ten of the total returned to Communist control. This small percentage of defectors, which was to set the pattern throughout the entire explanation period, must have come as a crushing blow to the Communists’ hopes of luring home their former troops.
More encouraging, but confusing to the Communists, must have been the occasional "bug outs." These PWs, who asked for repatriation before they were explained to, actually outnumbered the PWs whom the Communists were able to persuade to return to their homeland.
The next day the Communists were again able to stall explanations by requesting 1,000 Koreans instead of the Chinese who were willing to come to the explanation sessions. The Indian guards could find no means to get the prisoners to come out of their compounds, short of physical force and violence.
The third day, 17 October, was much the same as the first day. Although the Communists asked for 1,000 Chinese prisoners, they explained to only 430 of whom ten were repatriated. Again the Chinese prisoners were vocal in their condemnation of the communist explainers.
One of the major controversies of the explanation operations—should physical force be used to bring the prisoners to the explanation sessions—came as a result of these first three days of active explanations. The Communists demanded that the prisoners be dragged to the tents and forced to listen to extended sessions of intense grilling. The Swiss and Swede members of the NNRC insisted that such action would violate both the word and spirit of the Terms of Reference and the Geneva Convention.
Monday, 19 October, proved to be a repetition of the second day, as 1,000 Koreans were requested but couldn’t be induced to come out of their compounds. Although the Chinese non-repats actually expressed a desire to attend the explanations, the Communists persisted for Korean prisoners who would not leave their compounds.
By these tactics the Communists hoped to cause the NNRC to use force on the prisoners, which would create strife and bloodshed, and would possibly cause the Republic of Korea to take action against the Indians.
During this two-week lull in explanations, the NNRC was divided over the issue of forcing the prisoners to attend explanations. The Polish and Czech members demanded the use of force. The Swiss and Swede members were equally adamant in their stand opposing the use of force. So it was left to the Indian chairman to decide the issue, and he voted to support the Swede and Swiss view of "no force."
On the afternoon of 21 October, UNCREG received Corporal Edward S. Dickenson, the only American prisoner to change his mind during the explanation period. He was validated and returned to the UNC at the exchange point near the NNRC headquarters at Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone.
During the ninety-day period, a total of seven ROK prisoners voluntarily were repatriated. One of these defectors was a woman, the wife of another prisoner who also was repatriated. Husband, wife and their two small children returned to the UNC on 16 November.
The first mail from home to be received for the Americans in the North Camp was delivered on 24 October to the CFI, to be distributed to the individual prisoners. Spokesmen for the American non-repats complained that some of the letters were political and coercive in nature and requested that the NNRC censor their mail. The NNRC, thereafter, censored all mail before distributing it to the PWs.
Just when it appeared that the NNRC was hopelessly deadlocked over the issue of the use of force to make the non-repats attend explanations, General Thimayya announced that he had finally persuaded the Korean non-repatriates to come voluntarily to explanations.
When explanations were resumed on 31 October, the North Korean explainers had but little more success than their Chinese comrades. They were able to persuade only 21 out of 459 to return to Communism. And they were even less successful on the following day when they regained only 19 out of 483. It was now apparent that the Communists were "losing face" by continuing the explanations. Observers wondered what their next move would be.
The next day the Communists requested Chinese non-repats and immediately started a series of delaying tactics. They prolonged each explanation session as long as the individual Indian chairman would permit. Some sessions lasted as long as four hours. But in spite of these "brain washing" tactics, they were able to lure back only 2 Chinese out of 205 on 4 November and 2 out of 136 on the following day.
The CFI did not separate prisoners who had already received explanations from those remaining in their compound. Realizing that the CFI would, therefore, be unable to determine which of the PWs in the compound had already received explanations, the Communists were again able to bring explanations to a complete standstill on 6 November by demanding the remainder of the compound to which they had been explaining the previous day.
The Communists persisted in this demand until 16 November at which time they asked for Korean non-repatriates. But when they were able to persuade only six out of 227 to return, they immediately brought explanations to a halt by again demanding to explain to the remainder of the compound on the following day. In this way they succeeded in bringing explanations in the South Camp to a standstill until 21 December.
It was on 2 December that the long awaited UNC explanations in the North Camp began with five Republic of Korea officers explaining to 30 South Korean non-repatriates. In decided contrast to the Communist sessions, the ROK "come home" talks were "brief, dignified, and to the point." From the first day it was apparent that the PWs were hand-picked by their Communist captors, and were well-versed in the doctrines of Communism.
Explanations to the South Koreans continued on a daily basis until 11 December at which time the PWs announced that they would no longer attend explanations. Surprisingly, their main complaint was that the explanation sessions were too short in that they were not given time to question the explainers on immaterial subjects or to make propaganda speeches.
With a week and a half still remaining of the 90-day period, the UNC asked to start explanations to the American Prisoners on 14 December. But the Americans, too, refused to come out of their compounds until the demands of the Korean non-repatriates were met. Therefore, the UNC made a daily request for whomever the CFI was able to produce: Americans, British or Koreans.
When it became apparent that the non-repatriate leaders in the North Camp would face explainers, UNCREG turned to other means to present the UNC position to the prisoners. Mimeographed statements of the free choice principle were submitted for approval by the NNRC for distribution to non-repats. When the NNRC ruled that the statements would have to be submitted to the prisoners under the conditions and procedures of a regular explanation, spokesmen for the PWs refused to accept them.
Meanwhile, in the South Camp, the Communists again started explanations. During the last three days of the 90-day period, they explained to 742 Chinese prisoners but were able to persuade only 69 of them to return to Communism.
On 23 December—the very last day of 90-day explanation period—the American, British and Korean non-repatriates still persisted in their refusal to attend explanation sessions. UNCREG, therefore, resorted to still anther means to fulfill its obligation top resent the UNC free choice principle to the prisoners. By means of a loudspeaker, an American, British, and Korean explainer each presented a brief statement to the non-repats assembled in the North Camp compound. The prisoners replied by singing the Communist "Internationale."
Throughout the entire 90-day period the Communists used every propaganda device at their disposal to present their endless tirade of protests, accusations and deceits. But they were able to coax back to Communism only a little more than one percent (1.14%) of the 22,604 prisoners in the South Camp. The overwhelming majority of the prisoners expressed their desire to go to South Korea or Formosa. A few asked to go to one of the neutral countries. At the same time over two percent (2.23%) of the supposedly hard-core Communists in the North Camp voluntarily returned to the United Nations side.
In his letter of appreciation to Brigadier General Hamblen on the successful completion of "Operation Freepatriate," General John E. Hull, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, wrote:
"…it has been the major responsibility of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group to guide this critical undertaking in wisdom, restraint and discretion. On behalf of the entire United Nations Command, I wish to express my personal appreciation to you and your personnel for the manner in which your organization has fulfilled its mission. I am fully aware of the many difficulties which you have successfully overcome and it has been a source of deep satisfaction to me to observe the able, enthusiastic devotion to duty which has marked the performance of your group."
Long before the September birth of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group, thorough and far-reaching plans were being initiated to meet the Command’s complex makeup and critical need of qualified men.
Officers and enlisted men were selected by their military and civilian experience to fill duty positions in the various sections of UNCREG. Other qualified personnel were recruited from civilian and military sources throughout the Far East and the United States for critical vacancies in the sections.
The uniqueness of the mission of UNCREG required the formation of functional sections that had never existed before in Army history—Observer, Explainer and Representatives. Every section was organized to be highly flexible and adaptable to all situations that might occur.
At top strength, UNCREG’s personnel totaled almost 500, and was the largest command in Korea composed entirely of TDY personnel. Men came from the Korean Communications Zone, Prisoner of War Command, Eighth Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine units throughout Korea. Members representing the other United Nations were from the Republic of Korea, Great Britain, Australia, France, Canada, Greece, Belgium, Ethiopia, and Colombia. UNCREG was logistically supported by Headquarters support Group, UNCMAC, 8020th AU.
The nerve center of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group was the Office of the commanding General. It was here that Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen, with his Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Colonel Ward S. Ryan, formulated the policies and decisions directing the UNCREG operations.
The mission of the G-2 and G-3 Section was to supervise and coordinate for the Commanding General all matters pertaining to organization, plans, operations and intelligence arising in connection with the important missions and operations of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group.
The Assistant G-2 was responsible for coordination and functions pertaining to military intelligence and counter-intelligence, through planning and execution of the collection, evaluation, interpretation and dissemination of information affecting the UNCREG mission.
The Assistant G-3 was responsible for all activities pertaining to communications, organization, plans and operations as applicable to the mission and operations of UNCREG.
Working under the G-2, G-3 section, the Wireless Communication Section was assigned the responsibility of maintaining a rapid means of communication between the UNCREG observer and explainer teams in the Demilitarized Zone and UNCREG headquarters.
Three ¾ ton trucks were equipped with wireless radio equipment and were used as mobile units maintaining radio contact with the Signal headquarters. These mobile units had a transmitting radius of 30 miles. Within 5 minutes a vital message from the observing or explaining teams could be in the hands of General Hamblen at UNCREG headquarters.
The G-1 Section served as an advisor to the Commanding General on all matters concerning management and assignment of UNCREG personnel.
The Adjutant General Section performed the administrative functions for the command. It maintained all officers’ and enlisted men’s records and submitted varied reports and personnel data upon official request. All UNCREG bulletins were published under AG supervision. Because of the nature of its function, a night staff was maintained to provide round-the-clock service on administrative matters.
The PIO Section served as the advisor to the Commanding General and his staff on all matters pertaining to public information and relations. The PIO acted as the official spokesman for the Commanding General UNCREG.
It maintained a five-man escort team which accompanied convoys of UNC correspondents into the Demilitarized Zone. Facilities for radio and TV broadcasts as well as teletype accommodations were made available to the newsmen who were on hand to cover explanations to prisoners of war in the North and South Camps. The section began its operations on 7 September when Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson arrived from the Inchon Press Center to take over the duties of UNCREG’s Public Information Officer.
Essential to any military unit is the supply section, whose responsibility is the procurement and distribution of necessary equipment and supplies. Such items as food, clothing, office supplies, transportation, billets, etc., were the major concern of the men working in the UNCREG G-4 section.
The mission of the Military History Section was the preparation of a systematic, objective and balanced account of the UNCREG operation.
The Headquarters Commandant Section supported many of the operations of the other sections of the command. In its charge were the post security, messing facilities, billeting, post supply, clothing issue for all UNCREG troops and other miscellaneous UNCREG functions.
The home unit of the enlisted men of UNCREG was the Headquarters Detachment. In addition to normal administrative matters, the Headquarters Detachment was responsible for the handling and delivery of mail to members of the command. With the exception of PIO personnel, all enlisted men of the command were billeted in the detachment area.
The basic purpose of the Terms of Reference was to permit explanations. Therefore the "explainer" played the dominant role in the operation. He had the important task of assuring that each prisoner was fully informed concerning his rights should he decide to be repatriated, to controvert lies and misleading information he had heard from the Communists, and generally to inform the prisoner concerning his full freedom to return home to a peaceful life.
The Observer-Representative-Interpreter teams of UNCREG were present at all explanation sessions to Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates conducted by the Communist Command. Each team was composed of three men—an observer, a representative and an interpreter. In accordance with the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, one team attended each individual explanation session.
The duty of the observer was to insure that the explainer on the other side performed his functions in accord with the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, and to observe the general conduct of the explanations.
The representative functioned, in effect, as a defense counsel for the prisoner of war. He dealt with the Indian chairman of the NNRC subcommittee to insure that the Communist explainers did not coerce the prisoner, and to insure that the prisoner’s rights and interests were protected.
The interpreter translated the "persuasion talks" from Chinese or Korean to English for the presiding board of NNRC members.
Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen assumed command of the newly formed United Nations Command Repatriation Group on 1 September 1953. He assumed this duty in addition to his duties as Deputy Commanding General of the Korean Communications Zone. He was born in Maine and is a graduate of the University of Maine. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant upon his entry into the Army in 1916. General Hamblen has attended the Infantry School Advance Course, the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College. Among the decorations held by General Hamblen are the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, the Commendation Ribbon, War Cross of Brazil, War Cross of Italy, the Crown of Italy, Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre of France and Commander British Empire.
Colonel Ward S. Ryan, Deputy Commander & Chief of Staff of UNCREG, was born in Montana. He entered the United States Military Academy at West Point in June, 1934 and was graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree on 13 June, 1938. Since then he has also attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Command and General Staff School and the Armed Forces Staff College. Colonel Ryan has been awarded the Silver Star, the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Commendation Ribbon. Before his assignment to UNCREG he was the Commanding Officer of the United Nations Command PW Camp #2 near Pusan.
The government booklet, "The UNCREG Story", includes pictures of UNCREG personnel. Although the pictures are not available to the Korean War Educator, a list of the personnel pictured in the booklet follows:
Brig. Gen. A.L. Hamblen (Commanding General), Col. Ward S. Ryan (Deputy Commander & Chief of Staff), Lt. Gen. K.S. Thimayya (Indian Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission), Lt. Col. Kak Kyun choi (explainer).
UNCREG HQ Staff: Col. Frederick Nagle, Col. Howard F. Bresee, Col. Williard B. Carlock, Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson, Lt. Col. Albert J. Meteny, Lt. Col. Edgar A. Noel, Cmdr Edgar H. Forrest, Lt. Col. Gustave E. Vitt, Major James L. Rankin Jr., Lt. Col. Alexander Kharitonoff, Major David Burman, Major Louis E. Williams, Major Edward A. Moorer, Major Charles E. Fogg, Major Charles Cornett, 1st Lt. James P. Scilley, Major Louis Williams, Capt. Roger L. Ranck, 2nd Lt. Robert R. Ruggiero, SFC B.E. Worford, Cpl. Alfonso Lucero, Pfc Richard A. Olek, Pfc Daniel J. DiPrince, Pfc Floyd D. Poland.
G-2, G-3 Section: Capt. Charles Stanton, Capt. Alfonso A. Castro, Capt. Edward G. Usher, Sgt. Alejandro Pardo-Acosta, Pfc. Henry Chiurazzi, Pvt. James R. Juntti, MSgt Floyd Galloway, Pfc Boyd Paxston, Pfc John A. Riley, Pfc. Richard A. Garr, Pfc James R. Monahan, Pfc Frank J. Milillo.
Signal Section: MSgt Thomas W. Muston, Pfc John A. Zakutney, Pvt James D. Whitney, Pvt Michael Penta, Pfce Edward F. Neill, Pvt. Leory Giles, Pvt Bennie B. Cook, Pvt Dayton F. Johnson, PFC Ted McKinney, Pvt George C. Gutierrez.
G-1 Section: MSgt Pebble V. Roberts, PFC Robert V. George, Major Charles Cornett, Cpl. John R. Falk, Pfc James T. Quinn, Pvt Marvin R. Wolber, PFC Jerald G. Haley, PFC James C. Riley, PFC Robert A. Carr.
Adjutant General Section: Pfc Stanely M. Magda, Pfc Joseph DePeters, Pvt Clifford Grabowski, Pvt William D. Gibson, Pfc Fred O. Marchbank, Pfc Ted W. Pathakis, PFC Kenneth O. McCormick, PFC Robert L. Penta, Pfc John Moravek, Cpl Francis L. Donahue, Jr., MSgt Dwaine A. Johnson, Sgt Adrian S. LaRose, Pfc Saul Rosen, 1st Lt. Francis C. Miles, Capt Paul Kohanik, 1st Lt William J. Burgett.
Public Information Section: Pfc Edward Nichols, Pfc William Kolman, Cpl R.J. Crispeno, Pfc Ronald Hertz, 2nd Lt Charles A. McNeill, SFC James F. Diggs, 2nd Lt Thomas Carroll, Lt Col. Ralph E. Pearson, Major Peter Erickson, 2nd Lt. Howard Erickson, Sfc Elmo Johnson, Pvt Elmer Goddard, Pvt Willie Maddox, Cpl I.B. Thompson, Pfc William J. Ladyka, 2nd Lt. Allan R. Wilhelm, 2nd Lt. William Homiak.
G-4 Section: Sfc Bernard J. Keting, 1st Lt. Charles E. Price, Sfc Albert P. Virtes, Pfc. John Nelson.
Headquarters Commandant: Sgt Charles Shimel Jr, SFC George Parks, CWO Geoffrey W. Tirrell, MSgt Paul J. Gray, Pfc Sherwood Faust, Pfc Joseph Cavestani, Pfc Al Cetrulo Jr, Pfc John J. Morawa, Pfc Carl Fritz, Pfc Edgar Leitao.
Headquarters Detachment: Pfc A.L. Tom, 1st Lt George T. Frohmader, MSgt Roger G. Bellemare, Pvt Robert L. Kost, Pfc Shung S. Low, Pvt Don R. Minogue, Pvt Larry R. Delaney, Pvt Bernard Boyle.
Military History Section: Pfc Edward Amerson, Cpl Jack Tykal, Maj. David Burman, Cpl Milton Hollingshead.
Explainer Section: Lt Col Kak Kyun Choi, Brig Gen Yoong Zoon Park, Major Edward a. Moorer, 1st Lt. Thomas Singleton, Capt. Chester F. Hockeborn, 2nd Lt Edward L. Pinney, Major John Bojus, Major Desmond F. Ryan, Lt. Col Ha Sun Yun, Major Jin Gu Kim, 1st Lt Leslie A. Palmer, Major Dong Sik Kim, Major Kwi Su Kim, Major Woo Jin Sun, 1st Lt James O. Day, 2nd Lt James J. Riker, 2nd Lt. Lambert Asselberghs, DAC Shao Chyan Yang, 1st Lt Robert N. Spitzer, 1st Lt Boris Pogoloff, 1st Lt Karl F. Lange, 1st Lt. Jose Bibiloni, 1st Lt. Fletcher A. Aleong.
Explainer Section, Enlisted Personnel: Pfc W.W. Miller, Pvt W.J. Chico, Jr., Cpl. R.P. Crumb, MSgt H.A. Stevenson, Sfc F.A. McAlister.
Headquarters Observers: 2nd Lt James L. Anderson, Col. Willard B. Carlock, Col Howard L. Bresee, Major D. Ryan, Capt Tafesse Lemma, MSgt Foster N. Berry, DAC Roy C. Kim, DAC Robert H. Chee, DAC Chen Yih, Pvt. David L. Stephens, Pfc Joseph J. Milewski, Pfc William M. Stelter, Pfc Gerald Slotnick, Sfc Lawson E. Archer, Pfc Jesse Parker, MSgt Raymond B. Petroski, 1st Lt Harry M. Flower.
Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 1-8: Lt Col Ben M. Faribault, Lt Col V.F. Meisling, Maj Carret F.W. Kersbergen, Cmdr Carl Klein, Major C.K. Wong, DAC Chung Yean Kao, DAC Yuan Chang, Lt Col Phillip H. Hill, DAC Chen The Hsu, DAC Joe Yuen Jeong, Pfc Ngoon N. Tom, DAC Norman L. Lyon, Major Mario C. Dimseng, Major Gabriel S. Calingo, Capt. William B. Carpenter, DAC Chich Wang, Pfc Way S. Lee, DAC Chung En Huang, Pfc Calvin S.K. Wong, Maj. Charles H. Fogg, lst Lt Robert E. Kelly.
Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 9-16: Capt David E. Pihl, Major William Fox, Lt Col Guy B. Wilder, Major John Kiernan Jr, Major George V. Lane, 1st Lt Robert S. Munroe, DAC Robert Yang, Capt Donald J. McDevitt, DAC Eugene Chang, DAC Ching Chong His, DAC Frank L. Ke, DAC James P. H. Fan, DAC Richard W. Lee, DAC Sui Seng Na, DAC George Yen, Pvt Nay C. Toy, Pvt David K. W. Moy, DAC Loyd Tenaka, Pvt Paul G. Woo, DAC Jon Nicholas, 2d Lt Charles J. Kelly, DAC Francis Lee, DAC Chisiang Chien, Pvt Nelson Leong, Pfc Samuel L. Jeung.
Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 17-24: 1st Lt Richard F. Jordan, Lt Col Albert L. Seeger, Cpt Charles H. Jackson, 2nd Lt David C. Rosenberg, DAC David Tsao, Pvt Kwok T. Tom, DAC Phillip Lee, DAC Yi Hung Fang, Pvt Bow Lou, DAC Shao Chyan Yang, DAC Kang Chao, DAC Chun Ming Ying, Capt Wendell W. Long, DAC Hung Ku, Cpt Lindle Hancock, DAC Kwang Tsun Wei, DAC Ching Fung Kwang, DAC Raymond B. May, DAC Wilford Woo, Cpt Howard A. Gagnon, Cpl James S. Bard, DAC Shih Chun Peng, Pvt Phillip Hom.
Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 25-32: 1st Lt Richard F. Edwards, Cpt Donald G. Stettler, Cpt Harold J. Treace, Lt Col Raymond C. Woodes, Sr Lt Lichel Didisheim, Pfc Stephen W. Yee, DAC Watson Lee, DAC Leonard F. Bau, DAC Haven Chiang, DAC Charles Joe, DAC Shu Len Ksiao, Pvt Gum C. Lee, Pvt Wang Hai Dwo, Pvt Clayton J. Brock, DAC George Chang, DAC Frank Yue, DAC Shelley H. Cheng, DAC Tien Si Lee, Pfc Don Finney, DAC James B. Gibson, 1st Lt Harry Flower, 2nd Lt Glen Cannon.
Observers Section, Chinese, Teams 33-40: Cpt F.J. Hagerty, Cpt Carl Smith, Cpt Robert D. Geer, 2d Lt Kurt Weinke, 2d Lt James Anderson, Pfc Charles Sung, Pfc Hen M. Yee, Pvt James Jewik, Pfc Youe F. Hum, Pvt James M. Yee, CMS Jee Chong Sup, Pvt William Leong, Pvt Chong D. Koo, Pvt Ching Yuk, Cpl David C. Leong, Pvt Victor Ng, Pvt Ken Bing Hom, Pvt Raymond Mow, Pfc Tong Tze Yuen, lst Lt Joseph T. Cooke, Pvt James M. Chiao, Pfc Jacob Young, DAC Lee Chin Chuan, Pfc David T. Wu, Cpl Wing Fong, S/Sgt David S. Corbett, 1st Lt Patrick O’Shere, Pfc Louis G. Moon, A/lc Noel L. Pannin, 2d Lt Henry M.H. Leong.
Observers Section, Korean, Teams 1-8: Lt Col William R. Robinette, Lt Col Joseph L. Macsalka, Major Kenneth Hicks Jr, Major Duane C. Tway, CMS Yun Too Yung, CMS Lee Bom II, DAC Yoon Too Kang, Capt Ko Chung Ky, 1st Lt Kim Ke Hoon, 1st Lt Jong Hae Hon, 1st Lt Kim Young Ho, 1st Lt Koh Kyong Shik, 1st Lt Lee Duk Woo, Capt Jeung Dong Sah, Capt Bartley J. Greenwood Jr, 1st Lt William J. Alexander, 2d Lt Leonard Gaskins, Capt Hugh S. McChesney, 1st Lt Woo Doo Jae, CMS Sin Huon Kak, CMS Lee Tong Soo, Capt Choi Yong Chun, 1st Lt Choi Byung Hak.
Observers Section, Korean, Teams 9-16: Major Duane C. Tway, Cpt Lee Chang Hee, Major Clarence W. Ellis Jr., 1st Lt Kwon Sung Jin, 1st Lt Chang Won Yong, Capt Angel L. Carlo, 1st Lt Sung Nak Chil, Capt Yang M. Jeon, 1st Lt. Seu Kwang Wook, CMS Hae Hong, CMS Tong Ik Chang, Capt Dong Young Kim, CMS Oon Ki Pak, 1st Lt Cho Yang Hwi, Capt Lee Yoon Oh, Capt Robert E. Whitney, DAC Chang S. Yeun, Capt Harry A. Diehl, Capt Robert R. Scott, Capt Alfred Phillips, 1st Lt Kim Dal Sik, Capt Alfred L. Cler.
Observers Section, Korean, Teams 17-24: CMS Choi Bong Ho, Capt John K. Hyun, Lt Col A.F. Bruno, 2nd Lt Walter Harvey, 2d Lt John J. Burnett, Jr., 1st Lt Kim Dae Hwa, 1st Lt Donald McNamara, Myong Che Chon, Pek Hak II, Capt Kim Kyang Sup, 1st Lt Lee In Shik, 1st Lt Bioum Bo Cook, 1st Lt Sim J. Young, Jeung Ui Hwan, 1st Lt Philip Sheridan, Lu Keng Soong, 1st Lt William A. Phillips, Park Young Sik, 2d Lt Murray I Braumann, Capt Han Shick Moon, 1st Lt Ernest B. Johson.
Observers Section, Korean, Teams 25-32: Maj O.L. Jordan, Lt Col Schiller Shore, Lt Col Raymond E. Klein, Capt Andrew Hjelmstrom, Capt Robert B. Hill, 1st Lt Ji Kyng Duk, Capt Chung Dae Shick, 1st Lt Lee Woo Yun, 1st Lt Lee Hong Woo, 1st Lt. Kim Kyang Hwan, 1st Lt Choi Cung Chaeol, CMS Kang Hea Kyung, 1st Lt. Koo Ja Wook, DAC Choi Chang Ho, DAC Kim Sang Dong, 1st Lt. Kim Ki Yoon, 1st Lt Kim Kim Suk Bae, 1st Lt George W. Sears, 2nd Lt Arthur Culberson Jr., 1st Lt Albert L. Kimball, CMS Chong Do Bu.
Observers Section, Korea, Teams 33-40: 2d Lt James T. Gordon, Capt Eugene B. Legaspi, Capt Peter D. Sacco, 2d Lt John J. Valletta, DAC Roy CI Kim, 1st Lt Kim Hung Doo, 1st Lt Lee En Ran, 1st Lt Lim Han Soon, 1st Lt Lee Tong Ho, 1st Lt Kim Kyo Sik, 1st Lt Keung Ki Chang, CMS Kim Se Chun, 1st Lt Son Jae Jo, CMS Lim Chong Kook, CMS Kang Yun Kyang, 1st Lt Ka Jae Nam, 1st Lt Moon Kum Suong, 1st Lt Lee Byung Hak, 1st Lt Geum Kongh, 1st Lt Lee Hung Kun, 1st Lt Park, CMS Lee Byong Seng.
[KWE Note: The following articles of information about UNCREG came from the Korean War scrapbook of Bartley J. Greenwood of Pensacola, Florida. He loaned the material and pictures to the Korean War Educator in order to inform the general public about the important role that UNCREG played in the Korean War and world history. The information below represents material that was distributed to UNCREG staff, including an orientation speech, flyer text, regulations on dealing with prisoners, a key to violations, questions asked on debriefing forms, and newspaper articles.]
Gentlemen, we welcome you with great pleasure to PW Command where you will spend the next several days with the anti-Communist prisoners of war. The Command is extremely interested in your mission and will give you all possible assistance to make it successful. For the next few minutes I wish to orient you on what you can expect to find when you go to the camps. It is possible that some of what I have to say has already been told to you at your school, but it is important enough to be emphasized through repetition.
First as to your mission. Your general mission you know. Here in the command your mission will be to acquaint yourselves with the prisoners. Learn how they live, what they think and talk about, and what their hopes and fears are. You will find that they are different from most men that you have known. Years behind wire can create changes in the psychological make-up of most men, be they peasants or scholars. You must make it your business to understand them. Do not brush off their fears and actions as childish. They are very real to the prisoners. Remember you are to champion these people, protect them against coercion, and stand up for their rights. You must dedicate yourself to this task without compunction.
From here you will be sent out to the camps. In the Command there are three camps containing Korean prisoners and two having Chinese prisoners. Camp 1 on Koje-do has one compound of 568 Korean prisoners who have declared they will not be repatriated. At camp 2 in Pusan, there are seven compounds with about 3300 Koreans and one compound with about 450 Chinese. At Camp 3 on Cheju-do there are 30 compounds with over 14,000 Chinese, and at Camp 6 at Nonsan there are 8 compounds with over 4000 Koreans. The general arrangement of the camps is a series of enclosures, each enclosure having an average of 8 compounds. Each compound holds about 500 men. You will become familiar with the physical set up after your orientation by the camp commanders. Also, at each camp you will find a CI&E detachment which is in charge of the education information, agriculture, and recreation programs. In as much as the work they have been doing for the prisoners has been of assistance in relieving the boredom of imprisonment, you will find that the prisoners are favorably inclined toward the CI&E program. You will find that personnel can be of great assistance to you in your work. Look to them for guidance and assistance.
You will be urged to mingle with the prisoners. If time allows, you may be transferred to other camps in order to help you get to know as many prisoners as possible. Learn their routine and identify yourselves with them. Set an example of exemplary behavior. Recognize the fact, and let them know you recognize it, that they are more than just prisoners of war—they are a special group of individuals who are the physical embodiment of the great principle of non-forcible repatriation and political asylum.
The thoughts and fears of the prisoners will be evidenced in the questions they will ask you. Here are a few typical ones: Where are we going? When? Why? How? What protection shall we have? What will the NNRC do to us? Can we go to Taiwan? To South Korea? And so on. In practically every case those questions have been answered for them. They will ask them of you for corroboration, reassurance, or even to test your knowledge of your job. Never underrate them. These prisoners are smart in many ways. For example, the prisoners themselves are more proficient in the terms of reference than are their teachers. So do not brush off their questions. Give truthful, factual answers. Don’t guess. If you don’t know the answer, find out. I will give you the source of many of the answers in a few minutes. Assist the PW in every way you can, but don’t let them use you as message carriers, go-betweens, or buffers against camp discipline.
You will find that there are several classes of anti-Communists. Some are genuinely anti-Communistic, even fanatically so. Many are lukewarm, some are undecided, and some don’t give a damn for any political philosophy. At this late stage we can only treat them all alike. Within our power we are doing everything possible to reassure them and strengthen their resistance against Communist blandishments.
But they have fears. The Koreans fear that the process set up for them is too long and that they can do better for themselves by refusing to go through with the program and trying to escape now. They do not realize that they have been promised citizenship only if they go through the program. The Chinese on the other hand, are determined to go through with the program, but they enter it as martyrs, having little faith in the promises of all the world governments, including Taiwan, that they will be secure in their new camps. They fear the Indians; they fear that Communists will raid their camp; they fear that you as their representatives will not be smart enough to cope with the Communist tricks; and they fear that they themselves will succumb to the arguments of the Communist explainers. Your job and our job is to allay those fears and make them realize that only their patience, courage, and faith can the program be made to work. In this connection you can win their faith and confidence by looking out for their welfare, especially during the movement to and stay in the Neutral Zone camp. Look after their rights, and call attention of the authorities to all reasonable requests.
The basic sources of information which contain the answers to almost all of the questions which you might be called on to answer are these publications:
Target: Non-Repatriated PWs in UN PW Camps
This leaflet was designed by 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group to relate to the PWs the location of the camp that they will go to in the neutral zone and what type of transportation they will have to get there. Text translated from Korean original. Artwork: front – illustration of map of Korea, 2 trains, and demilitarized zone. Back – text only. Markings – Pusan, Nonsan, Yong Dong Po, Seoul, Rhee Camp, 38th Parallel, and Demilitarized Zone.
NNRC
Was full sub-committee present?
Number & names of persons by nationality and sex
EXPLAINER (Communist)
Nationality and sex
OBSERVER(S) (Communist)
Number, nationality and sex
INTERPRETERS (Communist)
Number, nationality and sex
UNC OBSERVER REPRESENTATIVE(S)
Observer (Grade, Name & Service)
Representative (Grade, Name & Service)
INTERPRETER(S) (UNC)
Grade, Name & Service
OTHERS (exclusive of PW)
PW(S) present (list nationality and number present)
Is this the first time PW was interviewed? If not, how many previous interviews?
EXPLAINERS
Tactics
Were any matters forward to Senior NNRC group for decision? Be specific.
Was sub-committee impartial in its decisions or general demeanor?
Nature of debates between sub-committee members.
Were Swiss and/or Swedish members of sub-committees as forceful in conduct of their argument(s) as Czech-Polish members?
Indian Chairman of sub-committee
Deliberate in his voting?
Apparently cast votes with little thought to nature of issue?
Appear biased either way, in speech or voting?
How many issues were decided by his (Chairman’s) vote alone?
Nature of issues settled by voting of sub-committee (be specific).
Lee Duk Woo to Mrs. Bartley Greenwood
23 October 1953
Dear Mrs. Greenwood
I think your husband, Captain Greenwood, have written you about me already. I am Lt. Lee Duk Woo, your husband’s poor partner in certain job here in Munsan, but it is about two month since I met him on Koje-do.
I am very glad that I could meet a U.S. officer like him, because as a still young man, I have many things to learn about human life, and I think I can learn many things from him. Among so many officers here, he is the only officer I could find who has deep feeling of humor and understanding of humanity.
I was very anxious when he caught a bad cold and laid on bed for two days, and I felt very grateful to him when I see him spending hard time in different circumstance and longing for home being so far from home. Suppose I am longing to see my wife even when she is only 26 miles from me and I can see her every weekend.
And I have deep respect for U.S. Army’s families who are supporting their husbands mentally and bearing all the sufferings they might have. This is not only my personnel feeling for the United States and her people but all the Koreans are very grateful to them.
I hope someday Korea become very good country and can help you to whom Korea owe very much. And I wish you can manage very happy life, healthy and wealthy with your husband very soon.
– Yours very sincerity, Lee Duk Woo
[KWE Note: Search for the following titles on the Internet to find full stories.]
Headquarters
United Nations Command
24 December 1953
Subject: Letter of Appreciation
To: Commanding General
United Nations Command Repatriation Group
The completion of the explanation period to the prisoners of war on 23 December marks the end of a truly unique operation in our military history. It has been the major responsibility of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group to guide this critical undertaking in wisdom, restraint and discretion. On behalf of the entire United Nations Command, I wish to express my personal appreciation to you and your personnel for the manner in which your organization has fulfilled its mission. I am fully aware of the many difficulties which you have successfully overcome and it has been a source of deep satisfaction to me to observe the able, enthusiastic devotion to duty which has marked the performance of your group.
Please express my thanks to each member of your command, with my best wishes for the holiday season.
John E. Hull, General
USA Commanding
---
Headquarters
UNC Repatriation Group
APO 72, 24 December 1953
To: Each Member of UNCREG and Its Allied Assistants
I am proud of the behavior and grateful for the service which each of you has performed. You have merited the high praise which the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, has bestowed upon you. I join him in extending best wishes and seasons greetings.
A.L. Hamblen, Brigadier General
USA Commanding
[KWE Note: When Gerry Munroe of Falmouth, Massachusetts, visited the Korean War Educator, she noticed that the UNCREG section of the United Nations Involvement page did not contain some of the documents which were in her husband’s possession at the time of his death. 1st Lt. Robert S. Munroe was an Observer with Chinese Team 916. (Note the UNCREG armband and file folder in this picture of Munroe, taken at the time he was 24 years old and serving in Korea.) Our thanks to Gerry for sending a copy of the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement, the letter from "Anti-Red Prisoners", debriefing documents, and the photo of her late husband.]
In order to meet the requirements of the disposition of the prisoners of war not for direct repatriation in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in pursuance of the provisions in Paragraph 61, Article V of the Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, agree to conclude the following Temporary Agreement supplementary to the Armistice agreement:
Under the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5, Article II of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, the United Nations Command has the right to designate the area between the Military Demarcation Line and the eastern and southern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone between the Imjin River on the south and the road leading south from Okum-ni on the northeast (the main road leading southeast from Panmunjom not included), as the area within which the United Nations Command will turn over the prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated and whom the United Nations Command has the responsibility for keeping under its custody, to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. The United Nations Command shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, inform the side of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war held in its custody.
If there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers have the right to designate the area in the vicinity of Panmunjom between the Military Demarcation Line and the western and northern boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone, as the area within which such prisoners of war will be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After knowing that there are prisoners of war under their custody who request not to be directly repatriated, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall inform the United Nations Command side of the approximate figures by nationality of such prisoners of war.
In accordance with Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, Article I of the Armistice Agreement, the following paragraphs are hereby provided:
After the cease-fire comes into effect, unarmed personnel of each side shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to enter the above-mentioned area designated by their own side to perform necessary construction operations. None of such personnel shall remain in the above-mentioned areas upon the completion of the construction operations.
A definite number of prisoners of war as decided upon by both sides, who are in the respective custody of both sides and who are not directly repatriated, shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to be escorted respectively by a certain number of armed forces of the detaining sides to the above-mentioned areas of custody designated respectively by both sides to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the armed forces of India for custody. After the prisoners of war have been taken over, the armed forces of the detaining sides shall be withdrawn immediately from the areas of custody to the area under the control of their own side.
The personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies, the armed forces of India, the Red Cross Society of India, the explaining representatives and observation representatives of both sides, as well as the required material and equipment, for exercising the functions provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be specifically authorized by the Military Armistice Commission to have the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the above-mentioned areas designated respectively by both sides for the custody of prisoners of war.
The provisions of Sub-paragraph 3c of this agreement shall not be construed as derogating from the privileges enjoyed by those personnel mentioned above under Paragraph 11, Article I of the Armistice Agreement.
This Agreement shall be abrogated upon the completion of the mission provided for in the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.
(Signed)
Kim Il Sung
Marshal, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Supreme Commander, Korean People’s Army
Peng Teh-Huai
Commander, Chinese People’s Volunteers
Mark W. Clark
General, United States Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command
Present:
Nam IL, General, Korean People’s Army Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers
William K. Harrison, Jr., Lieutenant General, United States Army, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation
[KWE Note: The following note is in broken English, and we did not attempt to correct it.]
Dear U.N. Honourable Fighters,
When the Reds bandits commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea, you all heroes were left your home and voluntary to sustain the just war, and didn’t care any of self-sacrifices to halt the aggression of Reds in hot fightings. For these action you have sucessed the worship of all the people of the world and we’re respect of your resolute will to preserve the world peace fighter.
Now we’re very apologetic to you for that you’ve fighted more than nineteen months for us. But we wouldn’t forget it and we’ll remember it by our heart when we’re in the anti-Reds battle. By that time we can offer our only power of life to destroy the world aggressor for thank you.
Now the war was stop and we’ve liberated under the offense of U.N. We hope we’ll meet again in the anti-Reds fire line to struggle the happiness for human.
Our dear honourable heroes. Now our country-brothers were live under the tyranny of the Reds China so we’ve to leave now. Because we want immediately to releive our country-brothers. See again in the anti-Reds battle.
God bless you and hope you fight victoriously all the time.
Yours sincerely,
All the Anti-Red Prisoners
Officers and enlisted men of the Military Police Corps are playing an important part in the operations of the United Nations in the repatriation of Communist and UN prisoners of war.
MPs serving with UNCRED as observers are: Col. Edward H. Farr; Lt. Cols Philip H. Hill; Raymond E. Klein and Angel F. Bruno; Maj John M. Kiernan; Capts William B. Carpenter and Howard A. Gagnon; 1st Lt. Robert S. Munroe and 2nd Lt. Burt E. Winke.
Attached to UNCREG to perform patrol and escort duties is Co. B, 519th MP Bn. Its officers are 1st Lts. Hiawatha Smith, Harold Steward and Joseph R. Cruciani.
PIO of UNCREG is Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson, assisted by Maj. Peter A. Erickson as executive officer and 2nd Lt. William Homiak as senior liaison officer. 1st Lt. Daniel G. Scheuermann is CO, HQ Det., UNCREG.
At Headquarters, UN Command Military Armistice Commission, Maj Robert L. Huffaker is the provost marshal, Capt John R. Kettinger his assistant, and 1st Lt Charles E. Casey the operations officer.
As CO of the UN component Joint Security Det., Capt Edward G. Luce is responsible for MP activities in the Demilitarized Zone. His men escort representatives of the neutral nations and patrol the south portion of the zone.
Memorandum No. 26
20 October 1953
Debriefing forms completed at the close of morning operations in the explanation area will be forwarded to the assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, by vehicle messenger. The senior officer present in Areas A and B will assure that all debriefing forms are turned in and complete as to detail.
General observers will keep the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, informed via telephone of all significant events occurring during the day. Sensitive matter will be sent by vehicle messenger.
Afternoon debriefing forms will be completed within one hour after return from the explanation area, assembled by the Chief, Observer-Representative Section, and forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, as expeditiously as possible.
Officers selected to survey the debriefing forms and collate the material therefrom will report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, at 1400 daily and remain until all information has been collated.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, will receive all messages from the explaining area during the day’s operations and compile all pertinent information in SITREP form, paragraphing information on separate papers for each paragraph, as well as indicating major SITREP paragraph designation.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2-3, will complete by 2030 daily a clear draft of SITREP for presentation to the senior observers and the Chief of Staff.
If the Commanding General calls a meeting of section chiefs and general observers, he may wish to add one or more paragraphs to paragraph "e" of the SITREP as a result of the additional information obtained.